The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention and Aid in Africa

266 Pages·2013·1.01 MB·English

by  Bronwen Everill

The Palgrave Macmillan
The History and Practice of
Humanitarian Intervention
and Aid in Africa
Bronwen Everill
and
Josiah Kaplan
The History and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention
and Aid in Africa
This page intentionally left blank
The History and Practice of
Humanitarian Intervention
and Aid in Africa
Editedby
Bronwen Everill
UniversityofWarwick,UK
and
Josiah Kaplan
UniversityofOxford,UK
Editorialmatter,selection,introductionandconclusion©Bronwen
EverillandJosiahKaplan2013
Foreword©JenniferWelsh2013
Individualchapters©Respectiveauthors2013
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978-1-137-27001-6
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Contents
ForewordbyJenniferWelsh vii
Acknowledgements xiii
NotesonContributors xiv
Introduction:EnduringHumanitarianismsinAfrica 1
BronwenEverillandJosiahKaplan
1 Freetown,FrereTownandtheKatRiverSettlement:
Nineteenth-CenturyHumanitarianInterventionand
PrecursorstoModernRefugeeCamps 23
BronwenEverill
2 PublicHealthorPublicGood?HumanitarianAgendasand
theTreatmentofLeprosyinUganda 43
KathleenVongsathorn
3 ContrabandCharity:GermanHumanitarianismin
ContemporaryKenya 67
NinaBerman
4 ‘Reading’BritishArmedHumanitarianInterventionin
SierraLeone,2000–2 93
JosiahKaplan
5 HumanitarianInterventionintheHornofAfrica 120
ChristopherClapham
6 TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo:TheLandof
HumanitarianInterventions 140
ClaudeKabemba
7 HumanitarianAspectsofInterventionsbytheUnited
NationsinSouthernAfrica 158
ChristopherSaunders
8 TheNigerianCivilWarand‘HumanitarianIntervention’ 176
MichaelAaronson
v
vi Contents
9 BuildingStateEffectiveness:EvolvingDonorApproaches
toGoodGovernanceinSub-SaharanAfrica 197
ClaireLeigh
10 BeyondHumanitarianImperialism:TheDubiousOrigins
of‘HumanitarianIntervention’andSomeRulesforits
Future 217
RichardDrayton
Conclusion 232
BronwenEverillandJosiahKaplan
SelectBibliography 239
Index 244
Foreword
Jennifer Welsh
Itisagreatpleasuretoprovideanintroductiontothisinterdisciplinary
work. I am, indeed, very admiring of the interdisciplinary attempt.
Several years ago, in collaboration with an international lawyer and a
philosopher, I decided to create the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law
and Armed Conflict, where we live interdisciplinarity every day. And
whileitisfantastictogetthemomentumtohavediscussionslikethis,
it does require time and a willingness to listen to how different things
areconceived.
My comments come with the health warning that I am a political
scientist, so I come at the issue of humanitarian intervention from
that perspective. In my own work, however, I have always been very
interestedinthehistoricalrootsofcurrentnorms–andinsomecases,
law – and also the intersection with law. In my own work on classical
thinkers and intervention, my colleagues and I have considered Mill,
Kant,Mazzini,Burke,Grotius,andanumberofotherthinkerswhohave
grappled with ideas of intervention from a moral, political and legal
perspective. It is thus interesting that while the phrase ‘humanitarian
intervention’ may not appear in their works, and while we all need to
beawareoftheSkinneredicttonotreadbackmeaning,Vitorianonethe-
lessdiscusses‘rescueofinnocents’,orinGrotius’case,actionstoprotect
persecutedpopulations.
In the discipline of international relations, the period of the nine-
teenth century is interesting from two perspectives. First, this was the
erainwhichaveryparticularpracticeofsavingforeignnationalsarose,
and which took on the narrow legal term ‘humanitarian intervention’
for much of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
Bythesametoken,however,thissameerasawthepracticedevelopingof
whatwemighttodayrecognizeasamoretwenty-firstcenturyconceptu-
alizationofhumanitarianintervention–asactionstoprotectpersecuted
minorities, predominantly, but not exclusively, Christian. Several texts
from political science explore this point, including, somewhat contro-
versially, Gary Bass’s Freedom’s Battle, in which the author attempts
to develop an argument in favour of humanitarian intervention, and
MarthaFinnamore’swork,whichexplorestheriseofhumanitarianideas
andrationale.
vii
viii Foreword
In my own work, particularlyin the introductionto my edited book
on humanitarian intervention and IR, I have grappled with a particu-
lardefinitionofhumanitarianinterventionwhichhasariseninlawand
practice during the post-1945 period. On the one hand, international
lawyershaveattemptedtonarrowthisphenomenontosomethingvery,
veryspecific:namely,actionwithouttheconsentofthehoststate,firstly,
of a military nature, secondly, unilateral. By unilateral, I mean that it
