The French Zones D'Education Prioritaire: Much Ado About Nothing?

12 Pages·2009·0.25 MB·English

EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
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Economics of Education Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/econedurev
The French zones d’éducation prioritaire: Much ado about nothing?
RolandBénaboua,FrancisKramarzb,∗,CorinneProstc
aDeptofEconomics,320BendheimHall,PrincetonUniversity,Princeton,NJ08544-1013,USA
bCrest-Insee,15bdGabrielPéri,92245Malakoff,France
cInsee,18bddolphePinard,75014Paris,France
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Articlehistory: WeprovideanassessmentoftheFrenchZEP(Zonesd’EducationPrioritaire),aprogram
Received5June2007 startedin1982thatchannelsadditionalresourcestoschoolsindisadvantagedareasand
Accepted2April2008 encouragesthedevelopmentofnewteachingprojects.Focusingonmiddle-schools,we
firstevaluatetheimpactoftheZEPstatusonresources,theirutilization(teacherbonuses
JELclassification:
versusteachinghours)andkeyestablishmentscharacteristicssuchasclasssizes,school
I21
enrolments,teachers’qualificationsandexperience,andstudentcompositionandmobility.
I22
WethenestimatetheimpactoftheZEPprogramonfourmeasuresofindividualstudent
I28
achievement:obtainingatleastonediplomabytheendofschooling,reaching8thgrade,
Keywords: reaching10thgradeandsuccessattheBaccalauréat(thenationalexaminationattheendof
Resourceallocation highschool).WetakeintoaccounttheendogeneityoftheZEPstatusbyusingbothdifference
Expenditures indifferencesandinstrumentalvariablesbasedonpoliticalvariables.Theresultsarethe
sameinallcases:thereisnoimpactonstudentsuccessoftheZEPprogram.
©2008ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
1. Introduction receivedextraresourcessuchasfunds,teacherhours,etc.
These zones were originally meant to be temporary, but
Manydevelopedcountrieshaveadoptedcompensatory theprograminsteadbecamepermanentandwassubstan-
educationpoliciesthatdirectextraresourcestodisadvan- tiallyextendedinsuccessive“waves”throughoutthe1980s
tagedschools.IntheUnitedStates,thishasbeenthecase and1990s.Initially,themaingoaloftheZEPswastofos-
since1965withtheTitleIprogram.InGreatBritain,the terneweducationalprojectsandpartnershipswithlocal
EducationPriorityAreasexperimentoftheearly1970sfol- actors that would help improve academic achievement.
lowedthePlowdenreport,athoroughreviewofprimary Gradually,decreasingclasssizealsobecameanimportant
educationinEnglandwhichhadaconsiderableimpact.This objective. The amount and nature of the extra resources
programre-emergedin1997–1998astheEducationAction giventotheZEPswereneverspecified,however,northe
ZonesandExcellenceinCities.Anumberofothercountries, actualprocedurebywhichprioritystatuswastobedeter-
suchasPortugalandBelgium,havesimilarprograms. mined.Perhapsmosttellingly,tothisdaytheMinistryof
InFrance,theideaofpriorityzonesfirstspreadamong Education’sbudgetstillcontainsnospecificlineitemfor
teacherunionsinthe1970sandthenbecamepartofthe “priorityeducation”.
political platform of the Socialist party, which came to As the first program to target schools and local areas
powerin1981.Thus,in1982,anewprogram,the“Zones ratherthanprovideindividualfinancialaidtopoorstudents
d’EducationPrioritaire”(PriorityEducationZones,hence- (usually very modest stipends), the ZEPs remain highly
forth ZEP) was launched, under which selected schools controversial.Somearguethatanyformof“positivedis-
crimination”iscontrarytothenationalideal,othersthatit
serves both fairness and efficiency and should get much
∗ more resources, others yet that it has just been a waste
Correspondingauthor.Tel.:[phone];fax:[phone].
E-mailaddress:[email protected](F.Kramarz). of money. Most recently, in the wake of the riots which
0272-7757/$–seefrontmatter©2008ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
doi:10.1016/j.econedurev.2008.04.005
346 R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
occurred in the poor suburbs of large cities in Novem- inparticularinthetimingofthechoiceofZEPs.Weshow
ber 2005, the French government put forth a set of new that the vote shares obtained in different French regions
measuresintendedtopromotegreaterequalopportunity bythemajorpartiesinthenational(legislative)elections
through subsidized housing projects and reforms of the of1981and1988provideaplausiblyexogenoussourceof
educationsystemandlabormarketregulation.Theflagship variationthatwecanusetoidentifytheZEPeffect.
decisionintheeducationfieldistobeanewexpansionand OurresultsonthenatureoftheZEP“treatment”,atleast
reformoftheZEPprogram. in term of quantifiable inputs, show that this treatment
InspiteofthecentralplaceitoccupiesinFrenchedu- translatedintoacontinuousbutextremelyslowdecreasein
cation policy and the political debate, there has been no classsizes(−0.2studentsperyearonaverage)andincrease
systematicevaluationoftheimpactoftheZEPsonschool- inteachinghoursperstudent(+1.2%peryear);meanwhile,
ingoutcomes.Inthispaper,weprovideanassessmentof the experience of ZEP teachers declined slightly, in spite
theZEPsalongthreedimensions:theresourceseffectively of the bonuses offered. Our results on the change in the
deployed,themobilityresponseofstudentsandteachers, compositionofthestudentbodyshowalargereductionin
andtheoverallimpactonacademicachievement.Dueto enrollmentsfollowingaschool’sclassificationasZEP.This
datalimitationswestudytheperiodthatcoversonlythe reduction did not come from an increase of the number
firstphaseofthepolicy(1982–92)andfocusonitsimple- ofthestudentsleavingtheseschoolsbutfromadeclinein
mentationinlowersecondaryschools. arrivals,anditdidnotleadtoanobviousdeteriorationin
This evaluation presents particular challenges. In par- the socio-economic background of the students. Turning
ticular, the precise nature of the intervention is not well finallytotheeffectsonstudentachievementoftheover-
known: priority status is allocated according to a rather allZEPtreatment(includingfinancialresources,themore
opaque,erraticadministrativeprocedureandittranslates qualitativeaspectsofthezones’educationalprojectsand
intounspecifiedextraresourcesthatmayvaryfromzone theeffortandmobilityresponsesofstudentsandteachers),
tozone,fromyeartoyear,orbeuseddifferentlybydiffer- theresultsfrombothourmethodologiesleadtothesame
entschools.Togetherwiththelackofbudgetarydata,this conclusion: during our sample period, the impact of the
leadsustodevotethefirstpartofthepapertoakindof ZEPsonthesubsequentacademicachievementofpupilsin
“detectivework”aimedatdeterminingwhatitmeant,in the6thand7thgrade(age11and12)isnil.
