THE HOMO IMAGO DEI MOTIF AND OF IBN 'ARABI IN THE INSHA'

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THE HOMO IMAGO DEI MOTIF AND
THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC METAPHYSICS
OF IBN 'ARABI IN THE INSHA' AL-DAWA'IR
TAKESHITA* MASATAKA
I. Introduction
"God created Adam in His own Image." This famous hadith, which
motif, Dei puzzled many Muslim theologians.imago the homo Biblical expresses
Ghazali dealt with it in many of his books.(1) In the Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din he
himinduce the is to will nothing key a great which hints mystery that this hadith
to divulge.(2) In one he of his most di-the esoteric works, al-Anwar, Mishkat
it motifDei more fully.(3) scusses But it Ibn 'Arabi is imago who used the homo
as the basis of his epistemology. Also his celebrated doctrine of the Perfect
Man is related al-kamil) closely (al-insdn to it.(4) Although the above hadith
and the again appears and al-Hikam major Fusus the al-works, again his in two
the most and systematic al-Makkiya, Futuhat lucid imagotreatment of the homo
al-Dawa'ir,(5) the central themein found Insha' the the treatise, small is motif Dei
of which is the rank supreme of man, who is created in the image of God.
Indeed it is with the allusion to that this hadith Biblical the treatise begins.(6)
Ibn 'Arabihow al-Dawa'ir Insha' the of basis the on paper show In I try to this
and how this in epistemologymotif epistemology Dei his imago the homo employs
that his man assertion the for andall the basis center the is of existents furnishes
the link which God connects and the universe. the First we partshall discuss
devoted to the analysis of existence and non-existence. This analysis serves
as an introduction to his epistemology. we Secondly, shall treat epistemology
plays an motif itself. important Dei role. image It here is that Lastly,the homo
the central theme of the treatise, man's supreme in position the universe, will
be analysed.(7)
* candidate, The University of Chicago.D. Ph.
111
II. Ibn 'Arabi's Analysis of Existence(8)
The first point he makes is that existence is identical with the existent;
therefore, it is neither an addition to the existent nor is it an abstract concept
separate from the existent, although our imagination conceives it (wahm) to be so.
And he rejects the essentialists' view that "existence" is a quality which things
come to possess when they come into Existence.(9)
1) The First Meaning of Existence
Ibn 'Arabi uses the curious metaphor of a house to illustrate the essentialists'
view of existence as a quality. Their view that a thing enters the house of
existence simply means that a thing comes into existence in concreto. And he
defines this meaning of existence as the affirmation of concrete existence of a
thing, and non-existence as the negation of it.
2) The Second Meaning of Existence
Once the existence in of concreto something is affirmed, "existence" and
"non-existence" can be said of the same subject in relation to a place. So once
is Zayd's affirmed, we existence can in concreto say that Zayd does not exist in the
house. But in this sense, "existence" not is a quality (wasf) like red or white, be-
cause if so, the two qualities would be mutually exclusive, but "existence" and
"non-existence" can be attributed at the same time to the same subject. For
example, one could say, "Zayd is existent in the market, but non-existent in
the house." Thus, he concludes that in this meaning "existence" belongs to
a category of relation (bab al-idafat wa al-nisab) like directions: "right" and
"left" have themselves no meaning, but always they must be used in relation
to something, just as "existence" must be used in relation to some place.
3) The Third Meaning of Existence
So far the meaning of existence is limited to existence but in concreto, is
this the only use of this word? Even if a thing is non-existent isin concreto,
it still possible to apply the word "existent" to that thing in relation to some
sphere? Ibn 'Arabi answers affirmatively. This is the wider sense of existence.
Ibn 'Arabi claims that there are four spheres of existence: existence in concreto,
in knowledge, in pronounced words, and in written words.(10)
Of the above four spheres, only the first two are important, and the
later discussion is centered on them. The first two kinds of existence correspond
to the external existence khariji) (wujud and the mental existence (wujud dhihni)
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THE HOMO IMAGO DEI MOTIF AND THE ANTHROPOCENTRIC METAPHYSICS
of Muslim phliosophers and theologians.(11) But comparing the doctrine of
Ibn 'Arabi and that of Muslim philosophers and theologians, we find that the
former is different from the latter in two points. First Ibn 'Arabi uses the
expression "existence in knowledge" instead of the more common "in the mind
(dhihn)" or "in imagination (wahm, khayal)", although Zayd in knowledge
is nothing else but a mental image of Zayd, as can be seen from the following
passage.
