The Front National in France: Continuity and Change Under Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen

115 Pages·2017·1.27 MB·English

by  Daniel Stockemer

Daniel Stockemer
The Front National
in France
Continuity and Change Under
Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen
The Front National in France
Daniel Stockemer
The Front National in France
Continuity and Change Under
Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen
DanielStockemer
SchoolofPoliticalStudies
UniversityofOttawa
Ottawa,Ontario
Canada
ISBN978-3-319-49639-9 ISBN978-3-319-49640-5 (eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-49640-5
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2016961215
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Contents
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 TheHistoryoftheFrontNational. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 TheExtremeRightinFrance,1945–1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 TheFoundationoftheFN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 YearsofMarginality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 FromtheFringestoPartyPolitics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 TheFNinthe1980sandthe1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 CrisisandRenewedSuccess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 TheFNUnderMarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 TheFN’sIdeologyUnderJean-MarieLePenandMarineLePen. . . 27
3.1 TheFN’sIdeologyUnderJean-MarieLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.1 Immigration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1.2 OtherFeaturesoftheFNProgramme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 TheFN’sIdeologyUnderMarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.1 TheFNIdeologyinItsPressReleases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 TheFNIdeologybyRegionalFNChaptersandtheFNJ. . . 37
3.2.3 QuoVadisDe´diabolisation?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.4 TheFNin2015:RadicalRightwithaSoftenedImage. . . 40
4 TheFN’sLeadershipandElitesUnderJean-MarieLePenand
MarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Leadership:Jean-MarieLePenVersusMarineLePen. . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.1 Jean-MarieLePen. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 44
4.1.2 MarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 ThePartyElitesUnderJean-MarieLePenandMarineLePen. . . 48
4.2.1 Jean-MarieLePen. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 48
4.2.2 MarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
v
vi Contents
4.3 TheFN’sRelationshipwiththeMediaUnderJean-Marie
LePenandMarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.1 Jean-MarieLePen. . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. 52
4.3.2 MarineLePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.4 TheLeadershipStylesofJean-MarieandofMarineLePen:
ASynopsis.. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. 56
5 TheFNMembershipUnderJean-MarieLePenandMarine
LePen. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 MethodandInterviewSample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2 ActivistsUnderJean-MarieLePenandMarineLePen. . . . . . . . 62
5.2.1 Activists’Socio-EconomicBackground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.2.2 Activists’PoliticalSocialization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.3 TheActivists’PoliticalValues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 TheActivists’PersonalValues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.5 TheActivists’MotivationsforEngagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.6 EngagementTrajectory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.7 ChangesinMembershipUnderMarineLePen:ASynopsis. . . . . 76
6 TheFNVotersUnderJean-MarieLePenandMarineLePen. . . . . 79
6.1 PredictorsoftheFNElectoralSuccess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.1.1 Demographics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.1.2 Socio-economicFactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.1.3 AttitudinalFactors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.2 Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.3 Method. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
6.4 Results. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . .. 86
6.5 Discussion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
AppendixA:TheInterviews. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
About the Author
DanielStockemer isAssociateProfessorintheDepartmentofPoliticalStudiesat
the University of Ottawa. He specializes in political behavior and political repre-
sentation. The study of radical right-wing parties in Europe is one of his main
research areas. He was awarded an Insight Development Grant from the Social
Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (2013–2016) to study the
electoralsuccessoftheradicalrightinWesternEurope.Hefurtherspent7months
onfieldworkinFrancein2013interviewingFNmembers.
His recent work on the radical right in Europe appeared in the Journal of
Common Market Studies, Social Sciences Quarterly, the European Journal of
Communication,andRepresentation.Healsoeditedaspecialissueontheelectoral
spark of the FN in French Politics. Furthermore, he published articles in, among
others, Electoral Studies, Political Studies, European Union Politics, and the
InternationalPoliticalScienceReview.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
OnarainyNovembermorning,dockersfromCalaisarefiringflaresinprotestagainstport
joblossesoutsidetheregionalcouncilinLille,thecapitalofFrance’soldindustrialnorth.
