the houthi movement (ansar allah)

16 Pages·2015·0.09 MB·English

Przegl¹dStrategiczny2015,nr8
FikriALOGAIL DOI 10.14746/ps.2015.1.28
ArabCulturalAssociation,London
THE HOUTHI MOVEMENT (ANSAR ALLAH) FACING
THE COALITION FORCES
What is after the fall of the government in the hands of the Houthi movement?
WhereisYemenpossiblygoing?Thisarticletriestoanswerquestionsrelatedfutureof
YemenaftertheHouthimovementtookoverpower.Thearticlewillshedlightonwhat
took place in Yemen during and after the Youth Revolution of February 11, 2011 that
wasagainsttheformerregimeofPresidentAliAbdullahSaleh;thearticleaddressesthe
causesthatledtothefallofthestateinthehandsoftheHouthimovement(HM)fol-
lowed by the coalition war that was called for by President Abed Rabbo Mansour
Hadi.1ThecoalitionisformedbytheGulfCorporationCouncil(GCC)andisbacked
byothercountriesincludingtheWest.ThewaragainsttheHouthisisnamedDetermi-
nation Storm.
FromthebeginningoftheDeterminationStorm,theYemeniconflictisontwolev-
els: political and military. The battles are still on the same pace from the time they
started.Nooneofthefightingforcesisabletocontrolthebattle.Thecoalitionforces
ledbySaudiArabiaareunabletochangethebattleonthegroundforthebenefitofthe
forcessupportingPresidentHadi.Ithasnotbeenablesofartoachieveamilitarybal-
ancethatwillallowHaditoreturntothecapitalSana’aorAden.Theachievementis
limited to destroying the military infrastructure of Yemen.
Ontheotherhand,theHouthimilitiasandtheforcesofSaleh(Houthi-Saleh)con-
tinuetheirwaragainsttheYemenisindifferentcities:Aden,Taiz,Al-Dhale,Shabwa,
Marib.ThebattleinMarebisstillopenbetweenHouthi-Salehforcesthetribalforces
thattrytodefendthecity.Inadditiontoallthat,thecityofMukallafellunderthecon-
trolofal-Qaida.2Thereisnovictoryinthiswarsofarasthewarsupporterswouldlike
tosee.ItdoesnotseemintheYemeniscenethatpeaceandsafetyarelooming.Thissit-
uationimpliesarealitythatisfullofchaosandthreatsofregionalwarwherethebattle-
field is Yemen.
ObserversoftheYemeniaffairnoticemuchofthepoliticalanalysesfocusonthere-
sult.Theydidnotaskwhyithappenedandhoweventsacceleratedsoquicklytoendin
awarthatmaythreatenaregionalwar.Whydidthishappen?Theanswertothisimpor-
1 ThelegitimatepresidentofYemen.
2 Al-QaidaannounceditsexistenceinNovember2014andclaimedresponsibilityfortheattacks
onMarch20,2015thatledtothedeathsofmorethan140worshipersinZaydimosquesinSana’a.
Al-Qadaexpands,especiallyinthesouth,takingadvantageofthecollapseofthestateandthesenti-
mentagainstHouthis.
416 FikriALOGAIL
tantquestionwouldgiveaclearvisionforthefutureandananswertothemostimpor-
tant question: what will happen after this war?
INTRODUCTION
Following coming to power in 1978, Saleh involves active actors in power after
strippingthemfromtheirarmedforces.Hetriestofindabalancebetweenthesepowers
andthisledtotheformulationofacommonforumbrellaforall.Therewastheestab-
lishmentof(GPC)in1982.Healsoworkedontheformulationofanationalcharter;the
textsofitrejectaffiliationstoparties,religioussects,regionsandcallsforunity.The
National Charter (almithaq alwatani) has been written in moderate Islamic language
withoutmanydetails.WhentheIranianIslamicRevolutiontookplace,thenorthofYe-
menwelcomedit.Butthisofficialwelcomingoftherevolutionchangedquicklywhen
thewareruptedbetweenIranandIraq.YemenstoodwithandsupportedIraq.Thesup-
porttoIraqagainstIranincludesmilitaryforces.TheYemeniPresidentAliAbdullah
SalehisofthefewArableaderswhovisitedthebattlefieldsatthattime.Yemennotthe
only one among the Arab countries who has this position but all Arab countries sup-
portedIraq.ThisisbecauseIraqwasseenasthedefenderofArabnationalismandthe
Gulffortheliberals.TheeyesofKhomeiniwerethenontheGulf.TheYemenisupport-
ive position to Iraq continued until the end of the war in the late eighties.
