The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism

267 Pages·1993·1.22 MB·English

by  Barry Buzan

The Logic of Anarchy:
Neorealism to Structural Realism
Barry Buzan, Charles Jones and Richard Little
New York
Columbia University Press
1993

Table of Contents
Preface
1. Overview
Section I
Rethinking System and Structure
2. Waltz, His Critics, and the Prospects for a Structural Realism
3. System, Structure, and Units
4. Beyond Neorealism: Interaction Capacity
Section II
Rethinking System Continuity and Transformation
5. Structural Realism and World History
6. Structural Realism and the Agent-Structure Debate
7. Agency and Competing Theories of the State
8. The Structure and Logic of Anarchy
9. Continuity and Transformation in the International System
Section III
Rethinking the Methodology of Realism
10. Analogy, Theory and Testing
11. Analogy or Metaphor?
12. Vertical Sectors and Disaggregated Power
Summary and Conclusions
References
Preface
This book began to take life in 1986, when Barry Buzan proposed to the others a
collective volume that would try to extend the existing framework of Neorealist
theory. Before that it had simply been a set of attractions, dissatisfactions, and
questions in Buzan’s mind arising from his encounter with Waltz’s work while
preparing the 1983 book People, States and Fear. After that it became a genuinely joint
project, with an agreed division of labor, and extensive comment and cross
fertilization between the drafts. After a longish period of gestation, reading, and
discussion, Buzan’s first draft came out in 1988, serving in part as an exegesis of Waltz,
while Jones and Little produced a ground-clearing draft on structuralism. Their two
sections followed on in 1989-90. We first went public with the project at a panel for
the BISA/ISA Conference in London in March 1989. As is evident from differences of
style, each of us has taken the prime responsibility for writing one of the three main
Sections. But there has been an immense amount of constructive interplay, and some
direct “hands on” inserts, with the result that the text as a whole represents a high
level of integration and consensus. The Overview and Conclusion chapters were
written collectively. Although we are leaving our names on the Sections in the text, we
present the book as a jointly authored whole.
We would like to thank Ken Waltz for taking an interest in the project at an early
stage, and for being willing to answer questions and comment on ideas; and Hayward
Alker, Ole Waever and Alex Wendt for reading and commenting on the whole text.
Barry Buzan would like to thank the many people who made thoughtful and helpful
comments on earlier drafts of Section I, and particularly Kjell Goldmann, Bob
Keohane, John Ruggie, and Ken Waltz for taking the time and trouble to give detailed
written responses. Charles Jones would like to thank Robert Skidelsky, Paul Chilton,
and Martin Hollis for comments on Section III, and the classes at Warwick University
with which he used Theory of International Politics as a discussion text. Our thanks also
to Frances Pinter for helping us to connect to Columbia University Press, and to the
referees and series editors for Columbia for their helpful comments on drafts of the
whole manuscript.
BB, CAJ, RL
1. Overview
Realism and Neorealism
Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (hereafter TIP)
in 1979, Neorealism has become a dominant school of thought in International
Relations theory. It is no exaggeration to say that TIP shaped much of the theoretical
debate during the 1980s, and that positive and negative reactions to it still reverberate
in the literature of the 1990s. By developing the idea of a structural explanation for the
logic of power politics, Waltz revived the flagging fortunes of the Realist tradition. In
the first place, by attempting (albeit unsuccessfully as we shall show later) to place
Realism on a secure scientific footing, he generated interest in the philosophical
foundations of International Relations theory. It is now beginning to be recognized by
analysts such as Ashley (1982), Walker (1987), Wendt (1987), and Spegele (1987) that
these foundations are much more complex and eclectic than was previously thought.
In the second place, Waltz provided a theoretical framework that proved sufficiently
robust for others to apply some empirical cladding.
One of the reasons why TIP made such an impact was that it changed the theoretical
orientation of the discipline.
His book inspired a critical literature, best exemplified in Robert Keohane ed.,
Neorealism and its Critics (1986), Spegele “Three Forms of Political Realism” (1987), R. B.
J. Walker, “Realism, Change and International Political Theory” (1987), and Alexander
E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory” (1987). It
also gave rise to some interesting attempts at application, including Robert Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics (1981), Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987),
Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations (1988), Barry Posen, The Sources of Military
Doctrine (1984), and Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks:
Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity” (1990).
In the decade before the appearance of TIP, the hold of post-1945 Realism on the
study of international relations had finally looked as if it were about to be broken.
From the late 1960s onwards it began to be argued and accepted that the
methodology and theory associated with Classical Realism were anachronistic.
Cobwebs rather than billiard balls now appeared the appropriate metaphor for
international politics and the theoretical foundations of Realism were coming under
increasing attack (Burton 1972). At the same time, behavioralists were arguing that, in
spite of their insistence on “eternal laws” of international politics, the work of Classical
Realists did not satisfy the canons of scientific investigation. Waltz acknowledged
that Classical Realism was indeed open to theoretical and methodological attack, but
not on the grounds claimed by mainline critics. He insisted that these authors had
failed to identify the basis on which international relations could be developed
scientifically. Whatever might be its own shortcomings, this critical breadth would
ensure that TIP caused heated controversy (Kaplan 1979; Rosecrance 1982).
But it is hard to believe that TIP would have provoked such enduring discussion had it
not appeared at a moment peculiarly propitious for a restatement of Realism. At the
end of the 1970s, detente gave way to a second Cold War, and advocates of
interdependence and transnationalism, still confidently generating explanations
premised on the progressive redundancy of force in international relations and the
fragmentation of state power, were caught off balance (Keohane and Nye 1977). By
contrast, Waltz’s theory took the ability of the state to survive as axiomatic. Partly
because of the sweeping nature of the attack on the discipline and partly because
Waltz’s theory resonated with the times, the ideas underpinning TIP
circulated very rapidly and Waltz was soon seen to provide a serious challenge to
alternative theoretical perspectives. Work emerging from those perspectives in the
1980s in many instances bore traces of theoretical and methodological reassessment
