The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War: Governement, Armed Forces and Defence Policy 1963-67 (Middle Eastern Military Studies)

353 Pages·2006·5.9 MB·English

by  Gluska

The Israeli Military and the
Origins of the 1967 War
This new book examines the relationship between the Israeli armed forces,
the government and the origins of the 1967 war. It analyses the effect of
the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on Israel’s defence policy between 1963
and 1967, against the backdrop of developments in the Middle East, and
Israeli decision-making immediately preceding the Six Day War in June
1967. A watershed event in the Arab–Israeli conflict, the war has had a
profound effect on the development of the Palestinian problem and the
character of Israel over the past four decades.
Making extensive use of original documents, including protocols of
meetings of the general staff and the government, discussions between the
Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, as well as testi-
monies by IDF generals, this volume sheds new light on the dramatic
tension between the army and the Israeli government in the weeks preced-
ing the conflict and the army’s intervention in diplomatic initiatives. It also
discloses the steps taken by the US Administration and its fluctuating pol-
icies during the crisis: from firm opposition to a pre-emptive Israeli strike,
to support for such an operation.
This book will be of great interest to students of Middle Eastern poli-
tics, strategic studies, Israeli politics and military history in general.
Ami Gluska lectures in history and political science at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem and the Ashkelon Academic College. In 2005 he won the
Yitzhak Sadeh prize for his book Eshkol, Give the Order! of which the
present book is a translation. Formerly, he served in the IDF and held a
number of senior positions in the ministries of defence and public security.
Middle eastern military studies
Series Editors: Barry Rubin
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Israel
The Israeli Military and the Origins of the 1967 War
Government, armed forces and defence policy 1963–1967
Ami Gluska
The Israeli Military and
the Origins of the 1967
War
Government, armed forces and
defence policy 1963–1967
Ami Gluska
First published 2007
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.
“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s
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© 2007 Ami Gluska
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from
the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British
Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN0-203-96596-5 Mastere-bookISBN
ISBN10: 0–415–39245–4 (hbk)
ISBN10: 0–203–96596–5 (ebk)
ISBN13: 978–0–415–39245–7 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978–0–203–96596–2 (ebk)
For my wife Shuli and our children Einat, Ittai and Orit
‘The Israeli army is called a “defense force” but it is not a defensive
army.... The Sinai campaign (1956), the reprisal acts and the raids
across the border were purely offensive operations, and were of decisive
value.... Not only the actions which were actually carried out but also
the IDF’s prevailing conception is offensive.... The most significant
technical expression of the new approach ... is the absence of fortifica-
tions and fencing along the country’s borders. Although the Govern-
ment’s policy is, politically speaking, essentially defensive – those
responsible for the armed forces have refrained from adopting defensive
measures. Their response to Arab provocation has been counter-attacks,
raids on enemy bases, transferring the war to the Arab countries ... to
put it simply: the IDF is a characteristically offensive army as regards
theory, planning and execution, in body and spirit.’
Major-General Moshe Dayan, April 1967
Contents
List of illustrations ix
Preface xii
Acknowledgements xviii
Introduction 1
1 Personnel changes in the defence establishment 14
2 Basic security issues 22
3 Escalation – Stage 1: from skirmishes in the
demilitarized zones to aerial sorties 40
4 Escalation – Stage 2: diversion 48
5 The dispute with Syria worsens 59
6 Escalation – Stage 3: ‘harassment’ 66
7 The General Staff wants a ‘frontal clash’ 74
8 Israel–Jordan: the Israeli dilemma, the Jordanian
dilemma 84
9 The clash with Syria approaches 92
10 Conflagration 98
11 The trigger 108
viii Contents
12 The start of the crisis 121
13 The era of diplomacy 131
14 The revision of Intelligence evaluations and the shift
to offensive planning 142
15 Casus belli 152
16 The army pressures the government 160
17 The politicians’ quandary 173
18 The height of the diplomatic campaign – and the
outcome 180
19 Waiting 194
20 Establishment of a national unity government:
the military aspect 204
21 The strategic turning point: the Egypt–Jordan
defence pact 216
22 The decisive meeting in the Pit: the Ministerial
Committee versus the General Staff 223
23 The decisive stage: war 238
Afterword 257
Appendix: what happened to Yitzhak Rabin? 262
Biographical notes 269
Notes 272
Select English bibliography 313
Index 317
Illustrations
Plates
1 Ben-Gurion takes his leave of the Ministry of Defence
2 Zvi Zur welcoming the new CO of the UN Truce
SupervisionOrganization, Norwegian General Odd Bull
3 Prime Minister Eshkol announces the handover of command of the
IDF from Zvi Zur to Yitzhak Rabin
4 Eshkol presents Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres to President
Lyndon Johnson at the White House
5 The Eshkol government with President Shazar after taking the oath
ofoffice in the Knesset
6 Ezer Weizman handing over command of the IAF to Motti Hod
7 Eshkol and CO Northern Command David Elazar examining the
damage by Syrian shelling of Kibbutz Gadot
8 Observers from the UNEF dismantling the Erez border point
9 Israeli tank crews mounting tanks in the Negev
10 Eshkol addressing the Knesset before the blocking of the Tiran Straits
11 Eshkol, Allon and Rabin touring IDF divisions in the Negev
12 Barlev, Sharon and Gavish during the ‘waiting period’
13 Rabin, Barlev and Weizman
14 The new ministers in the National Unity government
Maps
1 Israel and its neighbours – pre-1967 borders xi
2 The demilitarized zones along Israel–Syria border 41
3 The Arab diversion plan 50
Tables
1 Composition of the Israeli government – 1967 11
2 Composition of the IDF General Staff – 1967 12