The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP): A Method for Predictive Intelligence Analysis

339 Pages·2013·2.977 MB·English

by  Jonathan S. Lockwood

The Lockwood
Analytical
Method for
Prediction
(LAMP)
BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World
By Anthony Olcott
Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies
By Kerry Patton
BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
The Lockwood
Analytical
Method for
Prediction
(LAMP)
A Method for Predictive
Intelligence Analysis
JONATHAN S. LOCKWOOD
Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
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Bloomsbury is a registered trademark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
First published 2013
© Jonathan S. Lockwood, 2013
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
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from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury
Academic or the author.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Lockwood, Jonathan Samuel, 1955-
The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) : a method for predictive
intelligence analysis / Jonathan S. Lockwood.
pages cm. -- (Continuum intelligence studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Intelligence service--Methodology. 2. International relations--Forecasting. 3. Terrorism--
Forecasting. 4. World politics--Forecasting. I. Title.
JF1525.I6L63 2013
327.12--dc23
2013012216
ISBN: ePDF: 978-1-6235-6782-8
Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN
CONTENTS
Foreword by Dr Mark M. Lowenthal vi
List of figures and tables ix
Introduction: The development of the LAMP xi
PART ONE The LAMP in theory
1
1 The philosophy and steps of the LAMP 3
2 A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques 23
3 The initial use of the LAMP: Case study of the former
Soviet nuclear republics and nuclear weapons 39
4 Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP 59
PART TWO The LAMP in practice
67
5 The future of Afghanistan: Democracy, Islamic Caliphate,
or warlord principalities? A predictive study on possible
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban responses 69
6 Candidate moves in the Levant: An analysis of the region’s
geostrategic future using the LAMP method 129
7 The adaptability of the FARC and ELN and the prediction
of their future actions 209
Select bibliography 321
Index 323
FOREWORD
Dr Mark M. Lowenthal
Few professions are beset by as many “flavors of the month” as is intel-
ligence analysis. New techniques come and go, many of which are
ephemeral, and many more of which are chimerical—all claiming that they
can improve intelligence analysis. That word itself, “improve,” is somewhat
problematic. If we were being honest about what is commonly meant by
the use of this term with regard to analysis, it would mean getting it right
more often than we do now. But given that we have no substantive sense of
an analyst’s batting average—or of the batting average of the larger analytic
community—we would be hard pressed to describe how much improved
analysis should be. What it really comes down to is not making analytic
errors even as we recognize that errors in analysis are part of the price of
being an intelligence analyst. We do not hand out omniscience pills in the
cafeteria.
As I write this Foreword in the spring of 2013, the latest analytic flavor of
the month is big data. Without any substantive proof, big data advocates—
most of whom are IT specialists and not analysts—claim that big data, that
is, the slicing, dicing and parsing of reams of data, will provide answers
we did not even know we were looking for. This is problematic on several
counts. First, although this may be true on Wall Street and in business
where data do drive many decisions, it is much less true in intelligence
analysis where the key questions are not going to be found in the data—big
or small. The questions that most bother policy makers are about the plans,
intentions, and capabilities of other actors. What will Kim Jong Un do
next? Will Iran decide to weaponize its nuclear program? Few would argue
against the centrality of these questions; few should be able to argue that
the answers lie in data. The second problem with our current data-mania
is this is exactly not what policy makers want. When you talk to senior
civilian or military policy makers about this they will be both frank and
consistent: they want knowledge and expertise, not data.
Which brings us to Jonathan Lockwood’s book, The Lockwood Analytic
Method for Prediction (LAMP). This book is appealing on many levels.
First, Jonathan Lockwood has worked as an intelligence analyst, always a
plus when trying to create a new analytic tool or technique and much more
FOREWORD vii
rare than many would suppose. Second, he recognizes some of the perils of
the field into which he is entering and, unlike many of his predecessors who
make exaggerated claims for what their technique will do, Dr Lockwood
approaches his with a charming degree of modesty. He states quite clearly
that the LAMP is not the be all and end all and that it is an analytic starting
point, not an all inclusive solution. In that same vein, there is something
to be said for a book that forthrightly compares its technique with others
in the field (offering very good explanations for each of them) and that
includes an entire chapter on the limitations of the technique. Three cheers