We say "Zayd" with our tongues and thus understand the meaning, or we
write it on a paper and understand the meaning, or Zayd shoud appear
in his concrete existence and we understand the meaning, or we
imagine in our minds while he is absent, and understand the meaning.
And this (last) is existence in knowledge, now all of these ranks are
identical in meaning.(12)
Then why did Ibn 'Arabi here use the more ambiguous expression "existence
in knowledge"? That is because, as will be seen later, immediately after
the classification, he discusses the priority of the first two ranks of existence in
the case of God and of man, and "existence in the mind" or "in imagination"
is ill-suited to God.
The second point peculiar to Ibn 'Arabi is that while theologians took
external existence (wujud khariji) as particular individual existence, and mental
existence (wujud dhihni) as existence of in universals,(13) Ibn 'Arabi "existence
in knowledge" is also particular individual existence. As we have seen in the
above quotation, the existence of Zayd in knowledge is his image in the mind.
The problem of the existence of universals is here not in question.
After the classification, Ibn 'Arabi discusses the problem of the priority of
the first two spheres of existence, and asserts that from the point of view of man,
existence in concreto precedes existence in knowledge, but from the point of view
of God, existence in knowledge precedes existence in because concreto, His
knowledge is eternal, but existence is not. in concreto From this point on, one
must keep in mind the peculiar and consistent parallelism in Ibn 'Arabi's
thought, namely the parallelism between God's knowledge and man's knowledge.
As we have seen above, from the point of view of man, Ibn 'Arabi is a
firm empiricist. According to him, existence is in independent concreto from
existence in knowledge, and the former is the source of the latter. Futhermore,
XVIII Vol. 1982 113
Ibn 'Arabi's concept of knowledge is perceptual. This is why from the point
of view of man, God does not exist in knowledge; God cannot in concreto be
perceived by man; therefore, Ibn 'Arabi reserves the possibility of God's
existence in knowledge hereafter, since the beatific vision in Paradise is
promised in the Qur'an.(14)
Finally Ibn 'Arabi closes his analysis of the third meaning of "existence"
by pointing out that this meaning of "existence" is also not a quality (sifa) of
an existent, because Zayd can be at the same time both existent in the knowledge
of God, and non-existent in concreto. Although Ibn 'Arabi is not explicit, we
can infer from his argument that "existence" in this meaning also belongs to
a category of relation, just like "existence" in the second meaning.
III. Ibn 'Arabi's Classification of the Non-Existent(15)
Ibn 'Arabi classifies non-existents into four classes. The first class is an
absolute non-existent, whose existence is impossible. And he mentions the
partner of God, the son of God, and the wife of God as examples of this
class.(16) The second class is that whose existence is necessary only by pre-
ponderance (of existence over non-existence) in a voluntary way, not in a
necessary way. Any individual of a genus belongs to this class, therefore this
class should be interpreted as "contingents" in the term of Peripatetic philosop-
hers. Every existent except the necessary existent, i. e., God, must be included
in this class. The third kind of non-existent is that whose existence is possible,
however which does not exist in concreto. "The sweetness of water in the sea",
and "the bitterness of something that is sweet" are mentioned as examples of
this class. Imaginary animals such as griffins and phoenixes can be also
included in this class. The fourth kind is that whose existence is not possible
in a voluntary way, although one instance of its genus exists in concreto.(17)
Then Ibn 'Arabi discusses the possibility of knowledge of these four classes
of non-existents. As for the absolute non-existent, Ibn 'Arabi denies any
knowledge of this class. The other three classes can be reducible to existents,
therefore the knowledge of them is possible.
