The Gettier Problem PDF
Preview The Gettier Problem
The Gettier Problem When philosophers try to understand the nature of knowledge, they arguablyhavetoconfronttheGettierProblem.Thisproblem,setoutin EdmundGettier’sfamouspaperof 1963,haspossiblyyettobesolved, andhaschallengedourbestattemptstodefinewhatknowledgeis.This volumeoffersanorganisedsequenceofaccessibleanddistinctivechap- ters explaining the history of debate surrounding Gettier’s challenge, and where that debate should take us next. The chapters describe and evaluateawiderangeofideasaboutknowledgethathavebeensparked byphilosophicalengagementswiththeGettierproblem,includingsuch phenomenaasfallibility,reasoning,evidence,reliability,truth-tracking, context,luck,intellectualvirtue,wisdom,conceptualanalysis,intuition, experimentalphilosophy,andexplication.Theresultisanauthoritative survey of fifty-plus years of epistemological research – along with provocativeideasforfutureresearch–intothenatureofknowledge. StephenHetheringtonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityof New South Wales, Sydney. His many publications in epistemology includeKnowledgeandtheGettierProblem(2016). ClassicPhilosophicalArguments Overthecenturies,anumberofindividualargumentshaveformedacrucial partofphilosophicalenquiry.Thevolumesinthisseriesexaminethese arguments,lookingattheramificationsandapplicationswhichtheyhave cometohave,thechallengeswhichtheyhaveencountered,andthewaysin whichtheyhavestoodthetestoftime. Titlesintheseries ThePrisoner’sDilemma EditedbyMartinPeterson TheOriginalPosition EditedbyTimothyHinton TheBraininaVat EditedbySanfordC.Goldberg Pascal’sWager EditedbyPaulBarthaandLawrencePasternack TheGettierProblem EditedbyStephenHetherington The Gettier Problem Edited by Stephen Hetherington UniversityofNewSouthWales,Sydney UniversityPrintingHouse,CambridgeCB28BS,UnitedKingdom OneLibertyPlaza,20thFloor,NewYork,NY10006,USA 477WilliamstownRoad,PortMelbourne,VIC3207,Australia 314–321,3rdFloor,Plot3,SplendorForum,JasolaDistrictCentre, NewDelhi–110025,India 79AnsonRoad,#06–04/06,Singapore079906 CambridgeUniversityPressispartoftheUniversityofCambridge. ItfurtherstheUniversity’smissionbydisseminatingknowledgeinthepursuitof education,learning,andresearchatthehighestinternationallevelsofexcellence. www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9781107178847 DOI:10.1017/9781316827413 ©StephenHetherington2019 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2019 PrintedandboundinGreatBritainbyClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A. AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. ISBN978-1-107-17884-7Hardback ISBN978-1-316-63110-2Paperback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyof URLsforexternalorthird-partyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain, accurateorappropriate. Contents ListofContributors pagevii Preface ix Introduction:MeettheGettierProblem 1 StephenHetherington 1. TheGettierProblemandFallibilism 11 CharityAnderson 2. EpistemicClosureandPost-GettierEpistemologyofReasoning 27 ClaudiodeAlmeida 3. GettierCasesandEvidence 48 ClaytonLittlejohn 4. TheGettierProblemandExternalism 66 RodrigoBorges 5. TheGettierProblemandContext 78 DeliaBelleriandAnnalisaColiva 6. TheGettierProblemandEpistemicLuck 96 DuncanPritchard 7. TheSensitivityResponsetotheGettierProblem 108 KellyBecker 8. TheGettierProblemandIntellectualVirtue 125 JohnGreco 9. KnowledgeandWisdom 144 ErnestSosa 10. TheGettierProblemandtheProgramofAnalysis 159 PatrickRysiew 11. IntuitionintheGettierProblem 177 ElijahChudnoff vi Contents 12. ExperimentalEpistemologyand“Gettier”Cases 199 JohnTurri 13. TheGettierProblem’sExplicabilityProblem 218 StephenHetherington Bibliography 235 Index 252 Contributors CharityAndersonisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatBaylorUniversity,Waco, Texas. KellyBeckerisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNewMexico. DeliaBelleriisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofVienna. RodrigoBorgesisAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatPontificalCatholic UniversityofRioGrandedoSul(PUCRS)inPortoAlegre,Brazil. ElijahChudnoffisAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofMiami. AnnalisaColivaisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,Irvine. ClaudiodeAlmeidaisProfessorofPhilosophyatPontificalCatholicUniversityof RioGrandedoSul(PUCRS),inPortoAlegre,Brazil. JohnGrecoisLeonardandElizabethEslickProfessorofPhilosophyatSaintLouis University. StephenHetheringtonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofNewSouth Wales,Sydney. ClaytonLittlejohnisReaderinPhilosophyatKing’sCollegeLondon. DuncanPritchardisChancellor’sProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityof California,Irvine,andProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofEdinburgh. PatrickRysiewisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofVictoria,Canada. ErnestSosaisBoardofGovernorsProfessorofPhilosophyatRutgersUniversity. JohnTurriisCanadaResearchChairofPhilosophyandCognitiveScienceatthe UniversityofWaterloo,Canada. Preface The Gettier problem is a classic – and continuing – moment within modern philosophy. It began with a punchy question – the title of Edmund Gettier’s 1963paper,“Isjustifiedtruebeliefknowledge?”– andasnappyargument– Gettier’s–foraconfrontinganswer.Gettierwasaskingwhetherknowledgeis wholly definable as a justified true belief; his answer was a decisive “No.” In which case, epistemologists were left wondering – really wondering – about what knowledge is, if it is not what, according to Gettier, they had takenittobe. Sparking this epistemological upheaval was no small achievement. To understandhowmuchofanupheavalitwas,rememberthattheinitialcharacter- izationthatphilosopherseverofferofepistemology,suchastotheirintroductory students,isthatitis“theoryofknowledge.”Epistemologistswerethereforehit hard – very hard – by the thought of lacking an agreed definition of what knowledgeis.Whatweretheyeventheorizingabout?So,itishardlysurprising thatGettier’sargumenthadtheinitialimpactthatitdid. Ofcourse,hisargumentwouldnothavecontinuedmakingsuchanimpactif epistemologistshadswiftlyandsurelyconcurredonareplytothatargument–for instance,areplydecreeingwhatknowledgeis,ifnotsimplyajustifiedtruebelief. Butnosuchconsensusarose–atthetime,orsoonafter,orsoonafterthat,or... Wearestillwaiting.WetherebyfacewhatsoonbecameknownastheGettier problem. Andthuswehavethisbook. IamverygratefultoHilaryGaskinatCambridgeUniversityPressforinviting me to edit the book, as well as for her subsequent advice and guidance. TheGettierproblemisoneofthetopicsthatsparkedmyyouthfulepistemolo- gical instincts. And although I am no longer youthful, the Gettier problem remains with me. I hope that this book can help others to appreciate some of the philosophical complexity and richness that has created and sustained the problem. In surprisingly many respects, it has been a good problem for epistemologytohave.
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