The Innovation Complex The Innovation Complex Cities, Tech, and the New Economy SHARON ZUKIN 1 1 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress ISBN 978– 0– 19– 008383– 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America Innovation: A Trigger Warning Everyone talks about the “innovation economy,” but no one knows exactly where it begins. If “innovation” means new businesses and new ways of working that depend on digital technology, we can trace its origins to mid- twentieth- century centers of research and electronics production like California’s Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Boston. But if we want to know about the current era of “platform capitalism,” we look for innovation in new centers of software development in every big city of the world, beginning with San Francisco, New York, London, and Shanghai. Moral judg- ments also shape our search. Although critics of the new economy are outraged by precarious labor and digital surveillance, people who work within the self- styled “tech community” prefer an aspi- rational discourse of “innovation and entrepreneurship.” Yet one thing is sure despite contrasting views. Cities today are crucial sites for both the creation of—a nd resistance to—a powerful interplay of land, labor, culture, and capital that forms the base of the new economy: the “innovation complex.” As this phrase implies, the new economy has material as well as symbolic dimensions. On the material side, city leaders build multiple sites or “complexes” of buildings for technological viii The InnovaTIon Complex innovation to occur; symbolically, they manifest a psychological “complex” or cultural anxiety about controlling innovation without losing power. They are following the modern narrative of economic growth: with government support, new ideas thrive, businesses invest, and jobs are created. These “fictitious” expectations allow them to imagine a landscape of innovation where everyone prospers.1 The reality is riskier and more complex. Under the radar, the city gov- ernment plays a major role. It subsidizes business investment and special- ized education so that tech companies will create jobs. It sets up tech hubs and innovation districts for real estate developers to thrive. And it deals with tech- related “disruptions” in local markets and communities: ride- hailing services and short- term housing rentals, self-d riving cars and elec- tric scooters, and collection of private data by companies that offer “smart city” gear. Even if they try to ride the tiger of digital innovation, mayors are held in thrall by a larger context: the reshaping of global capitalism. To see how this works, look at The Grid, one of many initiatives the New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) has taken in recent years.2 Like other “partnership networks,” The Grid sets up a working relationship between private- sector tech companies, tech teams in city government, and nonprofit organizations, including local univer- sities, economic development corporations, and business improvement districts. This diverse array of organizations aims to share knowledge and forge innovation; along the way, it will save the city and the world from both economic and environmental disaster. Yet clearly each partner hopes to gain something from the arrangement: investment capital, procurement or training contracts, or jobs. Now, look at Jeff Merritt, a member of The Grid’s steering committee. The photo on his website shows a youngish guy with a fashionable amount of light brown stubble. Merritt’s background is in the field called “civic tech”; he has worked on projects for citizens’ participation and democratic gov- ernance with governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations in the United States and overseas. In 2010 he took a job with the current mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, when he held the office of public advocate. After de Blasio was elected mayor in 2012, he appointed Merritt the city’s director of innovation. In that position, Merritt helped to establish the Mayor’s Office of Technology and Innovation. He then moved to his current job as head of IoT + Smart Cities at the World Economic Forum. This is the organization that hosts the highly publicized, annual conferences Innovation: a Trigger Warning ix at Davos for A- list heads of corporations, governments, and research insti- tutions from around the globe. These seemingly trivial facts indicate a stunning reality: local lives and fortunes are inextricably linked to global capital. You see this best in big cities like New York that have emerged as “superstar cities,” centers of the new economy. In these cities, startups bloom, jobs of the future multiply, and a meritocracy trained in digital technology, backed by investors who control deep pools of capital, forms a new, tech- financial elite. But you must know where to look for it. Significant individuals whose names you don’t know and events you’ve never heard of are claiming influence, forging the rules, and shaping the mindset of a young generation. Jeff Merritt’s pres- ence on the steering committee of The Grid helps to connect New York’s innovation complex to the CEOs and organizational leaders of the World Economic Forum. This connection may remind you of the power elite, the term coined by the mid- twentieth- century sociologist C. Wright Mills to describe a new, unified structure of individuals at the top of business corporations, government, and the military—a structure broader in scope, more deeply embedded in national institutions, and more powerful than any local rulers and influencers in history.3 For Mills, the power elite that developed in the 1950s, after World War II, responded to the risks of all-o ut nuclear war and the riches of national markets. Today, a similar elite, based in the ranks of the tech industry and among financial investors, responds to the risks of all- out economic competition and the riches of global markets. Operating through public- private- nonprofit