The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization

247 Pages·1989·4.647 MB·English

by  Catherine Sullivan Norton, Catherine Sullivan Norton, Jerrold D. Green

THE INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS OF THE
PALESTINE
LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION
Edited by
AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON
and
MARTIN H. GREENBERG
With a Foreword by
JERROLD D. GREEN
I Southern Illinois University Press
■ Carbondale and Edwardsville
Copyright © 1989 by Augustus Richard Norton and Martin H. Greenberg
All rights reserved
printed in the United States of America
EditecPby Sally Master
Designed by Barbara J. King
Production supervised by Natalia Nadraga
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The International Relations ofthe Palestine Liberation Organization /
edited by Augustus Richard Norton and Martin H. Greenberg,
p. cm.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastinlyah. 2. International
relations. I. Norton, Augustus R. II. Greenberg, Martin Harry.
DS119.7.I497 1989
322.4*2—dcl9 88-29338
ISBN 0-8093-1533-5 CIP
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of
American National* Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence
of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. ©
to
MARION E. NORTON
and
AUGUSTUS NORTON

CONTENTS
Foreword, ix
JERROLD D. GREEN
1. Introduction, 1
AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON
2. The PLO and the Arab Fertile Crescent, 12
R. D. MCLAURIN
3. The PLO as Representative of the
Palestinian People, 59
RASHID KHALIDI
4. The PLO and the Islamic Revolution in Iran, 74
CHRIS P. IOANNIDES
5. The Soviets and the PLO:
The Convenience of Politics, 109
JOHN C. REPPERT
6. The People’s Republic of China and the PLO:
From Honeymoon to Conjugal Routine, 138
RAPHAEL ISRAELI
7. The PLO in Latin America, 166
ROBERT THOMAS BARATTA
8. Auditing the PLO, 196
ADAM ZAGORIN
Appendix: List of PLO Offices Abroad
by the Early 1980s, 209
Select Bibliography, 213
Notes on Contributors, 223
Index, 225