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IV. Ibn 'Arabi's Epistemology
Ibn 'Arabi defines knowledge as follows:
Now we first say that knowledge means a reality (haqiqa) in the mind
(nafs), i. e., a reality which relates itself both to a non-existent and to
an existent, in accordance with its reality on the basis of which it exists
(in the case of an existent), or would exist (in the case of a non-existent),
were it to come into existence. This reality is then knowledge."(18)
This definition of knowledge, although somewhat obscure, extremely is important
to understand one of the most crucial concepts of Ibn 'Arabi, "reality" (haqiqa).
The definition is obscure, because the term "reality" is used twice in the
definition: first is a reality in the mind as knowledge; second is a reality on
the basis of which a thing exists. In my previous article, I have established
that "reality" is interpreted as "abstract, universal concept".(19) It is synony-
mous to "meaning" (ma'na). For instance, man's knowledge of a dog is the
reality of a dog, i. e., "dogness" in the mind. The second reality is "dogness"
in a particular dog which exists in concreto. It seems that Ibn 'Arabi thought
that the reality of a thing is registered in the mind, when man perceives a
thing, and this reality becomes man's knowledge of this thing.(20)
However, according to Ibn 'Arabi, man can only know existents in concreto,
after he perceives them. In the case of man's knowledge the object of know-
ledge is identical with the object of sense-perception. Therfore how can
knowledge relate itself to the non-existent in concreto? In other words, how
can man know the non-existent in concreto such as "griffin" or "phoenix"? Ibn
' Arabi solves this question by introducing the concept of "mithl". He writes:
Knowledge relates itself to the non-existent by relating itself to the
existing "mithl" of the non-existent al-mawjud).(21)(bi-mithlihi
The "mithl" primarily means the copy, i. e., the mental image created
in the mind after the perception of the concrete object. Therefore, it can be
considered an existent in knowledge.(22) Ibn 'Arabi further explains in
more detail the of operandi modus man's knowledge of non-existents in concreto
Vol. XVIII 1982 115
through "mithl".
One of the conditions of knowledge's relation to the object of knowledge
is that one single individual of that genus be existent (in orconcreto),
parts of it be present scattered in different existents, through whose
combination a new existent emerges (in the mind), which you know
while it remains non-existent in concreto. It (the new existent in the
mind) serves as a copy (mithl) for the non-existent. Your knowledge
therefore is only your vision's relation to that existent and to that reality
(haqiqa).(23)
Therefore man's knowledge of a griffin is possible, because all the parts which
constitute a griffin exist scatteredly in different existents, and unlike the case
of the absolute non-existent such as the partner of God, one can combine all
the constituent parts, and the copy of a griffin thus created in the mind becomes
the object of knowledge.
It must be noted that copies are not universals, rather they are particulars,
since they are mental images to which not only knowledge but also vision can
be attached. On the other hand, it is the haqa'iq (realities) which perform
the function of universals in Ibn 'Arabi's metaphysics.
So far, we have discussed knowledge of non-existents in the case of man.
However, Ibn 'Arabi insists on the strict parallelism between man's knowledge
and God's knowledge, therefore the same procedure must operate in the case
of God's knowledge of non-existents. But there are differences between them;
first, in the case of God, knowledge does not depend on the sense-perception
of existents in concreto. He does not perceive creatures which exist in concreto.(24)
Therefore, from the point of view of God, all contingents are, in a way, non-
existents. Thus, God's knowledge of temporal existents operate on the same
principle as man's knowledge of non-existents in concreto.
Secondly, God's knowledge is the perception (idrak) of the differentiated
(mufassal) in the undifferentiated (al-mujmal), while man, on the other hand,
can know the undifferentiated only through the differentiated, namely through
temporal things which occur in the phenomenal universe.(25) Man knows
the undifferentiated only differentiatedly and separately as contingents which
can be both existent and non-existent in concreto. Then, what is the undi-
fferentiated in which God perceives the differentiated? It is here that Ibn
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'Arabi introduces the homo imago Dei motif.
