The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe by Kimberly Ann ...

230 Pages·2015·1.12 MB·English

The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western
Europe
by
Kimberly Ann Twist
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Political Science
in the
Graduate Division
of the
University of California, Berkeley
Committee in charge:
Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair
Professor Jason Wittenberg
Professor Jacob Citrin
Professor Katerina Linos
Spring 2015
The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western
Europe
Copyright 2015
by
Kimberly Ann Twist
Abstract
The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in Western Europe
by
Kimberly Ann Twist
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
University of California, Berkeley
Professor Jonah D. Levy, Chair
Aslongasfar-rightparties–knownchieflyfortheirvehementoppositiontoimmigration–
havecompetedincontemporaryWesternEurope,scholarsandobservershavebeenconcerned
about these parties’ implications for liberal democracy. Many originally believed that far-
rightpartieswouldfadeawayduetoalackofvotersupportandtheirisolationbymainstream
parties. Since 1994, however, far-right parties have been included in 17 governing coalitions
across Western Europe. What explains the switch from exclusion to inclusion in Europe,
and what drives mainstream-right parties’ decisions to include or exclude the far right from
coalitions today?
My argument is centered on the cost of far-right exclusion, in terms of both office and
policy goals for the mainstream right. I argue, first, that the major mainstream parties of
Western Europe initially maintained the exclusion of the far right because it was relatively
costless: They could govern and achieve policy goals without the far right. During this
period of exclusion, however, major parties of both the left and right attempted to win back
voters lost to the far right by enacting more restrictive immigration policies; they would
borrow from the far right as long as it was beneficial.
Second, I argue that the mainstream right has increasingly treated the far right as it
would any other party during coalition decisions. Major mainstream parties prioritize being
ingovernment, andwillselectthecoalitionthatoffersbothstabilityandtheabilitytoachieve
policy goals in areas of greatest importance to them at the time. As the far right continued
to attract voters throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the mainstream right realized
that working with the far right – which was now a more useful partner, as it had more
legislative seats – might result in more advantageous policy compromises. Once far-right
parties could be useful to the mainstream right, exclusion became a more costly strategy.
Third, far-right parties can be attractive coalition partners to the mainstream right be-
cause they are flexible on most issues – immigration excepted – and thus more willing to
give the mainstream right its preferred policies in exchange for gains in immigration. Addi-
tionally, far-right parties are nearly always smaller than the major mainstream-right parties,
1
so the mainstream parties are able to carry more weight in coalition decisions and obtain
important ministerial positions.
Idemonstratemyargumentthroughin-depthcasestudiesofAustriaandtheNetherlands,
from the 1980s through the present. Both countries have had far-right parties in and out of
government, providing important variation on the dependent variable. Finally, I show the
wider applicability of my argument in two ways by extending my arguments about inclusion
and exclusion to coalition-like agreements in the United Kingdom and France, as well as to
mainstream left responses to far-left parties in Europe.
2
To Stephen.
i
Contents
Contents ii
List of Figures iv
List of Tables v
1 The Mainstream Right, the Far Right, and Coalition Formation in West-
ern Europe 1
1.1 Mainstream-right and far-right parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 The far right in government: A record of growing collaboration . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Existing literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 My argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Data and methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Chapter overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7 Appendix: Party names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Appendix 2: Mainstream-right and far-right seat shares . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Changing Electoral Realities and the Mainstream Right 34
2.1 Mainstream voters up for grabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Opportunities for new parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 The importance of immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.4 The far right beyond immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3 Dutch and Austrian Parties 56
3.1 Mainstream parties in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Mainstream parties in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 The politics of the past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 The far right in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 The far right in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Voter support for the far right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
ii
4 Borrowing from the Far Right: The Mainstream Right and Immigration 87
4.1 The (end of the) Dutch consensus about multiculturalism . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.2 The politicization of immigration in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5 Coalition Formation in Austria 105
5.1 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far
right (Scenario 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2 Mainstreamrightprefersthepolicybenefitsfromacoalitionwiththefarright,
but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right
(Scenario 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4 Far right not mathematically part of coalition options (Scenario 4) . . . . . . 133
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands 138
6.1 Coalition Formation in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2 Mainstream right prefers policy benefits from a coalition with the far right
(Scenario 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.3 Mainstreamrightprefersthepolicybenefitsfromacoalitionwiththefarright,
but is concerned about coalition stability (Scenario 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.4 Mainstream right prefers the policy benefits from a coalition without the far
right (Scenario 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7 The Mainstream Right and Far Right in Majoritarian Systems: France
and the United Kingdom 163
