The Israeli Army, 1948-1973

411 Pages·1983·13.485 MB·English

by  Edward N. Luttwak, Daniel Horowitz

THE ISRAELI ARMY
1948-1973
.—
EDWARD N. LUTTWAK / DANIEL HOROWITZ
$25.00
1948-1973
How, in the span of a single generation,
did a people that once had no soldiers
become a nation of soldiers? How did a
nation whose founding fathers were
near-pacifists become so thoroughly
militarized?
Edward Luttwak and Daniel Horowitz's
The Israeli Army: 1948-1973 tells the
story of the army in a country that had
no real military traditions of its own and
did not import those of other countries.
Instead, the Israeli military grew rapidly
from an underground force into a disci¬
plined modern army, evolving under
the continuing pressure of a bitter con¬
flict, and shaped also by internal politi¬
cal pressures. The Israeli Army has had
— and continues to have — a tumul¬
tuous and controversial history.
The Israeli Army: 1948-1973 traces the
development of the Israeli Army since
its beginnings — the successes of the
Haganah in 1948 — through a period of
disorganization and demoralization in
the 1950s, to the modern army of the
1960s, built by Dayan. Here is the story
of the 1967 War that so altered Israel's
view of itself, and the world's view of
that small nation. This volume concludes
on the eve of another war, that of Oc¬
tober 1973, and it is left to the forth¬
coming companion volume to bring the
story to the present day.
In a time of continued turmoil in the
Middle East, The Israeli Army: 1948-1973
is a timely book about the people and
ideas that have shaped Israeli military
history.
THE ISRAELI ARMY
1948-1973
EDWARD N. LUTTWAK AND DANIEL HOROWITZ
Abt Books
REF
355.095,L978i,1983,v.1
Luttwak, Edward
Israeli Army
S. F. PUBLIC LIBRARY
Luttwak, Edward.
The Israeli Army.
<T7
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Contents: v. 1. 1948-1973.
1. Israel —Armed Forces. I. Horowitz, Dan.
II. Title.
UA853.I8L87 1983 355’.0095694 83-2609
ISBN 0-89011-585-0 (v. 1)
Originally published by Allen Lane in 1975.
© Abt Books, 1983.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording,
or any information storage or retrieval system, without
specific permission in writing from the publisher:
Abt Books, 55 Wheeler Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Printed in the United States of America
Contents
Lists of Maps and Diagrams vii
List of Plates [x
Introduction x[
1. Origins i
2. The Army of Independence 53
3. After the Armistice: A New Army 71
4. Decline and Revival 104
5. The Sinai Campaign: Prelude and Aftermath 138
6. From War to War: 1956-67 165
7. War: 1967 209
8. 1967: An Overview 282
9. Zahal in the Seventies 299
Notes 338
Appendices. 361
Index 387
Lists of Maps and Diagrams
List of maps page
1 The Division of Palestine 1947-1949 26
2 The Territorial Status Quo 15 May 1948 35
3 Operation Yoav, before and after 46
4 Operation Horev 49
5 The Geography of War, 1948 51
6 Tactical Map of Operation Dani 57
7 Tactical Map of Operation Yoav 60
8 The Sinai Campaign 1956: Dayan’s Plan 145
9 Sinai 1956: Unplanned Breakthrough at the Central
Crossroads 152
10 The Sinai Campaign 1956: The Reality 159
11 Israel’s Geographic Vulnerabilities pre-1967 Lines 211
12 Sinai 1967: Egyptian Troop Deployments and Israeli
Plans 232
13 Sinai 1967: The Northern Axis 242
14 Sinai 1967: Egyptian Defences at the Central Crossroads 245
15 Sinai 1967: Tactical Situation 9 June, Morning 251
16 Sinai 1967: Battle on the Trans-Sina Routes; the
Gavish Strategy 252
17 The Batde of the Passes, 7 June 1967 256
18 Sinai 1967: The Sequence of the Advance 5-8 June 1967 257
19 1967 Jordanian Front: Initial Dispositions 263
20 The Fall of Samaria 5-7 June 1967 266
21 1967 Jordanian Front: The (Uncoordinated) Battles for
Jerusalem 269
22 1967 Jordanian Front: The Sequence of the Advance
5-7June 271
23 1967 Syrian Front: Initial Dispositions 276
24 The First Breakthrough on the Golan Heights: 9 June 1967 278
25 The Syrian Front: Finale, 9-10 June 1967 280
26 Israel’s Strategic Position after the 1967 War 301
List of figures page
1 Organizational Structure of the General Staff 97
2 Organizational Structure of the Defence Establishment 100
3 The Assault on Fortified Strongholds, Two Tactical Systems 115
4 The Russian-style ‘Sword and Shield’ Defence 235
5 Armour and Infantry in World War Two 293
6 Armour and Infantry in Sinai 1967 294
Introduction
The Israeli Army Volume I: 1948-1973 (originally published in
Great Britain as The Israeli Army in a somewhat different format)
was written between 1968 and 1973, begun in the aftermath of a
great victory and completed at a time of renewed war. This
volume begins with the Haganah in 1948 and concludes on the
eve of the October 1973 War. The forthcoming companion
volume will pick up with the story of the October 1973 War and
will continue through the present invasion of Lebanon.
Together, these volumes are an attempt to explain the
phenomenon of the Israeli Army.* There is much to explain. In
the span of a single generation, a people that once had no
soldiers has become a nation of soldiers, creating in the process
an Army which, in 1973, sent into battle the third largest tank
force and the sixth largest air force in the Western world. Unlike
almost all other new armies, the Israeli Army did not grow out of
colonial regiments nor did it receive its military expertise ready¬
made from foreign instructors as its neighbours have done and
are still doing. Instead, through trial and error, through experi¬
mentation and debate, the Israelis have taught themselves vir¬
tually everything they know, from basic infantry skills to the in¬