ThispositionofYemenisofcoursekeptinthememoryTwelverSectleadershipin
Iran.Thissectdoesnotforgetthewrongsthattookplaceinhistory.Despitethatposi-
tionYemendoesnotcuttieswithIran.Itdidnottakeanysecuritymeasuresagainstany
practicesbytheIranianembassyinSana’aandthearrivalsfromTehran.Therewasnot
anythingonthesurface;YementhoughtitwassafefromwhatisgoingonbetweenIran
andIraq.ButinfacttherewereunderneathpreachingShiiteactivitiesduringtheeight-
ies.ThisisconfirmedbytheYemeniDeputyPrimeMinisterforDefenseandSecurity
Dr. Rashad al-Alimi. He said it in his speech before the parliament in June 2008.
The first thoughtful move according to some observers began in 1982 by Salah
AhmedFlutahwhoestablishedin1986YouthUnion.Partofwhatwastaughtasubject
about the Iranian revolution and its principles. This is taught by Mohammed Badr
Eddin al-Houthi. With the advent of the year 1990, a lot of events accelerated in the
Middle East in favor of the Zaidis in Yemen, including:
– Iraqi-Iranianwarstopped;thenthenegativeYemeniattitudetowardIranisremoved
since Yemen stood with Iraq during that war;
– thedeathofthehard-lineKhomeiniin1989andtheadventofthenewIranianPresi-
dent Hashemi Rafsanjani who tried to lead Iran in his peaceful and friendly policy
withtheMuslimworldnecessitatedthepoliticalchangeintheprincipleofexporting
theIranianrevolution.Theexportofaviolentrevolutionchangedintosoftexportal-
though the same effect if not worse;
– thereunificationofYemenin1990producedanimportantbasisofthepoliticaland
intellectualpluralism.Thispoliticalshiftallowstheestablishmentofpoliticalparties
thatbenefitedZaidiactiviststobuildtieswithIranandtookadvantagetobuildtheir
political agenda.
TheHouthiMovement(AnsarAllah)FacingtheCoalitionForces 417
THEBEGINNINGOFTHEHOUTHIMOVEMENT
–ORGANIZINGTHEYOUTHFEDERATION
The group of Believing Youth, which was built on the remains of the group Youth
FederationappearedwiththeYemeniunityandtheDeclarationofpoliticalpluralismin
1990.Itbeganitsactivitieswithmanysummerculturalcentersthatteachreligioussci-
encesoftheZaididoctrineunderthesupervisionofanumberofZaidischolarsinthe
provinceofSaada.ThiswaschairedbySheikhMohammedYahyaSalemAzzanatthat
time.Thiswasareligiousandculturalforumthathasnothingtodowithmilitaryorpo-
liticalaction.Thisisinaccordanceoftheestablishmentstatement.MohammedYahya
Azzan–theformerSecretaryGeneraloftheBelievingYouth–says“thattheYouthFed-
erationwasacultural,educationalandintellectualinstitutionconcernedwiththefor-
mationofpersonalreligiousscholarsoftheyoungpeople.Theestablishmentwasfrom
1990to1994.Thiswasthestageofestablishingsowewereputtingamendmentstoev-
erything:recruitingnewworkers,thinkingofstudyingnewthings,introducingnewac-
tivitiesincludingnewideasandvisions.Thustheestablishmentphaselastedallthose
years. Then the boom of the Youth Federation is from 1994 to 1996.”
MohammedAzzansays,“thattheideaoftheBelievingYouthwasreligious:aforum
for the young people to teach them some religious and intellectual classes. It was in-
tendedtoeducatetheyoungpeopleandtogetthemoutofnarrow-mindednessandin-
toleranceandthelikebutBrotherHusseinBadrEddinal-Houthiandadoptedanerror
of a new approach” (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 2007).
In1996,asplitoriginatedwithintheBelievingYouthandaccordingtoMohammed
Azzan:3 “the dispute was about the curriculum; this was in 1999. The difference in-
creasedamongtheBelievingYouthandwekeptthatawayfromothers,fearingothersto
make fun of us. We feared returning to the periods of bickering and exchanging of
chargesagainstdoctrines.Wewanttoclingtowhatisleftofagreements.Afteradebate
andnegotiationslastedforamonthinSana’a,wehadtoaccepttheamendmentsinthe
BelievingYouth.Thisincludestheexpansionofactivitiesonthebasisthatthesummer
centers are to be part of the activities and each year is to be led by a team.”
