The Himalayan face-off : Chinese assertion and the Indian riposte

332 Pages·2014·2.63 MB·English

by  Gupta

The Himalayan Face-Off
Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte
Shishir Gupta
P
RAISE FOR
The Himalayan Face-Off
‘“When two elephants fight or make love, it is the grass that suffers”, goes the saying. The rise of China and
the aspirations of India will have a profound impact on the world. The 21-day stand-off between the two
countries in April 2013 was the trigger for this book. The enormous research that has gone into writing this
book is truly impressive. The author’s capacity to correlate historical events and contemporary
developments is a measure of that research. A must-read for those who follow India–China relations and are
worried about the future.’
– P. Chidambaram ‘The emergence of China as an important economic player has brought about a paradigm
shift in the region. Its assertiveness is visible and at times, provocative. It has been going slow in resolving
the boundary issues with India. Its attitude on Arunachal Pradesh is indicative of its expansionist designs.
Its statements on Arunachal Pradesh, stapled visas [and] frequent incursions are a grim reminder that India
cannot lower its guard. India wants cordiality with its neighbours that can only be on basis of reciprocity.
Shishir Gupta’s book, The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte is based on
exhaustive research on the history of Indo–China relationship in the past 50 years. He has captured and
recollected in great detail the past history and highlighted the current challenges. The book reflects a deep
insight of a troubled relationship.’
– Arun Jaitley
First published in 2014 by Hachette India
(Registered name: Hachette Book Publishing India Pvt. Ltd)
An Hachette UK company
www.hachetteindia.com
This ebook published in 2014
1
Copyright © 2014 Shishir Gupta
Shishir Gupta asserts the moral right to be identified as
the author of this work
Map on page 3 courtesy Shishir Gupta
Maps on pages 65, 94, 125 & 139 illustrated by KBK Infographics
All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system (including but not limited to computers,
disks, external drives, electronic or digital devices, e-readers, websites), or transmitted in any form or by any means (including but not
limited to cyclostyling, photocopying, docutech or other reprographic reproductions, mechanical, recording, electronic, digital
versions) without the prior written permission of the publisher, nor be otherwise circulated in any form of binding or cover other than
that in which it is published and without a similar condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
The views and opinions expressed in this book are the author’s and the facts are as reported by him. The publishers are not in any way
liable for the same.
Print edition ISBN 978-93-5009-579-9
Ebook edition ISBN 978-93-5009-606-2
Author photo by Tashi Tobgyal
Cover design by The Visual Press
Hachette Book Publishing India Pvt. Ltd
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Typeset in Sabon Roman 10.5/13
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Anukriti Gaura & Pug Kiki
CONTENTS
Preface
Introduction: A Flawed Friendship
1. India and China: Adversaries Forever?
2. 1962 War and Trust Deficit
3. Chinese Military Capability and Threat to India
4. Convergence and Containment
5. Triggers on the Himalayan Belt
6. The Dalai Lama and the Tibet Question
7. India Takes up the Challenge
8. An Uncertain Future
Annexure
Bibliography
Notes
Index
PREFACE
The face-off between troops of the Indian Army and the intruding Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), at a rivulet called Raki on the high mountain
plateau of Depsang in eastern Ladakh, on 17 April 2013 may be a minor speck
on the humungous canvas of 10,000 years of combined existence of the two
states, but contemporary history will record the 21-day stand-off as a watershed
in bilateral relations between New Delhi and Beijing. The Chinese have called
the stand-off a ‘non-event’, as the PLA was well within China’s territorial limits.
PLA troops withdrew from the stand-off on 5 May 2013, but only after
underlining the fact that the 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the
two neighbours would remain a source of military flashpoint.
Change was more evident on the Indian side, as for the first time since the
1962 war between the two countries, India took up the Chinese gauntlet and
openly asked Beijing to vacate the Depsang plains. While the incident revived
memories of the humiliating war among the Indian public, Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s government realized deception and realpolitik were
legitimate diplomatic tools while engaging with the Middle Kingdom. One gets a
glimpse of these tools in the Chinese diplomatic armoury in the correspondence
between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese counterpart
Zhou Enlai on the boundary dispute in the run-up to the 1962 war. A democrat
and rather woolly idealist, Nehru in a letter told Premier Zhou that China could
not walk out of historic boundary accords between Tibet and British India just
because Beijing was weak. In his 26 September 1959 letter to Zhou, Nehru
wrote: ‘All Chinese governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that
previous Chinese governments were weak is no answer.’1
This book explores the friction between a near-superpower and an aspiring
one, as the growing influence of an assertive communist China in today’s world
intersects with the interests of a democratic India. With the 1962 war as an
important context, the book uncovers the growing uneasiness in India about
Chinese moves to confine India within South Asia and push it to a lower
equilibrium by keeping it engaged with its neighbours, who are being supported
by copious aid and military hardware periodically by Beijing. Although India’s
dismissal of the Depsang incursion as ‘acne in need of ointment’2 by its young
and energetic External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid is purely optical, New
Delhi, particularly Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Defence Minister A.K.
Antony, are seriously concerned about Beijing’s moves on the global scale and
its impact on India’s national security. Far from sounding jingoistic or
advocating military steps against China, the book records the steps that India has
taken post the unveiling of the ‘Look East’ policy in 1995 by then Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to safeguard India’s territorial limits and its
national interests.
The saving grace is that India’s China policy has gathered political consensus
