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The German Generals Talk B. H. Liddell Hart Copyright © B. H. Liddell Hart 1948 The right of B. H. Liddell Hart to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988. First published in the United Kingdom in 1948 by Quill, New York. This edition published in 2014 by Endeavour Press Ltd. To my son, Adrian, and to all who helped in this effort to be of service to history Table of Contents Preface Part One – Hitler’s Generals Chapter One – The Suicidal Schism Chapter Two – The Mould of Seeckt Chapter Three – The Blomberg-Fritsch Era Chapter Four – The Brauchitsch-Halder Era Chapter Five – “Soldier in the Sun” (Rommel) Chapter Six – Soldiers in the Shadow Chapter Seven – “The Old Guard” (Rundstedt) Part Two – Preliminaries to War Chapter Eight – The Rise of Hitler Chapter Nine – The Rise of Armour Part Three – Through German Eyes Chapter Ten – How Hitler Beat France – and Saved Britain Chapter Eleven – The End in France and the First Frustration Chapter Twelve – Misfires in the Mediterranean Chapter Thirteen – Frustration at Moscow Chapter Fourteen – Frustration in the Caucasus and at Stalingrad Chapter Fifteen – After Stalingrad Chapter Sixteen – The Red Army Chapter Seventeen – Paralysis in Normandy Chapter Eighteen – The Anti-Hitler Plot, as Seen from H.Q. in the West Chapter Nineteen – Hitler’s Last Gamble: The Second Ardennes Stroke Chapter Twenty – Hitler, as a Young General Saw Him Conclusion Appendix – Table of German High Command Preface When the war ended, I was fortunate in having an early opportunity of exploring the inside of “the enemy camp” — to find out what had gone on behind the opposing front, and in the opponent’s mind. Some work I was doing for official quarters brought me in contact with the German generals and admirals over a lengthy period. In the course of many discussions with them I was able to gather their evidence on the events of the war before memories had begun to fade or become increasingly coloured by after-thoughts. It brought to light many secrets of the German command and its workings. Understanding of what happened was helped by studying the German generals, as well as hearing their accounts. Few of them resembled the typical picture of an iron “Prussian” soldier. Rundstedt came nearest it, but in his case the impression was offset by his natural courtesy and light touch of humour. His quiet dignity in adversity and uncomplaining acceptance of hard conditions — that were no credit to his captors — won the respect of most British officers who encountered him. In contrast to him were a number of aggressive young generals, blustering and boorish, who owed their rise to Nazi favour. But the majority were of a different type to both, and by no means a dominating one. Many would have looked in their natural place at any conference of bank managers or civil engineers. They were essentially technicians, intent on their professional job, and with little idea of things outside it. It is easy to see how Hitler hoodwinked and handled them, and found them good instruments up to a point. In sifting and piecing together their evidence it was useful to have a background knowledge of the military situation in the pre-war period. It was a guide not only in saving time but in avoiding misconceptions that were still widely prevalent at the end of the war. Between the wars, my work as a military correspondent required me to keep a watchful eye on developments in Europe, and I always sought to keep touch with the trends in Germany. This task was eased, directly and indirectly, by the extent to which my own military books were read in Germany, some of the leading soldiers themselves undertaking the translation. The warnings I gave about the Nazi menace, and the emphatic line I took in opposing the policy of “appeasement” will be known to most of those who, in America as well as in Europe, followed my pre-war writings. I pointed out the ominous signs even before Hitler came into power. At the same time it was evident to me that the German General Staff had little influence with Hitler compared with what it had exercised in the Kaiser’s time, and that it tended to be more of a brake upon his aggressive plans than an impetus to them. But the idea that the General Staff had played a dominant part in Germany’s aggressive course, as it did before 1918, still coloured the prosecution proceedings at the Nuremberg trial. Earlier, that fixed idea had hindered the British and American governments from giving timely and effective encouragement to the underground movement in Germany which, with military backing, had long been planning Hitler’s overthrow. That still prevailing conception of the General Staff’s influence on policy was a long out-of-date notion. But legends are persistent, and delusions tenacious. They had the unfortunate effect of postponing Hitler’s downfall and prolonging the war months, and probably years, after it would otherwise have ended. The ill-consequences for Europe are now beginning to be realised. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the help and historical sense of those who facilitated the early exploration of events. Also, to Captain F. S. Kingston, whose mastery of the German language and intuitive teamwork were of great assistance in the discussions. At the same time I would express my appreciation of the ready help given by so many of those in the other camp in contributing to this piece of historical research, and of the objective attitude most of them showed in discussing events. Finally, I wish to thank Major-General Sir Percy Hobart, Chester Wilmot, G. R. Atkinson and Desmond Flower for valuable comments and suggestions while the book was in preparation. B. H. Liddell Hart Part One – Hitler’s Generals Chapter One – The Suicidal Schism Everything in war looks different at the time from what it looks in the clearer light that comes after the war. Nothing looks so different as the form of the leaders. The public picture of them at the time is not only an unreal one, but changes with the tide of success. Before the war, and still more during the conquest of the West, Hitler came to appear a gigantic figure, combining the strategy of a Napoleon with the cunning of a Machiavelli