practice,foraschooltobecomeaZEP—intermsofinputs The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
suchasclasssize,weeklyteachinghours,qualificationsand describethegeneraleducationalcontextandthemainfea-
seniorityoftheteachers,andsizeandcompositionofthe turesoftheZEPprogram.ThedataaredescribedinSection
student body. Then, in the second part of the paper, we 3. Changes in schools’ characteristics when they become
examine how the granting of ZEP status to a junior high ZEParethenexaminedinSection4,andtheimpactofpri-
schoolaffecteditsstudents’educationaloutcomes,bothin ority zone status on student achievement is analyzed in
thosegradesandbeyond.Thefactthattheprioritystatus Section 5. Section 6 offers a brief summary of our main
may–inparticularthrougha“labeling”effect–inducea findingsandtheirpolicyimplications.
mobilityresponseonthepartofteachersorstudents’fam-
ilies(movingtoanotherdistrict,sendingtheirchildrento 2. AbriefdescriptionoftheEducationPriority
privateschool,etc.)isanothersourceofcomplexityineval- Zones(“Zonesd’EducationPrioritaire”)
uatingtheZEPs.Atthesametime,studyingtheelasticityof
suchresponsesandassessingeducationaloutcomesfroma Firstestablishedin1982,theZEPs,oreducationprior-
programinwhichtheypotentiallyoperateisbothinterest- ity zones, include both primary (1rst to 5th grades) and
ingandimportant,becauseanyinterventionthatexceeds junior-highestablishments(6thto9thgrades),plusasmall
thescaleofsmallcontrolledexperimentsislikelytotrigger numberofhighschools(10thto12thgrades).Initially,the
suchbehaviors. ZEPscoveredapproximately8%ofjunior-highstudentsin
Our analysis combines very rich student survey data thecountry.Theprogramwasoriginallymeanttobetem-
withadministrativefilesonallFrenchschoolsandteach- porary,withthezonesestablishedforalimitedstatutory
ers.Thefirstsourceconsistsoftwopanelsofstudentsthat termof4years.Overtime,however,theprogramwasnot
providedetailedinformationontheirfamilybackground, only maintained but substantially expanded, with many
early educational history, and major academic outcomes newzonescreatedin1989,1990,1994and1999.Itisnow
throughoutsecondaryschooling.Thesecondsourceisan themainpolicyinFrancedirectedathelpingstudentsfrom
originalpanelofschoolsthatweconstructed,usingexhaus- disadvantagedbackgrounds.
tiveestablishmentfilesfromtheMinistryofEducation.We TheoperatingprincipleoftheZEPprogramistoprovide
unfortunatelyhadtorestrictattentiontosecondaryschools additionalresourcestoschoolsinthemostdisadvantaged
becauseoftheavailabledata,eventhoughtheZEPprogram zones and allow them to develop specific initiatives and
alsoconcernsprimaryschools. educationalmethodstailoredtotheirstudents’needs.In
WeaddresstheendogeneityintheallocationofZEPsta- 1982 the regional heads of the education administration
tus using two methods, namely difference-in-differences werethusaskedtoselectzonesaccordingtosomevague
(orestablishmentfixedeffects)andinstrumentalvariables. criteriaonthestudentpopulation.1Inlateryearsmanynew
Thesetechniquesareappliedwithfourdifferentmeasures
of academic achievement. Our instrumentation strategy
reliesonthefactthatnationalpoliticalforcesinterferedin 1 Headsoftheadministrationwereconducedtouseindicatorssuch
theprocessbywhichpriorityzonesweredesignated,and asparents’socialandprofessionalbackgrounds,parents’rateofunem-
R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356 347
zoneswerecreated,accordingtoaprocedurethatleftcon- ular, regional and local subsidies were not higher in ZEP
siderablediscretiontotheregionalheadsoftheEducation schools.
Ministry administration (“recteurs”) in making decisions The D400 million represented 1.2% of total expendi-
that were loosely based on indicators such as the shares tures on teaching activities in primary and junior high
amongparentsofblue-collarworkers,unemployedwork- schools, and were directed to 12% of the total student
ers,andhigh-schooldropouts,thefractionoffamilieswith populationinthosegrades.Thismeansthataschool’sclas-
at least one non-European member, and 3rd grade test sificationasZEPtranslatedin1998–99intoanextra10%
scoresinanationalstudentevaluation. more resources per student. Looking more appropriately
In1997nearly700,000studentsinprimaryschoolsand at instruction costs (leaving aside fixed operating costs,
400,000 in junior high schools benefited from “priority” etc.), which represent 77% of total costs on average, the
treatment, representing respectively 11% and 15% of the increase was 13%.5 No such data is available for the ear-
respectivetotals.2OnlyveryfewhighschoolsareZEPs.The lierperiodthatcorrespondstomostofourstudentsample.
vastmajorityofZEPstudentsliveinmajorurbancenters. We can, however, use some of our estimation results to
Agoodindicatorofpovertyisthefractionofstudentsnot come up with a reasonable ballpark estimate. Based on
enrolledintheschool’scafeteria’splan,becausethisgener- the establishment data, we estimate that teaching hours
allydenotesthattheirfamilycannotaffordtopayforthese perstudentincreasedbyabout1.2%peryearfollowingthe
lunches.3Thisfractionisindeedhigherinthepriorityzones grantingofZEPstatusinthe1989and1990waves(relative
(69%) than outside (40%), and reaches 80% in those ZEPs tonon-ZEPschools).Wealsoknowthattheteacherbonus
locatedinmajorurbancenters.Similarly,theproportionof in 1990–91 was approximately equal to 2% of the aver-
non-Frenchstudentsistypicallyhigher,exceeding35%in ageteacherwage.ThuswecanestimatethattheZEPlabel
morethan10%oftheZEPschools.Concerningeducational broughtanextra4.4%intheteachingbudgetthatyear,with
attainment,in199537%ofstudentsenteringthe3rdgrade theallocationbetweenbonuses(2%)andhoursperstudent
(age8)inZEPschoolsdidnotpossess“basicreadingcompe- (2.4%).