deriving from Waltz’s critique.
Although Waltz undoubtedly rekindled interest in Realism, he intended in TIP to
distance himself from the older traditions of Classical Realism. For this reason he was
happy to identify himself as a Neorealist. The older tradition had dominated the
theory and practice of international relations after the Second World War when an
influential group of writers including Morgenthau, Carr, Aron, Niebuhr, Kennan,
Herz, Wight, and
Kissinger produced major texts on the subject, with Kissinger going on to become an
important decisionmaker. These writers styled themselves as Realists on the grounds
that they were willing to look at things as they were rather than how they might like
them to be. But TIP provoked two incompatible responses to the marked distinction it
created between the Neorealism of Waltz and the Classical Realism of Morgenthau
and the others. The first response was to identify a core of ideas common to Classical
Realism and Neorealism. For many, Waltz was only the latest contributor to a
coherent tradition of thought that could be traced back through Hobbes and
Machiavelli to Thucydides. No other tradition of thought in the field of International
Relations can begin to compete with the distinguished pedigree claimed for Realism.
It is now also possible for specialists in International Relations to draw on an
expanding literature in the history of ideas which is in the process of tracing the
lineage of realist writers and exploring, for example, the links between Thucydides
and Thomas Hobbes, who made the first English translation of The Pelopponesian War
(Brown 1987, 1989).
A second and more muted response to the distinction between Classical Realism and
Neorealism stressed the disparity between the two schools. Ashley was quick to point
out that while the Classical Realists drew on a rich hermeneutic tradition, the
Neorealists were relying on an arid and now discredited structuralist tradition. This
defiant attack gave way to a much more measured and sympathetic assessment by
Walker, who denied, in the first place, that there was a coherent theoretical position
running through political Realism. Instead, he depicted Realism as the site for some
of the most significant philosophical debates in Western political thought: more
battlefield than school. The contemporary divide between Classical Realism and
Neorealism appeared, in this view, to be no more than the latest stage in a continuing
debate that could be traced back to arguments amongst Greek political thinkers
about the relationship between identity and difference.
Walker observed how the Classical Realists had focused on the constant flux of
political reality and stressed the contingent nature of political events. The Classical
Realists, as a result, were regarded as predisposed to a historical approach to analysis.
They accepted that the nature of social reality could undergo fundamental change
and that the world could be understood only by examining the evolving practices of
social actors. By contrast, Walker argued, Neorealists saw a more stable and
structured reality, where social action was amenable to scientific analysis. Walker
concluded that, without dismissing the importance of social structures, it was vital to
give priority to the social practices responsible for bringing them into being in the first
place. From this perspective, therefore, agency is privileged over structure. Walker’s
justification for his position needs to be more fully worked out because the complex
and contentious relationship between agency and structure has now become quite a
central theme in the social sciences (Cerney 1990, Clegg 1989, Layder 1989). The issue
is examined in more depth in chapter 6. What is worth stressing here is that the dual
response to Waltz has begun a post-Neorealist debate characterized by a three-way
tension between structure, agency, and historical contingency.
tension between structure, agency, and historical contingency.
Those most sensitive to the internal inconsistencies and eclectic character of Realism
have stressed the need to look carefully at both Classical Realism and Neorealism.
Neither is considered to provide an adequate foundation on which to build a theory of
international relations. They have argued, as we will, that the foundations of Realism
need to be extended (Spegele 1987; Walker 1987). But so far this has been very much a
minority response. As Walker makes clear, it is much more common in the discipline
simply to gloss over the tensions that exist within Realist writings, appealing to a
continuing broad consensus.
As noted earlier, the agreed tenets of Realism have been articulated on many
occasions during the 1980s.
Often this was done to distinguish Realism from the brand of neoliberalism or new
institutionalism which had become its major contender. Oversimplifying somewhat,
it is usually argued that Realists focus on conflict within the international system
while neoliberals stress cooperation. The next step is often to suggest the need to
integrate or reconcile the two approaches (Niou and Odershook 1991), a process
already visible in the work of writers such as Keohane and Gilpin. In fact, a clear
distinction between the two can be sustained only by defining Realism in very narrow
terms. The difficulty becomes apparent when attention is focused, for example, on
the work of Hedley Bull (1977), who describes the anarchic international system in
terms of a rule-governed society. The emphasis on anarchy is seen to place him in the
Realist camp, whereas his emphasis on rules has meant that he is also rightly
associated with the new institutionalists. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
literature in International Relations at this juncture often seems confused.
This confusion may in part account for frequent complaints of lack of progress. Many
International Relations theorists have claimed that the discipline has lost its sense of
direction and is in a state of disarray (Holsti 1985:1-2; Ferguson and Mansbach 1988;
Onuf 1989:8). Reactions to this assessment have varied. One has been to argue that
the discipline has been overambitious and that the quest for rigorous theory was
misguided (Ferguson and Mansbach 1988). Another has been to insist that the
proliferation of contrasting approaches should be seen as a necessary and desirable
consequence of the demise of positivism and the emergence of a post-positivist era.
Any complex social reality, it is argued, needs to be seen from a variety of divergent
perspectives. But Lapid, who has developed this argument, surely displays a closet
positivism when he concludes that as epistemology advances we will move toward a
better and more coherent understanding of social reality (Lapid 1989). A third
response has been to argue that the loss of direction experienced in International
Relations has occurred because the discipline as a whole has been working on an
erroneous premise. It is denied that anarchy is the central and defining feature of
international relations (Onuf 1990:14). Onuf has developed a sophisticated attack on
the use made by International Relations theorists of anarchy, which he sees as an
empty concept. His attack threatens the very foundations of the Neorealist
framework by dissolving the distinction between International Relations and Political
Science.