and the fanatical fervour of a Mahomet. After his first check in Russia, his figure began to shrink, and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had been the Allies’ greatest asset. All the disasters of the German Army were attributed to Hitler; all its successes were credited to the German General Staff. That picture is not true, though there is some truth in it. Hitler was far from being a stupid strategist. Rather, he was too brilliant — and suffered from the natural faults that tend to accompany such brilliance. He had a deeply subtle sense of surprise, and was a master of the psychological side of strategy, which he raised to a new pitch. Long before the war he had described to his associates how the daring coup that captured Norway might be carried out, and how the French could be manoeuvred out of the Maginot Line. He had also seen, better than any general, how the bloodless conquests that preceded the war might be achieved by undermining resistance beforehand. No strategist in history has been more clever in playing on the minds of his opponents — which is the supreme art of strategy. It was the very fact that he had so often proved right, contrary to the opinion of his professional advisers, which helped him to gain influence at their expense. Those results weakened their arguments in later situations which they gauged more correctly. For in the Russian campaign his defects became more potent than his gifts, and the debit balance accumulated to the point of bankruptcy. Even so, it has to be remembered that Napoleon, who was a professional strategist, had been just as badly dazzled by his own success, and made the same fatal mistakes in the same place. Hitler’s worst fault here was the way he refused to “cut his loss” and insisted on pressing the attack when the chances of success were fading. But that was the very fault which had been most conspicuous in Foch and Haig, the Allied commanders of the last war, as well as in Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who then held the German Supreme Command. All these had been professional soldiers. Hitler also did much to produce the German armies’ collapse in France by his reluctance to sanction any timely withdrawal. But, here again, his attitude was exactly the same as that of Foch. The vital difference was that in 1918 the commanders on the spot did not obey Foch more than they deemed wise, whereas in 1944-45 the German generals were afraid to disobey Hitler’s orders. It is the cause of that fear, and the internal conflict in the High Command, that we have to probe in order to find the real explanation why the German plans miscarried. Hitler’s strategic intuition and the General Staff’s strategic calculation might have been an all- conquering combination. Instead, they produced a suicidal schism that became the salvation of their opponents. The older school of generals, products of the General Staff system, had been the chief executants of German strategy throughout the war, but in the days of success their part had not received full recognition. After the tide turned, they filled an increasing part in the public picture, and came to be regarded by the Allied peoples as the really formidable element on the opposing side. During the last year the spotlight was largely focused on Rundstedt, their leading representative. The constant question became, not what Hitler would do, but what Rundstedt would do — both in the military field and in a political coup to wrest power from the Nazis. The German generals have been regarded as such a closely-knit body, and so much of one mind, as to be capable of wielding tremendous political power. That impression accounts for the persistent expectation, on the Allies’ side, that the generals would overthrow Hitler — an expectation that was never fulfilled. It also accounts for the popular conviction that they were as great a menace as he was, and shared the responsibility for Germany’s aggressions. That picture was true of the last war, but was now out of date. The German generals had little effect on the start of the Second World War — except as an ineffectual brake. Once the war had started, their executive efficiency contributed a lot to Hitler’s success, but their achievement was overshadowed by his triumph. When they came into more prominence in the eyes of the outside world, as Hitler’s star waned, they had become more impotent inside their own country. That was due to a combination of factors. They stood for a conservative order and tradition which had little appeal to a generation brought up in the revolutionary spirit and fanatical faith of National Socialism. They could not count on the loyalty of their own troops in any move against the regime — and especially its faith-inspiring Führer. They were handicapped by the way they had isolated themselves from public affairs, and by the way Hitler cunningly isolated them from sources of knowledge. Another factor was their ingrained discipline and profound sense of the importance of the oath of loyalty which they had sworn to the Head of the State. Ludicrous as this may seem in regard to one who was himself so outstanding as a promise-breaker, it was a genuine feeling on their part, and the most honourable of the factors which hampered them. But along with it often ran a sense of personal interest which undercut their loyalty to their fellows, and their country’s best interests, in face of a common threat. The play of individual ambitions and the cleavage of personal interests constituted a fatal weakness in their prolonged struggle to maintain their professional claim in the military field, and to preserve it from outside interference. This struggle went on throughout the twelve years from Hitler’s rise to Germany’s fall. The first phase ended in a definite advantage to the professionals that was indirectly gained when Himmler played on Hitler’s fears so effectively as to prompt him to carry out a murderous purge of Captain Roehm and other Brownshirt leaders. It is by no means clear whether the latter designed to overthrow Hitler, but there is no doubt that they were aspiring to fill a big place in the military system. Once they were killed off, Hitler became

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