FOREWORD
JERROLD D. GREEN
o modern national liberation movement has been as badly misun­
derstood, both purposely and unintentionally, as the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). Those sympathetic to its aims as
well as those violently opposed to it have failed to come to grips with the true
character of the organization. More specifically, it seems, frequently, to have
been easier or politically more expedient to distort the character of the PLO
than to Understand it as it is. Among those whcrhave adopted this pose are the
obvious—Israel and the United States—and the much less obvious—the
Arab states, the Soviet Union, and Iran.
Only the ideologically most rigid still cling to the notion that the PLO does
not really represent the Palestinians. Yet recognizing Palestinian reliance upon if
not great affection for the PLO accomplishes very little. Furthermore, the
organization*^ failures at least equal its successes and its weaknesses its
strengths. But it is sheer folly for the organization’s friends, foes, and competi­
tors to remain so ill-informed about it. One does not have to love the PLO to
recognize that it is an important organization. It is a significant force in Middle
East politics and is, for many, synonymous with Palestinian nationalism and
self-determination. Why is this the case? What are the strengths and weak­
nesses of the PLO? How does it work? Where does it get its funding? What is its
precise role in Middle East politics, in Great Power rivalry in the region?
For some, these are questions of greater importance than for others. This is
a consequence of the PLO’s major weakness: its uncertain status. Although
the organization has many of the obligations of a sovereign state, it has few of
the rights, allowing those with whom it interacts to dismiss it with great ease
and, at other times, to elevate it out of all proportion. States have territory,
they have capital cities, they have populations living collectively within a
single border, and they have permanent neighbors. For the most part, this is
not the case for the Palestinian people or for the Palestine Liberation
ix
X Foreword
Organization. Those who disagree with the PLO or envy its position can
simply dismiss it, unlike “normal” governments which cannot be shunted.
And just as quickly Arafat can be transformed into a quasi head of state.
Views of the PLO often tell us far more about the viewer than they do about
the Palestinians. There are those who believe that to study the PLO objec­
tively is somehow tantamount to endorsing its agenda or its methods.
However, to evaluate the true role and significance of the PLO we should stop
trying to determine how we feel about it and begin to study it using the same
concepts that we bring to the study of other complex organizations. Those
who deal with the PLO try to have it both ways: they magnify or minimize its
legitimacy, constituency, and significance as a means to enhance their own
political fortunes rather than promote understanding of the PLO itself. The
readers of this volume however, are not dealing with the PLO; they are trying
to comprehend it. And our understanding of the organization has—for too
long—been colored by the actions of political actors rather than by what can
be found in field research, libraries, and disinterested analysis. Position
papers substitute for systematic investigation. Given the rapid and at times
contradictory permutations that characterize international politics, opinions
about the PLO have come to replace facts. And the attitudes of the relevant
actors—both in the Middle East and those dealing with it from afar—are so
contradictory and self-serving that their utility for understanding the PLO is nil.
An obvious example was the abortive attempt initiated by the United States
Congress to force the closure of PLO information offices in the United States
since they are considered to represent a terrorist organization. At the same time,
Secretary of State George Schultz met with two leading PLO supporters,
Professors Edward Said and Ibrahim Abu Lughod. Although the Department of
State attempted to legitimize the meeting by trying to obscure the professors’
political views and portraying them as just “two American citizens,” the two
made no secret of their ties to the PLO and their membership in the Palestinian
National Council. Thus, one branch of the United States government met
with the PLO while another was trying to close down its operations in the US.
This indecision is not unrelated to Israeli perceptions of the PLO. Clearly
Israel knows as much about the PLO as anyone. Certainly the efficiency with
which the Israeli Mossad assassinated Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir) showed a
tactical understanding of the PLO that is probably without peer. Yet Israel’s
problem is ideological/political not military or analytical. As long as Israel
can persuade the world that the PLO is a terrorist group rather than a national
liberation organization, then Israel can continue to treat its conflict with the
Palestinians as a military rather than political one. Put somewhat differently,
Foreword xi
it is easier for Israel to turn all Palestinians into “terrorists” than to accord
them a measure of political recognition as a group with any legitimate
political agenda or aspirations. At this point, given the paralysis that afflicts
the Israeli government, it is simpler to fight with Arafat than to negotiate
with him. Yet even this convenient arrangement has caused Israel a measure
of discomfort and uncertainty.
In the early days of the political insurrection which has engulfed the West
Bank and Gaza, official Israeli pronouncements alternated between accusa­
tions that the PLO was “behind everything” to sober statements that the PLO
had no responsibility at all for the uprising. Blaming the PLO contributed to
the denigration of Palestinian nationalism. This was belied however, by the
Israeli tendency to argue, on alternate days, that the PLO does not represent
the Palestinians and thus could not possibly be behind the insurrection.
Israeli analysts, as opposed to political spokesmen, undoubtedly knew the
true story. But there was something almost comical about the manner in which
the government tried to inflate and deflate the organization simultaneously.
Arabs have also politicized the PLO in a fashion that has distorted general
understanding of it. For example, this was the case at the Amman summit
conference of 1987 where the primary agenda item was Iran and the expansion­
ist policies of Ayatollah Khomeini. King Hussein, who hosted the confer­
ence, used the gathering as a vehicle to shift the focus of Arab politics away
from the Arab-Israel conflict, where little progress was being made, and
toward the Iran-Iraq War which provided a genuine and sorely needed means
to call for Arab unity. In addition, the king was motivated by resentment
toward Yasser Arafat who had not, in Hussein’s opinion, supported their 1985
agreement. The 1985 Hussein-Arafat Agreement was meant to promote an
international peace conference which would embed Palestinian representa­
tion within a broader Jordanian delegation. Although Arafat originally
agreed to this arrangement, vociferous opposition to it in the higher echelons
of the PLO forced him to reconsider. Ultimately the agreement disintegrated
and Hussein felt bitterly betrayed by Arafat. He no doubt took some pleasure
in relegating the Palestine issue, the PLO, and Arafat himself to a back-seat
position in the Amman proceedings. Indeed, in the English language version
of the meeting’s resolutions, the PLO was not even mentioned as it was in the
Arabic. This diminution in the status of the PLO as well as the attendant
humiliation of Arafat illustrate the manner in which the PLO can rise and fall
in importance with far greater ease and speed than can a sovereign state. For
Jordan, as it is for the United States and Israel, the PLO is a political
organization more easily manipulated than dealt with consistently.
xii Foreword
Among others who have a long but inconsistent record of dealing with the
PLO is the Soviet Union. Breaking ties with Israel in 1967, the Soviets have
historically attempted to portray themselves as friends of the “Arab cause”
with a special commitment to the Palestine issue. In recent years however,
the Soviets have recognized that by siding with the Arabs and breaking ties
with Israel they had opted out of a more influential and meaningful role in
Middle East politics. The US, despite its pro-Israel bias, has still been able to
maintain good relations with a number of Arab states in the region. Thus,
while Washington had influence on both sides, Moscow had influence on
only one. In an attempt to assume a position of greater regional influence, the
Soviets have been compelled to temper their support for the PLO somewhat.
This explains the recent meeting in Moscow between Gorbachev and Arafat
in which the Soviet leader indicated that the PLO “was going to have to learn
to live with Israel.” In light of Moscow’s desire to placate the moderate Arab
states and to establish ties with Israel, support for the PLO was downgraded
and the organization demoted, perhaps temporarily.
Iran is another country whose ties with the PLO appear to have changed.
From the euphoria that characterized the first Arafat-Khomeini meeting in
Tehran immediately after the Iranian Revolution, we can trace a definite
cooling between the two. For the early enthusiasm which brought them
together has given way to the fact that the differences that divide them are
more powerful than the factors that could unite them. The PLO is Pan-Arab
in orientation; Iran is Pan-Islamic. The PLO needs broad Arab support by the
very countries that are supporting Iraq against the Islamic Republic. Iran’s
opposition to Israel is abstract; the PLO’s is not. The point is that the realities
of political life have forced the Iranians to turn their attentions elsewhere and
a once close PLO-Iranian tie has fallen victim to the political realities of a
region where pragmatism—not ideology—reigns supreme.
What distinguishes the PLO from virtually every other national liberation
organization is the fact that it has more than twenty-two ethnically, reli­
giously, and linguistically similar states in support of its basic goals. This
strength is also its weakness. Many of these states, in exchange for their
support, make significant demands upon the PLO. This support tempered by
competing demands explains how Yasser Arafat maintains his position and
yet why, at the same time, he appears so indecisive. For a hallmark of Arafat’s
leadership has been his attempt to maintain good relations with all states in
the Arab world. The challenge of satisfying Libya/Egypt or Syria/Iraq
simultaneously, for example, is daunting if not impossible. His efforts have
diluted his credibility while making him difficult to totally dismiss since at