tencies”,whichisdoubletheproportionfoundinnon-ZEPs By comparison, the resources devoted to the EIC pro-
(18%). gramintheUnitedKingdomamountedto£300millionin
TheZEPstatusisassociatedwithextraresourcesforthe 2003(aroundD440–460million)andcoveredaboutathird
selected schools, mostly in the form of additional hours of secondary school pupils (Machin, McNally, & Meghir,
of instruction and bonuses for teachers and other per- 2004).IntheUnitedStates,TitleIprogramsprovided$11.7
sonnel. Here again, considerable discretion was given to billion in 2003 to schools with high concentrations of
the regional heads of the education administration with povertyandthisfundingrepresentedroughly5%ofthese
respect to the amount and nature of the resources allo- schools’ total budget (Van der Klaauw, 2008). In terms
cated to ZEP schools. The French education system is of overall financial scope, these three different national
extremely centralized and the ZEP program was the first programs are thus more or less comparable. They dif-
one whose aim was to give relative freedom of action fer markedly, on the other hand, in how the additional
to local authorities. One of the drawbacks was that the resources are used. In the United Kingdom, the program
information about the extra resources was not collected includes very specific components aimed at extending
at the centralized level. The first year for which any learning opportunities through additional teachers, sup-
kind of budgetary information is available is the school port units, or extra help for the most disadvantaged
year1998–1999.ExtraresourcesdirectedtotheZEPsthat children.IntheUnitedStates,fundsareexplicitlytargeted
year amounted to D400 million, of which D110 million todisadvantagedchildreninsidetheschool.6
took the form of bonuses paid to all employees of the InFrance,thenatureoftheinterventionwaslefttoeach
schools – mostly teachers – while the rest was used to school’sdiscretion:theideaoftheZEPprogramwasjustto
increasetotalteachinghoursandreduceclasssizes.4Every impulse new educational projects and partnerships with
ZEP employee also benefited from a relative advantage localauthorities.Existingevaluationsarebasedonsimple
in administrative promotion criteria. As far as non-wage comparisonsofaverageachievementbetweenZEPstudents
financialresourcesareconcerned,therewasnopriorityfor and non-ZEP students (Meuret, 1994; Caille, 2001). Our
ZEP schools (Jeljoul, Lopes, & Degabriel, 2001). In partic- paperthusdiffersfromtheseearlieranalysesthroughthe
useofeconometrictechniquestoaddresstheendogeneity
andselection-biasproblemsthatareofprimaryconcernin
ployment,fractionofstudentswhoarenotnativeFrenchspeakersand
fractionofstudentshavingrepeatedagrade(averylargefractionofFrench
studentsrepeatedatleastonceinthoseyears). 5 Wecandecomposethis13%:13*(110/400)=3.6%wenttobonusesand
2 ThestatisticspresentedinthisparagrapharetakenfromtheMin- theremaining9.4%toincreasedhoursofteachingperstudent.Asacheck
istryofEducation’sNoten◦98-15,“LesZonesd’EducationPrioritairesen onthiscalculation,directcomputationsbasedonthedataweobtained
1997–1998”. showthatthebonusinthatyearwasapproximately4%oftheaverage
3 InFrance,lunchesaresubsidizedforeverybodybuttherearenofree- teachersalary.
lunchprograms.Someofthestudentswhodonothavelunchatschool 6 Machinetal.(2004)findapositive,albeitsmall,improvementinpupil
havelunchathomebecausethefamilyincomeislargeenoughthatthe outcomemeasuresforMathematics(butnotforEnglish)andastrong
mother(orfather)doesnotwork.Butthemajorityofstudentswhodonot reductioninabsenceswithinEiCschools.Onthecontrary,VanderKlaauw
havelunchatschoolarethosewhosefamilycannotaffordtopayforthe findsthattheTitleIprogramdoesnotimprovestudentachievement.He
lunches. interpretsthisfindingasrelatedtothemannerinwhichfundsarespread
4 Thus,aZEPbonusof1,046Euroswaspaidto96,000teachers,account- thinlyacrossalargenumberofschoolsandtotheapparentineffectiveness
ingfor100outofthe110million. ofmanyTitleIfundedremedialeducationprograms.
348 R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
theliteratureonprogramevaluation,suchasthenonran- 3.2.2. The1989panel
domallocationoftheZEPstatus. Thissampleincludes24,455studentswhoentered6th
grade in 1989. The sampling scheme here has only one
3. Thedata level: the heads of all junior high schools were asked to
include in the panel all students entering 6th grade in
3.1. TheFSEdatasets 1989 who were born on a specific day in each month
(1/30th). These students were observed until the end of
The FSE administrative files (Fichiers Standards their schooling, including higher education. The attrition
Enrichis)oftheMinistryofEducationconstituteourmain ratewassimilartothatobservedinthe1980panel.
sourceofschool-leveldata.Everyyear,allschoolprincipals Thesetwopanelsprovideextensiveinformationabout
fill out a detailed questionnaire on the characteristics of thestudents.First,wehavefamilybackgrounddata:dateof
eachgradeintheirestablishment.Thisincludesinforma- birth,sex,nationality,countryofbirth,numberofsiblings,
tion on class size, nationalities of students, number of birthrank,occupationoftheheadofthefamily,parent(s)
studentshavingrepeatedeachgrade,numberofstudents legallyresponsibleforthechild,andnumberofyearsspent
havinglunchattheschool’scafeteria,andlanguagecourses innurseryschoolandinprimaryschool.Second,wehave
chosen. Each statistic is measured by grade. These data schooling information for each year from 6th grade on:
are exhaustive for the period 1987 to 1992 and cover grade, class size, foreign languages studied, lunch at the
both public and private schools; we shall focus here on school’s cafeteria or not, financial aid received. For each
public-sectorjuniorhighschools(6thto9thgrades).7 observation(student-year),wealsoknowtheidentification
The FSE dataset can be extended to the period numberoftheschoolingestablishment.
1994–1999 by another data source, the IPES (Indicateurs Theonlyavailablecharacteristiconclassesisclasssize.
pour le Pilotage des Etablissements Scolaires). Unfortu- Theinformationonschoolsconsistsoftheestablishment’s
nately,notallthevariablesreportedtherearecompatiblein identification number, the educational administrative
theirdefinitionswiththoseavailablefortheearlierperiod. region and whether it is a private or public establish-
Wewillthereforemainlypresenttheresultsbasedonthe ment. Thanks to the identification numbers, we are able
FSEdatasetandreportmorebrieflyonthoseobtainedfor tomatchthestudentpanelswiththetime-varyingZEPor
thelongerperiod,whichareessentiallyidentical. non-ZEPstatus.Givenoursampleperiod,wehadstudents
We also link these two establishment datasets with ineachofthethree“waves”ofZEPs—1982,1989and1990.
filesfromtheEducationMinistry’sinformationsystemfor Wealsocomputedschool-levelvariablesbyaveragingstu-
themanagementofteachers.Thissourceprovidesuswith dents’characteristicsbyestablishmentineachpanel.
statisticsonteachercharacteristicsbyestablishment,such We now turn to measures of academic achievement.
asthenumberofyoungorexperiencedteachers,thediplo- Thepanelsunfortunatelydonotcontaininformationonthe
masheld,etc.Finally,anothersetoffilesfromtheMinistry gradesreceivedinnationalexamsornationalevaluations
ofEducationidentifywhichestablishmentsarelocatedin (theonlynationalevaluationinhighschoolisin6thgrade).
apriorityzone.8 Wedoknow,however,whetherthestudentpassedorfailed
anyexamthatsheorhetook.Wealsoknow,foreachyear,
whether he or she moves up to next grade, repeats the
3.2. Thepaneldatasets
grade,orexitstothevocationaltrack.Moreprecisely,the
fourmeasuresofacademicachievementthatweuseare:
Themainsourcesofindividualdatausedinouranaly-
sisaretwopanelsofstudentscollectedbytheMinistryof
Education. - Completionofschoolyearswithatleastonedegree(ver-
susfinishingschoolingwithoutanydiploma).
- Movingupto8thgrade(versusswitchingtoavocational
3.2.1. The1980panel
trackattheendof7thgrade).
This panel includes 20,961 students who entered 6th
- Movingupto10thgrade(versusswitchingtoavocational
grade (age 11) in 1980, and constitutes a representative
trackafterthe7thorthe9thgrade).
sampleof1/40ofallstudentsenteringjuniorhighschool
- Successatthe“Baccalauréat”,theFrenchnationalexam
inFrancethatyear.Thesamplingschemehastwolevels.
attheendofhighschool,i.e.12thgrade(versusgoingto
First,establishmentswerestratifiedaccordingtocitysize,
avocationaltrackthatdoesnotleadtotheBaccalauréat,
establishment size and sector (public or private school).
orfailingtheBaccalauréat).
