The Kashmir question : retrospect and prospect

193 Pages·2003·1.403 MB·English

by  Ganguly, Sumit

THE KASHMIR QUESTION
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The Kashmir Question
Retrospect and Prospect
Editor
SUMIT GANGULY
First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS AND COMPANY LIMITED Crown
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Copyright © 2003 Frank Cass & Co. Ltd
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
The Kashmir question: retrospect and prospect 1. Jammu and Kashmir (India)—Politics and
goverment 2. India—Foreign relations—Pakistan 3. Pakistan—Foreign relations—India 4.
India—Foreign relations—1984— I. Ganguly, Sumit 954.6
ISBN 0-203-50416-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-61027-X (Adobe e-Reader Format)
ISBN 0 7146 5558 9 (Print Edition) (HB)
ISBN 0 7146 8439 2 (Print Edition) (PB)
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The Kashmir question: retrospect and prospect/editor, Sumit Ganguly. p. cm. Includes
bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5558-9 (Cloth)—ISBN 0-7146-8439-2 (Paper)
1. Jammu and Kashmir (India)—Politics and government. 2. India—Foreign relations—Pakistan.
3. Pakistan—Foreign relations—India. I. Ganguly, Sumit. II. Title. DS485.K27K3763 2003
954’.6052—dc21 2003012080
This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue of India Review (ISSN 1473- 6489), Vol.2,
No.3 (July 2003), [The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect].
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise without the prior written permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.
This book is dedicated to Robert Jervis, outstanding scholar and unstinted intellectual
supporter
Contents

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction 1

Sumit Ganguly, Jonah Blank, and Neil DeVotta
India’s “Potential” Endgame in Kashmir 12

Amitabh Mattoo
Pakistan’s Endgame in Kashmir 27

Husain Haqqani
Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in Theory and Practice 43

Praveen Swami
US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospects for Resolution 72

Devin T.Hagerty
Politics, Proximity, and Paranoia: The Evolution of Kashmir as a Nuclear 94
Flashpoint
Timothy D.Hoyt
Kashmir and Tibet: Comparing Conflicts, States, and Solutions 117