MohammadAzzansaysin2002theslogansofHusseinBadrEddinal-Houthi(Deathto
America,DeathtoIsrael)appeared.Littlebylittle,thefollowersofshowakindofexagger-
atedreverencetothehandouts,4whichwerewrittenfromaudiotapesrecordings.Theideas
werestrangeforthosewhoknowtheZaidithoughts.M.Azzanconfirmsthatafterknowing
thattheBelievingYouthfoundalotthattheynotagreewith.Theymadeclarificationandat-
tempts to stop or reduce this. They showed that these statements do not represent them.
Theyexplainedtheydonotbeartheconsequences;thatwasnotonlytheirpositionbutthe
position of other religious scientists. The trends began disputes over school districts in
Saada.Thislasteduntilthefirstwarwiththegovernmentin2004(Al-Arabia.net,2007).
3 MohammedAzzanshowshimselfmoreindependentafterhisrefusaltoparticipatewiththeHo-
uthis.HeannouncedhisindependencefromthemthoughheisoneoftheleadersoftheBelievingYo-
uth.HewasremovedbytheHouthisbecauseheisnotfromalal-baytdescents;theHouthimedia
attackhimrecently.
4 Lecturesorhandoutsthatarephotographedanddistributedtostudents.
418 FikriALOGAIL
Husseinal-HouthiwasabletoleadtheBelievingYouthsinceheisseenasareligious
leaderfromtheProphets’descents.UnderthepretextofworkingfortheZaidisectthat
waskidnappedbytheWahhabism–asectspreadinginSaudi–accordingtoHouthis.
HemanagedtoorganizeandsweeptheZaidiregionsthroughthereligiouslessonsthat
wereculturalactivities.Littlebylittle,thisgroupbegantogaingroundintheZaidiar-
eas: Saada, Al-Jawf, Amran, Sana’a, Dhamar and Hajjah. It was Hussein al-Houthi
wholedarebellioninSaada5later(Al-ShareaqAl-Awasat,2007).Heknowswellhe
willnotbeabletooverthrowthegovernmentinYemenatthisstage,especiallytheuni-
fiedYementhatisgeographicallybig,knowingthatthefollowersoftheZaidisectrep-
resents less proportion than it was before unification and as a result of a lot of Zaidi
areasthatbecameSunnisduetodifferentreasons.Therefore,itseemstheHouthishave
agoaltobuildastrongintellectualmovementondoctrinalandsectariangroundsthatis
loyal to the sect to achieve a degree of cohesion among its followers.
TheHouthiwasabletocreatesomeintellectualrelationshipwithIran,wherehestayed
withhisfatherafterthewarof1994.SomesourcesindicatethatHusseinal-Houthireceived
highqualificationinIranandotherArabstatesthathaveShiitepresenceforthesakeofcar-
ryingoutthisroleonthebasisoftheinterestsforbothsides.TheHMfollowedthesame
methodsfollowedbytheShiitegroupsthatarebackedbyIran;whereculturalwork,mili-
tarytraining,mobilizationofsectarianextremismandcreatingasectarianhatredthatcriti-
cizetheexistingsituationbutwithholdtotheprincipleofinjustice–thisistocreateakind
ofanexplosivedevicereadytobeused.TheHouthibeganonthisbasisworkfromhislo-
calityinSaadathathasthesectarianandtriballoyalty.Thenheexpandedtheinfluencein
theareasthathavethesectarianbelief:Al-Jawf,Hajja,DhamarandSana’a.
Itseemstherewerefromthegovernmentwhosoughttotakecareofthismovement
tooperateandrunitsactivitiesunderasafeumbrella.Hereitmustbepointedoutthat
the move of the Houthis towards authority has received broad support from the
Hashemite families and from the Zaidi scholars and judges who are linked with the
Zaididoctrinebothintermsofintellect,benefits,andsocialclass.Inspiteoftheirdenial
ofthesupportinthebeginningbecausethestatestillretainssomeofitsstrengthbutthe
situationchangedafter2011.Itbecameusualtoannouncethattheyareinonelinewith
theHouthis.ThisisseeninmanyoftheinterviewsthatwereconductedbytheHouthi
channel (Al-Masirah) in the streets during the sit-in camps before the fall of Sana’a.
HOUTHIMOVEMENTANDITSRELATIONSHIPWITHIRAN
ForthereadertounderstandtheHMdeeper,onefirsthastoknowthesocialcompo-
nentofthismovementwhichistheYemenisociallayercalledtheHashemitefamily.
5 TheHouthilogicisbasedonsect.MohammedAzzanclaimedinadialoguewithAl-Shareaq
Al-Awasatnewspaper,sayingthatHusseinHouthiwasalientoForum;hesaidthattheYoungForum
wasestablishedonareligiousbasis.TheForumisestablishedinSaadaandmostofthepeoplefrom
theZaidibackgroundbutwewere–andaccordingtoourdocuments–providinganopenvisionto
others.Wemeetwithothersoragreewiththemwheretherearesharedconcepts.Therewasacampa-
ignin1997and1998againstusfromZaidipeoplethatwemakeZaidisectSunni.
