The Genesis of New Weapons. Decision Making for Military R & D

200 Pages·1980·3.977 MB·English

by  Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy (Eds.)

Pergamon Titles of Reiated Interest
Cannlzzo The Gun Merchants
Close Europe Without Defense?
De Volpi Proliferation, Plutonium and Policy
Harkavy Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases
Keliher The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions
PERGAMON
ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
POLICY
STUDIES
The Genesis
of New Weapons
Decision Malcing
for Military R &D
Edited by
Franklin A. Long
Judith Reppy
Pergamon Press
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Copyright © 1980 Pergamon Press Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
The Genesis of new weapons.
(Pergamon policy studies) .
Bibliography: p.
Includes Index.
1. Military research—United States-
Management. 2. Military research—Russia-
Management. I. Long, Franklin Α., 1910-
II. Reppy. Judith. 1937-
U393.5.G46 1980 355'.ά7O973 80-12243
ISBN 0-08-025973-1
All Rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
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Printed in the United States of America
Preface
The Peace Studies Program of Cornell University is an inter­
disciplinary effort of teaching and research which is concerned
with a better understanding of peace and war and with
measures to reduce the likelihood of war and the costs of war
should it come. Long term support for the program has come
from the Ford Foundation as well as from the University.
In 1977 the Rockefeller Foundation made a grant to this
program for a study by the co-editors of this book on the
topic "U.S. Decision Making for Military R&D." This support
has permitted a number of specific studies on the U.S. efforts
in military R&D. In the central area of concern, that of the
decision-making process for initiation and carrying out of R&D
programs, it seemed important to obtain the views of some of
the military officers, civilian managers of R&D programs and
members of the research groups in industry that accomplish
the R&D. An informal one day discussion meeting at the
Aspen Institute in August 1978 brought together a small group
of such experts and a most lively and productive discussion
ensued. The success of this meeting suggested that it might
be useful to organize a more formal workshop, with papers for
discussion prepared in advance and distributed to the partici­
pants. This workshop was held in New York on March 1-2,
1979. All of the topics that are presented in this book and a
few additional ones were vigorously debated. The authors of
the papers included in this volume then revised their papers
in the light of the discussions and the editors went about the
task of bringing them together as a book.
As editors, we owe heartfelt thanks to many people: the
authors who prepared papers for discussion at the workshop;
to the other workshop participants; the Rockefeller Foundation
and the Cornell Peace Studies Program for their sponsor­
ship and financial support. We are especially grateful to
vii
viii PREFACE
Mrs. Deborah Ostrander for her help in organizing the work­
shop, and to Mrs. Lynn Ashworth for help in organizing the
papers and typing them in final form and for preparing the
index to the book. The subject of the book is important, and
we very much hope the analyses of this volume will be helpful
to the military and industrial groups that design and accom­
plish the U.S. programs of militairy R&D, to the congressional
and other groups with responsibility for their oversight, and,
not least, to the interested citizens who have concern about
what is a large, expensive and consequential part of the U.S.
military effort.
Franklin Long and Judith Reppy
Editors
1
Decision Mal<ing in
Military R & D:
An Introductory Overview
Franklin A. Long
Judith Reppy
For more than three decades expenditure for military research
and development (R&D) has been by far the largest item in
the R&D programs of the United States government. The
initial impetus for this came from the many successful
products of military R&D in World War II: rockets, radar,
proximity fuses, anti-submarine devices, and, climactic ally,
the atomic bomb. Most of the individuals involved in this
wartime effort believed that science and technology would
continue to be vital to the military. In his influential 1945
report, Science; The Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush said,
"In this war, it has become clear beyond all doubt that
scientific research is absolutely essential to national security,"
and he urged a "permanent civilian activity to supplement the
research of the [military] Services." (1) Reflecting a con­
sensus on the importance of R&D, federal support for military
R&D continued at a high level after 1945. The United States»
strategic arsenal and many of today's conventional weapons
are the result of this sustained effort to develop new military
technology.
