The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (Revised Edition)

244 Pages·2007·1.04 MB·English

by  Fareed Zakaria

More Praise for The Future of Freedom

“Zakaria’s provocative and wide-ranging book is eminently worth reading….
His book displays a kind of argumentation, grounded in history and political
philosophy, of which there is precious little these days, particularly among
opinion columnists.”

—Foreign Affairs “Zakaria is a serious enough thinker and has produced a

serious enough book to require serious attention.”

—Gary Hart, The Washington Monthly “Brilliant…. Some books are too

short…. Oh that The Future of Freedom had a seventh chapter.”

—National Review

“The Future of Freedom is one of the most important books on global political
trends to appear in the past decade. Its sobering analysis has vital lessons for all
of us concerned with freedom’s future in the world.”

—Samuel Huntington “At once provocative and illuminating.”

—Bernard Lewis “Fareed Zakaria, one of the most brilliant young writers,

has produced a fascinating and thought-provoking book on the impact of

Western constitutional principles on the global order.”

—Henry Kissinger “In this incisive book, Fareed Zakaria asks searching

questions and offers provocative answers. The Future of Freedom is an

impressive contribution to our understanding of the crises of democracy that

lie darkly ahead.”

—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

“Compelling…. An intelligent study on the compromises necessary to reach

liberal democracy, and on the perils of maintaining it.”

—Christian Science Monitor

“A book with immense relevance for the immediate future of the Middle East.”

—Salon Magazine

“Thought-provoking and timely.”

—Publishers Weekly

“Fareed Zakaria covers an immense amount of ground in this eloquent
examination of the varieties of freedom and democracy. Mastering the nuances
of every corner of the world, discussing the critical (and virtually unexamined)
problem of ‘illiberal democracy,’ analyzing what he correctly calls ‘the Great
Exception’ of Islam, Zakaria forces us to think in new ways about values that
Americans take for granted.”
—Richard Holbrooke “This is a very thoughtful and intelligent book that is

important for all Americans and for those who would make American

policy. After all, what is more important than the real meaning of freedom

and democracy? The book could not appear at a more appropriate time.”

—Peter Jennings “Fareed Zakaria’s The Future of Freedom is a learned,
tough-minded, and intellectually courageous warning that easy bromides

about democracy, if taken as a literal guide to policy, could make the world

a more dangerous and less pleasant place.”

—Nicholas Lemann “Our role is to help you think for yourselves. So I

won’t tell you whether I think Zakaria is right…. Just let me suggest that

you read the book.”

—Richard Levin, President, Yale Freshman Address, Fall 2003

THE FUTURE OF Freedom

Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad

FAREED ZAKARIA

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY

NEW YORK LONDON

Copyright © 2007, 2003 by Fareed Zakaria All rights reserved

Poem reprinted with the permission of Bernard Lewis.

Production manager: Devon Zahn

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Zakaria, Fareed.

The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad/

Fareed Zakaria.—1st ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Democracy. 2. Liberty. 3. Political science—Philosophy. I. Title.

JC423 .Z35 2003

321.8–dc21 2002153051

ISBN: 978-0-393-06938-9

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110

www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street,

London W1T 3QT

For Paula

The Sirens were sea-nymphs who had the power of charming by their song all
who heard them, so that the unhappy mariners were irresistibly impelled to cast
themselves into the sea to their destruction. Circe directed Ulysses to fill the ears
of his seamen with wax, so that they should not hear the strain; and to cause
himself to be bound to the mast, and his people to be strictly enjoined, whatever
he might say or do, by no means to release him till they should have passed the
Sirens’ island.

Ulysses obeyed these directions. He filled the ears of his people with wax,

and suffered them to bind him with cords firmly to the mast. As they approached
the Sirens’ island, the sea was calm, and over the waters came the notes of music
so ravishing and attractive that Ulysses struggled to get loose, and by cries and
signs to his people begged to be released; but they, obedient to his previous
orders, sprang forward and bound him still faster. They held on their course, and
the music grew fainter till it ceased to be heard, when with joy Ulysses gave his
companions the signal to unseal their ears, and they relieved him from his bonds.

