The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity PDF
Preview The Intercorporeal Self: Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity
THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity S C O T T L . M A R R A T T O THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF THE INTERCORPOREAL SELF Merleau-Ponty on Subjectivity scott l. marratto State University of New York Press Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2012 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher. For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production, Kelli W. LeRoux Marketing, Anne M. Valentine Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Marratto, Scott L. (Scott Louis), 1968– The intercorporeal self : Merleau-Ponty on subjectivity / Scott L. Marratto. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 978-1-4384-4231-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908–1961. 2. Subjectivity. I. Title. B2430.M3764M373 2012 194—dc23 2011027049 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 In memory of my mother, Melody McLoughlin CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix List of Abbreviations xi Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Situation and the Embodied Mind 11 I. Mind, Self, World 11 Representation 13 Behavior 15 Situated Cognition 19 II. Perception 22 Sensation 22 Spatiality 28 III. Situated Subjectivity 34 Chapter 2: Making Space 39 I. Subjectivity, Sensation, and Depth 39 Affordance Depth 46 Spectral Depth 48 Spatial ‘Levels’ 54 Time, Space, and Sensation 55 The Depth of the Past 65 II. Learning 66 Chapter 3: Subjectivity and the ‘Style’ of the World 79 I. The ‘Subject’ and the ‘World’ of Situated Cognition 79 Sensorimotor Laws 80 Sensorimotor Subjectivity 85 Ecological Laws 88 Ecological Subjectivity 90 II. Perception and Subjectivity beyond Metaphysics 94 viii CONTENTS Chapter 4: Auto-affection and Alterity 113 I. Presence 113 The ‘Privilege’ of the Present 118 Auto-affection 125 II. The Deconstruction of Presence 128 Derrida’s Appraisal of Husserl’s Phenomenology 128 Derrida on the Lived Body (‘Leib’; ‘le corps propre’) 133 Derrida’s Deconstruction of ‘Intercorporeity’ 139 III. Auto-hetero-affection in Merleau-Ponty 141 Intercorporeity and Intersubjectivity 141 Body Schema 148 Auto-hetero-affection as the Advent of the Intercorporeal Body 155 Chapter 5: Ipseity and Language 165 I. Language and Gesture 165 The Tacit Cogito 169 Perceptual Meaning and Natural Expression 172 The Paradox of Expression 176 Institution 179 II. Diacritical Intercorporeity 181 III. Expression and Subjectivity 187 Conclusion 193 Notes 203 Bibliography 227 Index 235 ACkNOwLEdgmENTS In Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty remarks on the strange manner in which we discover, in a kind of unending process, the patterns of our own thinking only by letting it find its expression in the context of our relations with others. He writes, “There is . . . a taking up of others’ thought through speech, a reflection in others, an ability to think according to others which enriches our own thoughts” (PhP, 179/208). The process of writing a book, which is inevitably a reflection of many con- versations, collaborations, helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions, is particularly exemplary of this philosophical insight. There are a great many people to whom acknowledgment is due, and any list is sure to be incomplete. I would like to express my particu- lar gratitude to John Russon, who has been an inspiring and challenging teacher, mentor, and friend to me. His comments and reflections on this manuscript have been crucial to its development. I am grateful for John’s work as a gifted philosopher and teacher, and also for his efforts in organiz- ing an ongoing philosophical conversation among a group of scholars who have been meeting, for a number of years now, a few days each summer, in Toronto. It has been my privilege to participate in a number of these ‘Toronto Seminars’ to discuss the works of Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Hegel, Heidegger, Plato, and Fichte. The list of participants in these conversations over the years includes Ömer Aygün, Don Beith, Noah Moss Brender, Susan Bredlau, David Ciavatta, Peter Costello, Bruce Gilbert, Jill Gilbert, Shannon Hoff, Kirsten Jacobson, Kym Maclaren, David Morris, Alexandra Morrison, Gregory Recco, and Maria Talero. These conversations have shaped my own approach to the practice of philosophy as well as my interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, and I am grateful to all of them. My exploration of the relationship between Merleau-Ponty’s phenom- enology and Derrida’s ‘deconstruction,’ reflected in chapters 4 and 5 of this book, began with a paper that I presented at the Collegium Phaenomeno- logicum in Città di Castello, Italy, in 2006. I am grateful to the coordinator of that year’s Collegium, Michael Naas, and to those participants and faculty who have shared insights and helpful comments in the course of an ongoing philosophical conversation. I am thinking, in particular, of Bryan Bannon, ix
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