Oneinfivejuniorhighschoolswasthusselected.Second,
oneoutofeightstudentsinthoseschoolswasselectedand
Thesechoicesaremotivatedbythefollowingobserva-
thenfollowedacrossestablishmentsuntilthecompletion
tions.First,reducingthenumberofstudentswholeavethe
ofhisorhersecondaryschooling.Theattritionratewas9%,
schoolsystemwithoutanydegreewasthemaintargetof
reflectingdeparturesabroad,deaths,and(in80%ofcases)
the Ministry of Education in general and of the ZEP pro-
“unexplained”schooldepartures.
graminparticular.9Moregenerally,thismeasurecaptures
thebottompartoftheachievementdistribution.Second,
7 Throughoutthepaperwewilluse“year”insteadofthe“schoolyear”;
forinstance,year1987correspondstotheschoolyear1987–1988.
8 Descriptive statistics are available in Benabou, Kramarz, & Prost 9 Amongstudentsentering6thgradein1980,23%hadnodegreeatthe
(2005),BKPhereafter. endoftheirschoolingyears.
R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356 349
Fig.1. Chronology.
inFrancemanystudentsarevirtuallyforcedtoswitchtoa into“ExtremeRight”,“RPRandUDF”(thetwomainright-
vocationaltrack(seenasmuchlessdesirableandevenstig- wingparties),“OtherRight”,“Greens”,“CommunistParty”,
matizing)attheendof7thor9thgrades.Forinstance,only “Socialist Party”, and “Other Left”. We grouped RPR and
46% of those entering 6th grade in 1980 continued their UDF together, since these two parties formed a coalition
education in the regular track all the way to 12th grade. (singlelist)duringsomeoftheparliamentaryelectionsin
Reachingthe8thand10thgradesarethereforeimportant the80s.VotinginFrenchparliamentaryelectionsinvolves
milestonesintheschoolingprocess.Finally,successatthe two rounds, and as in Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) we
Baccalauréatiskeybecauseitconditionsentryintotheuni- usedonlythefirstround.Finally,wefocusedontheyears
versitysystemandthe“grandesécoles”(selectivecolleges). thatprecede1982,1989and1990(whennewZEPswere
Fig. 1 describes how the time structure of our panels implemented),thatis,ontheelectionsthattookplacein
mesheswiththechronologyoftheZEPprogram.In1981, 1981andin1988.Ourvariablesthusconsistofthefraction
justbeforethelaunchingofthepolicy,moststudentsofthe ofvotesreceivedbythevariouspoliticalgroupsinevery
1980panelwerein7thgrade(exceptthosewhorepeated “département”,ineachofthesetwoelections.
6thgrade).Bycontrast,forthestudentsinthe1989panel,
entryinto6thgradetookplaceas1989waveofZEPswas 4. TheimpactofZEPstatusonschoolcharacteristics
ongoing.Andoneyearlater,whenmostofthemwerein
7th grade, the 1990 wave was launched. Because condi- 4.1. Numberofstudentsandclasssize
tionsprevailinginthe6thand7thgradesstronglyaffect
students’futureschoolingoutcomes,andbecausemobility Using the FSE data for every year from 1987 to 1992,
betweenestablishmentsislow,theZEPindicatorweshall weanalyzethechangesinschoolcharacteristicsthatoccur
useisequalto1ifthestudent’sestablishmentinhisorher whentheZEPstatusisgranted.Wedistinguishtheimpact
7thgradeislocatedinaZEP,andequalto0ifnot.10Notethat ofthiseventonbothlevelsandtrends,byestimatingthe
thisindicatoristime-varying,sincesomestudentsinthe followingmodel
1980paneldotheir7thgradeinschoolsthatwillbecome
ZEPsonlyin1982,1989or1990,whilesomeinthe1989 Yj,t =ıt+ıj+1j∈zep89[(cid:2)zep891t≥88+(cid:2)czheapn8g9e1t≥89
phaavneeladcoquthireeidr7ptrhiogrriatydestiantuthse. verysameschoolsafterthey +(cid:2)tzreepn8d9T89]+1j∈zep90[(cid:2)zep901t≥88+(cid:2)zep901t≥89
+(cid:2)czheapn9g0e1t≥90+(cid:2)tzreepn9d0T90]+εj,t, (1)
3.3. Thepoliticaldataset
whereY correspondstocharacteristicsforschooljinyear
j,t
The last set of data that we use is political variables, t,ıtisanindicatorforyeart(yearfixedeffect),ıjanindi-
which will provide instruments to address the potential catorfortheestablishment(schoolfixedeffect),1j∈zep89is
selection bias in the determination of the priority zones. equalto1iftheschooljbecomesZEPin1989,1t≥(cid:4)isequal
to1iftheyeartisgreaterorequalto(cid:4),T isalineartrend
Thesharesofthevotereceivedbyeachpoliticalpartyin 89
startingin1989,andεisani.i.d.residual.Thevariablesin
everyparliamentaryelectionarecollectedattheregional
thesecondlineof(1)aredefinedsimilarly.
level (“département”) by the CEVIPOF (“Centre d’Etudes
Sinceyeardummyvariablescontrolforevolutionscom-
de la Vie Politique Franc¸aise”). To reflect the main fea-
mon to all establishments and school dummy variables
tures of the French political system we aggregated them
control for any difference in levels between them that
alreadyexistedin1987,thecoefficients(cid:2)zep89 and(cid:2)zep90
change change
capture the change in the level of Y specifically asso-
j,t
10 Ourresultsarerobusttousinginsteadanindicatorequalto1ifthe ciated to a change in status. Similarly, (cid:2)zep89 and (cid:2)zep90
studentwasinaZEPineitherthe6thor7thgrade,duetothelowinter- trend trend
establishmentmobilitybetweenthesetwoclasses. capture the linear trends specific to ZEP establishments
350 R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
Table1
Students,teachersandZEP.
Numberof Numberof Numberof Numberof Numberofweekly Shareofyoung Shareof
students studentsperclass teachers teachersper hoursperstudent teachers non-certified
student teachers
Zep89*1988 −6.7(4.7) 0.2*(0.1) −0.6(0.4) 0.000(0.001) 0.008(0.010) −0.006(0.008) −0.002(0.005)
dummy
Zep89*1989 −3.9(5.3) −0.2(0.2) −0.3(0.5) 0.000(0.001) 0.012(0.012) −0.014*(0.009) 0.010*(0.006)
dummy(zepeffect,
level)
Zep89*Trend −6.5**(1.5) −0.2**(0.0) 0.1(0.1) 0.001**(0.000) 0.011**(0.003) 0.013**(0.002) −0.003*(0.002)
startingin1989
(zepeffect,trend)
Zep90*1988 0.3(4.0) 0.3**(0.1) 0.1(0.4) 0.000(0.001) −0.003(0.009) 0.000(0.007) 0.005(0.004)
dummy
Zep90*1989 −5.2(4.0) −0.2(0.1) −0.3(0.4) 0.000(0.001) 0.008(0.009) 0.008(0.007) 0.004(0.004)
dummy
Zep90*1990 −6.1(5.1) 0.0(0.2) −0.2(0.5) −0.001(0.001) −0.004(0.011) −0.014(0.008) −0.007(0.005)
dummy(zepeffect,
level)
Zep90*Trend 0.5(2.0) −0.2**(0.1) 0.4*(0.2) 0.001**(0.000) 0.015**(0.004) 0.009**(0.003) 0.012**(0.002)
startingin1990
(zepeffect,trend)
R-Square: 0.97 0.75 0.96 0.82 0.79 0.66 0.63
Source:FSEfiles,1987–1992,4743establishmentsperyear.StandardErrorsinparentheses(*:significantatthe10%level,**:−5%level).Establishment
fixedeffectsandyearfixedeffects.
