The German generals talk

188 Pages·2002·1.19 MB·English

by  Liddell Hart, Basil Henry

The German Generals Talk

B. H. Liddell Hart
Copyright © B. H. Liddell Hart 1948
The right of B. H. Liddell Hart to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988.
First published in the United Kingdom in 1948 by Quill, New York.
This edition published in 2014 by Endeavour Press Ltd.
To my son, Adrian, and to all who helped in this effort to be of service to history
Table of Contents
Preface
Part One – Hitler’s Generals
Chapter One – The Suicidal Schism
Chapter Two – The Mould of Seeckt
Chapter Three – The Blomberg-Fritsch Era
Chapter Four – The Brauchitsch-Halder Era
Chapter Five – “Soldier in the Sun” (Rommel)
Chapter Six – Soldiers in the Shadow
Chapter Seven – “The Old Guard” (Rundstedt)
Part Two – Preliminaries to War
Chapter Eight – The Rise of Hitler
Chapter Nine – The Rise of Armour
Part Three – Through German Eyes
Chapter Ten – How Hitler Beat France – and Saved Britain
Chapter Eleven – The End in France and the First Frustration
Chapter Twelve – Misfires in the Mediterranean
Chapter Thirteen – Frustration at Moscow
Chapter Fourteen – Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad
Chapter Fifteen – After Stalingrad
Chapter Sixteen – The Red Army
Chapter Seventeen – Paralysis in Normandy
Chapter Eighteen – The Anti-Hitler Plot, as Seen from H.Q. in the West
Chapter Nineteen – Hitler’s Last Gamble: The Second Ardennes Stroke
Chapter Twenty – Hitler, as a Young General Saw Him
Conclusion
Appendix – Table of German High Command
Preface
When the war ended, I was fortunate in having an early opportunity of exploring the
inside of “the enemy camp” — to find out what had gone on behind the opposing front,
and in the opponent’s mind. Some work I was doing for official quarters brought me in
contact with the German generals and admirals over a lengthy period. In the course of
many discussions with them I was able to gather their evidence on the events of the war
before memories had begun to fade or become increasingly coloured by after-thoughts. It
brought to light many secrets of the German command and its workings.
Understanding of what happened was helped by studying the German generals, as well
as hearing their accounts. Few of them resembled the typical picture of an iron “Prussian”
soldier. Rundstedt came nearest it, but in his case the impression was offset by his natural
courtesy and light touch of humour. His quiet dignity in adversity and uncomplaining
acceptance of hard conditions — that were no credit to his captors — won the respect of
most British officers who encountered him. In contrast to him were a number of
aggressive young generals, blustering and boorish, who owed their rise to Nazi favour. But
the majority were of a different type to both, and by no means a dominating one. Many
would have looked in their natural place at any conference of bank managers or civil
engineers.
They were essentially technicians, intent on their professional job, and with little idea of
things outside it. It is easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked and handled them, and found
them good instruments up to a point.
In sifting and piecing together their evidence it was useful to have a background
knowledge of the military situation in the pre-war period. It was a guide not only in saving
time but in avoiding misconceptions that were still widely prevalent at the end of the war.
Between the wars, my work as a military correspondent required me to keep a watchful
eye on developments in Europe, and I always sought to keep touch with the trends in
Germany. This task was eased, directly and indirectly, by the extent to which my own
military books were read in Germany, some of the leading soldiers themselves undertaking
the translation.
The warnings I gave about the Nazi menace, and the emphatic line I took in opposing
the policy of “appeasement” will be known to most of those who, in America as well as in
Europe, followed my pre-war writings. I pointed out the ominous signs even before Hitler
came into power. At the same time it was evident to me that the German General Staff had
little influence with Hitler compared with what it had exercised in the Kaiser’s time, and
that it tended to be more of a brake upon his aggressive plans than an impetus to them.
But the idea that the General Staff had played a dominant part in Germany’s aggressive
course, as it did before 1918, still coloured the prosecution proceedings at the Nuremberg
trial. Earlier, that fixed idea had hindered the British and American governments from
giving timely and effective encouragement to the underground movement in Germany
which, with military backing, had long been planning Hitler’s overthrow. That still
prevailing conception of the General Staff’s influence on policy was a long out-of-date
notion. But legends are persistent, and delusions tenacious. They had the unfortunate
effect of postponing Hitler’s downfall and prolonging the war months, and probably years,
after it would otherwise have ended. The ill-consequences for Europe are now beginning
to be realised.
I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the help and historical sense of those
who facilitated the early exploration of events. Also, to Captain F. S. Kingston, whose
mastery of the German language and intuitive teamwork were of great assistance in the
discussions. At the same time I would express my appreciation of the ready help given by
so many of those in the other camp in contributing to this piece of historical research, and
of the objective attitude most of them showed in discussing events. Finally, I wish to thank
Major-General Sir Percy Hobart, Chester Wilmot, G. R. Atkinson and Desmond Flower
for valuable comments and suggestions while the book was in preparation.
B. H. Liddell Hart
Part One – Hitler’s Generals
Chapter One – The Suicidal Schism
Everything in war looks different at the time from what it looks in the clearer light that
comes after the war. Nothing looks so different as the form of the leaders. The public
picture of them at the time is not only an unreal one, but changes with the tide of success.
Before the war, and still more during the conquest of the West, Hitler came to appear a
gigantic figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a Machiavelli
