The Golden Horseshoe: The Wartime Career of Otto Kretschmer, U-Boat Ace

225 Pages·2011·2.22 MB·English

by  Robertson

Otto Kretschmer at U-boat Command Headquarters, Lorient.

The Golden Horseshoe: The Wartime Career of Otto Kretschmer, U-Boat Ace
This edition published in 2011 by Frontline Books,
an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Limited,
47 Church Street, Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, S70 2AS
www.frontline-books.com, email [email protected]
and
Published and distributed in the United States and Canada by the
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034
www.nip.org

Copyright © Terence Robertson, 1955
Introduction copyright © Jürgen Rohwer, 2003
This edition © Pen & Sword Books Ltd., 2011

The right of Terence Robertson to be identified as the author of this
work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Patents and
Designs Act 1988.
9781783469680

PUBLISHING HISTORY
The Golden Horseshoe was first published by Evans Brothers Limited, London,
in 1955. A hardback edition, which included a new introduction by Jürgen
Rohwer, was published in 2003 by Greenhill Books.

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2010940059

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Printed in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe
“Battles might be won or lost, enterprises might succeed or miscarry, territories
might be gained or quitted, but dominating all our power to carry on the war, or
even keep ourselves alive, lay our mastery of the ocean routes and the free
approach and entry to our ports.... The only thing that ever really frightened me
during the war was the U-boat peril.”
The Second World War Volumes II and III by Sir Winston Churchill
PREFACE
by Admiral Sir George Creasy, G.C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O.

THIS book deals primarily with the exploits of one U-boat commander, Captain
Kretschmer, from the outbreak of the war until U-99 was sunk in March 1941. I
believe that he was the most efficient and the most competent U-boat
Commanding Officer that Germany produced; he flourished at the time when
our defences were slowly building up and were as yet woefully weak; certainly
he inflicted heavier and more painful losses on Allied shipping than did any
other one man, and the destruction of his U-boat and his own capture, well-nigh
simultaneously with the loss of Prien and Schepke, must have been a severe
blow to the U-boat Command. To us it formed one of the bright gleams of hope
at a time when few such gleams lit the sombre story of the Battle of the Atlantic.
I well remember piecing together the evidence of one of his early attacks on a
convoy. It was at a time when most people were thinking in terms of the
orthodox submerged attack at periscope depth. I had already made up my mind
that we were dealing with attacks made with the U-boat on the surface, relying
on her small silhouette to give her a cloak of invisibility. And the times at which
torpedoes had hit, and the position of his targets in the various columns of the
convoy, convinced me that not only was Kretschmer’s U-boat on the surface, but
that he must have passed diagonally right through the convoy.
This was something new. But I remember, too, that I considered that the
manoeuvre was so risky that he had done it by mistake. This book shows that it
was a deliberate tactic, carefully thought out and brilliantly executed.
Happily, in this he had few imitators. Nevertheless the work of Kretschmer,
Prien and Schepke lived on, unfortunately for us, long after their active part in
the Battle of the Atlantic was over. They and a few of their contemporaries had
shown the way, and their tactics led to the night surface attacks by “wolf-packs ”
of U-boats in numbers which increased steadily as U-boat war production
mounted. Heavy indeed were the losses in ships and the loss in life inflicted on
the gallant Merchant Navies of the Allies by these attacks.
These losses began to mount at an alarming speed, far exceeding the rate at
which we could build new ships, to a dangerous total. On our ability to bring
material and men by sea into this country depended our ability to prosecute the
war.
But there was another side to the picture. Our countermeasures were also
steadily building up. The number of our escort vessels was increasing slowly at
first, but later more rapidly. The numbers of aircraft available to Coastal
Command were swelling. New tactics were being planned. And, perhaps most
important of all, time was being found to train sailors and airmen to use this
increasing strength to maximum purposes.
Moreover, the “submersible” tactics of the enemy had their weak point, if it
could be exploited. To achieve the high mobility given by surface speed, the U-
boat accepted the vulnerability inherent in surface operations once the problem
of location had been solved. Aircraft in sufficient numbers could cover wide
areas of sea and would have a maximum chance of locating and then attacking a
surfaced U-boat. Ships with efficient radar could offset the U-boat’s advantage
of a small silhouette, and what the human eye could not see would be visible to
the radar eye in the darkness.
The Battle of the Atlantic indeed became a race. Could we turn the tables and
start to inflict unbearable losses on the U-boats before the enemy had imposed
unbearable losses in merchant shipping, ships and men on us?
The Allied victory is now a matter of history, but we went through times of
deep anxiety before that victory was achieved. However, by the end of 1943 we
had inflicted heavy losses on the U-boats, and by this time American ship
production was in full stride and new merchant shipping was coming forward at
a rate which put defeat out of the question.
But here I must emphasise that the victory which was won was the defeat of
Doenitz’s U-boat submersible tactics which had proved so dangerous to the
Allied cause. The U-boat as a submarine was by no means defeated and, indeed,
it was not long before the enemy had fitted their U-boats with the Snort to enable
them to use their diesel engines whilst submerged, and, thus equipped, then
resumed the battle. But they had lost more than half their power of mobility and
they had been severely shaken by appalling losses, and never again did they
cause us any real anxiety.
Nevertheless, German ingenuity had not been idle, and new forms of U-boat
were under construction with high submerged speed and the ability to remain
permanently under water. These new types never became fully operational
permanently under water. These new types never became fully operational
before the war ended. Undoubtedly they would have set us fresh problems and,
though I have no doubt we should have mastered them, we might have faced
another period of losses in shipping before we had achieved this mastery.
In conclusion, I feel I should write some word of explanation of my interview
with Kretschmer after his capture, which is described in this book. I did not
expect to get any “intelligence” from him. I felt sure that any officer who could
handle his ship with such efficiency would guard his tongue with equal
efficiency. Nor was I wrong; he gave away nothing. But I saw him because I was
anxious to judge for myself what manner of man a successful U-boat captain
might be; to see for myself, if I could, the state of his nerves; to measure his
judgment; gauge his reactions to his seniors and to his juniors, the expected and
the unexpected. In simple words, to “size him up ”.
It may be of interest to record the impression he made on me. I saw a young
and obviously self-confident Naval Commander who bore himself, in the
difficult conditions of recent captivity, with self-respect, modesty and courtesy.
His record stamped him as brave and quick-witted; his appearance and manners
were those of an officer and a gentleman. When he left me I sincerely hoped that
there were not too many like him. My last word to him was that I hoped we
might meet again one day in more pleasant circumstances. I shall be very happy
if and when that day comes.