—Thomas Bulfinch, The Age of Fable or Stories of

Gods and Heroes

Contents

INTRODUCTION The Democratic Age

CHAPTER 1 A Brief History of Human Liberty

CHAPTER 2 The Twisted Path

CHAPTER 3 Illiberal Democracy

CHAPTER 4 The Islamic Exception

CHAPTER 5 Too Much of a Good Thing

CHAPTER 6 The Death of Authority

CONCLUSION The Way Out

Afterword

Notes

Acknowledgments

THE FUTURE OF Freedom

INTRODUCTION

The Democratic Age

WE LIVE IN a democratic age. Over the last century the world has been shaped
by one trend above all others—the rise of democracy. In 1900 not a single
country had what we would today consider a democracy: a government created
by elections in which every adult citizen could vote. Today 119 do, comprising
62 percent of all countries in the world. What was once a peculiar practice of a
handful of states around the North Atlantic has become the standard form of
government for humankind. Monarchies are antique, fascism and communism
utterly discredited. Even Islamic theocracy appeals only to a fanatical few. For
the vast majority of the world, democracy is the sole surviving source of political
legitimacy. Dictators such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Zimbabwe’s Robert
Mugabe go to great effort and expense to organize national elections—which, of
course, they win handily. When the enemies of democracy mouth its rhetoric and
ape its rituals, you know it has won the war.

We live in a democratic age in an even broader sense. From its Greek root,

“democracy” means “the rule of the people.” And everywhere we are witnessing
the shift of power downward. I call this “democratization,” even though it goes
far beyond politics, because the process is similar: hierarchies are breaking
down, closed systems are opening up, and pressures from the masses are now the
primary engine of social change. Democracy has gone from being a form of
government to a way of life.

Consider the economic realm. What is truly distinctive and new about

today’s capitalism is not that it is global or information-rich or technologically
driven—all that has been true at earlier points in history—but rather that it is
democratic. Over the last half-century economic growth has enriched hundreds
of millions in the industrial world, turning consumption, saving, and investing
into a mass phenomenon. This has forced the social structures of societies to
adapt. Economic power, which was for centuries held by small groups of

businessmen, bankers, and bureaucrats has, as a result, been shifting downward.
Today most companies—indeed most countries—woo not the handful that are
rich but the many that are middle class. And rightly so, for the assets of the most
exclusive investment group are dwarfed by those of a fund of workers’ pensions.

Culture has also been democratized. What was once called “high culture”

continues to flourish, of course, but as a niche product for the elderly set, no
longer at the center of society’s cultural life, which is now defined and
dominated by popular music, blockbuster movies, and prime-time television.
Those three make up the canon of the modern age, the set of cultural references
with which everyone in society is familiar. The democratic revolution coursing
through society has changed our very definition of culture. The key to the
reputation of, say, a singer in an old order would have been who liked her. The
key to fame today is how many like her. And by that yardstick Madonna will
always trump Jessye Norman. Quantity has become quality.

What has produced this dramatic shift? As with any large-scale social

phenomenon, many forces have helped produce the democratic wave—a
technological revolution, growing middle-class wealth, and the collapse of
alternative systems and ideologies that organized society. To these grand
systemic causes add another: America. The rise and dominance of America—a
country whose politics and culture are deeply democratic—has made
democratization seem inevitable. Whatever its causes, the democratic wave is
having predictable effects in every area. It is breaking down hierarchies,
empowering individuals, and transforming societies well beyond their politics.
Indeed much of what is distinctive about the world we live in is a consequence
of the democratic idea.

We often read during the roaring 1990s that technology and information had

been democratized. This is a relatively new phenomenon. In the past, technology
helped reinforce centralization and hierarchy. For example, the last great
information revolution—in the 1920s involving radio, television, movies,
megaphones—had a centralizing effect. It gave the person or group with access
to that technology the power to reach the rest of society. That’s why the first step
in a twentieth-century coup or revolution was always to take control of the
country’s television or radio station. But today’s information revolution has
produced thousands of outlets for news that make central control impossible and
dissent easy. The Internet has taken this process another huge step forward,
being a system where, in the columnist Thomas Friedman’s words, “everyone is
connected but no one is in control.”

The democratization of technology and information means that most anyone

can get his hands on anything. Like weapons of mass destruction. We now know

that Osama bin Laden was working on a serious biological-weapons program
during the 1990s. But what is most astonishing is that the scientific information
and manuals found in Al Qaeda’s Kabul safe houses were not secrets stolen from
government laboratories. They were documents downloaded from the Internet.
Today if you want to find sources for anthrax, recipes for poison, or methods to
weaponize chemicals, all you need is a good search engine. These same open
sources will, unfortunately, soon help someone build a dirty bomb. The
components are easier to get than ever before. Mostly what you need is
knowledge, and that has been widely disseminated over the last decade. Even
nuclear technology is now commonly available. It is, after all, fifty-year-old
know-how, part of the world of AM radios and black-and-white television. Call
it the democratization of violence.