TheHouthiMovement(AnsarAllah)FacingtheCoalitionForces 419
This family ruled parts of Yemen in different periods. The revolution of September
1962wasagainstitsrules.YemenwasmovedasaresultfromtheRoyaltotheRepubli-
can system.
Bylookingatthekingsandprincesofthisfamilyoverathousandyears,onecansee
towhatextentthisfamily(theHashemite)hasadoptedforceandviolenceinextending
itsinfluence.Becausethissociallayerhadlivedinanatmosphereofpowerandauthor-
ityforalongperiodbeforetheestablishmentoftheRepublic,ithasequippeditselfdur-
ing those periods – and later to a lesser extent – much of the social, political and
economic privileges. This family felt after the September 1962 revolution that it has
withdrawnthemtheprivilegestheyhadenjoyedbefore.Thegenerationsofthisfamily
inheritedasenseofinjusticeandasenseofnotbeingloyaltytotheRepublic.Through
therecenteventsinYemenandthesupportgiventotheHMfromthesefamilies(the
Hashemite)inZaidiareas,wecansayforsurethattheywerethroughouttherepublican
eralookingbacktotheroyalruling.Thisiswhatalreadyoccurredwiththeemergence
oftheHM.ItwasnotunusualforthemajorityoftheHashemitefamilyintheZaidiar-
eas(Saada,Al-Jawf,Amran,Sana’a,DhamarandHajjah)tojointhisnewmovement.
Thissupportiseitherstraightforwardorthroughthelogisticsupportfrompoliticalin-
stitutional sites here and there.
ThesealonewerenottheelementsofpowerintheHM.Themovementhasbeen
able to recruit the remnants of the Hashemite loyalty among some families and
tribesintheZaidiareas;forthismostfightersofthismovementarefromtheseareas
whodonothavequalificationsexceptcarryingguns.ItisfromthismixturetheHM
was formed.
Oneoftheelementsthathelpedthemovementtoachievestronglinkageswithtribes
isthecharacteristicsthatthesetribeshave.ThemajorityoftheseareasbelongtoZaidi
Doctrine.Thusthesectarianinterestmeetsthefamilyloyaltiestoformtheidentity(Doc-
trineandTribe)oftheseareas.Theaffiliationofthemajorityoftheseareasiseitherreli-
gious (being Hashemite) or supporters of the Hashemite. In these areas illiteracy and
ignorancedominateandlessEducationinthoseareas.Theseareasareclosedandtheylit-
tlemixwithothersduetodifficultgeographyorculturalcloseness.Thesemakethesear-
eas till recently out of the authority of the country. These areas also lack modern
constructionsandbasicservices(electricity,water,phones,andeducationalorhealthin-
stitutions.Oftenpeopledependonagriculture,grazingortrade;thoseareasarealmostre-
mote places.
Ontheotherhand,manyoftheHashemiteZaidifamilieswereabletobejudgesand
theyhaveaccesstohighpositionsinthegovernment;someministrieslikeEndowment
and Justice were in their hands. This spread in the government institutions helped
Houthisintheirwaragainstthegovernment.Thesewerelikethehiddensupportersfor
the Houthis and part of the political agenda for them.
InaletterbyBadrEddinal-HouthitoJawadal-Shahristani,thereiswhatrefers
tothat.Thelettersays:“Wehavefullknowledgeofwhatgoesoninthecorridorsof
therulingregimeduetothepresenceofsecurityagentsinpower;theseagentsare
closetothemembersofthemovement.Weknowouropponentsofseniorofficials.
Theydonotknowthatwehavefiveministersbetweensupportersandadvocatesof
our movement. We have four of the governors of the followers who harbor evil of
420 FikriALOGAIL
the unjust rules in broad daylight. They work to support Believing Youth without
fear.”6
In addition to this the Houthis were able to gain the sympathy of people and win
their love in areas suffering from poverty. They adopted charitable and humanitarian
workintheseareasthatwereignoredbythegovernment.Thecharitableorganizations
usuallydonotreachtheseareas.Theyusuallyarelimitedwiththeiractivitiestotheout-
skirtsofmajorcities.Theypresentedareligiousspeechthattouchesthepeople’sneeds
andaccordingtothesectarianvision.ThereforethelecturesofHusseinal-Houthicame
mostly in simple colloquial dialect free of any complexity.
