ebook img

The high-cost hospital medical staff proposal in the Health Security Act : distributional impacts PDF

48 Pages·1994·1.9 MB·English
by  WelchW. Pete
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview The high-cost hospital medical staff proposal in the Health Security Act : distributional impacts

6210-08 July1994 TheHigh-CostHospitalMedicalStaff ProposalintheHealthSecurityAct: DistributionalImpacts W.PeteWelch MarkE.Miller 2T1h0e0UMrbSatnreeItn,stNit.uWt.e Washington.DC 20037 SupportforthisresearchwasprovidedbytheHealthCareFinancingAdministrationtoThe UrbanInstitutethroughCooperativeAgreementNo<l8^-9003^ ThisCooperauveAgreement supportedanumberofresearchprojectsrelatedtoinRbspitaiphysicianexpenditures. Thetotal budgetforalltheseprojectswasS646.002andrepresentsthesolesourceoffunding. TheauthorswouldliketoacknowledgeEllenEnglertforresearchassistanceandHarvey Meycrsonrurprogramming. .Anyopmionsexpressedarethoseoftheauthorsanddonot necessarilyreflecttheopinionsoftheHealthCareFinancing.Administration.TheUrbanInstimte. oritssponsors. 51 TABLEOFCONTENTS EXECUTIVESUMMARY i INTRODUCTION I. , ILTHEPROPOSALINTHEHEALTHSECURITYACT 2 in.METHODS 4 A.BehavioralAssumptions 4 B.DatabaseConstruction 5 IV.THEDISTRIBUTIONALIMPACT 6 A.Simulation 5 B,VolumeperAdmissionbyState 9 V.THEIMPACTOFAPROTOTYPETRANSITIONOPTION 1 VT.THEPOTENTULSHIFTINGOFMEDICAREADMISSIONS 14 A.Introduction [4 B.Results 15 C.Discussion 1 REFERENCES 19 AppendixA.DECOMPOSITIONOFPOLICYIMPACT 21 AppendixB.CONSTRUCTIONOFSHIFTING-ADMISSIONDATABASE 26 AppendixC.HOSPITAL-LEVELADJUSTMENTS 29 TABLES EXECUTIVESUMMARY TheProposal Tofinancehealthcarelefcrr..theClintonAdrainistrationsHealthSecurityAct(HSA) includesseveralMedicaresavingsproposals. Oneoftheseproposals(Sec.4114)wouldlimit paymentstophysiciansinhospitalswithhighvolumeofphysicianservicesperadmission (i.e.,high-costmedicalstaffs). Thehigh-costmedicalstaffproposalwouldmeasurethevolumeofphysicianservices intermsoftheRelativeValueUnits(RVUs)usedintheMedicaidFeeSchedule. Amedical staffscoUectiveperformancewouldbedefinedintermsof"volumeperadmission"~RVUs peradmissionadjustedforcasemix.teachingstatus,anddisproportionatesharestatus. Ina givenyear.Medicarespaymentstophysiciansonamedicalstaffcouldnotcollectively exceedalimitdefinedasacertainpercentageabovethenationalmedian. PhysiciansprovidingservicesinhospitalswouldbillMedicareastheydonow. In 1998.theHealthCareFinancingAdminisQ-ation(HCFA)would,however,withhold15 percentofthepaymentforanyphysicianservicedeliveredinahospitalthathadbeen designatedashavingahigh-costmedicalstaff. In 1999.HCFAwouldcomparetheservices actuallydeliveredbyamedicalstaffandthelimit. Forstaffsbelowthelimitin 1998,the entirewithholdwouldbereturned. Forotherstaffs,thehigherthevolumeperadmission,the lessofthewithholdwouldberemmed. Thispapersimulatestheimpactofthisproposalonmedicalstaffsbythetypeof hospitalandbystate. Datafrom 1991 and 1992areusedforthesimulation. DistributionalImpacts OfaUmedicalstaffs.22.8pcrccmwouldbedesignatedas"highcost"andwouldhave awithholdappliedtotheirpayments. UndertheconservadvcAssumptionthatphysicians wouldnotchangetheirbehaviorinresponsetotheseincentives,only3.2percentofallstaffs wouldreceivealloftheirwithholdback. Theremaining 