tricacies of air combat. Sometimes very advanced and highly ef¬
fective, sometimes merely different, and in some cases perhaps
backward, the Army’s doctrines, tactics and structures are all the
original creations of the Israelis themselves, a nation of 650,000
in 1948 and even now fewer than three million. Among the
lesser powers this is a unique achievement.
* Throughout the text, dr my capitalized stands for the armed forces
as a whole, whose official tide is Zvah Haganah Lelsrael, officially
translated as Israel Defence Forces (I.D.F.); army in lower case stands
for the ground forces, as opposed to air and naval forces.
Introduction vii
Though loosely chronological, this book is neither a history of
the Israeli Army nor a history of Israel’s wars. Its central focus is
on the men and ideas that have shaped Israeli defence since the
beginning. Men who first appear in these pages as young guer¬
rillas in 1941 emerge as the leaders of the field battalions that
fought in 1948; they reappear as brigade commanders in 1956
and as the generals of what had become a modern army in 1967.
The man who led the crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973,
fighting in the vanguard of his own division, is first introduced in
these pages two decades earlier as the leader of a band of
commandos.
Another kind of continuity is evident in the primacy of ideas
over traditions. From the ideological controversies of the 1930s,
when there was passionate debate over the exact limits of legiti¬
mate self-defence, to the controversies of the 1950s, when air
force men and tank enthusiasts were contesting the predomi¬
nance of the infantry7, and in the strategic debates of the 1960s
innovation and change were frequently opposed but not by the
dead weight of ingrained tradition. The Israelis had no real
military traditions of their own and neither did they import
others’ traditions as virtually all post-colonial armies have done.
Created in the midst of war out of an underground militia, many
of whose men had been trained ‘in cellars with wooden pistols’,
the Israeli Army has evolved very rapidly under the relentless
pressure of a bitter and protracted conflict. Instead of the quiet
acceptance of doctrine and tradition, witnessed in the case of
most other armies, the growth of the Israeli Army has been
marked by a turmoil of innovation, controvery and debate. If
the outcome of the 1973 War will be a further wave of radical
reforms in doctrines, forces and tactics, this would merely con¬
form to the pattern established since 1948: the imposition of for¬
mal military discipline after the War of Independence, the rise of
the paratrooper school of combat in the fifties, the emergence of
an autonomous all-fighter air force, the victory of the tank en¬
thusiasts’ approach to land warfare, and later the ill-fated accep¬
tance of a static defence for the Sinai, were all drastic innova¬
tions accomplished amidst intense controversy and wide-ranging
debate. In the last analysis, the formal authority of superior rank
was indispensable to implement change but it never sufficed by
itself to decide the issue.
viii Introduction
Much of the book is concerned with these political, strategic
and tactical debates whose results have shaped the'growth of the
Army.
From the dissolution of the elite Palmac'h striking forces of the
War of Independence, whose tactics and morale were examplary
but whose politics were suspect, to the choice of successive Chiefs
of Staff until the present day, party politics have consistently
intruded in the workings of the Army and of the defence estab¬
lishment as a whole. While among its neighbours the military
frequently dominate civilian political life, in Israel it has always
been the other way around. This unfortunate legacy of the days
of the underground — and a direct reflection of the extreme poli¬
ticization of Israeli life — is a further theme of this book, though
the treatment of this complex subject is more episodic than
systematic.
Of the many ironies of Israeli life, none is more significant
than the sharp contrast between the near-pacifism of the foun¬
ding fathers and the military preoccupations of modern Israel.
Forced step by step into an ever-greater defensive effort to cope
with a widening circle of enmity, beginning with the Palestinians
and now including the entire Arab world forcefully supported by
the Soviet Union, the Israelis have been transformed into a na¬
tion of soldiers. When fully mobilized, the Army includes within
its ranks virtually all able-bodied men and many women. Army
and society are thus reflections of one another, and this book is
in a sense a study of Israeli society at war. Here too there is a
paradox since Israel’s exceedingly militarized society is not
militaristic. The ethos of militarism — the glorification' of war
and the celebration of martial virtues — is absent from Israeli life
as is its substance, the corporate political control of society by the
military. As the events of 1973 showed, Israel could well have
benefited from a touch of militarism; in the wake of the October
war there was widespread gloom and pessimism among the
Israelis even though their losses amounted to less than one-tenth
of one per cent of the population (as opposed to one per cent in
1948), and even though it was Israeli troops that stood on the ap¬
proaches to two Arab capitals and not the other way round.
During the fighting, the anguished sensitivity to casualties
shared by the public and the Army command alike acted as a
powerful brake on the pace of military operations. After the war,