THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE THE LIBERTARIAN ALTERNATIVE CHRIS BERG MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PRESS An imprint of Melbourne University Publishing Limited 11–15 Argyle Place South, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia [email protected] www.mup.com.au First published 2016 Text © Chris Berg, 2016 Design and typography © Melbourne University Publishing Limited, 2016 This book is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 and subsequent amendments, no part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means or process whatsoever without the prior written permission of the publishers. Every attempt has been made to locate the copyright holders for material quoted in this book. Any person or organisation that may have been overlooked or misattributed may contact the publisher. Cover design by Design by Committee Typeset by Cannon Typesetting Printed in Australia by McPherson’s Printing Group National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Berg, Chris, author. The libertarian alternative/Chris Berg. 9780522868456 (paperback) 9780522868463 (ebook) Includes index. Libertarianism—Australia. Public administration—Australia. Political parties—Platforms. Australia—Politics and government—21st century. 320.5120994 Contents Introduction Part I: THE LIBERTARIAN ETHIC 1 How Free Markets Free People 2 The Libertarian Alternative 3 How We Went Left and Right 4 Market Success, Government Failure Part II: LIBERTARIANISM APPLIED 5 The Spirit of Free Trade 6 Unlocking the Borders 7 How Incentives Can Save the Environment 8 The Intimacy of Free Speech 9 Peace and a Tolerable Administration of Justice Part III: CHOICE, LIBERTY AND ECONOMIC REFORM 10 Personal Choice 11 How the Human Rights Project Lost Its Way 12 Economic Reform 2.0 13 A Different Way Acknowledgements Bibliography Notes Index Introduction I T HAS BEEN more than thirty years since the Hawke government began to deregulate and liberalise the Australian economy. We’re still not over it. In December 1983, Bob Hawke and his treasurer, Paul Keating, floated the Australian dollar. Their decision was both inspired and visionary. It was also forced upon them. Speculators were flooding Australia with capital, betting that the dollar would appreciate against other world currencies. This was unsustainable. The float was an epoch-defining decision. Australian governments started to place their faith in markets. In 1985, the government opened the banking sector —one of the most tightly monopolised and anti-competitive industries in the Australian economy—to foreign competition. Throughout the next decade, publicly owned businesses were privatised. Tariffs and other trade barriers were lowered. The labour market was substantially deregulated. The airline market was opened to competition. Ports were sold and restrictions on shipping liberalised. The final break with the past came with changes to the tax system— the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2000 replaced a sales tax regime that had been instituted by James Scullin’s Labor government in 1930. Australians tend to cringe at the myth-making of countries like the United States, which has suffused its own past with a complex political folklore, only tenuously connected to the historical record. But where Americans have George Washington and his apple tree, Australians have the larrikin Bob Hawke and the lanky Paul Keating ripping out the foundations of old Australia and propelling its economy towards the twenty-first century. The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have become the stuff of legend. The historian and journalist Paul Kelly set the tone with his 1992 book The End of Certainty. His account is seen as definitive not just because of the detail in his history of the politics of the 1980s but also for the overarching story he imposed on that period. Kelly argued that the Hawke–Keating reform agenda represented a definitive break with what he called the Australian Settlement. This settlement, which dated back to the first decades of the twentieth century, had five pillars: the White Australia policy, protectionism, the industrial relations arbitration system, state paternalism, and ‘imperial benevolence’ or faith in the rightness of the British Empire. The Australian Settlement had been sustained with remarkable bipartisan clarity throughout most of the twentieth century; its edifice was only chipped away after the retirement of Robert Menzies. The irony was that Kelly’s book was released at the tail end of the reform movement he helped define. He created a test by which future governments and reform movements are now judged. When business leaders and political commentators speak today of ‘the need for reform’, they are consciously or unconsciously calling on The End of Certainty folklore. ‘Reform’, of whatever stripe, has become the gold standard of government. For the political class, a successful government is that which reforms; an unsuccessful government squibs on reform. But while one of the most common tropes in the Australian press is the business-leaders-urge-reform genre, in which CEOs and corporate lobbyists complain that politicians are avoiding tough decisions about economic change, rarely do they offer any specific proposals. The reform mantra has allowed each side of politics to dress up regulatory or legislative change as a great reform no matter what its purpose. For the Australian Labor Party, the Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) and the emissions trading scheme introduced by Julia Gillard’s government were considered great reforms. For the Coalition, abolishing those two schemes constituted great reform. Each harks back to the Hawke–Keating era not just as precedents for economic change but as some sort of justification for that change. Reform has become the sine qua non of government. What made the reforms of the 1980s significant was not their constituent parts but that they added up to an agenda. Governments of the time deliberately shifted