The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy

618 Pages·1997·87.856 MB·English

by  Jerome B. Schneewind

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LibraryofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Schneewind,J. B. (JeromeB.),1930
Theinventionofautonomy: ahistoryofmodernmoralphilosophy /
J. B.Schneewind.
p. em.
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindexes.
ISBN0-521-47399-3.- ISBN0-521-47938-X(pbk.)
1.Ethics,Modern- 17thcentury. 2. Autonomy(Philosophy)
History- 17thcentury.3. Ethics,Modern- 18thcentury.
4· Autonomy(Philosophy)- History- 18thcentury.5. Kant,Immanuel,
1724-1804- Ethics.1.Title.
BJ301.S35 1997
17°'.9'°32- DC21 97-7570
CIP
A catalogrecordfor this bookisavailablefrom
theBritishLibrary
ISBN° 521 473993hardback
ISBN° 52147938Xpaperback
A note on references and abbreviations
Thefirstbibliography,Sources,listsmaterialpublishedpriorto1800.
It includes a number of early histories of moral philosophy as well as
theworks ofthe authorswhoare mymainconcern. WhenIciteany of
theseworks, Iuse the author's name ifthere is only one worklisted, a
short title of the work, or one of the abbreviations listed here. Quota
tionsfrom anthologies,whichare alsogathered underSources,follow
ing the primary authors, are similarly identified byindicating the edi
tor's name and the page number.
Citationsfromlatercommentatorsandhistoriansareidentifiedinall
cases by author and date. The works Irefer to are listed in the second
bibliography, Commentary. Occasionally Irefer to a modernworkjust
once and incidentally; in these cases bibliographical details are given
only in the citation.
DJBP Hugo Grotius, On the Law ofWar and Peace (De Jure Belli
ac Pacis Libri Tres). Trans. Francis W. Kelsey. Oxford,
1925.
DJN Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law ofNature and Nations
(1672). Trans. C. H. Oldfather and W. A. Oldfather.
Oxford, 1934.
DJP Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law ofPrize and Booty
(De Jure Praedae Commentarius) (1604). Trans. Gwladys
L. Williams and Walter H. Zeydel. Oxford, 1950.
ECHU John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding
(1689). Ed. Peter Nidditch. Oxford, 1979.
LCCorr Samuel Clarke and G. W. F. Leibniz, The Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence. Ed. H. G. Alexander. Manchester, 1944.
LE Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics. Ed. Peter Heath and J.
B. Schneewind. Trans. Peter Heath. Cambridge, 1997.
MM Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics ofMorals. Trans. Mary
Gregor. Cambridge, 1991.
xxi
xxii Anote on references and abbreviations
ST St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. Trans. Fathers of
the English Dominican Province. New York, 1947.
T.P Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770. Trans.
and ed. David Walford and RalfMeerbote. Cam
bridge, 1992.
Introduction
1
Them.es in the history of m.odern m.oral
philosophy
Kant invented the conception of morality as autonomy. I use the
notion of invention as Kant himself did in an early remark. "Leibniz
thought up a simple substance," he said, "which had nothing but ob
scure representations, and called ita slumberingmonad. This monad he
had not explained, but merely invented; for the concept of it was not
givento himbutwas rather createdbyhim."l Autonomy, as Kantsaw
it, requires contracausal freedom; and he believed that in the unique
experience of the moral ought we are "given" a "fact of reason" that
unquestionablyshowsus thatwepossesssuchfreedom asmembers of
anoumenalrealm.Readerswhohold,asIdo,thatourexperienceofthe
moraloughtshows us no suchthingwillthinkofhis version ofauton
omy as an invention rather than an explanation.2 Those with different
views on freedom and morality may wish that I had called this book
The Discovery ofAutonomy. We can probably agree that Kant's moral
thoughtisashardtounderstandasitisoriginalandprofound.System
atic studiesfrom Patonand Beckto the presenthave greatlyimproved
our critical grasp of his position. In this book I try to broaden our
historical comprehension of Kant's moral philosophy by relating it to
the earlier work to which it was a response.
1 "Leibniz dachte sich eine einfache Substanz, die nichts als dunkle Vorstell
ungen hatte, and nannte sie eine schlummernde Monade. Hier hatte er night diese
Monadeerklart,sondernerdacht;dennderBegriffderselbewarihmnichtgegeben,
sondernvonihmerschaffenworden." GesammelteSchriften2.277;TP, 249wherethe
translationissomewhatdifferent.Seealso CritiqueofPureReason A729=B757.
