The German Invasion of Norway : April 1940

631 Pages·2009·17.7 MB·English

by  Haarr

To my father
‘In Norwegen kreuzen sich drei große Kraftlinien:
Die deutsche, die russische und die englische.’
In Norway, three great power lines cross:
the German, the Russian and the British.
Dr Heinrich Sahm,
German minister to Norway, 1938

Copyright © Geirr H Haarr 2009
First published in Great Britain in 2009 by
Seaforth Publishing,
Pen & Sword Books Ltd,
47 Church Street,
Barnsley S70 2AS
www.seaforthpublishing.com
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 1 84832 032 1
PAPERBACK ISBN: 978 1 84832 089 5
PDF ISBN: 978 1 78346 501 9
EPUB ISBN: 978 1 78346 967 3
PRC ISBN: 978 1 78346 734 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information
storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of both the copyright owner and
the above publisher.
The right of Geirr H Haarr to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Typeset and designed by JCS Publishing Services Ltd, www.jcs-publishing.co.uk
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Group
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Wheels Within Wheels
3 Storm Warning
4 The Dogs of War
5 The Oslofjord
6 Ultimatum
7 Kristiansand–Arendal
8 Stavanger–Egersund
9 Bergen
10 In Harm’s Way
11 Trondheim
12 Encounter in the Storm
13 Narvik
14 No Room for Mistakes
15 A Tide in the Affairs of Men
Appendices
A The European Iron Ore Trade
B The Royal Norwegian Navy, April 1940
C British Ships Involved in Norway, April 1940
D Ships in Narvik Harbour, 8 April 1940
E The German Naval Invasion Forces
F Losses
Abbreviations and Glossaries
Notes
References
Acknowledgements
M to this book, some from a lifetime of their own
ANY PEOPLE HAVE CONTRIBUTED
research, others with a small but important detail. Their contributions are highly
appreciated.
Above all, the altruistic help and support from Robert Pearson of Ipswich,
England, is gratefully acknowledged. Were it not for him, this project would
have been shelved a long time ago. David Goodey, Reinhard Hoheisel-
Huxmann, Erling Skjold and Andrew Smith are also thanked sincerely. Without
their help and support nothing would have been achieved.
John Ballam, Ronald Crocker, Albert Goodey, Bernhard Hallis, Vic Hiscock,
Dagfinn Kjeholt, Derek Morris, Jan Reimers and Wilfred ‘Robbie’ Robinson
were all there in 1940 and some sixty years later gave me the privilege of taking
part in their thoughts and memories. Often sad, sometimes troubled, but
inevitably low-key and with an understatement I could not fully fathom, they
spoke of the little things that are not in the reports. Many have crossed the bar
since and precious few are left. Let us never forget them or their mates.
The efficient staff at Sola Folkebibliotek, my local library, deserve great
thanks. There is not a single book or document I have asked for they have not
been able to find. Also the nameless staffs of the National Archives at Kew,
Bundesarchiv in Koblenz and Freiburg, and Riksarkivet in Oslo deserve thanks
for patience and professional dedication. The Naval Museum in Horten and
Nordland Røde Kors Krigsminnemuseum (War Museum) in Narvik are thanked
for enthusiastic support.
Julian Mannering at Seaforth Publishing deserves great thanks for believing in
me and giving me the deadlines I needed. Without his support the project might
never have seen completion.
Frank Abelsen, Dag-Jostein Andressen, John Asmussen, Bill Bartholomew,
Keith Batchelor, Øystein Berge, Jostein Berglyd, Alexander Dietzsch, Tore
Eggan, Ivar Enoksen, Nicole Granholt, Peter Harrison, Pamela Jacobsen, Tor
Jevanord, Svein Aage Knudsen, Ernst Knutson, Sonia Law, George Malcomson,
Oddvar Naas, Finn Nesvold, Tor Ødemotland, Simon Partridge, Paul Sedal,
Halvor Sperbund, Ian Thomas, Ulf Eirik Torgersen, Trond Erik Tveit, John
Warburton-Lee, Alister Williams, Ingrid Willoch, Ellen Margrete Willoch, Kåre
Willoch and Atle Wilmar all deserve acknowledgement.
Last, but not least, thanks to my beloved wife Gro, for allowing me to share
my passion for her with that for history; listening patiently when I needed to
discuss some detail and skilfully distracting me when I needed to relax.
Geirr H Haarr
Sola, Stavanger, May 2009
— 1 —
Introduction
T German invasion of Norway in April 1940 (Operation
HIS BOOK DOCUMENTS THE
Weserübung), focusing on the events at sea.1 The objective is to give a balanced
and factual account; readable but without compromising the demand for research
and accurate detail.
As far as possible, the narrative has been based on primary sources. There is
still an overwhelming amount of detail and anybody having information that
would lead to modifications or improvements are more than welcome to contact
me. The research material has come in many languages: Norwegian, German,
English, Swedish, Danish and French. All translations into English are my own
responsibility and where necessary I have striven to maintain the significance of
what was said or written rather than create a word-by-word translation.
The military impact of Operation Weserübung has largely been overshadowed
by the events on the Western Front and the fall of France, but there is no doubt
that the invasion of Norway and the subsequent campaign had a significant
influence on WWII in Europe. On paper, Germany had made a move of great
strategic significance, breaking the British blockade of the North Sea and
opening a potential to strike out towards the Atlantic. Lacking the resources to
capitalise on the gains though, the conquest instead became a burden. The
surface arm of the German Navy was small before the operation; afterwards it
was crippled virtually beyond recovery. There were insufficient resources
available to develop the full potential of the Norwegian bases and through the
loss of many large surface ships the Kriegsmarine was, in reality, converted to a
navy of small ships, incapable of even considering reaping any strategic gains
from the venture. The Norwegian U-boat bases were of limited value compared
to those on the French coast that became available very shortly after the
Norwegian ones.
Nevertheless, Hitler and his senior staff were strengthened by Operation
Weserübung and in spite of grave losses, the Führer consolidated his grip on the
armed forces, paving the way for the campaigns in the West and in Russia.
The true strategic value of Norwegian territory appeared after the invasion of
Russia in 1941, when northern Norway was used as a springboard for the polar
front and the air and naval attacks on the supply route to Murmansk – neither of
which were considered at all in 1940. Even after the attack on Russia it was
difficult for the German Navy to find the resources to utilise the Norwegian
ports and seaways to their full potential.
The loss of Norway and her territorial waters was in itself not catastrophic for
the Allies but it took away an option to outflank Germany at the start of the
campaign in France. Ironically, the most persuasive asset for either side prior to
the events, the Swedish iron ore, was almost irrelevant afterwards. The supply to
Germany continued virtually unaffected through the Baltic, and its strategic
value diminished as the iron-ore mines in Lorraine were seized shortly after.