The First Anglo-Afghan Wars: A Reader

285 Pages·2014·2.45 MB·English

by  Antoinette Burton

The First Anglo- Afghan Wars

The First
Anglo- Afghan Wars
A READER
Antoinette Burton, editor
With a Foreword by Andrew J. Bacevich
Duke University Press Durham and London 2014
© 2014 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid- free paper ∞
Typeset in Minion Pro by Westchester Publishing Services
On page viii: Rajkamal Kahlon, Shadow of the Future, provided courtesy of the artist.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
The First Anglo-Afghan Wars : a reader / Antoinette Burton, editor ; with a foreword by Andrew J. Bacevich.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-8223-5650-9 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-8223-5662-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Afghan Wars. 2. Afghanistan—History—British Intervention, 1838–1842. 3. Afghanistan—History,
Military—19th century. 4. Great Britain—History, Military—19th century. I. Burton, Antoinette M., 1961–
II. Bacevich, Andrew J.
ds363.f57 2014
958.1'03—dc23 2013044873
To all those who have died or lost loved ones
in “just and necessary” wars
this book is humbly dedicated
Contents
Foreword, Andrew J. Bacevich ix
Ac know ledg ments xi
Introduction: The Anglo- Afghan Wars in Historical Perspective 1
Part I Strategic Interests on the Road to Kabul 15
1. A Sketch of the Military and Po liti cal Power of Rus sia (1817), Robert Wilson 17
2. Journey to the North of India (1838), Arthur Conolly 24
3. The Court and Camp of Runjeet Sing (1840), W. G. Osborne 35
4. A Narrative of the Rus sian Military Expedition to Khiva, under General Perofski (1839) 39
Part II The First Anglo- Afghan War, 1839– 1842:
Occupation, Route, Defeat, Captivity 43
5. Narrative of the War in Aff ghanistan (1840), Henry Havelock 45
6. To Herat and Cabul: A Story of the First Afghan War (1902), G. A. Henty 57
7. A Journal of Disasters in Aff ghanistan (1843), Florentia Sale 75
8. “En glish Captives at Cabul” (1843) 86
9. The Life of the Amir Dost Mohammed Khan (1846), Mohan Lal 105
10. The Afghan Wars (1896), Archibald Forbes 118
Part III The Second Anglo- Afghan War, 1878– 1880:
Imperial Insecurities, Global Stakes 127
11. “Gorchakov Circular” (1864) 129
12. “The Rus sian Foreign Policy in Asia” (1877), Eugene Schuyler 131
13. “The Afghan War: A Lecture” (1878), Handel Cossham 144
14. “Af ghan i stan and Its Peoples” (1878) and “Afghan Women and Children” (1880) 155
15. “India and Af ghan i stan” (1879), R. D. Osborn 161
16. From the Spectator: “The Magnitude of the Afghan War,” “The Disaster in Candahar,”
“Abdurrahman Khan,” “The First Lesson of Candahar,” “The Rumour from Cabul,”
and “The Death of Abdurrahman Khan” 175
Contents / vii
Part IV The Great Game, 1880– 1919 189
17. Rus sia in Central Asia (1889), George Nathaniel Curzon 191
18. “The Amir’s Homily” (1891), Rudyard Kipling 198
19. The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Af ghan i stan (1900) and
“The Ameer’s Memoirs” (1900), Mohammed Khan, editor, and the Spectator 201
20. The Rus sians at the Gates of Herat (1885), Charles Marvin 210
21. The Campaign Towards Af ghan i stan (1885), Andrei Bolandin 217
22. The Story of the Malakand Field Force (1901), Winston Churchill 222
23. “The Indian Frontier Troubles,” The Graphic (1897) 233
24. The Judgment of the Sword (1913), Maud Diver 234
25. “Our Relations with Af ghan i stan” (1919), Demetrius C. Boulger 245
26. “Third Afghan War” (1919) 251
Selected Bibliography of Secondary Sources 255
Reprint Ac know ledg ments 257
Index 259

Foreword
Andrew J. Bacevich
“History,” Mark Twain reputedly remarked, “does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” For
a student of twenty-fi rst-c entury American wars in the so-c alled Greater Middle East, this
imm ensely instructive collection of documents relating to British wars in nineteenth-
century Afg hani s tan serves to affi rm Twain’s famous dictum. H ere was a usable past, ready
to off er instruction. Here was an alarm, loud, insistent, unmistakable.
Why did the architects of U.S. policy aft er 9 / 11 show so little interest in examining that
past? Why were they deaf to history’s warnings? Policymakers in the age of George W. Bush
ignored the British experience in Af ghan i stan for precisely the same reason that policy-
makers in the age of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson ignored the French experience
in Vietnam: persuaded that America’s motives are inherently diff erent— more enlightened,
benign— U.S. policymakers believed that the experience of others had nothing to teach.
Aft er all, unlike the Eu ro pe an imperial powers, the U.S. Army fi ghts not to dominate or
exploit, and certainly not to colonize, but to liberate and uplift .
Imbued with this conviction of American singularity, those wielding power in Washing-
ton reject out of hand the possibility that others might construe U.S. policy as a variant of
imperialism. Yet it is imperialism, however much U.S. offi cials and ordinary Americans
insist otherwise. The “global leadership” that the United States purports to exercise is little
more than a euphemism for empire. As with most euphemisms, its purpose is to conceal.
Alas, by employing it, we succeed chiefl y in confusing ourselves.
In her insightful introduction to this volume, Antoinette Burton notes that British critics
of the Anglo-A fghan Wars tended to be “antiwar even as they w ere proempire.” These critics
could not see that the wars they opposed w ere an inevitable outgrowth of imperial ambitions
to which they gave tacit approval.
Much the same can be said about critics of U.S. policy in our own day. The wars that have
extended across the past de cade command little popularity. Even on the po liti cal right, en-
thusiasm for invading and occupying countries has faded. On the left , it has vanished alto-
gether. Yet the pol itic al mainstream, Republican and Democ ratic alike, remains committed
to the proposition that providence has summoned the United States to lead the world, pre-
sumably until the end of time.