19.6percentwouldreceivesomeor noneoftheirwithholdback. Totheextentthatphysicianspracticeamoreconservativestyle ofmedicine,theywouldreceivemoreoftheirwithholdback. Asagroup,medicalstaffs wouldlose5.5percentofMedicarepaymentsforinpatientphysicianservices. AspresentedinTable 1.thisimpactvariesbyhospitaltype. Thepercentagereduction inpaymentwouldbeaboveaverageformedicalstaffsinlargeurbanareasandclosetozero forstaffsinruralareas. ThepercentagereductionwouldbeweUaboveaverageformedical staffsofmajorteachinghospitalsandweUbelowaverageforstaffsofnonteachinghospitals. Medicalstaffsofhospitalsservingadisproportionateshareofthepoorwouldexperiencea slightlygreaterthanaveragepercentagereduction. Thereissubstantialgeographicvariationintheimpact. MiddleAdanticstaffsfacea substantiallygreaterpercentagereducuoninpaymentthanstaffselsewhere. Notsurprisingly, theimpactvariesevenmoreatthestatelevel. .AspresentedinTable2,staffsinsevenstates- -Connecticut.D.C.,Rorida.Nevada,.\ewJersey..\ewYork,andPennsylvama-wouldloseat least8percentofMedicarepaymentforinpatientphysicianservices. ImpactofaPrototvpeTransitionOption WhentheProspectivePaymentSystem(PPS)wasimplemented,therewas geographicvariadoninadjusitdcostperadmission. To.nitii..^ J.c:..liai ii distributionalimpactofPPS.Congressenactedatransition. Giventliisprecedent,thispaper delineatesaprototypetransitionoption. Ineachregionwithamedianvolumeperadmission :'-ate>^:eedsthenationalmedian,staffswouldfacelimitsbasedona50-50blendofthe nationalandregionalmedian. Inotherregions,staffswouldfacealimitbasedonlyonthe nationalmedian. Asimpleschedulemightentailthe50-50blendforayearortwo.followed byfullimplementation. Forillustrativepurposes.Tables3and4showtheimpactbyhospitaltypeandbystate ofthistransitionoption. ThedistributionalimpactoftheHSAmedicalstaffproposalwould besubstantiallymoreequalunderthistransitionoption. ThisismostapparentfortheMiddle Atlantichospitals,whosepercentagereductionwouldfallfrom 10.5percentto4.3percentof payment,closetothenewaverage. Forregionswithmediansbelowthenationalmedian,the impactnecessarilyremainsthesame. PotentialfortheShiftingofAdmissionsamongHospitals Thispaperalsoanalyzesasecondaspectofthepolicy. Aconcemraisedbysomeis thatphysiciansmightrespondtoahigh-costmedicalstaffpolicybyshiftingtheiradmissions amonghospitalstoavoidthewithhold. Shiftingcouldthreatentheviabilityofcertain hospitals. Toshiftadmissionsintheshonrun.aphysicianmustbeamemberofatleasttwo staffs,oneofwhichisdesignatedhigh-costandoneofwhichisnot. Usingthenauonal admissionsfile,thispapercalculatedthenumberof"shiftable"Medicareadmissionsineach hospitalwithahigh-coststaff. iii Intheaveragehospitalwithahigh-coststaff,shiftabieMedicareadmissionsaccount for11percentofall(Medicareandnon-Medicare)admissions. ShiftabieMedicare admissionsalsoaccountfoi-^a-^?inepercent(i.e., II)ofMedicareadmissionsinallhospitals (i.e..withhigh-coststaffsandothers). Thesepercentagesretlectthefactthatonaverage, physiciansadmittoonlyoneandahalfhospitals. Inaddition,somephysicianshave privilegesatseveralhospitals,allofwhicharehighcost. Concernovertheviabilityofhospitalsisgreatestforhospitalsthatserveasthelast resonfortheinner-citypoor. Forthesehospitals,shiftabieadmissionsrepresentonly7 