Insidetheplushchamber,atall,solidlybuiltblondewomaninjeansandbootscrooksaleg
over her knee and flicks through a news magazine. Marine Le Pen, leader of the Front
National,whichhas18councilseats,hasdroppedinfromadayattheEuropeanParliament
innearbyBrussels,wherethepartyhas23MEPs.LePenlooksboredasthecouncillors
droneonaboutallocating€1.1billionofEUmoneytohelprevivethebleakeconomyof
Nord-Pas-de-Calais.Whenhermomentcomes,shelaunchesintoariffontheevilsofthe
Union.EUfundsjustreinforcethedictatorshipofBrusselsandimpoverishthedowntrod-
denruralandsmall-townfolkoftheregion,shesays.“Ihavetoremindpeopleadnauseam
thatthisisnotEuropeanmoney.It’spartofFrenchtaxpayers’moneythattransitsthrough
BrusselswiththerestgoingtopayforcentralandEasternEurope.”Withthat,theterrorof
theFrenchpoliticalestablishmentpicksupherpapers,closesherbeigewooljacketand
slipsouttoacarforthedrivebacktoParis,missingthecouncil’ssplendidlunch.Soitgoes
forLePenasshetillsthefertileelectoralsoilofthenorthasthepreludetoarunatthe
E´lyse´ePalacein2years’time.(Bremner2014)
“TheFrontNationalisatthegatesofpower”(BBCNews2014).Thiswake-up
call from French Prime Minister Manuel Valls to his dishevelled Parti Socialiste
(PS) summarizes the attitude of the French political class towards the Front
National (FN). The mainstream parties, both the PS on the left and the Union
PourunMouvementPopulaire(UMP,nowcalledtheRepublicans)ontheright,are
frightened: they are frightened that the FN wave continues to sweep over France;
theyarefrightenedthatthe2002earthquake,whichsawJean-MarieLePeninthe
second round of the presidential elections, might be repeated; they are frightened
that Marine Le Pen could accede to the presidency in 2017. Are these fears
justified?IstheFNindeedatthegatesofpower?
The answer to these questions is not obvious or easy. It is true that the FN has
beentransformedfromasuccessfulyetmarginalpartytoamajorplayerinFrench
politics.SinceMarineLePentookthereinsin2011,theFNhasbeensuccessfulon
threefronts.First,intermsofpublicopinion,MarineLePenhasturnedtheviewsof
asignificantportionoftheFrenchpopulationintheparty’sfavour.Fromthe20to
25 % who perceived the FN as a “party like others” under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s
©SpringerInternationalPublishingAG2017 1
D.Stockemer,TheFrontNationalinFrance,DOI10.1007/978-3-319-49640-5_1
2 1 Introduction
leadership,theproportionhasincreasedtoover50%sinceMarineLePenhasbeen
incharge(see,e.g.LePoint2015).Second,thepartyhasmultiplieditsmembership
byafactorofthreeorfour.WhereastheFNhadapproximately20,000membersat
the turn of the twenty-first century, it had between 60,000 and 80,000 in 2014,
makingitthethird-largestpartyinFrance(Stockemer2014).Finally,thepartyhas
reached heretofore unseen electoral heights. In the 2012 presidential election,
MarineLePenreceived18%ofthepopularvote.Inthe2014Europeanelections
andthe2015departmentalelections,theFNearned24.9%and25.2%ofthevotes
cast, respectively, ranking it first and second among all French parties in these
elections (Ministe`re de l’Inte´rieur 2015a). The December 2015 regional elections
sawafurtherboostintheFNvote,with27.9%inthefirstround(Ministe`redel’Inte´
rieur 2015b). In addition, polls in 2014 and 2015 credited Marine Le Pen with
approximately30%ofvoterintentionsfor2017,puttingheronparwiththemain
centre-rightandcentre-leftcontenders(e.g.,AlainJuppe´andManuelValls)oreven
aheadofthem(LeFigaro2015).
Yet,theFN’ssuccesses,particularlyinthepolls,looksomewhatlessremarkable
if we evaluate them in terms of political representation rather than vote shares.
Certainly,25%ofthepopularvoteisimpressive,but,exceptintheEuropeanand
regional elections, this electoral success has not translated into representation. In
terms of number of deputies at any level, the FN ranks only sixth in France as of
August 2015, making it a rather marginal political force. In addition, it does not,
yet, have strong local implementation.1 Not only does the party still struggle to
form local lists, particularly in small and medium-sized towns, but, even more
importantly, it did not win any major city in the 2014 local elections. Despite the
fact that the FN is in the majority in a dozen municipalities—among others, the
party won the towns of Be´ziers and Fre´jus and the seventh arrondissement of
Marseille—its local power is still marginal; in 2014, it only won 1 in 3000 cities
andthemajorityofthevotein1in1000municipalities(Shields2015).