2 Fora compactand learned review ofthe history ofthe term, seePohlmann
1971. Initially standingfor a politicalconception inGreek thought, the term came
to be used in religious controversies during the Reformation; but its main use in
earlymoderntimeswasinpoliticaldiscussions.Kantseemstohavebeenthefirstto
assign broader significance to it, using it in his theoretical as well as his practical
philosophy.
3
Introduction
4
i. Moral philosophy and social change
There are reasons beyond the particular importance of Kant's own
views for studying the history of the moral thought out ofwhich they
emerged.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries established con
ceptionsofmoralityas obediencecameincreasinglytobecontestedby
emergingconceptionsofmoralityasself-governance.Ontheoldercon
ception, moralityis to be understood nlost deeply as one aspect ofthe
obediencewe owe to God. In addition, most ofus are ina moralposi
tioninwhichwe must obeyotherhumanbeings. God's authorityover
..allofusismadeknowntousbyreasonaswellasbyrevelationandthe
clergy.Butwearenotallequallyabletoseeforourselveswhatn10rality
requires. Even ifeveryone has the most fundamental laws ofmorality
writtenintheirheartsorconsciences,mostpeopleneedtobeinstructed
bysomeappropriateauthorityaboutwhatismorallyrequiredinpartic
ular cases. And because most people usually do not understand the
reasons for doingwhat moralitydirects, threats ofpunishment as well
as offers of reward are necessary in order to assure sufficient com
pliance to bring about moral order.
The new outlookthatemergedbythe end ofthe eighteenthcentury
centeredonthebeliefthatallnormalindividualsareequallyabletolive
together in a morality ofself-governance. All ofus, on this view, have
an equal ability to see for ourselves what morality calls for and are in
principle equallyable to move ourselves to act accordingly, regardless
of threats or rewards from others.3 These two points have come to be
widelyaccepted- sowidelythatmostmoralphilosophynowstartsby
assumingthem. Indailylife they giveus the working assumption that
thepeoplewelivewitharecapableofunderstandingandacknowledg
ing in practice the reasons for the moral constraints we all mutually
expectourselvesandotherstorespect.Weassume,inshort,thatpeople
are equally competent as moral agents unless shown to be otherwise.
Therearemanysubstantivepointsonwhichmodernmoralviewsdiffer
from what was widely accepted at the beginning of the seventeenth
century, but our assumption ofprima facie equal moral competenceis
the deepest and most pervasive difference.
Theconceptionofmoralityasself-governanceprovidesaconceptual
framework for a social space in which we may each rightly claim to
directour own actions withoutinterferencefrom the state, the church,
theneighbors,orthoseclaimingtobebetterorwiserthanwe.Theolder
conception of morality as obedience did not have these implications.
3 Darwall1995,p.8andn.18,·usesanarrowernotionofself-governancethanI
do.
Modemmoral philosophy 5
Theearlymodernmoralphilosophyinwhich the conceptionofmoral
ity as self-governance emerged thus made a vital contribution to the
rise ofthe Western liberal vision of the proper relations between indi
vidualand society. Thatform oflifecouldnothavedevelopedwithout
the work of moral philosophers.
My attribution to moral philosophy of this essential role in aiding
basicsocialchangemayseemsurprising,butitshouldnotbe.Humanly
meaningful differences among individuals and societies are in large
partnotbiological. Theyare culturaland therefore impossiblewithout
shared vocabularies and concepts. This is certainly true of the moral,
political, and religious aspects of life. In these matters we can only be
what we can think and say we are. Philosophical debate in the seven
teenth and eighteenth centuries was a major source of new ways of
conceptualizing our humanity and of discussing it with one another.