TIP as a Starting Point for a Theory of International
Relations
Given the confusion and conflicting positions in International Relations, it is
necessary to explain why we have decided to use TIP as a jumping off point rather
than beginning from a broader conspectus or starting from scratch. In general, we
took the view that it is better to focus debate on a real representative figure, and on
widely read texts, than to hack away at some amorphous composite labeled
Neorealism, where private interpretations would inevitably sow the seeds of
misunderstanding. Waltz filled this bill nicely. More specific motives for working
thorough TIP lay partly in the attractions of some of Waltz’s fundamental definitions,
and partly in dissatisfaction with his theory and his critics. Like Waltz we accept that
International Relations constitutes a legitimate and independent field of inquiry. Our
discipline confronts the uniquely difficult question of how to theorize the totality of
intersocietal relations in all their forms. Although we disagree with many of Waltz’s
positions on epistemology, structure, and consequence, we take the view that his
basic conception of structure offers a solid foundation for this task. It is attractive both
because of the penetration of Waltz’s original insight into structure, and because it
provides an intellectual framework that has become part of the standard equipment
of the profession. For more than a decade TIP has been shot at, embellished,
misunderstood, and caricatured, but never quite displaced. We think it is now time to
build a new structural theory of international relations to replace TIP, but
acknowledge that Waltz’s work still provides some of the foundations for this
enterprise.
Along with many of his critics, we are not entirely satisfied with Waltz. We find flaws
in his logic, epistemology, and conceptualization of the field. We find him taking an
unnecessarily narrow, static, and political perspective on what can and should be a
much more comprehensive theory of international relations. We chafe at an
ahistorical approach to theory. Our dissatisfaction with his critics stems from their
misunderstandings of TIP, from their own very different, but equally obstructive,
flaws and obscurantism in logic, epistemology, and vocabulary, and from the
preponderance of destructive over constructive criticism.
As we have already noted, there have been attempts to apply Waltz’s theory,
attempts to debunk it, and some sympathetically critical attempts to defend it. But so
far there has been surprisingly little sustained attempt to develop it. This book is not,
like the 1986 Keohane volume, a collection of disparate commentaries. It is a