the Australian economy from one system of political economy to another. They began to instinctively favour market solutions to policy problems where their predecessors had looked to the state. It was a revolution in philosophy as much as it was a legislative program. Once the full significance of this revolution sank in, there was a host of books published by intellectuals of the old Left who believed that Hawke and Keating had hijacked the grand old Labor 1 Party and its socialist-tinged traditions. The sociologist Michael Pusey influentially argued that the Commonwealth bureaucracy had been captured by economic rationalists, a sort of reverse-Fabian takeover of the institutions of 2 government. These economic rationalists had a new idea of what Australia ought to look like and what values public policy should reflect. So the budding reformists have a problem. Since John Hewson’s economic policy package Fightback! died at the hands of voters in 1993, there has been no driving vision of what Australia might look like, no vision of what values ought to underpin political change. There is scarcely any serious contest of ideas. We can attribute that to a generation of politicians too weak to build and defend a vision. It’s a neurosis that infects the entire political class. The Libertarian Alternative, in all modesty, is my attempt to offer a new agenda. Libertarianism is a political philosophy that favours liberty in all its facets. The libertarian agenda is deceptively simple but powerful and ambitious. It wants people to be free to trade across national borders and to move their families across them too. It provides a philosophical structure for open markets, unencumbered by excessive regulation and red tape, exposed to and strengthened by engagement with a global marketplace. It views overregulation not simply as a cost to business but as a brake on human progress and innovation. It takes seriously the choices people make about how they spend their money and sell their labour, without assuming that policymakers and the government know better what values those people are weighing up when they make risky decisions. It views entrepreneurs as the central driver of economic growth, and the key to future living standards. And it says that decisions are better when they are made by the people they affect. Libertarianism offers a new and important perspective on the biggest issues facing Australian society, from human rights to the environment and inequality, from trade to sexuality and gender. It provides a new way through our moribund political debates. The first part of The Libertarian Alternative explains the libertarian ethic— the underpinnings of the philosophy of individual freedom and its relationship to the social good we all desire: human flourishing. I give a potted history of this philosophy and its deep, largely forgotten roots in Australian history. To be a libertarian in Australia today is to be part of a distinct tradition that can be traced back to the nineteenth century. The libertarianism I argue for is a fundamentally practical one. It takes people as they are. It treats human society as an impossibly complex, endlessly diverse and infinitely exciting web of relationships and ideas. It asks what economic and political system suits a world in which people have different preferences and want to lead different lives, form different communities and enjoy different lifestyles, but all have equal rights. Government can only limit our liberties, not enhance them. Markets and civil society, by contrast, facilitate such difference, encourage toleration and cooperation, and take advantage of the natural pluralism of a free people. In the second part of the book, I apply these principles to the policy issues that matter most today. Libertarianism exposes old problems to a new light, helping us understand how to tackle them and what’s at stake in doing so. I start with the big two: trade and immigration. Nothing reveals the distinctiveness of libertarian thought more than its insistence that trade and immigration are two sides of the same coin: the case for opening borders to goods and capital is the same as that for opening borders to people. I examine the inequality debate and argue that before governments try to ‘fix’ economic inequality, they should first realise they’re already making the problems of poverty and inequality worse. I discuss how environmental problems are fundamentally property rights problems, and how to handle the biggest of them all: climate change. I consider freedom of speech and privacy, two of the thorniest issues of modern public policy. Some conservatives argue that libertarianism can’t handle questions of national security and foreign policy—I make the case for a security policy that respects individual freedoms, and a non-interventionist foreign policy. In the third part of The Libertarian Alternative, I return to the domestic sphere to tackle freedom of choice, consumerism, and what the human rights debate tells us about the state of libertarian ideas today. The economist Adam Smith wrote that all that was necessary to allow a nation to thrive was ‘peace, 3 easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice’. What made sense in 1755 is even more compelling now, as technological change and innovation eliminates many of what our predecessors saw as the necessary limits on the market economy. We’re on the edge of a revolution in the way we work, the way the economy functions, and the way we relate to each other. Exploiting these possibilities to the fullest will mean rethinking what government is for—and recognising its limits. That theme ties this book together. Libertarianism is a philosophy of optimism. It is a philosophy that understands what institutions can and cannot do. It embraces change. It embraces difference and diversity and pluralism. It wants government out of your wallet and out of your bedroom. Libertarianism, alone, wants individual freedom in all its dimensions. Part I THE LIBERTARIAN ETHIC
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