AmongtheissuesadoptedbytheHMiswhatwassaidbyAbdul-Malikal-Houthi,
thecurrentleaderofthemovement7wherehesaid:“HMisakindofpublicgroupsthat
movepeacefullytoopposetheUS-IsraeliattackontheIslamicworldthroughthefa-
mousslogan:DeathtoAmerica.DeathtoIsrael,CursetheJews,VictorytoIslam.They
calltoboycottAmericanandIsraeligoodsandthedisseminationofQuranicculturein
the face of ideological invasion. The movement is not a political party.” (Al-Akhbar,
2008).ThemobilizationagainstIsraelandAmericahasitsacceptanceinYemenitribal
circlesthathaveemotionfortheArabandIslamicissues.TheHouthisloganislikeare-
sponse to a sentiment in the hearts of the Yemenis in those areas who stood in many
cases with the Muslim issues both east and west.
The presence of weapons under the influence of the Zaidi areas helped to acquire
weapons. One of the main arms markets in the area is in Saada (Al-Talh area). This
givesthemovementtheabilitytosupplyandprovideammunitiontoitsfollowers.Itis
knownalsothatarmsareavailableinmanynorthernprovinces;oftentribesacquiredif-
ferent and varied weapons.
Theincreaseofpeople’sdissatisfactionwiththerulingregimeandtheircomplaints
openedthewayfortheHMtoputtheideaofalternativesforthegovernment:eitherto
return to the Imamate – according to the letter of Badr Eddin al-Houthi to Jawad
al-Shahristaniorthecoupagainsttheregime.Abdul-Malikhaspointedoutthatmost
Yemenisagreeon“thetyrannyoftheregimeandthatitprovidedthepeoplewithonly
ignorance,disease,waranddestruction,”andthatmostofthemunanimouslyagreeon
theneedtochangethisreality.Thisisanimportantstepthatcouldbefollowedbyother
steps(coordinationofpositionsandefforts,includingchangeofthetragicanddarkre-
alityexperiencedbytheoppressedYemenipeople.“HealsoexpressedthatAliSaleh
regime has no legitimacy. One asks does mean religious legitimacy; there is no reli-
giouslegitimateforanyunjustrulers:whetherunderthenameofimam,president,king
orprince.Iftheintendedlegitimacyreferstodemocracy,therehastobesomecoordina-
tionbetweenpracticeofdemocracyandgovernance.Asforwhynotresorttoconstitu-
tionalinstitutionsratherthantakeuparms?Wedidnotcarryarmsinordertoachieve
certain ambitions; we are active culturally, socially, politically and through peaceful
6 LetterofBadrAldinal-HouthiToJawadal-Shahristanisentbeforeyearsandwaspublishedby
severalMedia,e.g.SiteMaribPressin10/25/2008.Thoughthiswasnotdocumentedbutistheseissu-
esareclosertoreality.Thedetailsofthedocumentedwerepublishedinbook(Al-Zaharwaal-Hajar,
p.353–355).ItwasRe-publishedinabook(BawaeqRafidahtal-Yaman).
7 HetookovertheleadershipofthemovementafterthedeathofhisbrotherHusseinin2004.
TheHouthiMovement(AnsarAllah)FacingtheCoalitionForces 421
means.Thegovernmentistheonethattookuparmsagainstusandtreateduswithvio-
lence and without justification.” (Al-Akhbar, 2008).
Tryingtosettheimamisseenasawaytofindreligiousauthority.Inthisway,the
Houthisaretryingtocometothisendandthroughstages.HereHouthismeetwiththe
Iranianrevolutioninthegoalofrestoringtheruleof(al-albaytorforthedescentsofthe
Prophet); this is according to the letter of Badr Eddin to al-Shahristani.
ThestrategypursuedbytheZaidiintheirquestforpoweristohavefaithinthepe-
riodasapoliticalnecessity;theydonotabandonthisstrategy:progressofpretexts:po-
liticalandmilitaryaction.Theirhistoryisfullofexamplesofthis;thefirstmottoisto
calltheprincipalrulertoestablishAl-Shareaorjustice,beingthemainoneresponsible
infrontofGodforapplyingjustice.Thisisfollowedbycalminginjusticesufferedas
aresultofhisoppositiontothedarkness.Thisisfollowedbyseekingtolifttheinjustice
onthevulnerable:combatingcorruptionandthecorrupt.Thisisallunderprovidingad-
viceandfightinginjusticeandevil.ThiscanbeseenintheHMwherethefirstsloganis
toestablishShareaandgetridofAmericandominanceandrejectingtheoneswhohave
tieswithit;hereitreferstoSaleh(hereinSaleh).Afterthatthefirstwarthatwaswaged
in2004,whichendedonlywiththedeathofthemovement’sleaderHusseinal-Houthi,
themovementraisedthesloganofpoliticalandintellectualinjusticetothefollowersof
theZaidisect.TheHouthiswereabletowithstandfiveotherwarsfoughtbytheYemeni
armyagainstthemwiththesupportofmembersoftheIslahPartyandsometribes.This
wentontill2011wherethepoliticalequationwaschanged.Thefriendsofyesterday’s
enemiesbecametoday’sfriends.Therebellionswhowerelivinginthemountainsand
cavesinSaadabecamepartnersintherevolutionagainsttheformerregime.Thatwas
theumbrellaforallpartiesinthecountry.Thenewsloganforallwastooverthrowthe
corrupt regime, including the Houthis.