aftertheybecameZEP.BecauseaZEP-specifictrendcould 1995and1999.Again,thedecreaseinthenumberofstu-
pre-exist,thecoefficients(cid:2)zep89,(cid:2)zep90and(cid:2)zep90capture dentsisessentiallyconcentratedon6thand7thgraders.12
88 88 89
anychangesinY thatstartedin1988(respectively,in1988 The second and important result in Table 1 is that
j,t
or1989)betweentheestablishmentsthatbecameZEPin thereductionsinclasssizeassociatedtoZEPstatuswere
1989(respectively,in1990)andtheothers. quite small: on average, a decrease of 0.2 students per
InTable1weonlyreport(cid:2)zep89,(cid:2)zep90,(cid:2)zep90,(cid:2)zep89, class per year. On the other hand, class size in 1987 was
88 88 89 change
(cid:2)zep90, (cid:2)zep89 and (cid:2)zep90, together with their estimated alreadysmallerinschoolsthatbecameZEPin1990(24.0
change trend trend versus24.4fornon-ZEP).Theseschoolswerethusproba-
standard deviations. The estimation is carried out over
blyalreadyidentifiedandbenefitingfromextraresources
4743juniorhighschoolsperyear.Amongthose,138estab-
evenbeforeacquiringprioritystatus.Theanalysisoverthe
lishmentsbecameZEPin1989(weshallrefertothemas
longer period 1987 to 1999 shows a continuation of this
ZEP-89)and365othersacquiredthestatusin1990(ZEP-
modestandslowdecrease.Overthecourseof10years,the
90).
averageclasssizedecreasedby2studentsfortheZEP-89
In1987,ZEPestablishmentsareonaverage7–9%larger
and by about 1.5 students for the ZEP-1982 and ZEP-90,
thanothers.Table1revealsthattheaveragenumberofstu-
whiletheaverageclasssizeinnon-ZEPsremainedstable.
dentsdecreasedby7peryearinthoseschoolsthatbecame
OurresultsarethusconsistentwiththeMinistry’sesti-
ZEPin1989.Themostlikelyexplanationisthatofanavoid-
mate that ZEP junior high schools in the late 90s had 2
ancestrategyonthepartofsomefamilies,evenbeforethe
students less per class than non-ZEP,13 but at the same
statuschange,aviewthatfindfurthersupportinananaly-
timetheyrevealamuchlesswell-knownfact:theunderly-
sisofstudentmobility,whichconfirmthatthereductionin
ingprocesswasextremelyslowandactuallybeganbefore
thenumberofstudentswasprimarilyduetoreducedentry
thegrantingofprioritystatus.Inanycase,eventheten-
intothoseestablishments,ratherthantoincreasedexit.11
yearreductioninclasssizeinthepriorityzoneswasatbest
ThecoefficientsfortheZEP-90aregenerallynotsignifi-
modest,especiallyinlightoftheintendedgoalofimproving
cant,butthisisnotsurprisinggiventhattheFSEdataends
educationalconditionsofstudentslivinginsociallydisad-
in 1992, making it difficult to identify structural breaks.
vantagedareas.
And indeed when we analyze the full 1987–1999 period
usingbothFSEandIPESdata,thepreviousresultsarelargely
4.2. Sizeandcompositionoftheteachingstaff
confirmed.ThenumberofstudentsinZEP-89schoolscon-
tinueditsgradualdecrease,relativetothegeneraltrend,
Table1showsthatthenumberofteachersinZEPschools
until 1999. Schools that became ZEP in 1982 lost about
didnotincreasemorethaninotherestablishments,except
4 students per year between 1987 and 1999, and those
forasmallpositivetrendintheZEP-90.14SinceintheZEP-
becameZEPin1990lostabout6studentsperyearbetween
12 Theresultsfortheperiod1987–1999areavailablefromtheauthors
11 Theanalysisofmobility,notshownhere,wasdonethroughlinear uponrequest.
probabilitymodelsofleavingaschool,usingthestudentpanelstoanalyze 13 Seefor1997,MinistryofEducation,noten◦98-15.
anindividual’sprobabilityofleavinghisorherschoolforanotheronein 14 Overthelongerperiod1987to1996,thenumberofteachersactually
thesameeducationaladministrativeregion(seeBKP). decreasedbyoneperyearfortheZEP-1982andZEP-1989,andremained
R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356 351
Table2
SocialcompositionoftheschoolsandZEP.
OccupationoftheHeadoftheFamily: Nationality:African,Asian Schoolinginformation:
Nolunchatthe
canteenoftheschool
White-collarworker Skilledblue-collarworker
EstablishmentbecameZEPin1982 −0.0226(0.0244) 0.0355(0.0279) 0.0888**(0.0142) 0.0228(0.0326)
EstablishmentbecameZEPin1989 −0.0154(0.0344) 0.0596(0.0394) 0.0600**(0.0201) 0.0526(0.0460)
EstablishmentbecameZEPin1990 −0.0618**(0.0294) 0.0901**(0.0336) 0.0454**(0.0172) 0.0466(0.0393)
R-square: 0.1279 0.1648 0.2252 0.2929
Sources:1980and1989panels.28,713observations.Regressionsinclude3200establishmenteffects.Therelevantschoolistheonewherethestudentisin
hisorher7thgrade.StandardErrorsinparentheses(*:significantatthe10%level,**:−5%level).