percentoftotaladmissions. Hence,suchhospitalswouldbelessvulnerabletolosing admissionsthanotherhospitals. iv I. INTRODUCTION Forseveralyears,theHealthCareFinancingAdministration(HCFA)hasfunded researchexploringoptionsforconiroUingMedicarephyo^cianpayments,eitherbydesigning paymentfor"bundles"ofphysicianservicesorbycombiningpaymentforfacilityand physicianservices. Onethrustofthisefforthasbeenresearchdirectedtowardgivingthe medicalstaffsofhospitalsincentivestocontrolservicesprovidedduringinpatientstays.' ThisresearchdevelopedthepoUcyoptions,createdthetechnicalunderpinningsneededfora numberofpolicyoptions,andexploredrelatedissues. Thisresearchisreportedinboth technicalreports--arecentonebeingWelchandMiller(1994)-andrefereedjournals-Welch (1989),MiUerandWelch(1992. 1993b),Welch,etal.(1993).Miller,Welch,andEnglert (1994),andWelch.Miller,andWelch(1994). TheClintonAdministration-sHealthSecuntyAct(HSA)includesahigh-costmedical staffpolicyasonewaytogenerateMedicaresavingstohelpfinancehealthreform. TheHSA proposalonhigh-costmedicalstaffsdrawsheavilyonthebodyofresearchnotedabove. This paperreportsthedistnbutionaiimpactoftheHSAproposal. InSections and01.thispaper descnbestheproposalandthemethodsusedtosimulatetheimpact. Ontheassumptionthat medicalstaffsdonotrespondtotheincennves.SectionIVsimulatesthedistributionalimpact oftheproposalbyr>'peofhospital(e.g..teachingstatus)andbystate. Becausetheproposal woulddisproportionatelyreducepaymentstomedicalstaffsintheMiddleAdanticregion. SecuonVsimulatesasimpletransiuonaipolicy. Finally.SectionVIanalyzesarelated Generally,tieterms hospitals'and"medicalstaffs"canbeusedmterctangea^-lv.becauseahospitalcannot ofnulnycuwohnewnitahhooustpiatamle'dsipchaylsisctaifafns(i.aec..tictosrpphoyrsaitceilaynsle).ga.,ndreavimeewdiincgalprsatacfufcceapnanootemfsu)nctuhoatnwweithusaehtohsepittearl.m Itis medicalstalf." issue--thepoienriaiforphysicianstoshiftadmissionsbetweenhospitalsinordertoavoidthe incentivesofthepolicy. ILTHEPROPOSALINTHEHEALTHSECURITYACT InSection4114ofitsHSA.theClintonAdministrationhasproposedlimiting Medicarepaymentstophysiciansinhospitalswithphysicianservicevolumeperadmission thatisconsistendyabovenauonalnorms. InagivenyearMedicare'spaymentstothe physiciansonamedicalstaffcouldnotexceed125percentofthenationalmedianforurban hospitalsand 140percentforruralhospitals. Similarlimitsarealreadyusedinotherpartsof theMedicareprogram,suchashomehealthagencies,skillednursingfacilities,and rehabilitationandpsychiatrichospitals. TheproposalwouldmeasurephysicianservicesintermsoftheRelativeValueUnits (RVUs)usedintheMedicareFeeSchedule(MFS). RVUsperadmissiondirectiymeasures physicianservicevolumeandintensityperadmission. Thatis,RVUsperadmissionvaries acrossmedicalstaffsdependingonthenumberofser\'icesandthecomplexityofservices (e.g..anMRlinsteadofanX-rayj. RVUsperadmissionwouldbeadjustedfordifferencesin patientmixacrossstaffsaswellasforteachingstatusanddisproportionatesharestatus,two characteristicsthatcontributetohigherphysicianservicesperadmission,inpan,because thesehospitalsarethoughttohandlepatientswithgreaterseverityofillness. (Disproportionatesharehospitalsserveadisproportionateshareofthepoor.) Forexpositional