Carole McGranahan
Kashmir: All Tactics, No Strategy 144

Jonah Blank

Abstracts 161
Notes on Contributors 164
Index 165
Acknowledgments
This volume would not have been possible were it not for the substantial support of the
Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New
Mexico. A generous grant from the Cooperative Monitoring Center made possible a
workshop held at the University of Texas at Austin. The initial drafts of these articles
were discussed and critiqued at this workshop. The Asia Foundation in San Francisco, the
College of Liberal Arts and the Center for Asian Studies at the University of Texas also
provided supplementary assistance.
Apart from institutional support, Professor Vijay Mahajan, the John P.Harbin
Centennial Chair in Business at the McCombs School of Business at the University of
Texas, provided generous financial assistance for the workshop. Finally, Professor
Harrison Wagner and Professor Shylashri Shankar, both of the Department of
Government at the University of Texas at Austin, read and commented on all the initial
drafts.
The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and
Prospect
SUMIT GANGULY, JONAH BLANK, AND NEIL DEVOTTA
Few bilateral conflicts have proven as resistant to resolution as the Kashmir dispute
between India and Pakistan. What explains the tenacity of this dispute? The answer is
complex and goes to the very basis of state-construction in South Asia. India, which had
been created as a civic polity, initially sought to hold on to this Muslim-majority state to
demonstrate its secular credentials.1 Pakistan, in turn, had laid claim to Kashmir because
it had been created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia.2 After the break-up of
Pakistan in 1971 the Pakistani irredentist claim to Kashmir lost substantial ground. If
Pakistan could not cohere on the basis of religion alone it had few moral claims on its co-
religionists in Kashmir. Similarly, in the 1980s, as the practice of Indian secularism was
eroded India’s claim to Kashmir on the grounds of secularism largely came apart. Today
their respective claims to Kashmir are mostly on the basis of statecraft.3
The Road to Conflict
The historical origins of the dispute are well known. They can be traced to the hasty
process of British colonial withdrawal from the subcontinent in 1947. At the time of
colonial disengagement from the subcontinent two classes of states existed in the Indian
Union. One set of states included those of British India and were under the tutelage of the
British Crown. A second set of states, which were nominally independent, were classified
as the “princely states.” These entities, ruled by local monarchs, recognized the British
Crown as the paramount power in the subcontinent.
Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, decreed at the time of independence and the
partition of the British Indian empire into the two nascent states of India and Pakistan
that, with the lapse of British rule, the princely states could join either India or Pakistan.
He ruled out any prospect of independence. The vast majority of the rulers complied with
Mountbatten’s decree. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, was one of the few
monarchs loath to join either India or Pakistan. Months after the partition and the
independence of India and Pakistan he had not acceded to either state. In early October, a
tribal rebellion broke out in Poonch, in the western reaches of his state. The Pakistani
military, with the support of the political authorities, quickly entered the fray. They
armed and organized the rebels and also provided them with logistical support.4 Within
the next two weeks the insurgents had reached the outskirts of Srinagar, the summer
capital of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Maharaja Hari Singh, now in a state of panic,
appealed to India for military assistance. India agreed to provide such assistance only
when two conditions were met. Maharaja Hari Singh would first have to seek the
The Kashmir question 2
imprimatur of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir
National Conference, the largest secular and popular organization within the state. If
Abdullah granted his assent to accession to India the Maharaja would have to sign the
formal Instrument of Accession before Indian troops could be provided for the defense of
his realm. In the event, Sheikh Abdullah did opt for joining India and the Maharaja then
signed the Instrument of Accession. Almost immediately thereafter, in late October,
Indian troops were dispatched to Srinagar to stop the Pakistan-aided tribal advance.5
Over the remainder of the year Indian and Pakistani forces, along with the tribal
invaders, fought a series of pitched battles. On the advice of Lord Mountbatten, India
referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations on January 1, 1948. The United Nations
sought to broker a settlement of the dispute and passed a crucial resolution on August 13,
1948. This resolution called on Pakistan to “vacate its aggression” in Kashmir, on India
to reduce the number of troops in the region commensurate to the maintenance of law and
order, and for an impartial plebiscite to be conducted to determine the wishes of the
Kashmiri population. Neither side adhered to the terms of this resolution. Pakistan did not
withdraw its forces from Kashmir and India reneged on the plebiscite. On January 1,
1949, the first Kashmir war came to a close with a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire.
At the time of the ceasefire Pakistan came to control about one-third of the state and India
approximately two-thirds. The line separating the two warring armies came to be known
as the “Cease-Fire Line” (CFL). During the next two decades the Kashmir issue was
endlessly debated in the United Nations. However, these multilateral negotiations proved
mostly futile due to the intransigence of both parties to the dispute. By the early 1960s
the United Nations largely lost interest in the subject.6
In the interim, India drafted a separate constitution for Jammu and Kashmir. Sheikh
Mohammed Abdullah became the first Prime Minister of the state under the new
constitution. Shortly thereafter, he reached an agreement with Prime Minister Nehru in
1952 that granted Kashmir a large degree of autonomy under the Indian constitutional
order. The terms of this agreement as well as Abdullah’s tenure in office proved to be
short-lived. India dismissed him and his government in 1953 on the grounds that he was
threatening to declare independence. These allegations against Abdullah were never
conclusively proven but he was periodically incarcerated for the next two decades. In
Abdullah’s absence, New Delhi tolerated the malfeasances of a series of regimes in
Kashmir as long as they did not threaten secession.
With the failure of multilateral negotiations the United States and the United Kingdom
made an attempt to promote a bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan in 1963. This
effort, which led to six rounds of talks, nevertheless failed to break the continuing
deadlock. In the interim, India started steadily integrating its portion of Kashmir into the
Indian Union. India’s attempts to integrate Kashmir and the failure of both multilateral
and bilateral negotiations prompted the Pakistani leadership of President Mohammed
Ayub Khan to resort to war to wrest Kashmir from India. This military operation,
however, failed and the war ended in a stalemate. The United States chose not to promote
a postwar settlement, thereby permitting the Soviet Union to proffer its good offices. The
Soviets accordingly brought the two parties together and brokered a settlement in the
Central Asian city of Tashkent in 1966. Under the terms of the Tashkent Agreement the
two sides agreed to return to the status quo ante and to abjure from the use of force to
settle the Kashmir dispute.7