for intellectual honesty!
One of the most difficult aspects of intelligence analysis is that we are
dealing with other human beings—flawed, deceptive, uncertain, mercurial—
and trying to discern what they will do next. As I have written elsewhere,
our goal as intelligence analysts is to study and write about these difficult
creatures in such a way that we can reduce the uncertainty that our policy
makers face as they both react to these other players and as they try to craft
initiatives of their own. That is where the LAMP comes in. The LAMP is a
12-step analytical process clearly focused on potential political outcomes.
The “P” in the LAMP (prediction) is a bit misleading because the LAMP
will not come up with the one answer. But the LAMP is a very logical series
of analytic steps that will allow an analyst to come up with rank orders of
scenarios of possible outcomes. This is in essence what good intelligence is
about, laying out for policy makers which outcomes are more or less likely,
so that they can focus their attention on these as they see fit. This is a crucial
service as it avoids the “single threading” of analysis that too often is so
narrow that it tends to have a deadening effect on ongoing analysis. It also
recognizes that the most likely scenario may not be the one that actually
happens. The “scenario race” is full of successful dark horses.
I will not go through all 12 steps in the LAMP, which Dr Lockwood
lays out very neatly in Chapter 1. But there are several steps that are
worth noting. Step 4 has the analyst lay out all possible courses of action
by the actors in question. This is a key step as it does not assume that
the actor is rational, only that he can and will act. The assumption of
rationality is one of the biggest flaws in too much intelligence analysis,
especially in a world inhabited by such actors as the Kim family in North
Korea. Now, they may be rational by their own light, but if we only try
to analyze the actions that we find rational then we have committed the
analytic sin of “mirror imaging” and are likely to omit scenarios that
may prove to be important only because “we would never do that.” We
might not but they might. Step 10 requires the analyst to come up with
focal events that would have to occur for our alternate future outcomes to
happen. This is crucial as it creates a list of indicators that will allow the
analyst or policy maker to continue narrowing the field of likely outcomes
as events unfold.
viii FOREWORD
One of the other appealing aspects of the LAMP is that it is not, as Dr
Lockwood notes, a quantitative system. He lists this as a limitation; I see it
as a plus. When I teach analysis I often point out that the best analytic tool
is a knowledgeable analyst who can think and write and who needs little
more than pencil and paper. Admittedly, as one gets into the more complex
permutations and combinations of various LAMP scenarios, some sort of
IT assistance may be in order, but the bulk of the LAMP can be done in the
simplest ways imaginable. This is definitely a plus.
A great deal of the book is a series of well written essays by three of
Dr Lockwood’s students showing the LAMP in action. Most readers will
probably dip in and out of these chapters but they are useful guides to how
the LAMP works and of the range, subtlety, and sophistication of analysis
that the LAMP can support. A word of praise is also in order for the
authors of these chapters, Nicholas Lusas, Mary Boyle, and Drew Lasater.
Dr Lockwood appropriately gives them credit in his Introduction and I wish
to do the same.
So, let us welcome the LAMP into the lists of analytic tools and
techniques. As I have written elsewhere, good intelligence analysis is
competitive. I know that Dr Lockwood does not shrink from this compe-
tition and has offered up a worthy entrant. The proof will be in the doing
but I do hope that serious analysts will take the time to experiment with the
LAMP, to which this book is a useful guide.
LIST OF FIGURES
AND TABLES
Figures
1.1 Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP 8
1.2 The analytic map 20
5.1 Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity 76
6.1 72 month average retail price chart 131
7.1–7.3 Evolution of FARC actions 240
7.4–7.6 Evolution of ELN actions 258
Tables
1.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) 10
3.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) 42
3.2 Scenario 2 – Russian ultra-nationalists seize power 50
5.1 Alternate future permutations 88
5.2 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) 89
5.3 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) 91
5.4 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) 92
5.5 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) 94
5.6 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) 95
5.7 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) 96
6.1 Alternate future permutations 158
6.2 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 1 159
6.3 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 2 161
6.4 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 3 162
6.5 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 1 163
6.6 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 2 165
6.7 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 3 166
7.1 Matrix diagram and analysis (FARC) 238
7.2 Matrix diagram and analysis (ELN) 257