necessarily has to be only one state engaging in it, but not authorized
bytheUNSecurityCouncil.Thisrationaleforunilateralismis,inturn,
rootedinthefactthatactionswhichareauthorizedbytheUNSecurity
Council under Chapter 7 are considered by lawyers to be acts of col-
lective security. They may have a rationale that humanitarian crises or
threats to civilians constitute a threat to international peace and secu-
rity,buttheyareconceivedbyinternationallawyersasactsofcollective
security. In my view, this conceptualization, while very helpful from
a legal standpoint, is of limited utility in providing us, as analysts, in
understandingafarbroadercategoryofactivity.Ithereforedivergefrom
thatdefinitioninacoupleofways.
One, I recognize that the non-consent of the host state is some-
thing very tricky to demand. In certain cases, consent will exist, but it
willbecoercedinsomesignificantways.Ormissionsmayevolvefrom
peacekeepingmissionswhichoriginallypossessedconsentfortheorig-
inalplacingofforces–asinBosnia–butwhichhavelostthatconsent
atalaterstage.Isuggestthat,whileplayingaroundwiththenotionof
whether there is consent or not is incredibly important analytically, if
we want to examine a body of cases, we may want to recognize that
strictrequirementofnohost-nationconsentisactuallyquiteadifficult
preconditiontodemand.
At the time of this writing, the debate surrounding humanitarian
intervention in Libya’s ongoing civil war represents a very interesting
footnote, because in my reading this is actually the very first time the
Security Council has authorized the use of force for humanitarian pur-
poses without the consent of the host state. This development differs
from previous issues of consent surrounding military intervention in
Somalia,East TimorandRwandaina numberofways. Inthefirst case
in Somalia, there is a very good argument to be made that there was
not actually a coherent agent that that could give consent. And in the
latter two cases, consent was technically achieved, but under implicit
coercion.InthecaseofEastTimor,theIndonesiangovernmentdidcon-
sent to Australian-led action in 1999, although I would argue that it
washeavilycoercedbythethreatofrenegingonIMFloans.Andinthe
Foreword ix
caseofOperationTurquoise,aUNpeacekeepingoperationwasalready
operating on the ground. With this context in mind, Libya is actually
quitesignificantbecauseitisarguablythefirsttimethecouncil’sactions
mightbeconceivedasnothingotherthanexplicitlycoercive.
Consentisonlyonepieceofthedefinitionofhumanitarianinterven-
tionwhich,Isuggest,wemaywishtorelax.Thesecondisthatwemay
notwanttoonlyconsiderhumanitarianinterventionintermsofthose
that do not have Security Council authorization, or the authorization
of a regional body that then gets Security Council authorization. This
isbecause,again,Ibelievethisencouragestheriskofoverlookingcases
where humanitarian justifications, or humanitarian motives, were the
primary justificationofthemission.Suchoperationsaredifferentthan,
forinstance,aninterventionforthepurposesofeliminatingthreatsto
peace and security which are related to civil war, or even arguably the
possessionofweaponsofmassdestruction.
This point brings up the thorny issue of motives. Can we only call
humanitarian interventions those which have a pure humanitarian
motive? Two points here are worth raising. One is that there will be
many cases where more than one motive may be at work. And of
course,thatisarealityinpolitics.Casesexist–IwouldargueAustralia’s
impetus in East Timor is a good example – where a mix of humanitar-
ian rationales and particular reputational and economic interests drive
internationalinvolvement.Somalia,Iwouldargue,isconverselyoneof
thehardestcasestosaytherewerestrongcompetingnationalinterests–
here,Ithinkhumanitarianmotives,whetherornottheywererealisticor
carriedoutappropriately,werenonethelessprimary.Anothercasewhere
humanitarianmotivesareverydominantistheinterventionattheend
ofthefirstGulfWarin1991,toprotectKurdsinNorthernIraq.Here,a
seriesofconsiderationsabouttheendofthatconflictclearlydrovethe
US calculus. But there was also good evidence to suggest that the first
Bush administration was highly influenced by humanitarian concerns.
Thesewerepartlyreputational,tiedtothefactthattheUShadjustgone
to war to remove a regime, and now faced massive humanitarian suf-
fering which compelled responsible action. But these motives are very
difficulttodisentangle.
Ifinditinterestingthatwhenpoliticalscientistsspeaktophilosophers
aboutthisphenomenonofmixedmotives,theyareoftenverypuzzled
as to why we tie ourselves in knots about this question. Philosophers
oftensaytome,‘well,inmoralphilosophy,weacceptthephenomenon
of mixed motives, that individuals act for a variety of reasons. So why
are you so worried about having only one motive?’ I think it is an