You should know that but for the fact that man exists in the image
('ala al-sura), knowledge would not relate itself to him eternally (az-
alan), because knowledge which relates itself to a temporal thing (al-
hadith) eternally occurs and continues to occur only through the eter-
nally existing image (al-sura al-mawjuda al-qadima) in which man is
created. And the entire universe is created in the image of man.
Therefore the universe also exists in the image in which man is cre-
ated.(26)
Although the above passage is somewhat enigmatic and placed out of context,
it is clear that here the Dei imago homo motif is supplemented by the mundus
motif hominis imago God's eternal knowledge is related to the eternally exi-
sting image, which is nothing but the image of Himself. Although God does
not have any perceptive knowledge of man and the universe, God's knowledge
of them is possible through His knowledge of His image, because both man
and the universe are created in His image. Thus we can conclude that the sole
object of God's knowledge, the undifferentiated in which he can perceive
the differentiated, is this "eternally existing image", i. e., His image. The
above thought of Ibn 'Arabi that God knows only His image acturely is very near
to Ibn Sina's thought that God knows particular existents by knowing Himself.
Indeed, Ibn 'Arabi states this identity of God's self-knowledge with His knowle-
dge of particular existents more explicitly on the basis of the Deiimago homo
motif.
It is necessary that every knower without any exception and specifi-
cation be an existent both in his mind (fi nafsihi) beingand in concreto,
a knower of himself and a perceiver of himself. Every other object
of knowledge either exists in his (a knower's) image ('ala suratihi), in
which case he (a knower) is a mithl (paradigm/copy) of it (that object
of knowledge), or exists in some part of his imge. In this way, one
becomes a knower of the objects of one's knowledge, because he is a
knower of himself. And this self-knowledge governs the objects of
knowledge.(27)
Vol. XVIII 1982 117
The whole passage is unfortunately very obscure. One of the reasons of this
obscurity is that Ibn 'Arabi here makes a vague general statement intentionally
so that it could be applied to both God's and man's knowledge. Therefore it
is necessary to analyse this passage in both cases separately.
First, when we apply the above passage to God's knowledge, his thought
is as follows: God is a knower of Himself, a perceiver of Himself. Therefore,
the first object of His knowledge is Himself. All objects of knowledge other
than Himself either exist in His image entirely or in some part of His image.
In the light Dei imago of motif homo motif, and hominis imago the mundus object
of knowledge which exists entirely in His image must be both man and the
universe. Then he continues to say that God Himself is the copy (mithl) of
man and the universe. However this thought sounds strange. It is because
in the case of God's knowledge, "copy" is obviously not an adequate trans-
lation of "mithl". As was pointed out previously, the exact meaning of "mithl"
is the object of knowledge existing in the mind of a knower. In the case of man,
"mithl" depends on the sense -perception of the existent concreto. in On the other
hand, in the case of God's eternal knowledge, the object of knowledge does not
depend on sense-perception, on the contrary it is clearly stated that from the point
of view of God existence in knowlege precedes existence in concreto. Thus,
in the case of God's knowledge, the best translation of the term "mithl" is
"paradigm", and in this sense, it comes very close to the Platonic Idea (mi -
thal).(28)
When we translate the term "mithl" by "paradigm", the above passage
means that God Himself is the paradigm of man and the universe. On the
other hand, we know from the previous passage that God's sole object of know-
ledge is "the eternally existing image". Therefore the paradigm of man and
the universe nothing is but else the eternally existing imgae In of God.(29) this way,
Ibn 'Arabi interprets Ibn Sina's thought that God only knows Himself as "God
knows His image." And he follows Ibn Sina in his assertion that in the know-
ledge of God, the knower, the knowledge, and the object of knowledge are
one and the same thing. Therefore, the object of God's knowledge, that is,
the Image of God, the paradigm of man and the universe, is ultimately iden-
tical with the knower, i. e., God.
Lastly, as for the objects of knowledge which exist in some part of His
image, they must be particular existents in the universe. They are known
through the differentiated which God perceives in the undifferentiated, that is,
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in His image, though He does not have any direct perception of them.