and the fanatical fervour of a Mahomet. After his first check in Russia, his figure began to
shrink, and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering amateur in the military field,
whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had been the Allies’ greatest asset. All the
disasters of the German Army were attributed to Hitler; all its successes were credited to
the German General Staff.
That picture is not true, though there is some truth in it. Hitler was far from being a
stupid strategist. Rather, he was too brilliant — and suffered from the natural faults that
tend to accompany such brilliance.
He had a deeply subtle sense of surprise, and was a master of the psychological side of
strategy, which he raised to a new pitch. Long before the war he had described to his
associates how the daring coup that captured Norway might be carried out, and how the
French could be manoeuvred out of the Maginot Line. He had also seen, better than any
general, how the bloodless conquests that preceded the war might be achieved by
undermining resistance beforehand. No strategist in history has been more clever in
playing on the minds of his opponents — which is the supreme art of strategy.
It was the very fact that he had so often proved right, contrary to the opinion of his
professional advisers, which helped him to gain influence at their expense. Those results
weakened their arguments in later situations which they gauged more correctly. For in the
Russian campaign his defects became more potent than his gifts, and the debit balance
accumulated to the point of bankruptcy. Even so, it has to be remembered that Napoleon,
who was a professional strategist, had been just as badly dazzled by his own success, and
made the same fatal mistakes in the same place.
Hitler’s worst fault here was the way he refused to “cut his loss” and insisted on
pressing the attack when the chances of success were fading. But that was the very fault
which had been most conspicuous in Foch and Haig, the Allied commanders of the last
war, as well as in Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who then held the German Supreme
Command. All these had been professional soldiers. Hitler also did much to produce the
German armies’ collapse in France by his reluctance to sanction any timely withdrawal.
But, here again, his attitude was exactly the same as that of Foch. The vital difference was
that in 1918 the commanders on the spot did not obey Foch more than they deemed wise,
whereas in 1944-45 the German generals were afraid to disobey Hitler’s orders.
It is the cause of that fear, and the internal conflict in the High Command, that we have
to probe in order to find the real explanation why the German plans miscarried. Hitler’s
strategic intuition and the General Staff’s strategic calculation might have been an all-
conquering combination. Instead, they produced a suicidal schism that became the
salvation of their opponents.
The older school of generals, products of the General Staff system, had been the chief
executants of German strategy throughout the war, but in the days of success their part had
not received full recognition. After the tide turned, they filled an increasing part in the
public picture, and came to be regarded by the Allied peoples as the really formidable
element on the opposing side. During the last year the spotlight was largely focused on
Rundstedt, their leading representative. The constant question became, not what Hitler
would do, but what Rundstedt would do — both in the military field and in a political
coup to wrest power from the Nazis.
The German generals have been regarded as such a closely-knit body, and so much of
one mind, as to be capable of wielding tremendous political power. That impression
accounts for the persistent expectation, on the Allies’ side, that the generals would
overthrow Hitler — an expectation that was never fulfilled. It also accounts for the
popular conviction that they were as great a menace as he was, and shared the
responsibility for Germany’s aggressions. That picture was true of the last war, but was
now out of date. The German generals had little effect on the start of the Second World
War — except as an ineffectual brake.
Once the war had started, their executive efficiency contributed a lot to Hitler’s success,
but their achievement was overshadowed by his triumph. When they came into more
prominence in the eyes of the outside world, as Hitler’s star waned, they had become more
impotent inside their own country.
That was due to a combination of factors. They stood for a conservative order and
tradition which had little appeal to a generation brought up in the revolutionary spirit and
fanatical faith of National Socialism. They could not count on the loyalty of their own
troops in any move against the regime — and especially its faith-inspiring Führer. They
were handicapped by the way they had isolated themselves from public affairs, and by the
way Hitler cunningly isolated them from sources of knowledge. Another factor was their
ingrained discipline and profound sense of the importance of the oath of loyalty which
they had sworn to the Head of the State. Ludicrous as this may seem in regard to one who
was himself so outstanding as a promise-breaker, it was a genuine feeling on their part,
and the most honourable of the factors which hampered them. But along with it often ran a
sense of personal interest which undercut their loyalty to their fellows, and their country’s
best interests, in face of a common threat. The play of individual ambitions and the
cleavage of personal interests constituted a fatal weakness in their prolonged struggle to
maintain their professional claim in the military field, and to preserve it from outside
interference. This struggle went on throughout the twelve years from Hitler’s rise to
Germany’s fall.
The first phase ended in a definite advantage to the professionals that was indirectly
gained when Himmler played on Hitler’s fears so effectively as to prompt him to carry out
a murderous purge of Captain Roehm and other Brownshirt leaders. It is by no means
clear whether the latter designed to overthrow Hitler, but there is no doubt that they were
aspiring to fill a big place in the military system. Once they were killed off, Hitler became