THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE FIRST WORLD ...

330 Pages·2010·1.5 MB·English

THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING THE FIRST
WORLD WAR, JULY 1914 – DECEMBER 1915.

by

MICHAEL RYAN FLOYD

A DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of History
in the Graduate School of
The University of Alabama

TUSCALOOSA, ALABAMA

2010
Copyright Michael Ryan Floyd 2010
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
ABSTRACT

When the First World War began in August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson declared
that he wanted the United States to remain neutral. By avoiding the conflict in Europe he hoped
to demonstrate that his country held itself to a higher standard and that he was an honest broker
who could mediate an end to the war. Additionally, Wilson hoped that the United States could
profit from selling goods to the belligerents. He was not, however, well-versed in diplomacy,
nor was he a non-partisan observer. This disposition, along with his desire for American
prosperity, regularly influenced his policies and, in turn, aided the Allies. Yet, regardless of his
restricted and often parochial approach to international affairs, Wilson did not intentionally
violate American neutrality in the early months of the war. His position changed as the conflict
progressed because Britain and the United States gradually increased their economic and
political ties to the point that U.S. and U.K. interests became Anglo-American interests. This
dissertation examines how the intertwining of U.S. and British political and economic interests
during the first eighteen months of the First World War induced Wilson to intentionally deviate
from neutrality and provide calculated support for the Allies.

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DEDICATION

For
Delaney
―My Little Editor‖

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have completed this dissertation without the support and encouragement of
many people. My wife Elizabeth‘s love and patience have played an integral role in helping me
to spend the time necessary to research and write day in and day out. I cannot imagine doing this
without her by my side. I am also proud to have two parents who have always encouraged me to
find something that makes me happy and do it well. I am proud to follow in their footsteps.
I would like to thank Dr. Howard Jones for his guidance on this project and my graduate
career as a whole. I have sincerely appreciated his support and friendship over the past eight
years. The rest of my dissertation committee: Dr. John Beeler, Dr. Andrew Huebner, Dr. Harold
Selesky, and Dr. Donald Snow, also deserve enormous gratitude for taking the time to read my
work and provide valuable advice.
There are also numerous others who have supported me along the way. Waist-deep in
their own projects, my fellow graduate students were a great sounding board and support group
when I could not see the end of the tunnel. Standing out among many are Mathew Downs and
Joe Danielson. Their close friendship and editorial eye have been indispensable. I only hope
that I have been able to help them half as much as they helped me.
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Finally, but certainly not least are the archivists and librarians in the United States and
Great Britain. Special thanks go out to Brett Spencer at the University of Alabama and Gail
Barton at Samford University, who always seemed to locate that elusive file I could not find.

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION........................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................ iv
Introduction ..................................................................................................1
Chapter One - British War Aims, Neutral Rights, and Early
U.S. Mediation Efforts - July 1914 – September 1914 ................................7

Chapter Two - The Conclusion of the Declaration of London Debate,
Britain‘s Revised Order in Council, and the U.S. Mid-Term
Congressional Elections - October 1914 – November 1914 ......................43

Chapter Three - The Developing Anglo-American Munitions Trade
and U.S. efforts to Maintain the Spirit of Neutrality
- October 1914 – December 1914 ..............................................................78

Chapter Four - Munitions Bills, a Government Owned
Merchant Marine, and Restarting Talks of Mediation
-December 1914 – January 1915 .............................................................111

Chapter Five - The Failure of House‘s Second Mission to Europe,
German Submarine Warfare, and the Tightening of the Allied Blockade
- February 1915 – April 1915 ..................................................................150

Chapter Six - The Submarine Crisis, Shell Shortages, and the
Turning of the Tide - April 1915 – June 1915 ....................................... 188

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Chapter Seven - Britain‘s Economic Emergency, U.S. Distrust of
Germany, and the New Course for U.S. Policy toward the Belligerents
- June 1915 – August 1915 ......................................................................232

Chapter Eight - The Conclusion of the Arabic Crisis,
Rumors of German Sabotage, Clandestine U.S. Mediation Efforts
- September 1915- December 1915 .........................................................272

Conclusion ...............................................................................................296

Bibliography ............................................................................................303

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Introduction

In August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson wanted his country to remain neutral. The
President hoped that the so-called ―spirit of neutrality‖ would prevent domestic strife within the
multicultural American populace and demonstrate that the country held itself to a higher standard
than the rest of the world, making the United States well suited to mediate an end to the war.
Despite his high-minded goals, Wilson was ill-prepared to participate in international relations.
He admitted to such a weakness in the days before he became President when he declared, ―[i]t
would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs.‖1
Additionally, Wilson was not impartial and regardless of his apparent belief that he was
behaving without bias, his actions often benefitted the Allies. While his narrow-minded world-
view was misguided and even naïve, the President did not deliberately violate American
neutrality during the first year of the war, but by late 1915 Wilson was no longer attempting to
maintain a neutral stance. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how the intertwining of
U.S. and British political and economic interests over the first eighteen months of the war
induced the President to willfully violate American neutrality and provide calculated U.S.
support for the Allies.
In August 1914, the respective policies of Britain and the United States over neutral trade
were not in accord. Britain controlled the shipping lanes headed to Europe and planned to use
the Royal Navy to prevent the Central Powers from importing war materiel from neutral
countries. The British policy interfered with neutral shipping on the open seas and spurred major
controversies over U.S. commercial rights and Britain‘s ability to pursue its naval strategy. By

1 Arthur Link, Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look as His Major Foreign Policies (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1957),
3-5.

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the fall of 1914, however, Britain found it necessary to rethink its initial policies toward the
United States. The conflict in Europe had reached a stalemate and Britain had to build up its
ground forces to buttress the French on the Western Front. The duration of the war and the sheer
number of troops London had to equip required enormous quantities of materiel that domestic
manufacturers alone could not be supply. Britain and its allies needed America‘s manufacturing,
agricultural, and financial resources to defeat the Central Powers and London had to prevent
these resources from reaching their enemies. But, the Foreign Office concluded that if it
interfered too much with neutral trade, the United States could retaliate by impeding British
access to weapons and ammunition. Therefore, when structuring its naval cordon of the
European coast, Britain had to appease Wilson and his constituency by negotiating on certain
issues, such as the cotton trade, without conceding more vital war aims and strategy.
Even though Wilson continued his effort to maintain neutrality he realized that the
protracted war necessitated a re-evaluation of his policies concerning the belligerents. Wilson
and his advisors concluded that Britain‘s determination to continue its economic warfare against
Germany required the United States to relinquish some of its rights at sea or risk a confrontation
with the Allies. The Wilson administration also understood that the conflict provided an
enormous economic opportunity. The U.S. business community benefited greatly from the
Allies‘ demand for American-made goods, and by mid-1915, Britain had become the main
international market for U.S. agricultural and industrial products. The Allies‘ dependence on
foreign goods increased so much that even without trade with Germany, the United States
experienced economic growth. Wilson did not want any disruptions to America‘s prosperity and
began deliberately acting to protect trade with Britain. Consequently, while Wilson and his
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