The House Rules?

95 Pages·2007·6.72 MB·English

The House Rules? is the final output of a two-year Constitution Unit research project inves-
tigating who runs, and who should run, the House of Commons. In a year in which the Prime
Minister and both major opposition parties have expressed concern about government
dominance of parliament, this report seeks to inform the debate by looking at how much
autonomy the Commons has over its own affairs – in particular its agenda, its committee
system, and its procedures. The authors draw ideas from the legislatures of Scotland, Ger-
many, New Zealand and Australia to set out a programme of reform that would strengthen
the control exercised by backbench MPs and committees over their own institution.
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The report asks: H
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Should MPs and committees have more influence over the parliamentary agenda? e
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Would a ‘business committee’ of the kind existing in other parliaments be a good idea? le
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Could the power of the Speaker or others to ‘speak for parliament’ be enhanced? In
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Could the way that committee members are chosen be improved? n
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The report calls for a new logic of parliamentary control and makes 60 recommendations for a
change. But it also argues that there is much to celebrate at Westminster compared to other l le
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parliaments, so future reforms must build upon rather than undermine the healthier aspects so
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of British parliamentary democracy. s
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Dr Meg Russell is Senior Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit, and author of numerous reports cin
and articles on parliament and its reform. In 2000 she published Reforming the House of Lords: g t
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Lessons from Overseas (Oxford University Press). From 2001-03 she was seconded as a full-time e
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adviser to Robin Cook in his role as Leader of the House of Commons. u
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Akash Paun leads the Constitution Unit’s work on devolution as well as conducting research in the m
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area of parliamentary reform. He manages the Devolution Monitoring Programme and edits the Unit’s o
regular newsletter, The Monitor. f t
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The Constitution Unit in the School of Public Policy, UCL, is the UK's foremost research body on ou
s The House Rules?
constitutional reform and comparative constitutional studies. It is independent and non-partisan, e
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and the centre of a wide network of national and international experts. f C
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This research project was funded by The Nuffield Foundation. m
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SCHOOL of PUBLIC POLICY R
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29–30 Tavistock Square ll a
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Meg Russell and Akash Paun
The Constitution Unit
Price: £10 The Constitution Unit
ISBN 1-903903-01-7
October 2007 October 2007
This report is dedicated to Robin Cook, a friend and adviser to this project until his untimely death
in August 2005, and a dedicated defender of parliament.
ISBN1-903903-01-7
PublishedbyTheConstitutionUnit
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UCL(UniversityCollegeLondon)
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WC1H9QU
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Web:www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/
©TheConstitutionUnit,UCL2007
Table of Contents
List of Tables......................................................................................................................... 4
Acknowledgements...............................................................................................................5
Introduction........................................................................................................................... 7
Summaryof recommendations............................................................................................ 9
Control of theCommons: The keyissues......................................................................... 13
The plenary timetable..............................................................................................................................15
The work ofcommittees.........................................................................................................................20
Changing the rules...................................................................................................................................24
Whospeaksforparliament?Individuals..............................................................................................25
Whospeaksforparliament?Co-ordinating bodies.............................................................................28
Experiencein other parliaments........................................................................................ 30
The plenary timetable..............................................................................................................................31
The work ofcommittees.........................................................................................................................44
Changing the rules...................................................................................................................................50
Whospeaksforparliament?Individuals..............................................................................................54
Whospeaksforparliament?Co-ordinating bodies.............................................................................60
Conclusions......................................................................................................................... 65
Reasonstobe cheerful............................................................................................................................65
A new logic ofparliamentary control...................................................................................................67
Specific optionsforchange....................................................................................................................69
Theplenarytimetable...............................................................................................................................70
Appointmentstocommittees.....................................................................................................................77
Changingtherules....................................................................................................................................79
Whospeaksforparliament?Individuals...................................................................................................80
Whospeaksforparliament?Co-ordinatingbodies.....................................................................................81
References........................................................................................................................... 84
Appendices.......................................................................................................................... 90
Appendix A: Standing OrderNo. 14....................................................................................................90
Appendix B: Non-governmenttime by session (% oftotal).............................................................92
Appendix C:RepresentationofLabourrebelsonstanding committees.........................................93
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List of Tables
Table 1: Distribution ofHouse ofCommonsagendatime – in hours(%of total)...........................16
Table 2: Key featuresofthe five comparatorparliaments.....................................................................30
Table 3: Basicsofthe plenary timetable in comparatorparliaments....................................................32
Table 4: Allocation oftime fordifferentpurposes..................................................................................36
Table 5: Control ofthe parliamentary timetable......................................................................................42
Table 6: Basic information aboutcommittees(July 2007).....................................................................44
Table 7: Parliamentarycommittees............................................................................................................48
Table 8: Control ofparliamentary rulesandprocedure..........................................................................53
Table 9: The role ofparliamentary presiding officers.............................................................................56
Table 10: Otherkey individuals..................................................................................................................59
Table 11: Collectiveand coordinating bodieswithinparliament..........................................................62
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Acknowledgements
This report was made possible by the generous support, co-operation and advice of many
individuals, as well as by its funder. The authors warmly acknowledge all those involved in this
collectiveeffort, whilsttaking full responsibility for any shortcomingsin itsfinal product.