89thenumberofstudentswentdownslightlymorethan Theresultsestablishedsofarleadtotwomainconclu-
elsewhere,thenumberofteachersperstudentroseslightly sions. First, the extra resources allocated to ZEP schools
after 1989. The annual rate of increase was again small, intermsofadditionalteacherslotsandextrahourswere
whichisconsistentwiththeresultsonclasssize. quite limited. Second, the more substantial bonuses and
It is worth noting that the extra teaching hours promotion incentives granted to ZEP teachers (indepen-
attributed to ZEP schools would not necessarily have dentlyoftheperformanceoftheirstudents)didnothelpin
translated into reductions in class size. These additional stabilizingtheteachingstafforimprovingitsskillcomposi-
man-hours(orwoman-hours)canalsobeusedtodivide tion.Inthe“market”forteachers(internaltotheEducation
classesintosubgroupsforsomedisciplines,ortoaddreme- civil service), the ZEP wage premium was not nearly
dial classes given in small groups. One way of capturing sufficient to compensate for the adverse “hedonic” and
suchusesistocomputetheweeklynumberofhoursper signalingcharacteristicsassociatedwithteachinginsuch
teacherandperstudent.Thisratioincreasedwhenaschool schools.
acquiredprioritystatus,by0.011hperweekintheZEP-89
andby0.015hintheZEP-90.Thus,onceagain,theincrease 4.3. Socialcompositionofschools
wasveryslowandmodest—inpercentageterms,0.8%and
1.2%peryearrespectively.Sincethereductioninclasssize WenowcomparethesocialcompositionofZEPestab-
was0.8%peryear,itthusaccountedformostoftheincrease lishmentstothatofnon-ZEPones,bothbeforeandafterthe
in hours per student, with only a much smaller fraction former’schangeinstatus.Theevolutionofthesocialmix
usedinotherways. isofinterestbothperseandbecauseofitspossibleimpact
While class size and hours show only very mod- onstudentperformancethroughpeereffects.16
estchanges,thesignificantresourcesallocatedtoraising Theestimationissimilartothepreviousone,butnow
teacherpayinZEPscouldhaveledtoanimprovementin onthepanelsofindividualstudentdata.Onlytwoyearsare
thequalificationsoftheprofessorialstaff.Infact,ouresti- compared:1981,whenstudentsfromthePanel1980arein
matesrevealexactlytheopposite.Onestandardmeasure their 7th grade and 1990, when students from the Panel
of quality is experience: Table 1 shows that the fraction 1989areinthatsamegrade.Thesestudentsaretheones
ofyoungprofessors(lessthan30yearsold)inZEPschools whowillbeusedinSection5toestimatetheZEPeffect.
goesupslightlyshortlyafterthestatuschange(theincrease Themodelis:
appears in 1990 for the ZEP-89). An optimistic interpre-
tationofthisevolutionwouldbethatyoungteachersare 1characteristic(i)=ıi∈80panel+ıj(i)+(cid:2)82·1j(i)∈zep82·1t(i)≥82
moredynamicorbetterabletorelatetothechildren,even +(cid:2)89·1j(i)∈zep89·1t(i)≥89
though they have less professional experience. Unfortu-
nately,ourresultsonprofessionalqualificationsshowthat +(cid:2)90·1j(i)∈zep90·1t(i)≥90+εi
thefractionofteacherswithouttenureandholdinglesser
where 1 (i) is a dummy variable for a student
diplomas(“maîtres-auxiliaires”,whodonothavethereg- characteristic
characteristic(forexample,occupationoftheheadofthe
ularteachingcertificate)alsoincreasedslightlyinschools
family=executive)ofstudenti;j(i)andt(i)denoterespec-
thatbecameZEPin1990.15ItisworthnotingthatinFrance,
tively the establishment and year where and when the
schools do not hire their teachers. Job assignment are
studentwasinhisorher7thgrade;ı isanindicatorfor
insteaddeterminedatthenationallevel,throughasystem j(i)
theestablishmentwherethestudentwasinhisorher7th
inwhichteachersexpresspreferredchoicesandpriorityis
grade andı an indicator equal to 1 if the student
roughlydeterminedaccordingtoseniority(tenurelength). iε80panel
Hence,moreexperiencedteachersareabletochoosethe
schoolstheywant,whereasyoungeronestendtoendupin
16 InSection5,wewillestimatetheimpactofZEPstatusonstudent
less“desirable”establishments.
achievementwithadifference-in-differencesapproach.Thankstothe
paneldatasets,wewillcomparestudentsbeinginaZEPschooltothose
beinginanon-ZEPschool,withschoolvariablesandschoolfixedeffects
stablefortheZEP-90.Asexplainedearlier,theseresultsarenotreported controllingforstabledifferencesbetweenestablishments.Butifthereis
herebutareavailablefromtheauthors. deteriorationinthesocialcompositionofZEPschoolsrelativetotheoth-
15 Othermeasuresofskills,suchastheproportionofthosewiththe ers,ourschoolvariablesmaynotbesufficienttocontrolforthatandthe
highestteachingdiploma(“agrégation”),remainedvirtuallyunchanged estimatedZEPeffectmayunderestimatethe“pure”impactoftheZEP
(resultsnotreportedhere). treatment(effectoftheextraresourcesandeducationalprojects).
352 R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
belongedtothe1980panel.Indicators1j∈zep82,1t≥82,etc., tion)couldhavediscouragedeffortbybothprofessorsand
aredefinedinthesamewayasbefore. students,leadingtodeteriorationinschoolperformance.
Table2presentstheresults.Itseemsthatthecomposi- Finally,ifteacherexperienceimprovesstudentattainment,
tionofthestudentsdidnotchangemuchintheZEPschools, theincreaseinthefractionofyoungerteacherscouldhave
exceptregardingstudents’nationalities.In1982,theZEP lowered the educational achievement of some or all the
schoolsalreadyhadalargershareofAfricanandAsianstu- students.
dents than the other schools. This share increased more ToassessthevalueoftheZEPprogram,onetherefore
thanelsewherebetween1982and1990(Table2).Butitis needstoquantifytheoverallimpactofgrantingprioritysta-
worthnotingthataccordingtoseveralstudies,17 children tustoaschoolonstudents’academicachievement.Thisis
fromimmigrationhaveinFrancesimilarorbetterachieve- thepaper’ssecondmainobjective,towhichwenowturn.
mentthanotherchildren,allotherfactorsbeingequal.Our
resultsontheachievementregressions,inSection5,lead 5.1. Estimationstrategy
tothesameconclusions.
There is no strong evidence of deterioration of the Itwouldclearlybeinappropriatetosimplyregressindi-
socialcompositioninZEPschools.Concerningtheparents’ vidual student performance on personal characteristics
occupations, the only significant change is more skilled plus a ZEP indicator, and thus compare mean outcomes
blue-collar workers and less white-collar workers in the betweenZEPandnon-ZEPstudents.Indeed,theZEPvari-
schoolsthatbecameZEPin1990.Thereisalsonochange ablecertainlyisendogenous,evengivenallourindividual
in the fraction having lunch at the school cafeteria.18 As controls.Forinstance,prioritystatuscouldhavebeenpref-
mentionedearlier,inFrancechildrenwhoareenrolledin erentiallygrantedtothoseestablishmentswhereschooling
the cafeteria plan typically come from more advantaged outcomesweretheworseordeterioratingthemostrapidly,
backgroundsthanthosewhodonot. orconverselytothoseamongthe“difficult”zonesdeemed
the most likely to succeed. To deal with this prob-
5. TheimpactofZEPstatusonindividualschooling lem,weusebothdifference-in-differences(implemented
achievement through establishment fixed effects) and instrumental
variables.