The above argument is basically Ibn 'Arabi's modification of Ibn Sina's
doctrine of God's self-knowledge. However, Ibn 'Arabi emphasizes that the
above of operandi modus knowledge is not only applicable to God, but also to
man.(30) Because of the parallelism between the motifimago mundus hominis
and the Dei imago homo motif, the application to man seems to be easy. Since
the entire universe is created in the image of man, the object of knowledge
which exists in his whole image must be the entire universe. Therefore man
is the paradigm of the universe. The objects of knowledge which exist in some
part of his image must be particular existents of the universe, for the image in
which the universe created is must contain every particular existent in the universe.
Thus, like God, man can know all the particular existents of the universe contained
in image his by knowing his image. If man the is paradigm of the universe, parti-
cular existents contained in image his must be paradigms also particular of existents
in concreto. Therefore, man's knowledge does not need any sense-perception of
existents in concreto. He can know paradigms of particular existents contained
in his image only by perceiving and knowing his image. But here difficulty
arises. The above thought is apparently contradictory to his previous em-
piricist view that from the point of view of man, existence precedesin concreto
existence in knowledge. As we have already pointed out, in the case of man's
knowledge "mithl" should be interpreted as "copy", not as "paradigm". This
basical difference between God's knowledge and man's knowledge disappears,
and they become completely same. Although Ibn 'Arabi does not solve this
contradiction explicitly, it seems that he alluded to the solution in his second
difference between Man's knowledge and God's knowledge. On the basis
of this difference, his solution should be in a following manner: although the
object of knowledge in the mind of man, that is, his image in which the uni-
verse is created, contains all the particulars of the phenomenal universe potenti-
ally, it is still not yet differentiated. Only when one sees a tree forin concreto,
instance, through this tree, is the undifferentiated in his mind differentiated.
To use his own expression, man can know the undifferentiated, that is, his
image, differentiatedly only through the temporal particular existents in the
phenomenal universe.
Then for the third time, Ibn 'Arabi combines Dei motif the imago withhomo
the motif of self-knowledge.
XVIII Vol. 1982 119
If someone exists in the image of something, then this something is
also in his image, so that by the single act of seeing one's own image,
he sees the one who exists in his image huwa 'ala (man suratihi), and by
the single act of knowling himself, he knows the one who exists in his
image (man huwa 'ala suratihi).(31)
The above passage is, like the previous passage, expressed in such general terms
that it can be interpreted in several ways. In the case of God, the first part
of the passage alludes to Dei the motif. imago Biblical homo But Ibn 'Arabi goes
further and suggests that as man exists in the image of God, so does God in
the image of man. Since the image of God and that of man are the same, by
the single act of seeing His own image, He man sees who is created in His own
image and the universe which is in turn created in man's image. By the single
act of knowing Himself, He knows both man and the universe.
In the case of man, this passage can be interpreted in two ways, that is,
with respect to man's relation to the universe, and to God, because of man's
intermediary position between God and the universe. And these two interpre-
tations are possible due to the ambiguity of the phrase "man huwa 'ala suratihi"
which allows two different translations. With respect to man's relation to
the universe, the phrase must be translated as in the above quotation. The uni-
verse exists in the image of man, and man in the image of the universe, and
because of this correspondence, man's self-knowledge amounts to his knowledge
of the universe. However, as was pointed out previously, man's detalied know-
ledge of the universe needs existents in in concreto the universe. Therefore it
would be more adequate to say in the case of man that his knowledge of the
universe amounts to his knowledge of himself.
In the second respect, namely in man's relation to God, the phrase must
be translated by "(he sees/knows) the one in whose image he exists." Then
the whole passage means the identification of man's knowledge of himself with
his knowledge of God. This identification is found in the well-known hadith,
"Whoever knows himself knows his Lord (man 'arafa nafsahu 'arafa rabbahu)",
which Ibn 'Arabi himself quotes later in the Insha' al-Dawa'ir.(32) At first
sight, this doctrine seems contradictory to his theory of the absoulte unknow-
ability of God, which he emphasizes repeatedly. But for Ibn 'Arabi, there is
no contradiction at all. According to him, the God which we can know through
our self-knowledge is different from the absolute transcendent God which has
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