partnerships like The Grid, a tech- financial- governmental elite and its related meritocracy are remaking cities for a new age of global capital. I admit this is a more polemical vision of the new economy than most accounts offer. On the one hand, economists and geographers map a “new geography of jobs” that concentrates a small number of highly paid jobs for highly qualified professionals in a few superstar cities. On the other hand, sociologists and business experts who study innovation focus on processes of informal social networking between organizations that eventually results in marketable products and ideas. Both approaches emphasize the appar- ently determining role of “tech talent”— young, mobile, educated labor— who now want to live and work in cities, a cultural choice that has brought us food halls, bike lanes, and coworking spaces, universal signifiers of the in- novation complex, as well as New York City branches of Google, Facebook, x The InnovaTIon Complex IBM Watson, and a planned HQ2 for Amazon that was only prevented from locating in Long Island City, New York, by widespread protest.4 I would not deny that cultural choices— aspirations, tastes, aesthetic dispositions— have magnified the growing appeal of the new economy and shaped the narratives that it promotes.5 At least as important, however, as the sociologist Manuel Castells saw years ago, is capital, specifically, the un- equal concentration of wealth and markets that gives some cities resources to jump- start new businesses. This is primarily financial capital, of course, but it is also the social capital that connects different actors and organiza- tions in the “startup ecosystem” and the cultural capital that is transmitted from investors to entrepreneurs and tech workers through mentorship and networking in various “pipelines” of the innovation complex, notably uni- versities, accelerators, and coding schools.6 Although most of these processes unfold within the private sector, the city government plays a crucial role. In New York, since the 2008 economic crisis, the city government has led an industrial policy oriented toward the tech industry. Sometimes NYCEDC subsidizes new locations for individual tech companies— excessively so, in working with New York State to bid for Amazon’s HQ2— but it also subsidizes private-s ector and nonprofit part- ners to outfit workspace, set up training programs, and build infrastruc- ture, from tech hubs to ferry lines, that will fill vacant buildings, raise land values, and create future jobs. I suspect this program is shared to a great de- gree by all city governments regardless of who the mayor is or the dominant political party or ideology. Here, though, is the contradiction. The more successful the innovation complex, the less livable the city becomes. One reason is that private inves- tors reap most of the rewards. They justify their gains because of their will- ingness to take risks. Yet, as the economist Mariana Mazzucato says, while governments deserve both moral credit and financial rewards for backing innovation, private equity managers and venture capitalists get too much of both. The great wealth amassed by these investors, and by startup founders and early employees who cash out their equity in an initial public offering (IPO) or sale, floods the city’s housing market. Land values rise too high and too fast for most of the “native” workforce to afford to live there.7 Time after time, we see city governments that are unable or unwilling to capture enough of the financial rewards of innovation to pay for an ad- equate supply of affordable housing, a smoothly functioning mass transit system, and equitable public schools. At worst, the investment boom in a Innovation: a Trigger Warning xi city’s startup ecosystem depends on an unsustainable bubble of real estate speculation, financing by sovereign wealth funds, and visa programs for overseas investors. Yet, in the past few years, the public has awakened to the yawning gap between the wealth of tech titans and workers’ economic insecurity, and between the power of social media platforms and users’ exposure to risk. Awareness of the dark side of the innovation complex has stoked resistance. In Berlin, residents and social activists protested Google’s plan to open of- fices in a gentrifying neighborhood—a nd the company withdrew. In San Jose, the city government asked for more influence in Google’s plans to build affordable housing near its headquarters so that lower- income residents outside the tech workforce would benefit. In New York, members of the city council and state legislature, social activists, and residents showed so much anger toward their exclusion from the bidding process for Amazon’s HQ2, and the state’s and city’s failure to negotiate significant benefits for the immediate community despite granting huge subsidies to Amazon, that the company canceled the deal. Although the governor and mayor claimed this resistance cost New Yorkers the economic development opportunity of their lifetimes, tech companies continued to open offices, the city council proposed broader participation in economic development plans, and planning processes that were already in effect—e xpert reviews, public hearings, step-b y- step nego- tiations and approvals— began to come under greater scrutiny. These are good first steps toward less charismatic but more democratic forms of inno- vation than those represented by tech titans and billion- dollar IPOs. I do not think I am naïve to believe that a city like New York can show us both the promises and perils of the innovation complex. With its expan- sive resources and equally outsize liabilities, New York offers a key testing ground to use innovation for the common good. To begin, we must look at how the innovation complex has been built in that city, brick by byte, since the economic crisis of 2008. For this I offer both a layered history and a crit- ical interpretation, showing how a new economy is put in place, reshaping the city in our time.