Ourresultssofarshowthatthefinancialsupportgiven Thefirstmethodexploitsthefactthat,thankstoourtwo
toZEPschoolswasfarfromnegligible,butalsothatthese panels, we can compare students who went through the
funds were sprinkled across many establishments, with- samegradeinthesameschool,butwithsomeattending
out any apparent targeting towards the potentially most before it became a ZEP and others nine years later, after
efficient inputs or towards those students most likely to it had acquired priority status. The idea is then to sub-
benefitfromtheseextrainputs.Thusthedecreaseinclass tractfromthedeviationbetweenZEPandnon-ZEPschools
size was small and progressive, the number of teachers estimatedonthe1989panelthecorrespondingdeviation
hardlyincreasedandtheirqualificationremainedatbest estimated on the 1980 panel, but with the ZEP indicator
unchanged. replaced there by a “future ZEP” dummy, equal to 1 if a
The ZEP “treatment”, however, is a potentially much school was part of the ZEP “wave” of 1989 or 1990. This
more complex object than a simple change in financial differenceindifferencesapproachcontrolsforanyunob-
resourcesorteachinghours.First,theofficialgoaloftheZEP servedfactorsaffectingstudentperformanceinthepriority
programwasalsotoprovidethemeansforschoolstocre- zones(relativetonon-ZEPones)thatalreadyexistedprior
ateneweducationalprojectsandconnectmorecloselywith tothestatuschange,andthereforeyieldsanunbiasedesti-
local institutions such as municipalities. These projects mate of the reform’s impact (assuming stability of the
weresupposedtohaveapositiveimpactontheacademic unobserved heterogeneity and distribution of errors.) In
achievementofZEPstudents.Second,thesizeablebonuses the linear model, this method is implemented both very
andcareerimprovementsofferedtoteachersinZEPschools simplyandmoregenerallybyrunningasingleregression
couldhavecontributedtoimprovingtheirmotivation,19or that includes establishment-specific fixed effects, which
allowedtheEducationMinistrytoselectteachersforthese control for unobserved stable heterogeneity across all
schoolsfromahigherqualitypoolofapplicants(inways schools.
notreflectedbyseniorityandtenureindicators).Third,on Oursecondmethodfordealingwithpotentialselection
thenegativeside,anadversesignalingeffect(stigmatiza- biasesusesinstrumentalvariables,describedinsubsection
3.3.
Inallthesecases,ourestimatesdifferentiatebetween
17 SeeforinstanceCailleandVallet(1995)andGary-Bobo,Prieto,and thethree“waves”ofZEPs,thuscapturingapotential“dura-
Picard(2006). tioneffect”:forinstance,someestablishmentsthatwere
18 ThisinformationisalsoavailableintheFSEdata.Thesameestimation ZEPsin1990acquiredthatstatusin1982,whereasothers
asin3.1and3.2showsthatthefractionofstudentshavinglunchatthe
receiveditonlyin1989.
schoolcafeteriadecreasedslightlyintheZEPschoolsafter1989and1990
comparedto1988andtotheotherschools(seeBKP).Thisdecreasemay
havefollowedanincreasebetween1982and1988. 5.2. Difference-in-differencesestimates
19 Sincethesebonuseswerenotconditionedonstudentachievement
oranyotherperformancemeasuretheycouldnothavehadanystan-
Inthissectionweestimatetheeffectofthe“ZEPtreat-
dardincentiveeffect.Theycouldstill,however,haveenhancedteachers’
ment” using the difference-in differences technique in a
“intrinsicmotivation”byelicitingfeelingsofreciprocityorprofessional
pride. linearprobabilitymodelwithfixedeffects.Thus,astudent’s
R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356 353
academicachievementismodeledasfollows: Table3
Linearmodelwithestablishmentfixedeffects:ZEPvariable.
1achievmt(i)=˛Xi+ıi∈80panel+ıj(i) Gettingonedegree Movingupto8th-grade
Coefficient Stderr Coefficient Stderr
+(cid:2)82·1j(i)∈zep82·1t(i)≥82 ZEPin1982 −0.0428 0.0299 −0.0052 0.0293
+(cid:2)89·1j(i)∈zep89·1t(i)≥89 ZZEEPPiinn11999809 −00..00003608 00..00346264 −00..00132369 00..00336934
+(cid:2)90·1j(i)∈zep90·1t(i)≥90+εi (3) R2 0.2077 0.2556
Nbofobs 27831 28713
where1 (i)isanindicatorforachievement(moving
achievmt Movingupto10th-grade Successatbaccalauréat
upto8thgrade,to10thgrade,gettingatleastonedegree,
successattheBaccalauréat)ofstudenti;j(i)andt(i)denote Coefficient Stderr Coefficient Stderr
respectivelytheestablishmentandyearwhereandwhen ZEPin1982 −0.0046 0.0330 −0.0200 0.0338
thestudentwasinhisorher7thgrade;ı isanindica- ZEPin1989 0.0561 0.0497 0.0212 0.0457
j(i)
torfortheestablishmentwherethestudentwasinhisor ZEPin1990 −0.0171 0.0432 −0.0494 0.0443
her 7th grade and ıiε80panel an indicator equal to 1 if the R2 0.3272 0.3179
student belonged to the 1980 panel. The vector X con- Nbofobs 27831 27831
i
tainsthestudent’sindividualandfamilycharacteristicsas Sources:1980and1989panels.Regressionsincludeabout3200establish-
wellasestablishmentvariables,measuredastheaverage mentfixedeffects,inadditiontotheindividualcharacteristicsandschool
oftheindividualvariablesoverthosestudentsinthepanel variables(averagesofindividualcharacteristicsbyschooloneachpanel).
Therelevantschoolistheonewherethestudentisinhisorher7thgrade.
studyinginthesameschoolj(i).Thisaggregationisdone StandardErrorsinparentheses(*:significantatthe10%level,**:−5%
separatelyforeachpanel,sotheseestablishmentvariables level).
aretime-varying.Finally,theindicators1j∈zep82,1t≥80,etc.,
aredefinedinthesamewayasbefore.
Turning to the variables of central interest,22 we see
Eq. (3) makes clear how the coefficients (cid:2) , (cid:2) and
82 89 fromTable3thattheZEPcoefficientsareneversignificantly
(cid:2) , which capture the effects of a change to ZEP status,
90 different from 0, irrespective of the measure of achieve-
areidentifiedbyusingourtwopanelssimultaneously.For
mentused.Thesenon-significantZEPeffectsshowthatthe
instance,foragivenestablishmentthatbecameZEPin1982
granting of “priority” status to their school did not help
theindicatorfunction1j(i)∈zep82·1t(i)≥82goesfrom0forthe students,oncepre-existingdifferencesbetweenestablish-
studentsinthe1980panelwhoattendedthatschoolto1
mentsarecontrolledfor.Thisisoursecondmainfinding.
forthoseinthe1989panelwhofollowedthemtherenine
yearslater.