IthasbeenestimatedthattheHMfollowerswhowerebroughtupunderthisdoc-
trineinaboutfifteenthousandpeople.ThisisaccordingtoseveralinterviewswithMo-
hammedYahyaAzzan.Somefiguresincreasethenumbersintotwenty-fivethousand
people.Theydonotdoubtthesefollowersassupportersofideas,loveandsympathyfor
thestrategypursuedbytheZaidi8intheirquestforpoweristohavefaithintheperiod
asapoliticalnecessity;theydonotabandonthisstrategy:progressofpretexts:political
andmilitaryaction.Theirhistoryisfullofexamplesofthis;thefirstmottoistocallthe
principalrulertoestablishal-Shareaorjustice,beingthemainoneresponsibleinfront
ofGodforapplyingjustice.Thisisfollowedbycalminginjusticesufferedasaresultof
his opposition to the darkness. This is followed by seeking to lift the injustice on the
vulnerable: combating corruption and the corrupt. This is all under providing advice
andfightinginjusticeandevil.ThiscanbeseenintheHMwherethefirstsloganisto
establish Al-Sharea and get rid of American dominance and rejecting the ones who
8 ThepoliticalZaidiexperienceproducedthreetypesofrulers.First:theImamwhohasallthe
conditions.Thesecondistheonewhodidnotmeetallconditionsofleadership.Thethirdtypeofru-
lerscouldbecalledthepoliticalincubatorwheretheImamgrewup.TheImamleadershipinheritedby
positionoftheImamatewithoutregardtothatlistofconditionssetbythetheoristsofthedoctrine.
This appeared in the era of Qasmiyeh State or what some call the third Zaidi state (between the
16th–20thcenturies).
422 FikriALOGAIL
havetieswithit;hereitreferstoSaleh.Afterthatthefirstwarthatwaswagedin2004,
which ended only with the death of the movement’s leader Hussein al-Houthi, the
movementraisedthesloganofpoliticalandintellectualinjusticetothefollowersofthe
Zaidisect.TheHouthiswereabletowithstandfiveotherwarsfoughtbytheYemeni
armyagainstthemwiththesupportofmembersoftheIslahPartyandsometribes.This
wentontill2011wherethepoliticalequationwaschanged.Thefriendsofyesterday’s
enemiesbecametoday’sfriends.Therebellionswhowerelivinginthemountainsand
cavesinSaadabecamepartnersintherevolutionagainsttheformerregime.Thatwas
theumbrellaforallpartiesinthecountry.Thenewsloganforallwastooverthrowthe
corrupt regime, including the Houthis.
The political performance of the Houthis demonstrates intelligence and wisdom;
they raise slogans that stand with the demands of the people. They claim their reluc-
tancetopower;theypresentedindependentcandidatesforthepresidencyofthegov-
ernment. They selected competent and capable scientific and academic candidates,
suchasProfessorAyoubAlHammadi.Thismayrefertothepotentialforcesthatstand
behindtheirplanningandinternallyandexternalsupport.However,onthegroundthey
extend their authority tough they declared their refusal to be part of the government.
Theybecametheforceonthegroundimposedtheirauthoritybyforce.Theyareafter
immediate and future gains and this is obvious to any observer.
ThepopularityofHMincreasedbytheprominenceoftheLebaneseHezbollahin
theArabmediainrecentyears.HezbollahappearedasaresistantIslamicpartythough
itisaShiiteparty.OrdinarycitizensinYemenaccepttheideaofHezbollah’sresistance
andvictory.Thisisinatimewhenthenationneedsaglimmeroflighttofeelproudover
itsenemies.WhathappenedinIraq,whereShiitesareenabledandbecameadominant
forcethatcontrolsthereinsofpowerunderoccupationisdeemedfortheShiiteregion
asthehopetheywouldliketoachieveinthecountriesinwhichtheyhavearelativeand
aninfluentialpresence.IranalsopresentsitselfasastrongstateandasdefenderofIs-
lamintheconfrontationoftheWestandIsrael.IranstoodwiththePalestinians.Thisis
when countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt abandon this role. They even appear as
conspiratorsagainstjihadistmovementsinPalestineandLebanon.Thisisinadditionto
thetendencyoftheShiitestoshowtowardsSunniswhattheydonotreallythinkabout
them–thisispartofbeliefcalledTaqwa–akindofhypocrisytowardstheSunnisby
calling for living with these communities but working to subdue them.