Regardless of how impressive, or not, we might find the FN’s electoral and
non-electoralvictories,itisnecessarytoputthemintoperspective:theyoccurredin
amostbeneficialstructuralenvironment.From2009to2015,France,andEurope,
suffered from multiple crises (see Mondon 2014). First is the economic crisis,
which started to cripple the country in 2008–2009 and is still lingering, as shown
intheunemploymentrate ofover10%anddeficitscontinuouslyreaching3%or
moreofthestatebudget.Second,apoliticalcrisisisshakingupthepoliticalclass.
Second, President Hollande, discredited by scandal and government inaction, has
thelowestapprovalratingsofanypresidentintheFifthRepublic.Thecentreright
does not score much higher in public approval; following ex-President Sarkozy
reclaimingtheRepublicanParty’spresidencyin2014,thepartyisstillrecovering
frominternalbattlesoverleadershipandprogramme.Withthependingnomination
of its presidential candidate in 2016, the party, which is anything but united, is
1WiththeregionalelectionsinDecember2015,thishasprobablychangedslightly,giventhefact
thattheFNhasgainedrepresentationinnearlyallregions.
1 Introduction 3
likely to face more turmoil. Third, there is a crisis of governance and direction
within theEuropeanUnion.BeitGreece,therefugee crisis,ortheNorth Atlantic
FreeTradeAgreement,theEuropeanCommunityisfacingmultiplechallenges,and
fissuresareeverywherebetweenandwithinEuropeanUnionmembercountries.
Giventhesecrises,itisonlylogicalthatiftheFNshouldeverbesuccessful,it
wouldinsuchabeneficialstructuralenvironment(McAdam1988).However,what
happens if this structural window of opportunity closes? Can the FN sustain
progress in public approval, membership, and electoral results, or will it once
again fall back to a position of relative marginality? Answering these questions
requires an in-depth analysis of the party, its leader, its programme, its ideology,
and its members and supporters. Has the party been transformed after Marine Le
Pen was elected to the FN presidency inFebruary 2011? Isit the same party as it
was during the 40-year leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, or has it evolved into a
different party? These are the questions that I seek to answer in this book. More
precisely, and using a mixed methods approach, I compare the “old” FN under
Jean-MarieLePentothe“new”FNunderMarineLePenacrossfourdimensions:
(1) the party’s ideology; (2) leadership styles, including the composition of the
partyelites andthe leaders’andparty’srelationshipwiththemedia; (3)themem-
bersoftheparty;and(4)thevotersfortheparty.
Inmoredetail,Ievaluatethedegreetowhichthereiscontinuityorchangefrom
Jean-MarieLePentoMarineLePenforthesefourdimensions,usingasupply-and-
demand framework (see Klandermans 1986, 1997, 2004). In its original sense,
supply refers to the products and services that a company puts on the market,
whereas demand refers to the potential buyers of a product in a society, who are
susceptibletoappealstopurchasetheproduct.Inthesamewayasacompanymust
convincepotentialbuyersofthevalueandnecessityofitsproducts,politicalparties
mustconvincecitizenstorankthemfavourably,tovoteforthem,ortojointhem.
Parties can influence citizens in two ways: first, through their programme and
ideology; second, through their leadership. A party’s ideology, electoral
programme, and policy briefs are crucial tools for convincing citizens and sup-
porterstobemembersandvotersofthepertinenceandcorrectnessofitspositions
andofthenecessitytofightforitscause.
Thebookisstructuredasfollows:InChap.2,Idescribethehistoricaldevelop-
ment of the FN, from its modest first steps in politics to becoming a mainstream
French party and one of the most successful radical right-wing parties. What
ideological changes did the FN undertake after Marine Le Pen took over the
presidencyfromherfatherin2011? Thisis thequestionthatIanswer inChap.3.
MainlythroughqualitativetextualanalysisofFNpartydocumentsbeforeandafter
2011,whichIcomplementwithsomequantitativedata,Ishowthattherehasbeen
verylittlechangeintheFN’sideologyandprogrammebetweenJean-MarieLePen
andMarineLePen.TheFNwas,andcontinuestobe,theprototypicalradicalright-
wing party. It has always advanced, and still advances, a simplistic frame that
pushes anti-immigrant, anti-establishment, and nationalist sentiments. As such, it
portrays French society as tainted by foreign influences and governed by corrupt
elites thatembracelaxgovernmentpoliciesinthe areaofpublic security (Cre´pon