Our own moral philosophy carries on from the point to which those
earlier discussions took us. Seeinghow we got to that point is not just
seeinghowwecametoasksomeofthephilosophicalquestionsweare
stillasking.Itisalsoseeinghowwecametoadistinctivelymodernway
of understanding ourselves as moral agents.
ii. Morality and self-governance
Mymainthemeinwhatfollows istheemergenceofvariousconcep
tions ofmoralityas self-governance. As earlyasMachiavelliandMon
taigne there were thinkers who set aside the conception ofmoralityas
obedienceinordertoworkoutanalternative. Butmostofthe philoso
phers who rethoughtmoralityinthe seventeenthand early eighteenth
centuriesdid notintendtoreplacethe olderconceptionwitha concep
tion ofmoralityas self-governance. Theywerefor themostparttrying
to solve problems arising within the older view. Most of them were
hopingtoshowhowChristial1moralitycould continuetoofferhelpful
guidanceintheface ofdifficulties thatno onehadpreviouslyfaced. To
solve the problems that new social and political circumstances posed
for their moral and religious commitments, some of them developed
newwaysofthinkingaboutmoralityandpolitics. Theycouldnothave
foreseen the uses to which later thinkers eventually put their ideas.
Itwasonlyfromabouttheearlyeighteenthcenturythattheeffortto
create a theory of morality as self-governance became self-conscious.
Moralandpoliticalconcernsledincreasingnumbersofphilosophersto
thin.k that the inherited conceptions of morality did not allow for a
proper appreciation of1111man dignity, and therefore did not properly
allow even for the moral teachings of the Christianity that many of
them still accepted. Such concerns had already been strongly voiced
duringtheseventeenthcentury.Eighteenth-centuryphilosopherscould
6 Introduction
therefore draw on the work of predecessors as they sought ways to
develop new understandings of morality. The moral philosophies of
Reid, Bentham, and Kant are the final eighteenth-century efforts to
articulatethenormativebeliefaboutthedignity andworthoftheindi
vidual that led to conceptions of morality as self-governance.4
Kant'sexplanationofthisbeliefwasfullerandmoreradicalthanany
other. He alonewas proposing a truly revoh.ltionary rethinking ofmo
rality. Heheldthatweare self-governingbecauseweare autonomous.
By this he meant that we ourselves legislate the moral law. It is only
becauseofthelegislativeactionofOllrownwillthatweareundermoral
law; and the same action is what always enables everyone to be law
abiding. Kant was the first to argue for autonomy in this strong sense.
His theoryis, ofcourse, ofmorethan historicalinterest. Itismorefully
involved in current philosophical ethics than is the work of any other
early modern thinker, with the possible exception of Hobbes. In the
narrative that follows, therefore, I have kept Kant in mind. Naturally
enough this skews myselectionofphilosophers and topics for presen
tation.ButIhavetriedtogiveafairpresentationofthecomplexdebates
out ofwhich there emerged the questions Kant tried to answer.
Bentham, Reid, and Kant came to questions in moral philosophy
withdifferentconcernsaboutpoliticsandreligion. Iftheyallreadsome
of the same earlier philosophers, continental as well as British, Kant
knew the work of others who were not on the British horizon at all.
MuchofwhathemadeofmoralphilosophywasshapedbyhisGerman
predecessors. Unless we know somethingabout themas wellas about
themorefamiliar thinkersfrom whomhelearned,wewillnotseehow
profoundlydifferentthesourceswerethatcontributedtohisinvention
of autonomy.
iii. Morality and religion
Conceptions of morality as self-governance reject the inequality of
moralcapacityamonghumansthatwasa standard partofconceptions
ofmoralityasobedience.WhatistheroleofGodinthesetwofamiliesof
conceptions?WhatisthemoralbearingofinequalitybetweenGodand
human beings? IfGod's superiority is not acceptable, must all ties be
tweenmoralityandreligionbesevered?Thedebatesabouttheseissues
form another major theme in what follows.
Eventsoutsideofphilosophyitselfwerelargelyresponsibleforstim
ulatingtherethinking ofmoralitythatoccurredintheseventeenthand
eighteenth centuries. The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation
4 Reid'stheoryallowsforself-governancebut,asIpointoutinChapter20.V,it
isnotclearthatBentham'spositiondoes.
Modernmoral philosophy 7
madeanythingtiedtoreligionamatterofcontroversy- andeverything
s
was tied to religion. The warfare that racked Europe almost contin
uously from the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth
century, and the civil conflicts in Britain that lasted almost until the
century's end, were understood in terms of issues about religion. If
God's rule oftheworldastransmittedbytheclergywas theonlyhope
fororder,itcouldwellseemthatpeacewasnottobeobtained.Morality
as interpreted by churches that were themselves rent by sectarian dis
agreements could not provide either an inner sense of community or
external constraints sufficient to make civilized life possible.