TheseeventsprovidedgroundfortheShiitepreachingintheregionandmarketing
theseideologiesintheSunnicountries;theaimisrevivingthedreamoftheShiiteCres-
cent.Previousscientificandresearcheffortshavewarnedagainstthis.Iranstandsfully
behindthisbecauseofitsimpactonitsnationalagendaandplanofexpansioninthere-
gion,whichhaslongbeendreamedofsincetherevolution.Yemenwasthetargetwithin
reach since it has the Shiite presence that has chances of being able to have power.
The close relation between the Shiite in Iran and the Houthis does not represent
amajorthreattotheintellectualZaidis.Theintereststhatmeetdonotnecessarilyentail
abandoning old beliefs, especially among Shiite communities. They understand each
otherhistoricalandideologicalspecificities.Ontheotherhand,thewelayat-efaqihit-
selfisabreakthroughinthethoughtoftheImamate;itisarevolutioninthetheoryof
waitingfortheexpectedMahdi.Atthesametime,itrepresentsaconvergencewiththe
TheHouthiMovement(AnsarAllah)FacingtheCoalitionForces 423
theoryoftherulingsystemwiththeZaidis.BothseethejuristorIslamicscholarasthe
onewhohastherightofthehighestauthorityinthestate.Welayat-efaqihhasbeenlik-
enedwiththeTwelverFaqihortheguardianwiththeZaidithoughts.Thisiswithasig-
nificant of time difference where the Zaidis have this idea in more than a thousand
years.What’swrongthenfortheHouthisfromtryingapoliticalexperiencethathasits
ancientrootsintheZaidithought?Assumingitisanewexperience,theinnovativearea
offreedomwiththeZaidiscouldacceptthiskindofreligiousgovernmentwithinthere-
publicansystem.ThereisnodoubtthatIranthathaseightymillionpeopleandfourmil-
lionbarrelsofoiladaymakesallShiitessectsintheworldtrytobealliedwithsuch
arichcountryeveniftheyprovideabitofconcessionstopleaseIran,beingtheonly
country in which the Islamic government is Shiite.
Yemen’s interior minister has talked about Iran’s support for the Houthis, saying:
“IrandevoteditsofficialmedialikeTehranradio,Al-Alamchanneltosupportthere-
belsinSaada.”HepointedoutthatthepreviousactingIranianagentwaskeentogoto
Mecca to perform Umrah – he performed Umrah dozens of times; he goes by land
throughSaada.ThisistoprovidematerialsupporttotheHouthis.TheIranianambassa-
dortoSana’ainsistedrepeatedlytogotoUmrahthroughHajjahwherethereisagroup
belongingtotheHouthi;buttheSaudiembassyinSana’arefusedtogivehimUmrah
visabylandandgivehimanoptiontogobyairtogototheholyland.Headdedthatthe
IranianofficialssaytheyarewiththeYemeniunityandagainstsabotage;butrealityis
different.TheinteriorministerurgestheofficialpositioninIrantobeclearonwhatis
happeninginSaada,pointingoutthat,asasecuritypersonheknowsthatIranianintelli-
gencehasamajorroleinmobilizingandrecordingdemonstrationsinthestreetsofTeh-
raninfrontoftheYemeniEmbassytoshowtheirsympathyandsupportfortheHouthi
rebels against the Yemeni government (Eylaph, 2007).
The same accusation repeated by the former Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr
al-Qirbiwhosaid:“IhavealreadyannouncedthepresenceofsomeconnectiontoIran
andLibyaonwhatishappeninginSaada.TheDeputyPrimeMinisterandtheInterior
MinisterexplainedthattheIraniansupportofembracingtheYemenireligiousleaders
intheirinstitutions.Thisisinadditiontothepromotionofterroristactsthroughtheoffi-
cialmedia;thisisincompatiblewiththeIranianofficialconfirmationthatIraniswith
Yemen’sunityandstability.ThisistocalluponbrothersinIrantotranslatethisconcern
intopractice.WithregardtoLibya9(Al-Arabia,2007),wewelcometheirclearposition
and its condemnation of the rebellion in Saada. We requested the funds provided for
someYemenifigurestobegivenfordevelopmentinYemen;thisisthemosteffective
andbeneficialwayforthetwocountriesandtheircommoninterest.”10(GeneralPeo-
ple’s Congress, 2007; Okaz, 2007).