clarity,weusethetenn"volumeperadmission'forcaseraix-,teaching-,anddisproportionate share-adjustedRVUsperadmission.Thus,theproposalwouldmeasuretheperforraanceof medicalstaffsintermsofvolumeperadmission. ThetiSAwouilhaveHCFAcalculatethevolumeperadmissionforeachhospital medicalstaffinthecountry. HCFAwouldthenrankthenation'shospitalsfromhighestto lowestvolumeperadmission,anddesignate"high-cost"medicalstaffsonthebasisofthis ranking. PhysicianswouldcontinuetobillMedicareastheydonow. However,HCFA wouldwithhold15percentofthepaymentforanyservicedeliveredinhospitalswhose medicalstaffhadbeendesignatedashighcost. Themaximumliabilityofaphysician,in otherwords,wouldbe 15percentofhisorherMedicarebillsforinpatientservicesdelivered asamemberofahigh-costmedicalstaff. Physicianstypicallyprovide90percentoftheirinpatientservicesinasinglehospital (Miller,Welch,andEnglert. 1994). Physiciansonthemedicalstaffofmorethanonehospital wouldbetreatedaccordingtowheretheservicesweredelivered. Forexample,aphysician mightbeontwomedicalstaffs-onehigh-cost,theothernot. The 15-percentwithholdwould applyonlytoservicesdeliveredaspanofthehigh-coststaff. Financialrisksaresimilarly separatedforphysicianswhobelongtomorethanoneIndependentPracticeAssociation (IPA),atypeofHealthMaintenanceOrganization. Operationally,theHSAhigh-costmedicalstaffpolicywouldworkasfollows: In 1997.HCFAwoulddesignatecertainmedicalstaffsashigh-costonthebasisof1996 performance. In1998,HCF.A.wouldapplythe 15-percentwithholdtoservicesdelivered(in 1998)inhospitalswithhigh-costmedicalstatYs. In 1999.HCFAwouldcomparetheservices actuallydeliveredin 1998(ie.rhc:"ff:f-rfc—-r.ce)withthe 125or140percentlimit,as 3 appropriate.^ ForstaffsbelowtheUmiLtheentirewithholdwouldbereturnedwithinterest Foreachstaffabovethelimit,eithernoneoraportionofthe 15-percentwithholdwouldbe returned,dependingonhowfarabovetheumiiiwo )QQ"volumemmedouttobe. Withheld amountswouldbereturnedtothemedicalstaffasawhole,whichcouldthendecidehowto allocatethemamongitsphysicianmembers.^ Everyyearthecyclewouldbeginanew. In 1998,forexample,HCFAwouldagain designatecertainmedicalstaffstobe"highcost,"basedthistimeon 1997performance. In 1999.itwouldapplythewithholdtoservicesdeliveredinthosehospitalsin1999. In2000,it wouldcomparetheacmalphysicianservicesdeliveredin1999tothelimitandremm withheldpaymentsasappropriate. m.METHODS SectionIVpresentsthesimulatedimpactofthepolicybytypeofhospitalandby state. SectionVTpresentsananalysisofthepotentialforshiftingadmissions. Thissection brieflydescribesthebehavioralassumptionsanddatabaseconstructionfortheseanalyses. A.BehavioralAssumptions Itisimportanttonotethatthebehavioralassumptionsdifferforthesimulationof impactsandtheanalysisofshifting. InSectionIV.thesimulationoftheproposal's distributionalimpactonmedicalstaffsassumesnochangeinthebehaviorofphysicians,even -Thelimitwouldbedefinedinlennsofthemedianhospitalin1996. Thelegislationwouldnotupdatethis limitforfutureyears. "ThestaffmayrequestthattheSecr..aryofHealthandHumanSer.'.-to.w.jju .unuoviu-ccdyto physiaans.proraungthemaccordmgtothephysiaan'sservices. 'Sj^alsothatbeginnmgin2000thehmitfor urbanhospitalswoulddecreaseto120percentofthenauonalmedian. 4

See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.