7.1 The mainstream right and far right in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
7.2 The mainstream right and far right in the United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . 174
8 Conclusion: Mainstream and Extreme Parties in Western Europe 185
8.1 The mainstream left and extreme parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
8.2 The future of mainstream right and far right cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Bibliography 196
iii
List of Figures
2.1 Alford Index, 1947-1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1 Immigration tagline in the Conservative Party manifesto, 2005 . . . . . . . . . . 179
7.2 “Go home” vans (Conservative-Lib Dem coalition, 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
iv
List of Tables
1.1 Formal and informal governmental inclusion of the far right . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Elections: Would a mainstream-far right coalition have a majority of seats? . . . 7
1.3 Elections: If the mainstream right and far right had enough seats to govern, did
a coalition form? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Elections: Could a right-wing coalition be formed without the far right? . . . . . 8
1.5 Replication of de Lange’s (2008) results: Variables affecting far-right inclusion . 12
1.6 Test of party distance as a predictor of far-right inclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.7 Austrian coalitions and CMP distance measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.8 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 1990 (CMP scores in parentheses) 15
1.9 CMP most-important issues for Austrian parties, 2008 (CMP scores in parentheses) 16
1.10 Predictions of coalition formation, Austria 2008, using traditional theories . . . 17
1.11 Three measures of party placements, Dutch parliamentary parties . . . . . . . . 19
1.12 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.13 Dutch party positions and issue importance, 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.14 Far right party positioning and issue importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.15 Expectations: Mainstream right inclusion of the far right . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.16 Coalition cases, by country and scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.17 Far-right parties in Western Europe, 1980s-present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.18 Current major mainstream-right parties in Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.1 Working-class as percent of active work force, 1950s-1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.2 Change in religious affiliation of Europeans, 1970-97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Percent of population attending religious services at least once per week, 1970-98 37
2.4 Percent change in number of party members, 1980-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Real GDP growth, 1960-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Left-right distance between the major parties of left and right, 1983 to 1993 . . 42
2.7 Vote shares for “old” parties, 1960 and 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after 1980 . . . . . . . 44
2.9 Vote shares of the major left and right parties before and after the far right’s first
successful national election (> 5%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.10 Percent of British respondents feeling there are too many immigrants in the UK 45
2.11 Percent wanting immigration partially or totally restricted . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
v
2.12 Foreigners/immigration as an important problem in the Netherlands, 1971-2012 47
2.13 Foreign residents as percentage of the total population, 1950-1990 . . . . . . . . 47
2.14 Percentage of new immigrants from outside the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.15 Asylum applications, 1985-99 (in thousands) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.16 Far right party positioning and issue importance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.17 Percent agreeing they “would not want an immigrant” as a neighbor . . . . . . 50
2.18 Percent saying that there are too many immigrants in their country . . . . . . . 52
2.19 Far right parties’ average vote share in national elections since 1980 . . . . . . . 53
3.1 Major Dutch parties’ Tweede Kamer votes and seat totals, 1946-2012 . . . . . . 59
3.2 Dutch governments, 1946-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Percentage of votes accounted for by the ‘structural model’ . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Percentage of Dutch population in each of the pillars, 1986-2006 . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Percentage of each pillar voting for its respective party, 1986-2006 . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Austrian governments, 1945-83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Major Austrian parties’ Nationalrat vote and seat totals, 1945-2013 . . . . . . . 69
3.8 Dutch Tweede Kamer results, 1981-98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.9 Dutch electoral results, 2002-12 (percent of votes, with seats in parentheses) . . 78
¨
3.10 FPO’s national vote share, pre-Haider period (1956-83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
¨
3.11 FPO’s results in Carinthian Land elections, 1956-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.12 Austrian Nationalrat results, 1986-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.13 Blue-collar workers in Austria: Percent supporting each party (1979-2013) . . . 84
5.1 Austrian governing coalitions, 1986-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2 Coalition cases, by scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.3 1990 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4 1994 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.5 1986 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.6 1995 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.7 1999 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.8 2002 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.9 2006 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.10 2008 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.11 2013 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.1 Dutch governing coalitions, 1981-2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 Coalition cases, by scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.3 Dutch far-right parties: Vote shares and seat totals, 1981-2012 . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.4 2002 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.5 2010 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.6 2003 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.7 2006 election: Results and coalition options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
vi