The Last Great Nuclear Debate: NATO and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons in the 1980s

236 Pages·1995·20.752 MB·English

by  Thomas E. Halverson (auth.)

THE LAST GREAT NUCLEAR DEBATE
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The Last Great
Nuclear Debate
NATO and Short-Range Nuclear Weapons
in the 1980s
Thomas E. Halverson
Foreword by
Lawrence Freedman
First published in Great Britain 1995 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-39325-1 ISBN 978-0-230-37788-2 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230377882
First published in the United States of America 1995 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN 978-0-312-12604-9
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Halverson, Thomas E.
The last great nuclear debate : NATO and short-range nuclear
weapons in the 1980s I Thomas E. Halverson.
p. em.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-12604-9 (cloth)
I. Nuclear arms control. 2. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
3. Cold War. 4. Germany (West)-Military policy. I. Title.
JXI974.7.H284 1995
327.1 '74----dc20 94--45759
CIP
Text© Thomas E. Halverson 1995
Foreword © Lawrence Freedman 1995
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1995 978-0-333-62538-5
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of
this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or
transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with
the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
or under the tem1s of any licence permitting limited copying
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Totten ham Court
Road, London WJP9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95
To my wife
Elaine Holoboff
and our daughters
Anastasia and Nicole
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Contents
Foreword by Lawrence Freedman xi
Preface xiii
List of Abbreviations XV
Introduction
I. I Framework of Analysis 4
1.1.1 The Nuclear Responsibility Bargain 4
1.1.2 The Nuclear-Deterrent Continuum 6
1.2 Understanding National Doctrinal Preferences 8
1.2.1 American Objectives: Limiting Escalation 8
1.2.2 The West German Objective: Early
Escalation at Long Range 9
1.2.3 The British Objective: Maximum Deterrent
Credibility I 0
2 NATO's Nuclear Strategy and Weapons 12
2.1 Parameters and Targets 12
2.1 .I The Lance Surface-to-Surface Ballistic
Missile 12
2.1.2 Air-Delivered Nuclear Gravity Bombs 13
2.1.3 Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles (AFAPS) 14
2.1.4 Atomic Demolition Munitions 15
2.1.5 Nike-Hercules Anti-Aircraft Missiles 15
2.2 The Comprehensive Mix of Land-Based Nuclear
Weapons 16
2.3 Problems of NATO Strategy 17
2.3.1 Direct Defence 17
2.3.2 Deliberate Escalation 18
2.3.3 General Nuclear Response 18
2.4 The 1979 INF Deployment Decision: The Great
Debate Opens 18
2.4.1 Explaining the INF Decision 22
VII
Vlll Contents
3 INF Arms-Control Decision-Making and the
Responsibility Bargain 24
3.1 West German Priorities 24
3.2 United Kingdom Priorities 25
3.3 Politics and INF Arms Control, 1979-83 26
3.4 Negotiations, 1985-86 29
3.4.1 The Year of Abolition 32
3.5 The Responsibility Bargain and the Limitations
of the SCG 36
3.6 Ending the INF Saga 38
4 The Evolution and Destruction of Doctrinal Consensus,
1980-87 50
4.1 Introduction 50
4.2 Building Consensus on Nuclear Force Size and
Composition 55
4.2.1 Criteria for the Future Nuclear Force 58
4.2.2 The Montebello NPG Meeting 59
4.3 The Meaning of Montebello 61
4.3.1 Montebello and Doctrinal Consensus 61
4.3.3 Montebello and the Responsibility Bargain 64
4.4 Grappling with Nuclear Guidelines 67
4.4.1 Developing the General Political Guidelines 69
First Use 70
Political Emphasis 71
Follow-On Use 72
Consultation Procedures 73
Range Definitions 74
Timing and Consensus 74
The GPG Consensus 75
The Weakness of the GPG Consensus 77
4.5 The INF Treaty: The Consensus Shattered 78
5 An Untold Story - Civil-Military Tensions over Nuclear
Policy and the Reevaluation of Nuclear Requirements 80
5.1 Politics and Nuclear Requirements 80
5.1.1 The New Planning Methodology 82
5.2 The SHAPE Reaction to Montebello: NWRS-85 85
5.2.1 Follow-on-to-Lance 87
Contents ix
5.2.2 Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (T ASM) 88
5.2.3 Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles 88
5.2.4 NWRS-85 and the Comprehensive
Weapons Mix 89
5.3 Nuclear Weapons Release and Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile Targeting 89
5.4 SHAPE and the INF Treaty 90
5.4.1 SHAPE's Doctrinal Preference 91
5.4.2 The Reykjavik Shock 91
5.4.3 Double-Zero 94
6 The Last Great Nuclear Debate 99
6.1 Responding to the INF Treaty: Revisiting
Nuclear Doctrine 99
6.2 Opening Positions in the Great Debate 101
6.2.1 West German Thinking on the Deterrent
Continuum and Comprehensive Nuclear
Weapons Mix Post-INF 101
6.2.2 UK Thinking on the Deterrent Continuum
and Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons
Mix Post-INF 104
6.2.3 America Sets the SNF Agenda 105
6.3 The Great Debate 107
6.3.1 What Goes Around Comes Around:
Nuclear Doctrine and SNF Modernization
Plans Collide 113
6.3.2 SHAPEing a Compromise Package 115
6.3.3 Last Gasp of the Comprehensive Nuclear
Weapons Mix: The NWRS-88 Package 119
6.3.4 Final Moves 122
6.3.5 Bonn Shatters the Comprehensive Mix
and Responsibility Bargain 124
6.3.6 Buying Time: President Bush's NATO
Summit Surprise 127
6.4 Conclusion 132
7 Conclusion 134
7 .1.1 The Role of the Special Consultative Group 134
7.1.2 The Role of the High Level Group in
the 1980s 135