across party lines, and was pursued with equal vigour by the BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) government headed by Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee between 1999 and 2004. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
understanding of an assertive China and its ramifications on the Asian security
calculus and the world at large are mentioned at length. It is quite evident that
while China gets insecure about unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, its assertiveness in
East Asia and South Asia will lead to serious consequences by rearming Japan
and increasing the US’s focus on the Asia-Pacific region, while bolstering the
confidences of Vietnam and Philippines.
The book also records Chinese infrastructure development and military
capacity building in Tibet and Xinjiang, with serious strategic consequences to
India, as well as the steps New Delhi has taken since the turn of the twenty-first
century to safeguard its national security. A subtle message from Delhi post the
Depsang intrusion has been that peace on the border is central, or what Antony
called an ‘important guarantor’3, for growth in bilateral ties including trade, and
that any PLA assertiveness on the border would be equally matched by the
Indian Army. This book exposes the gross asymmetry between the huge Chinese
deployment, infrastructure development and military capabilities on the Sino–
Indian border, while also discussing lagging Indian capacities and the efforts
New Delhi is making to catch up to its neighbour. It also explores the steps
China has taken to expand its influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean in
order to win the confidence of India’s neighbours in the Himalayan belt as well
as on the latter’s eastern, western and southern peripheries.
Viewed from the Indian perspective, the book conveys the perception of the
Indian government and the public which is yet to get over the 1962 war and
notes the continued hurdles from Beijing towards Indian aspirations – whether in
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)’s waiver for the Indo–US nuclear deal or the
expansion of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. While taking a hard
look at the doctrines, hardware and capabilities of China’s armed forces – the
PLA, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force – the book tries to compare the two
countries’ respective forces and their future impact on national security. Keeping
the big strategic picture in mind, the book carefully builds a case for India to not
get enticed by words and public posturing of the Chinese leadership but to be
prepared for the uncompromising message sent out by the PLA on boundary
dispute resolution and Pakistan.
At the outset, I must admit that I have neither had the opportunity to visit
China nor interact with its leaders; however, this book is not about China, but its
policies and mindset towards India as perceived by the top Indian leadership,
political parties and the public. This book has all intentions of promoting Indo–
China bilateral terms on equal terms. It is based on newspaper articles,
reportage, historical interpretations, policy papers and the views of experts on
Indo–China relations.
Since the arrest of five nondescript Chinese spies in McLeodganj, near
Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh, in 1995, I have closely observed the
fourteenth Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso and the Tibetan government-in-exile. I
have been fortunate to personally interact with the Dalai Lama and discuss the
Sino–Tibet relationship with him on more than two occasions. This book delves
into how the Dalai Lama and his followers could be used as a point of
confrontation by China, and how a leaderless Tibetan radical movement post the
current Dalai Lama could be a bigger headache for not only Beijing but also
New Delhi. While it examines the Tibetan struggle post the fourteenth Dalai
Lama and the various options created by Beijing for his successor, it argues that
the Tibetan independence movement will not die out. Instead, the movement will
get more inflamed and radicalized. For China, dialogue and not belittling the
Dalai Lama is the only option out, as the Tibetan movement has caught the eye
of global powers.
Perhaps for the first time ever, the book records in great detail Indian
infrastructure development, including border road development as well as
accretion of Indian military capabilities vis-à-vis Chinese forces. In order to have
a first-hand experience of the Indian response and its gaps, I travelled to Ladakh,
Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and to the Arabian Sea in the past decade to assess
military and naval capabilities. While India’s border infrastructure development
does not have any territorial designs nor is it built with the intention of seizing
disputed territory by force, the political leadership at the same time has no
intention of sweeping incidents under the carpet as in the run-up to the 1962 war,
as Nehru admits in his letters. In fact, the current Indian leadership is in no mood
to back down on any diplomatic or military misdemeanours by the Chinese. In
this context, the book argues that the time is ripe for both sides to resolve the
boundary dispute, as any accidental flare-ups could have serious consequences
for both nations and the world at large.
Given that both countries have existed for thousands of years, this book has
been a tedious exercise to say the least. However, I was helped by top political,
military, diplomatic and bureaucratic leaders, whom I cannot name for obvious
reasons, to understand the vexed relations between the two countries and its
historic past and future ahead. These experts not only showed me the context in
which Indo–China bilateral ties had proceeded in the past five decades but also
the way forward. They shared their perceptions and analyses about past and
current events, knowing that the organization they were heading could also come
under criticism.
I would like to thank Amish Raj Mulmi of Hachette India, who repeatedly
asked me questions to make the book more lucid, and gave me suggestions to
focus on the big picture. My discussions with Editorial Director Nandita
Aggarwal were invaluable as she gave her insight and comments to make the
book concise and reader-friendly. The support of my newspaper Hindustan
Times has been invaluable to say the least.
Lastly, I would like to thank my father J.P. Gupta and dearest late mother
Mridula Gupta, without whom none of this would have been possible. All faults
and mistakes in this book are mine alone.
Shishir Gupta
31 December 2013