It’s more than a catchy phrase. The democratization of violence is one of the

fundamental—and terrifying—features of the world today. For centuries the state
has had a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in human societies. This
inequality of power between the state and the citizen created order and was part
of the glue that held modern civilization together. But over the last few decades
the state’s advantage has been weakened; now small groups of people can do
dreadful things. And while terrorism is the most serious blow to state authority,
central governments have been under siege in other ways as well. Capital
markets, private businesses, local governments, nongovernmental organizations
have all been gaining strength, sapping the authority of the state. The illegal flow
of people, drugs, money, and weapons rising around the world attests to its
weakness. This diffusion of power will continue because it is fueled by broad
technological, social, and economic changes. In the post–September 11 world
the state has returned, with renewed power and legitimacy. This too will endure.
The age of terror will thus be marked by a tension, between the forces that drive
the democratization of authority on the one hand and the state on the other.

To discuss these problems is not to say that democracy is a bad thing.

Overwhelmingly it has had wonderful consequences. Who among us would want
to go back to an age with fewer choices and less individual power and
autonomy? But like any broad transformation, democracy has its dark sides. Yet
we rarely speak about them. To do so would be to provoke instant criticism that
you are “out of sync” with the times. But this means that we never really stop to
understand these times. Silenced by fears of being branded “antidemocratic” we
have no way to understand what might be troubling about the ever-increasing
democratization of our lives. We assume that no problem could ever be caused
by democracy, so when we see social, political, and economic maladies we shift
blame here and there, deflecting problems, avoiding answers, but never talking

about the great transformation that is at the center of our political, economic, and
social lives.

Democracy and Liberty

“Suppose elections are free and fair and those elected are racists, fascists,
separatists,” said the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke about Yugoslavia in
the 1990s. “That is the dilemma.” Indeed it is, and not merely in Yugoslavia’s
past but in the world’s present. Consider, for example, the challenge we face
across the Islamic world. We recognize the need for democracy in those often-
repressive countries. But what if democracy produces an Islamic theocracy or
something like it? It is not an idle concern. Across the globe, democratically
elected regimes, often ones that have been re-elected or reaffirmed through
referenda, are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and
depriving their citizens of basic rights. This disturbing phenomenon—visible
from Peru to the Palestinian territories, from Ghana to Venezuela—could be
called “illiberal democracy.”

For people in the West, democracy means “liberal democracy”: a political

system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly,
religion, and property. But this bundle of freedoms—what might be termed
“constitutional liberalism”—has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy and
the two have not always gone together, even in the West. After all, Adolf Hitler
became chancellor of Germany via free elections. Over the last half-century in
the West, democracy and liberty have merged. But today the two strands of
liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart
across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not.

In some places, such as Central Asia, elections have paved the way for

dictatorships. In others, they have exacerbated group conflict and ethnic
tensions. Both Yugoslavia and Indonesia, for example, were far more tolerant
and secular when they were ruled by strongmen (Tito and Suharto, respectively)
than they are now as democracies. And in many nondemocracies, elections
would not improve matters much. Across the Arab world elections held
tomorrow would probably bring to power regimes that are more intolerant,
reactionary, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic than the dictatorships currently in
place.

In a world that is increasingly democratic, regimes that resist the trend

produce dysfunctional societies—as in the Arab world. Their people sense the
deprivation of liberty more strongly than ever before because they know the

alternatives; they can see them on CNN, BBC, and Al-Jazeera. But yet, newly
democratic countries too often become sham democracies, which produces
disenchantment, disarray, violence, and new forms of tyranny. Look at Iran and
Venezuela. This is not a reason to stop holding elections, of course, but surely it
should make us ask, What is at the root of this troubling development? Why do
so many developing countries have so much difficulty creating stable, genuinely
democratic societies? Were we to embark on the vast challenge of building
democracy in Iraq, how would we make sure that we succeed?

First, let’s be clear what we mean by political democracy. From the time of

Herodotus it has been defined, first and foremost, as the rule of the people. This
definition of democracy as a process of selecting governments is now widely
used by scholars. In The Third Wave, the eminent political scientist Samuel P.
Huntington explains why:

Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the
inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be
inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special
interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public
good. These qualities make such governments undesirable but they do
not make them undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the
only one, and the relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices
can only be understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from the
other characteristics of political systems.

This definition also accords with the commonsense view of the term. If a

country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it “democratic.” When
public participation in a country’s politics is increased—for example, through
the enfranchisement of women—that country is seen as having become more
democratic. Of course elections must be open and fair, and this requires some
protections for the freedom of speech and assembly. But to go beyond this
minimal requirement and label a country democratic only if it guarantees a
particular catalog of social, political, economic, and religious rights—which will
vary with every observer—makes the word “democracy” meaningless. After all,
Sweden has an economic system that many argue curtails individual property
rights, France until recently had a state monopoly on television, and Britain has a
state religion. But they are all clearly and identifiably democracies. To have
“democracy” mean, subjectively, “a good government” makes it analytically
useless.