It is no secret that the HM is an Iranian arm in the region, like the Lebanese
Hezbollah.TheIranianleadershavebecomeoutspokenaboutthisfactwherethereisno
9 Al-Qirbiindicatedinastatementdatedon15/5/2007thattheMPYahyaal-HouthiisinLibya.
Hostingal-HouthitheregivessufficientevidenceoftheinvolvementofLibyaanditssupportforthe
Houthis.LibyarefusedtohandhimovertoYemenwhendemandedthroughtheInterpoltocross-qu-
estionhimonsecuritymattersconcerninghisrelationshipwithSaadarebellion.
10 GeneralPeople’sCongressNet(in03/06/2007,quotedfromOkaz(aSaudiArabianewspaper).
424 FikriALOGAIL
needforconfirmation.TheMovementalsorecentlybenefitedfromawaveofhostility
announcedbysomeneighboringcountriesoftheMuslimBrotherhoodandoftheArab
Spring, A number of regimes and political parties found in Houthis a weapon to
overthrowthepowerfulMuslimBrotherhood.ThustheHMhasbenefitedfromso-
cial, historical, sectarian factors as well as from the existing regional and interna-
tional conditions. It also did not miss out to take advantage of the weaknesses in the
government.
ItisexpectedthatthepoliticalfutureoftheHouthiswillnotbemuchdifferentfrom
theLebaneseHezbollah;HouthishavebeenpreparedinadvanceforthisroleinYemen.
TheytooktheirweaponsagainstthecapitalSana’aandothercitiesandtheywillnotac-
cepttobedisarmedinthefuture.Theyarelikelynottoabandontheirweapons;they
will maintain them and use them as a pressure for their political moves.
THEROLEOFTHERULINGREGIMEINMAKINGTHEHOUTHI
MOVEMENT
SincethevictoryofSaleh’sregimein1994waragainstthesouthernpartner,thefor-
merpresidentdecidedtothinkofpassingpowertohiseldersonAhmed.Salehiswell
awareofthesizeoftheobstaclesthatstandinfrontofthisambition.Hedecidedtore-
movetheobstaclesinathoughtfulway.Hebeganwiththeinternalobstacles:First:the
leadersofthemilitaryregionsarepartnersinpower,wealthandregime.Second:thein-
fluentialfamilies,particularlyal-Ahmar,HashedtribeSheikhs.Third:thestrongoppo-
sition parties, particularly the Islah.
Itisimpossibleforthesethreepartiestoacceptthepassingpowerfromfathertoson
andtheyarecapableofpreventingit.Oncethewarendedin1994,Salehbeganworking
ontheimplementationofthisagendaindifferentways.Thebeginningwaswithfour
leadersofthemilitaryareaswhoareconsideredthepillarsoftheregime.Twoofthem
wereeliminatedinahelicopteraccident,whilethethirdwasremovedfromhisjob.The
fourthisthemostintellectual–MajorGeneralAliMohsen–hadanimportantrolein
theeventsoftherevolutionin2011.11AliMohsenisthecommanderoftheFirstBri-
gade. There were several attempts to remove from the scene but they all failed.
Atthesametime,theformerpresidentwasactivelyengagedtoarrangeforeignfiles
to solve the problems, which may constitute an inevitable obstacle before passing
powertotheson.OnthetopofthesefilesistheborderwithSaudiArabia,Oman,and
Eritrea. He succeeded in settling these files and closed them in a manner deemed by
11 AliMohsenthegeneralcommanderofthefirstArmoredBrigaderejectedtobepartoftheregi-
meafterthemassacreonFriday18/03/2011(than70oftheyouthrevolutiondied).Heannouncedhis
supportfortheYouthRevolutionandthathewouldprotectthem.Hisarmyspreadintheareaandsur-
roundsYouthRevolution,protectingthem.Sana’awasdividedintotwoparts:onewithSaleh(contro-
lledbytheRepublicanGuardandCentralSecurityforcesandtheotherwiththeYouthRevolution,
controlledbyAliMohsen).AliMohsen,apillarofSalehsystem,wascalculatinginhispositionwith
theYouthRevolution.Forthis,theYouthRevolutionisstolenfromfourforces:thejointparties,esp.
Islahparty,themilitarycommanderAliMoshen,aswellasreligiousandtriballeaders,esp.Hashed
tribeandfamilyofAl-Ahmar.