We are grateful to the Nuffield Foundation for providing the funding for the project, and for their
thoughtful support which went far beyond the barely financial. Our thanks to the trustees and the
staffofthe Foundation, and particularly toSharonWitherspoon.
The project benefited from the wisdom of an advisory committee, comprising UK and overseas
experts. The UK members of the committee were all interviewed at an early stage of the project,
attended meetings and gave advice on various publications. These members included Rt Hon
Robin Cook MP (until August 2005), Paul Evans, Oonagh Gay, Andrew Kennon, Greg Power,
Lord (Paul) Tyler, Barry Winetrobe, Dr Tony Wright MP (from October 2005) and Rt Hon Sir
George Young MP. Other UK figures interviewed for the project included Sir Alan Hazelhurst,
Robert Rogers, Paul Seaward and Lord (Bernard) Weatherill. Some of these, as well as our formal
advisers, kindly readand commented on thisreport. We thank ofall ofthemfortheirsupport.
The overseas advisers for the project gave help in understanding their institutions, and also in
providing contacts. They were Professor John Uhr (Australia), Professor Elizabeth McLeay (New
Zealand) and Uwe Leonardy (Germany). Invaluable help with setting up of interviews in the
comparator parliaments was provided by Anthony Marinac and Kay Walsh (Australia), Carol
Rankin(NewZealand), JanetSeaton(Scotland)andFrank Sobolewski (Germany).
A lot of other busy people kindly gave up their time to be interviewed for the project, thereby
helping us understand not only the formal rules of the comparator parliaments, but crucially also
their political norms and culture. In Australia these included Senator Andrew Bartlett, Barbara
Belcher, Senator Paul Calvert, Cleaver Elliot, Harry Evans, Senator John Faulkner, Ian Harris,
Senator John Hogg, Tony Levy, Senator Joe Ludwig, Anthony Marinac, Gerard Martin, Peter
Mason, Daryl Melham MP, Don Morris, Senator Andrew Murray, Senator Kerry Nettle, Roger
Price MP, Richard Pye, Margaret Reid, Joanne Towner, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Robyn
Webber and Bernard Wright. In Germany they included Martina Krogmann, MdB, Uwe Küster,
MdB, Christian Majewski, Ulrich Maurer, MdB, Wolfgang Müller, Ulrich Schöler, Frank
Sobolewski, Thomas Strobl, MdB and Jörg van Essen, MdB. In New Zealand they included
Debbie Angus, Tim Barnett MP, Hon Dr Michael Cullen MP, Te Ururoa Flavell MP, Joel George,
Mary Harris, Rodney Hide MP, Hon Doug Kidd, John Martin, David McGee, Rt Hon Sir
Geoffrey Palmer, Fay Paterson, Amanda Powell, Louise Sparrer, Lindsay Tisch and Hon Margaret
Wilson MP. In Scotland they included Mark Ballard MSP, Lee Bridges, Patricia Ferguson MSP,
Phil Gallie MSP, Donald Gorrie MSP, Ken Hughes, David McGill, Des McNulty MSP, Andrew
Mylne, Nora Radcliffe MSP, George Reid MSP, John Scott MSP, Janet Seaton, John Swinney MSP,
Bill Thomson, Murray ToshMSPand ElizabethWatson.
At an early stage of the project we published an ‘Issues and Questions’ paper, and we are grateful
to all of those who took the time to respond. These included several MPs, clerks of the House of
Commons, and others. Some oftheirresponsesare quotedin the text.
Last but not least, we benefited from the help of various interns based at the Constitution Unit.