In recent years, funds for R&D programs have con­
stituted 10 to 12 percent of the total U.S. military budget,
or about $15 billion in fiscal year 1979. This figure repre­
sents 50 percent of total federal spending for research and
development. More significantly, the spending for military
R&D is a very large fraction of U.S. investment in military
hardware, comprising 30 percent of total acquisition costs in
1979 (where acquisition is defined as the sum of R&D and
procurement). Thus, spending for military R&D not only
dominates the government's support of science and tech­
nology, but is also a disproportionate share of U.S. spending
for military hardware - at least as judged by the standard of
private firms, which typically spend only two to five percent
of sales on R&D.
4 THE GENESIS OF NEW WEAPONS
The standard justification for these large expenditures
for military R&D is that they supply the new technology that
the military services need and strongly demand. The De­
partment of Defense is committed to a U.S. position of overall
technical superiority in military technology; technical leader­
ship is regarded as being essential in itself as well as being
necessary to preclude technological surprise. Moreover, ad­
vanced technology is considered an area of comparative ad­
vantage for the United States, making it possible to rely on
smaller numbers of superior weapons.
The substitution of quality for quantity has limits, how­
ever, and many military men have been dismayed by the small
numbers purchased of some of the newest products of R&D
purchased, such as the expensive aircraft and naval vessels.
Since in real terms, funds for weapons acquisition have re­
mained about constant, one might predict strong pressure
from within the military to reduce the relatively large fraction
of expenditures that currently goes to R&D. More generally,
one might expect continuing concern and analysis of the
proper balance between technological sophistication of new
weapons and the quantities procured. But the quality-
versus-quantity debate has had no apparent effect on the
volume of resources allocated to military R&D.
A more profound question is, what is the overall impact
of rapid changes in military technology on U.S. national se­
curity? Vannevar Bush was correct in saying that scientific
research is essential to national security. But is it also true
that more and more new military technology is better and
better? Even apart from the cost, there are reasons for
doubting that the answer to this is always yes. First, our
principal adversary, the Soviet Union, appears committed to
keeping closely abreast of the U.S. at all levels of military
effort. Soviet capabilities for developing innovative military
technology are, in generad, considerably behind those of the
U.S., but the Soviets have shown real ability to absorb new
U.S. developments and move more rapidly to produce them for
their own military forces.
These moves and countermoves in the development and
adoption of military technology constitute an element of the
arms race between the U.S. and USSR leading to escalating
costs and higher potential for destruction on both sides, with
only illusory gains in national security for either. A further
problem is that the new technologies are rapidly taken up by
other nations, typically by arms transfers, with a consequent
world-wide buildup in levels and sophistication of armaments.
Another profound concern is the destabilizing potential
of new military technologies. Both the U.S. and the USSR,
and indeed most nations of the world, have a strong desire to
avoid major war. Hence there is a general desire for weapons
systems with a strong deterrence capability. But new military
AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 5
technologies can have a harmful effect on mutual deterrence
in at least two ways. Some weapons systems are inherently
destabilizing; for example, multiple warheads (MIRV) on stra­
tegic nuclear-armed missiles are destabilizing because they
enhance the potential gain from, and hence the likelihood of,
a nuclear "first strike. "(2) Other weapons systems, which
may not be especially destabilizing, in the end are often so
when first deployed by one side, because they upset a pre­
vious balance and introduce a new element of uncertainty
about a future balance; long-range cruise missiles are cur­
rently leading to this sort of instability. In sum, the rapid
introduction of new military systems, which may appear 'un-
contestably desirable as an element of "technological superior­
ity," involves the risk of introducing undesirable destabilizing
effects. One cannot assume that military R&D is an uncom­
plicated good.
THE CORNELL/ROCKEFELLER WORKSHOP
The long-term goal of the Cornell studies on military R&D is
to address these crucial issues of national security. How­
ever, an essential first step is to understand in some depth
how the U.S. programs of military R&D really work. Only
then can one hope to analyze and evaluate the connections
between military requirements, R&D programs, the utility of
new military systems, and their effects on national security.
Where do research ideas come from? Who evaluates them?
How are choices made among them? How are projects managed
and carried out? What are the roles of the military services,
the civilian elements of the Department of Defense, and the
industrial performers of R&D? All of these questions are ele­
ments of decision making in military R&D. We were therefore
led to organize a workshop on this topic, which is of great
interest in itself, and to solicit the participation of experts in
the various aspects of the conduct of U.S. programs of mili­
tary R&D.