5.3. Instrumentalvariablesestimation
Theregressionscorrespondingtoreaching8thgradeare
carriedoutover17,279studentsenrolledin2099establish-
ToaddresstheendogeneityoftheZEPstatus,wealso
ments in the 1980 panel and 11,435 students enrolled in
estimate the model using instrumental variables, based
3031establishmentsinthe1989panel.20Theidentification
on the shares of the vote received by the various parties
of the ZEP coefficients relies on the 1944 establishments
(or coalitions) in the first round of the 1981 and 1988
present in both panels, with 93 of these becoming ZEP
parliamentaryelections.Severalelementsrevealthatthe
in1982,40in1989and62in1990.Thereferenceestab-
grantingofZEPstatuswasindeedinfluencedbypolitical
lishment is that of the first 7th grade of each student.
considerations,ontopofeducationalones.First,establish-
Whenestimatingtheotherthreeequations–forobtaining
mentsinadesignatedgeographicalzonecouldoptoutand,
adegree,movingupto10thgradeandsuccessattheBac-
in the first years of the program, the Communist Party
calauréat–thesampleconsistsof16,816studentsenrolled
gave instructions to its mayors to refuse the ZEP status
in2051establishmentsforthe1980paneland11,016stu-
in their cities, as it saw it as stigmatizing. Second, and
dentsenrolledin3009establishmentsforthe1989panel.
surprisingly,priorityzoneswereinitiallyconcentratedin
TheidentificationoftheZEPcoefficientsnowrelieson1891
onlyahandfulofregions,especiallyinSeineMaritimeand
establishmentscommontobothpanels,with93establish-
Aquitaine,whicharefarfrombeingparticularlypoor.By
mentsbecomingZEPin1982,40in1989and61in1990.In
contrast,therewerenopriorityzonesinMarseillesuntil
thesecases,thereferenceestablishmentisthatofthelast
the“wave”of1990,eventhoughitisFrancethird-largest
7thgradeofeachstudent.21
city and includes some of its most disadvantaged areas.
Andeventhen,therewereoddpriorities:asmanyas29%
ofthejuniorhighschoolslocatedintheNièvre“départe-
ment” were granted ZEP status, as were 19% of those in
20 We excluded the observations from Corsica from our sample, in
ordertomaketheregressionsmorecomparabletothoserunlaterwith the Ariège “département”—two rural regions with obvi-
instrumental-variables,inwhichthepoliticalvariablewasnotavailable ously much less need for this type of program. Analysts
forthatregion(duetothefactthatasingle“département”waslatersplit dulynotedthattheNièvrewaspresidentMitterand’selec-
intotwo).LeavinginCorsicahasnoeffectontheresults,however.
21 Theideaherewastominimizethetimeintervalbetweenthe7th
gradeZEP/non-ZEPtreatmentandthe10thgradeorBaccalauréatout-
come.Usingthefirst7thgradeinsteadmakesnodifferencetotheresults, 22 Resultsofindividualandestablishment-levelvariablesareshownin
however. BKP.
354 R.Bénabouetal./EconomicsofEducationReview28(2009)345–356
Table4
InstrumentationoftheZEPindicators.
Zepin1989 Zepin1990
Coef. Sterr Coef. Sterr
Votesduringparliamentaryelections:
Extreme-right −0.0948** 0.0373 0.4238** 0.0432
RPR-UDF −0.0213 0.0421 0.0944* 0.0487
Otherright 0.1609** 0.0476 −0.1986** 0.0550
Otherleft −0.3355** 0.0793 −1.1475** 0.0916
Communistparty −0.3632** 0.0458 −0.1434** 0.0529
Greens 0.0783 0.0977 0.9149** 0.1129
Extreme-left 0.1846** 0.0590 0.3613** 0.0682
F-statforthesignificanceoftheinstruments 25.24 63.97
(p-value) (p<0.01) (p<0.01)
Sources:1980and1989panels.27,831observations.Regressionsincludeabout3200establishmentfixedeffects,inadditiontotheindividualcharacteristics
andschoolvariables(averagesofindividualcharacteristicsbyschooloneachpanel).ThepoliticaldataareCevipofdata,fortheyears1981and1988.The
estimationisdonewithalinearprobabilitymodel.TheFisherstatisticsisthesignificancetestofthepoliticalvariables.Therelevantschoolistheonewhere
thestudentisinhisorher7thgrade.StandardErrorsinparentheses(*:significantatthe10%level,**:−5%level).
toralstronghold,andAriègethatofLionelJospin,Minister cationoperates),whereeducationaloutcomesandpolitical
ofEducationbetween1988and1992.EvenLionelJospin conditionscouldbequitecorrelated;(ii)thecontrolvari-
recognizedthattheattributionoftheZEPstatuswaslinked ables include school fixed effects, which will absorb in
to political considerations: in a June 1998 speech at the particularanyfixeddifferencesinthepopulationcompo-
“AssisesnationalesdesZEP”inRouen,whenhewasnow sitionofa“department”thatcouldaffectbothitspolitical
PrimeMinister,hecriticizedthefactthat39%ofjuniorhigh outcomeandthe(relative)performanceofitsmostdisad-
schoolstudentsinNièvrewereinaZEPschoolagainstonly vantagedschools.
19%ofstudentsinSeine-Saint-Denis,averypoor“départe- The first-stage regression corresponds to the linear
ment”wheretheriotsstartedinNovember2005. probabilitymodel
Our instrumentation strategy relies on two hypothe- 1 =X(cid:6)ˇ+(cid:2)P +ı +ı +ε (4)
ses.First,politicalfactorsmustaffectthedeterminationof iεzep89 i j,t(i) iε80panel j i
whereZEPschoolsarelocated—aswejustconfirmed.Sec- wherePj,t(i)denotesthesharesofthedifferentpartiesin
ond,thepoliticalvariablemustbeuncorrelatedwiththe theparliamentaryelectionsthattookplacein1981(resp.
(differential)performancestudentsinZEPschools,condi- in1988)ifthestudentbelongedtothe1980panel(resp.
tionalonalltheotherexogenousregressors.Tounderstand the1989panel),theshareoftheSocialistPartybeingthe
whythisisaplausibleassumption,itisimportanttonote omittedvariable.Theinclusionoftheestablishmentfixed
that:(i)thepoliticalvariableismeasuredatthelevelofa effectsisagainallowedbythefact(withtheestimationper-
“département”,whichisamuchlargerentitythanthatof formedonbothpanelsofstudents)boththeZEPvariables
schooldistricts(thelevelatwhichtheZEP/non-ZEPclassifi- andthepoliticalinstrumentsaretime-varying.
Table5
Linearmodelwithinstrumentalvariables.
Gettingonedegree Movingupto8th-grade
Coefficient Stderr Coefficient Stderr
ZEPin1989 0.1622 0.5195 −0.0546 0.5177
ZEPin1990 0.0106 0.3079 −0.1541 0.2915
R2 0.1001 0.1354
Nbofobs 27831 28713
(cid:2)2over-identification 3.2728 2.4089
test(p-value) (p=0.86) (p=0.93)
Movingupto10th-grade Successatbaccalauréat
Coefficient Stderr Coefficient Stderr
ZEPin1989 0.0062 0.6199 0.3879 0.6293
ZEPin1990 −0.0608 0.3674 −0.5339 0.3730
R2 0.2161 0.1798
Nbofobs 27831 27831
(cid:2)2over-identification 2.3147 5.9496
test(p-value) (p=0.94) (p=0.55)
Sources:1980and1989panels.Regressionsincludeabout3200establishmentfixedeffects,inadditiontotheindividualcharacteristicsandschoolvariables
(averagesofindividualcharacteristicsbyschooloneachpanel).TheZEPvariableisinstrumentedbytheschoolvariablesandthepoliticalvariables.The
relevantschoolistheonewherethestudentisinhisorher7thgrade.StandardErrorsinparentheses(*:significantatthe10%level,**:−5%level).