The German army on the Western front 1915 PDF
Preview The German army on the Western front 1915
To my aunt and godmother Joan Ede With love and thanks for a lifetime of kindness. By the same author: The German Army on the Somme 1914 – 1916 The German Army at Passchendaele The German Army on Vimy Ridge 1914 – 1917 The German Army at Cambrai The German Army at Ypres 1914 The Germans at Beaumont Hamel The Germans at Thiepval With Nigel Cave: The Battle for Vimy Ridge 1917 Le Cateau First published in Great Britain in 2012 by Pen & Sword Military an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street Barnsley South Yorkshire S70 2AS Copyright © Jack Sheldon 2012 9781783032266 The right of Jack Sheldon to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset in Ellington by Phoenix Typesetting, Auldgirth, Dumfriesshire Printed and bound in England by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Family History, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Pen & Sword Discovery, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe True Crime, Wharncliffe Transport, Pen & Sword & Sword Select, Pen & Sword Military Classics, Leo Cooper, The Praetorian Press, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and Frontline Publishing For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk Table of Contents Dedication Title Page Copyright Page Introduction Acknowledgements Author’s Note CHAPTER 1 - The Winter Battle in Champagne CHAPTER 2 - Neuve Chapelle CHAPTER 3 - Gas Attack at Ypres CHAPTER 4 - The Spring Battles in Artois: Arras, Aubers Ridge and Festubert .CHAPTER 5 - The Argonne Forest CHAPTER 6 - The Autumn Battles in Artois: Arras and Loos CHAPTER 7 - The Autumn Battle in Champagne APPENDIX I - German – British Comparison of Ranks APPENDIX II - 1915: An Outline Chronology APPENDIX III - Selective Biographical Notes Bibliography Index Introduction The German Army series concentrates on description and analysis of the way events unfolded along the Western Front and does not usually pursue consideration of alternative scenarios. However a broader discussion is essential in the case of 1915. This was a seminal year on the Western Front and for the First World War more generally. Despite months of incessant fighting it did not even begin to determine the outcome of the war, but it certainly defined the way it would be fought. The stalemate at Ypres the previous November brought mobile operations to an end in the west. This forced the German High Command and Falkenhayn in particular to confront the reality of the long-feared war on two fronts and to decide on future strategy. Given the constraints of manpower and equipment it was clear that it would be impossible to maintain large-scale offensives in both east and west at the same time. Priorities had to be laid down and difficult choices confronted. In the event, the decision was to attack on the Eastern Front and to conduct defensive operations along the Western Front. There were only two, relatively limited, exceptions to this policy. Throughout the year, but more especially up until August, the reinforced XVI Corps, commanded by General der Infanterie von Mudra, conducted a permanent offensive, driving in a southerly direction through the difficult terrain of the Argonne Forest west of Verdun whilst, in late April and early May, Fourth Army, commanded by Generaloberst Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, launched a limited attack, preceded by the first offensive use of chlorine gas, which was designed to eliminate the Ypres Salient. Despite their peculiar impersonal dryness and strange couching in the third person throughout, it is clear from an examination of Falkenhayn’s memoirs that he appreciated that the greatest threat was posed by the Allies in the west and that it would be in Germany’s interest to conclude a separate peace with Russia. As a result of this line of thought, his first inclination was to deploy the extra forces generated in early 1915 on the Western Front rather than in the east. A combination of training and equipping new units, coupled with a major reorganisation of the field army, including substantial reductions in the infantry reorganisation of the field army, including substantial reductions in the infantry available in each of the divisions, made it possible to create eight additional divisions in February 1915 and a further fourteen the following April. All these extra forces, in fact, went to the east, which throws up two questions: why was this done; and, was there an alternative? It would appear that by the end of 1914 Falkenhayn had already decided that the ultimate decision would have to be fought out on the Western Front but that, in the light of the failure the previous November in Flanders and the relative strength of the two sides, this could not be achieved by breakthrough and manoeuvre. Instead, it would have to rely on a policy of attrition, coupled with delaying tactics on the Eastern Front. It could be said that this was another example of Falkenhayn playing a percentage game, rather than risking all on decisive, but possibly risky, action. It is certainly consistent with the way he chose to fight the battles around Ypres and Flanders the previous autumn. By launching the fresh formations of Fourth Army east-west, parallel to the coast, he ensured that, if there was no swift breakthrough and wheeling movement to the south, there would at least be a defensible line at the end of the offensive. A great captain might well have preferred to have massed his forces along the line of the Lys, allowed the Allies to progress along the Belgian coast towards Ostende then to have driven hard north to the sea, refusing his left flank and so have eliminated the main body of the BEF. Falkenhayn later described the operations in Flanders as a ‘gamble’, but he was referring to the rushed deployment of his raw troops, rather than risking all his chips on one spin of the wheel. Throughout 1915 the war in the west comprised more or less incessant French attacks, with the main emphasis placed on the winter battles in Champagne in February and March and the Anglo-French offensives in Artois and Champagne in May and June; September and October. On the Eastern Front the inverse was true, with the forces of Oberbefehlshaber-Ost (Ober-Ost) [Commander in Chief Eastern Theatre] launching one major offensive after another, which gained great swathes of territory, but influenced the strategic situation not one jot. Although the Argonne offensive, which was maintained throughout the year, was obviously designed to interdict the main railway line to Verdun and thus prepare the way for an offensive against that salient, it was not until February 1916 that operations intended to give substance to Falkenhayn’s policy of attrition began. This suggests either that Falkenhayn’s plan was never realistic, or that he did not stick to it. Of the two decisions to deploy forces in the east, the despatch of eight divisions in February is the more difficult to understand. Falkenhayn himself stressed that the situation of the forces of Austria-Hungry, though extremely
Description:The list of books you might like