Could politics by itself provide those constraints? Repressive force
could indeed keep the peace for a while. But who was to control such
force,andtowhatends?Thequestionswerepressing.Thosewhoasked
them increasingly wanted to be given reasons for submitting to au
thorities whose traditional standing was no longer enough. Religious
controversy affected internalstate authority as much as it did interna
tionalaffairs.Newgroupswithineachpolitybegantodemandaccessto
power, justifying their claims with theories about how governn1ent
should be handled and limited, and who should be involved in it.
Religious strife undermined the claims of clergy to be the sole au
thorities in morals; political strife led ever more people to demand
recognitionasfullycompetenttotakeanactivepartinaffairs. Amoral
ity of self-governance was a better view with which to defend such
claims than previously available theories. The need for new generally
acceptable justifications of authority and the distribution of power
made a rethinking of morality inescapable. Philosophy, appealing to
reasonand nottoanyauthority,seemedanappropriatesourceofhelp.
It is often supposed that the amazing sixteenth- and seventeel1th
century developments in scienceprovided the impetus for new efforts
in philosophy generally, and as part of that, in philosophical ethics.
There is no reason to doubt that the development of science from
Copernicus and Galileo through Newton and on into the eighteenth
centurywasprofoundlyimportantinshapingthecourseofphilosophy.
Butmoralitywouldhaverequiredreexaminationandreshapingevenif
there had been no l1ew science. Without the science, the course that
moral philosophy tookwould no doubt have been quite different. But
theproblemsarisingfromreligiousdissensionandfromcallsforwider
participationinpoliticswere not themselves due to advances in scien
tific kl10wledge. And it was the former, not the latter, that primarily
gave rise to modern moral philosophy.
5 SeeFebvre1982,chs.9andla,forabrilliantdiscussionofhowreligiousbelief
so saturated sixteenth-century Frenchvocabulary that itwas nearly impossible to
thinkbeyond religion, oreventonotice thatonecould notdo so.
8 Introduction
What I have called conceptions of morality as self-governance are
oftenthoughttoresultfromamajoreffortbyEnlightenmentthinkersto
bring about a secularized society. It is assumed that there was an "En
lightenment project" to show that morality had no need of religion
because it had its own, wholly rational, foundations. Modern views of
morality are then assumed to have been thought out as part of this
effort. Ifind the assumptions questionable in several respects.
Therewere,ofcourse,someatheistswhopublishedtheirviewsdur
ing the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Bentham, after all, was
notthefirsttocrusadeforafullysecularmorality. Butthereweremany
rnorepeoplewho,withoutbeingatheists oreven doubters,weretaken
tobeantireligiousonlybecausetheyheldthatinstitLltionalreligionwas
doing great harm. They certainly hoped to see the churches or the
clergyreformed,buttheysoughtnosecularethic.Anticlericalismisnot
atheism.
A wide variety of writers in the latter part of the period I shall be
considering called themselves "enlightened" and wanted others to
think them so. If some were atheists, the majority were not; and they
differed in many other respects as well. Like many other scholars I
consequently do notfind it helpful to think in terms ofa single move
ment ofEnlightenment orAufkliirungor Lumieres, still less ofanything
thatmightbecalled asingleprojectinvolvingallthosewho claimed to
be enlightened.6 The error about moral philosophy and secularizing
enlightenment is particularly egregious.
Briefly, the claimthatthemaineffortofthemoralphilosophyofthe
eighteenthcenturywastosecularizemoralitysimplydoesnotstandup
toeventhemostcursoryinspection. Indeed,ifIwereforced toidentify
something or other as "the Enlightenment project" for morality, I
should saythat itwas the effort to lin1itGod's control over earthlylife
while keeping him essential to morality. Naturally this effort took
different forms, depending on how the relations between God and
morality were conceived.
As I shall be reiterating, there are two basic approaches to keeping
God essential to morality. One is now usually called "voluntarism."7
VoluntaristsholdthatGodcreatedmoralityandimposedituponusby
anarbitraryfiatofhiswill.Heisessentialtomorality,therefore,because
-hecreateditandcanalways,inprinciple,alterit- asheseemstodoon
those rare occasions, such as his commanding Abraham to sacrifice
Isaac, when he intervenes in it. On the other approach, often called
"intellectualism," Goddidnotcreatemorality. Whenhegivesusmoral
6 SeePorterand Teich 1981,and for anoverview,Outram1995,ch. 1.
7 According to the Oxford English Dictionary the term is a nineteenth-century
coinage.