Research help was provided by Mark Glover, René Holbach, Vilhelm Öberg and Max Shapiro.
Significanthelp in preparing thisreportforpublication wasprovided by OrlaBerry.
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TheHouseRules?International lessonsforenhancingtheautonomyof theHouse of Commons
Introduction
This report is the final output of a two-year Constitution Unit research project on ‘The
Governance ofParliament’, funded by the Nuffield Foundation. The purpose ofthe projectwasto
look in detail at the internal organisation of the House of Commons with a view to making
proposalsfor strengthening itsability tocontrol its ownbusiness.
The principal research question addressed is how much autonomy the Commons has, and how
much it should have, over its own affairs. That is, its agenda, its internal appointments processes,
and its rules and procedures. Concerns about these issues have long been shared by parliamentary
reformers inside and outside parliament. Inrecentyearsa numberof relevantcontroversies– most
notably over committee appointments and the power to recall parliament during recess – have
brought these issues to broader public and political attention. These have helped feed a growing
sense that parliament is in decline, with insufficient influence over the governance of the country
(see, forinstance, PowerCommission 2006).
The current frustrations can be explained by reference to Anthony King’s seminal article on the
different ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations (1976). The most visible aspect of Westminster
parliamentary democracy is the confrontation between government and opposition – as
symbolised in the weekly sparring match of Prime Minister’s Question Time. But this ‘opposition
mode’ of executive-legislative relations is only one of several that could exist. There is also an
intra-party mode, where government ministers are kept in check (largely behind closed doors) by
their own backbenchers. What King found far less evidence of was the ‘cross-party’ mode, in
which MPs from across the House work together, in particular to call government to account.
This might be expected to form the heart of executive-legislative relations, but was found by King
to be weak. Thirty years on, in today’s Britain, the ‘opposition mode’ looks increasingly outdated.
We have seen declining party loyalties outside parliament (Dalton 2002; Webb 2002), and a rise in
backbench independence at Westminster (Cowley 2002, 2005), fed to some extent by the growth
of expert select committees (Natzler and Hutton 2005; Seaward and Silk 2003). A rebalancing of
parliamentary democracy from the ‘opposition’ to the ‘cross-party’ mode of activity would
therefore chime withboththe tenorofcurrentpolitical debate and recenttrendsatWestminster.
All three major parties have now responded to this disquiet. A central theme of the Conservative
Party’s Democracy Taskforce has been to ‘to restore and enhance the role of the House of
Commons in our political life’ (2007: 1), while a recent Liberal Democrat policy paper sought ‘to
empower Parliament …[and] reinforce the dependence of the government on Parliament for its
authority and legitimacy’ (Liberal Democrats 2007: 2). Most significantly, in July 2007, Gordon
Brown indicated the importance that he attaches to this issue in his first prime ministerial
statement to the Commons, on constitutional reform.1 In presenting this package one of the
government’s stated intentions was to ‘rebalance power between Parliament and Government’
(Ministry of Justice 2007: 11). Many of the proposals in its Green Paper clearly do this – for
example by giving parliament the right to vote on sending troops to war, to ratify international
treaties, and to recall and dissolve itself. But there are also many other important steps that could
be taken in order to give greater control of parliament to its members. Our proposals are therefore
consistent with the direction in which all parties have indicated that they want to go, and offer
detailedsuggestionsforfurtherreformsin thisdirection.
1HouseofCommonsHansard,3July2007,Cols.815-820.
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TheHouseRules?International lessonsforenhancingtheautonomyof theHouse of Commons
The methodology used in this research project began with detailed study of the procedures and
structures of the House of Commons, supplemented by interviewing key individuals within
Westminster and reviewing the recent history of parliamentary reform debates. We also undertook
a consultation exercise on the main themes of the project, inviting responses to a brief ‘Issues and
Questions Paper’ (Russell & Paun 2006a), some of which are integrated below. However the key
element of the project was its international comparative research. We looked to five parliamentary
chambers from across the world for lessons as to how the Commons might be organised
differently andbetter. The ScottishParliamentwaschosenbecause itwasdesigned asa ‘Parliament
with a purpose’ (Winetrobe 2001), intended to improve upon the Westminster system by fostering
a non-partisan and more inclusive form of politics. The New Zealand House of Representatives
was formerly regardedas ‘more Westminster than Westminster’ due to its history of overwhelming
executive dominance and stable single-party government. But following a shift to proportional
representation in 1996 it underwent a radical set of organisational and procedural changes that
might offer inspiration for the UK. Also in the Westminster tradition, we looked to the Australian
Commonwealth Parliament, where the majoritarian House of Representatives has much in
common with our House of Commons, while the Senate has developed many procedural
innovationssince its switchtoa proportional electoral systemin 1948. Andfinally, we turnedtoan
example from the continental European tradition, the German Bundestag, which is of similar size
to the House of Commons, is elected by a highly proportional system, but usually delivers stable
(coalition) majority government. In each case we conducted desk research, followed by study visits
during which interviews were conducted with parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, and other local
experts.