The workshop, jointly sponsored by the Peace Studies
Program of Cornell University and by the Rockefeller Founda­
tion, was held in New York City on March 1 - 2, 1979. The
goal was to identify the chief actors and the important deci­
sion points in the development of new weapons. A particular
hope was to isolate and illuminate the factors that are in­
volved in the initial stages of R&D projects; these early
stages, which are the least visible and least well understood,
appear to be the most important for determining the general
character of U.S. military equipment.
The participants at the workshop included military plan­
ners and program managers, command officers from operation-
6 THE GENESIS OF NEW WEAPONS
al military units, civilian analysts from within and without the
Department of Defense, persons from the defense industry,
and members of congressional-committee staffs. By including
representatives from the main organizational components in­
volved in decision making for military R&D, we hoped to have
a lively discussion in which the main points of view would be
expressed. In this we succeeded; indeed, we could have
used much more time for discussion.
As the chapters of this book demonstrate, there is dis­
agreement, even among a group of well-informed experts, on
some of the major issues raised by the military R&D program.
In particular, the general question, how well is the United
States doing? was answered rather optimistically by most of
those working within the R&D system, but much less favor­
ably by the outside analysts and those representing the mili­
tary "customer." The questions of political control of military
R&D were also strongly debated, with differing views ex­
pressed on the appropriate relationship between the military
services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
and between the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress.
We have grouped the chapters under four headings.
Those in the first group (Chapters 2-4) are broad, critical
assessments of the current U.S. procedures and institutions
for developing new weapons. These are followed by Alexan­
der Kossiakoff's chapter (5), which traces in detail the formal
procedures for initiating a new weapons project in the De­
partment of Defense. The chapters in the next group (6-8)
take up the comparison of the U.S. system for developing
new military technology with that of the Soviet Union. Here
the differences in the underlying "technology culture" are of
interest, as are the differences in organization and decision
making between the two countries. The last two chapters
discuss aspects of political control of weapons developments in
the United States: civilian control within the Department of
Defense, and program oversight and budgetary control by
Congress.
OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY R&D PROGRAM
The scope of the U.S. program of military R&D is immense.
There are thousands of separate research projects, ranging
from the modest long-term research projects designed to
broaden the technology base, to major developmental efforts
for a new weapon or communication system. Virtually every
scientific and engineering discipline is represented. Project
size varies from very small to very large, and duration can
be from a few months to several years. Tables 1.1 and 1.2
present data on the main characteristics of the U.S. program.
AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW 7
The first table gives a complete accounting of total govern­
ment spending on military R&D. The largest component is
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) appro­
priation in the DOD budget, totaling $12.7 billion for fiscal
year 1979. In addition to this sum, the Department of Ener­
gy spent about $1.1 billion on research related to nuclear
weapons, and an additional $464 million was spent by the DOD
on pay for military personnel assigned to the RDT&E effort
but paid out of other appropriations. Finally, payments for
independent-research and bid-and-proposal programs amount­
ed to $1,106 billion; these are payments to defense companies
for part of their costs for in-house R&D and proposal devel­
opment; the costs are recovered by the companies as over­
head charges against DOD contracts, and therefore do not
appear separately in the DOD budget. (3)
Table 1.1. U.S. Government Funding for
Müitary R&D, FY 1979
(budget authority, est.)
$ Billions
Department of Defense
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 12.699
Military Personnel Assigned to R&D .464
DOD Payments for IR&D/B&P* 1.106
Department of Energy
R&D on military systems 1.127
Total $ 15.390
•Calendar 1978
Sources: National Science Foundation, April 1979, "An Anal­
ysis of Federal Funding by Budget Function, FY
1978-1980"; Department of Defense, "Annual Report
on IR&D Costs and B&P Costs."
The sum of these categories was $15.4 billion for fiscal
year 1979, a very large sum indeed. Table 1.2 gives four
tabulations showing how the RDT&E portion of that total was
spent: according to performer, to stage of development, to
military service, and to budget activity. Apportionments at
this level of aggregation are quite stable over time, and pro­
vide a good picture of some of the main features of the R&D