The structure of the rest of the report reflects this methodology. It starts with an analysis of how
the House ofCommons worksatpresent in terms ofcontrol of its timetable, itscommittee system
(including the appointments process), and its procedures and rules. We also consider the roles of
various individuals and bodies who might embody the Commons as a collective, and could
therefore play an important role in ‘speaking for’ the chamber as a whole. This is followed by the
comparative sections, which explore the operation of our five comparator chambers in each of
these fields respectively, in search of lessons for the UK. The concluding sections of the report
then look at lessons that can be drawn from ourcomparative work. Here we start by highlighting a
number of ways in which Westminster represents a positive rather than negative model of
parliamentary autonomy. We discuss how a new logic of parliamentary control – giving greater
autonomy to members – might replace the status quo. Finally, we concentrate in detail on those
areas where improvements to the Commons are both desirable and feasible, setting out our
recommendationsforchange. These are summarised below, before the mainbody ofthe report.
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TheHouseRules?International lessonsforenhancingtheautonomyof theHouse of Commons
Summary of recommendations
A full discussion of our recommendations is included in the last section of the report. The
following isa summary ofthe key points.
The plenary timetable
Schedulingnon-governmenttime
1. The radical option would be to turn the current logic of standing order no. 14 on its head, by
limiting government time on the agenda to specified periods, and giving precedence to ‘House
Business’ instead. This is the logic used in the Australian Senate, and would return the
Commonstoa situation similartothatbefore Balfour’sreformsof1902.
2. An alternative is to specify further categories of business which have guaranteed time,
including committee businessandprocedural matters.
3. The best solution may be to establish a far clearer dichotomy between ‘government time’ and
time for‘House Business’ or‘backbenchbusiness’, withthe latterguaranteeda largerandmore
regularblock ofagenda time.
4. A reconsolidation of existing time (without the loss of private members’ Fridays or members’
adjournment debates) should result in at least half a day, and up to a full day, per week being
given over to House Business. This should be on Tuesday or Wednesday to ensure that it is in
‘prime time’.
5. It is an important principle that members should be able to force votes on House Business.
This would enable committees to force decisions ontheir reports, and the House to express its
view collectively onissues ofcurrentpublic importance.
6. Standing orders should continue to set out, as they do now, a minimum allocation of time for
private members’ billsand fordebating committee reports.
7. Crucially, if there is a new category of House Business, the responsibility for allocating time
between different items of business on this part of the agenda should no longer rest with the
‘usual channels’, whichgive primary control tothe governmentChiefWhip.
8. A new committee made up of backbenchers (the ‘Backbench Business Committee’) should be
established todetermine the timetable ofHouse Business.
9. The Backbench Business Committee should have responsibility for scheduling different items
in the regular House Business slot, within the confines set out in standing orders. It might also
be givensome control overprogramming on private members’ Fridays.
10. To ensure that members’ and committee business is clearly separate, and freed from the
control of the whips, the new Backbench Business Committee should have no role in
timetabling governmentbusiness.
11. While we do not propose that opposition days should be considered House Business,
opposition parties should have a right to demand a half-day debate be scheduled within five
days, as recommended by the Conservative Democracy Taskforce, and to exchange some of
their days for government statements on specified topics as recommended by the Hansard
Society in 2001.
12. The BackbenchBusiness Committee should have broad representation from acrossthe House,
and be wholly made up of backbench members. It might comprise, say, ten members drawn
proportionately from across the House, who could be elected in their party groups. The chair
of the Liaison Committee, and possibly the chair of the Procedure Committee, should sit as
ex-officio members. The committee should be chaired by one ofthe DeputySpeakers.
13. It is extremely important that drawing up a draft schedule does not fall, de facto, into the
hands of the whips (as has occurred with respect to business committees elsewhere).
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