Table Of Content

The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S. Air Force Priscilla D. Jones Washington, D.C. 2011 1 Table of Contents Introduction 5 (cid:14)ORADAirDefenseStructureon9/11 6 Overviewofthe9/11AttacksandSummaryoftheAirDefenseResponse 8 AmericanAirlinesFlight11 18 UnitedAirlinesFlight175 34 AmericanAirlinesFlight77 38 UnitedAirlinesFlight93 41 TheImmediatePost-AttackPeriod 45 Epilogue 46 Photographs 26–29 DiagramandTables 53–59 Notes 61 3 The First 109 Minutes: 9/11 and the U.S.Air Force Introduction Tuesday,September11,2001,dawnedcoolandclear,withsunnyskiesall alongtheeasternseaboard.ForAirForceaviatorslikeLt.Col.Timothy“Duff” Duffy of the 102d Fighter Wing at OtisAir National Guard Base, Massachu- setts,thedayheldthepromiseofperfectflyingweather,atatimewhentheU.S. civilaviationsystemwasenjoyingaperiodofrelativepeace,despiteconcerns aboutagrowingterroristthreat.Morethantenyearshadpassedsincethelasthi- jacking or bombing of a U.S. air carrier. That morning, however, the country came under a shocking, coordinated aerial assault by nineteen al Qaeda1 hi- jackersatthedirectionofthenetwork’sleaderandcofounder,Islamistextrem- ist Osama bin Laden (1957/1958–2011).2 The attack plan carried out by the suicideoperativeshadbeenyearsinthemaking.Itwasintendedtocausemass, indiscriminatecasualtiesandtodestroyordamagethenation’sfinancial,military,andpoliticalcenters,fourhigh-valueU.S.targetsselectedbybinLaden,in- dependentoperatorKhalidSheikhMohammed,andalQaedaoperationschief MohammedAtef.3Analysts in the United States immediately recognized the historicnatureofthestrikes,4launchedwithoutwarningagainsttargetsinNew YorkCityandWashington,D.C.,andcomparedthemtoanotherdeadlysurprise aerialattackagainsttheUnitedStatesalmostsixtyyearsearlier.5TheDecember 7,1941,assaultbyJapaneseforcesontheU.S.navalbaseatPearlHarborhad been the most devastating attack against U.S. territory by a foreign adversary untilthemorningofSeptember11,2001.6 ThefouralQaedahijacker-pilotsandtheirteamscommandeeredthefour fuel-laden commercial jets in which they were passengers and intentionally crashedtheminto1and2WorldTradeCenter,inNewYorkCity;thePentagon, inArlington, Virginia; and an empty field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. This finalhijacking,ofUnitedAirlinesFlight93,fellshortofitsintendedtargetin Washington,D.C.,becauseofheroiceffortsbyitspassengerstotakebackcon- troloftheaircraft.The9/11attack,whichbeganwiththehijackingofAmerican AirlinesFlight11andwasfollowedbythehijackingsofUnitedAirlinesFlight 175,AmericanAirlinesFlight77,andUnitedAirlinesFlight93,wouldbecome, overthenexttwoandaquarterhours,thedeadliest,costliestterroriststrikein U.S.history.The109-minuteattackperioditselfbeganwhenAmericanAirlines Flight11wasattackedatorjustafter8:14a.m.EasternDaylightTime(EDT). ItendedwhenUnitedAirlinesFlight93crashedat10:03a.m.EDT,buttheloss of life did not. By the time 1 World Trade Center, North Tower, collapsed at 10:28a.m.EDT,almostthreethousandpeoplehadbeenkilledorweredying;the financialcenteroftheUnitedStateshadbeenreducedtoburning,toxicrubble; theiconicsymbolofthemilitarystrengthofthecountryhadbeenseverelydam- aged;thetranquilityofafieldinPennsylvaniahadbeenshattered;U.S.AirForce andAirNationalGuardfighteraircrafthadsetupcombatairpatrolsoverWash- 5 ington,D.C.,andNewYorkCity;andtheadministrationofPresidentGeorgeW. BushandtheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hadbegunshiftingmajorresources ofthefederalgovernmentandmilitaryservicestoanewnationalpriority,home- landdefense.7 Evenwhiletheattackswereunderway,itwasclearthatthecountryfaced anunprecedentedchallenge.OnthefloorofthecommandcenterattheNorth AmericanAerospace Defense Command’s (NORAD) NortheastAir Defense Sector (NEADS) in Rome, NewYork, SMSgt. Steve Bianchi, an assistant to mission crew commander Maj. Kevin J. Nasypany, reflected: “This is a new typeofwar.”8Andsuddenly,asVicePresidentRichardCheneynotedafewdays aftertheattacks,thecountry’snationalleadershiphadtoconsideranewmission forU.S.AirForcepilots:thepossibleshoot-downofcommercialpassengerair- craftfilledwithU.S.citizens.9 TheterroristattacksofSeptember11,2001,hadaprofoundimpactonthe nation’s economy and governmental organization; on its budgets for national defense;andonthemissionofitsarmedforces,particularlytheU.S.AirForce. Even the date—9/11—quickly became iconic, and without the hijackings, the first three major U.S. military operations of the new century would not have beenlaunched:OperationNobleEagle,OperationEnduringFreedom,andOp- eration Iraqi Freedom.The U.S.Air Force has played an important role in all three. The 9/11 attacks precipitated the launch of Operation Noble Eagle and obliged the U.S.Air Force to deploy forces to protect the continental United States,Alaska,Canada,Hawaii,andGuamagainstadditionalairattacks. Thenature,timing,andeffectivenessoftheairdefenseresponseinitiated bytheNortheastAirDefenseSectoronthemorningofSeptember11depended onmanyfactors.SeveralwerepartlyorentirelyoutsidethecontroloftheU.S. AirForce,suchasthespeedoftheattacksandthetacticsofthehijackers;the knowledge, experience, intuition, and initiative of FederalAviationAdminis- tration(FAA)personnel;andtheinvolvementandactionsofthosehigherupthe civilianchainofcommand.Buttheairdefenseresponsedependedperhapsmost ontheeffectivenessofthecommunications,coordination,andinteractionwithin andbetweentheFAAontheonehandandNORADandNEADSontheother.10 (cid:14)ORADAirDefenseStructureon9/11 On September 11, 2001, the NorthAmericanAerospace Defense Com- mand,basedatPetersonAirForceBase,Colorado,underthecommandofGen. RalphE.Eberhart,oversawthreeairdefenseregions,whichwereresponsiblefor protectingtheairspaceoverAlaska,Canada,andthecontinentalUnitedStates. Thelastofthese,theContinentalUnitedStatesNORADRegion(CONR),under thecommandofthedual-hattedcommanderofFirstAirForce,Maj.Gen.Larry K.Arnold,oversawtheNortheast,theWestern,andtheSoutheastAirDefense Sectors.Thelocationsofthedepartures,flightpaths,andcrashsitesofthefour aircrafthijackedonSeptember11,2001,wereallintheNortheastAirDefense 6 Sector, commanded by Col. Robert K. Marr (see Diagram, NORADAir De- fenseStructureon9/11,p53). OnSeptember11,2001,theresponsibilityfordefendingcontinentalU.S. airspacerestedwithonlyfourteenfighteraircraftatsevenairdefensealertsites acrossthecountry.11BasedinRome,NewYork,theNortheastAirDefenseSec- torhadonlytwoalertsitesonwhichtocall—OtisAirNationalGuardBasein Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and LangleyAir Force Base in Hampton,Virginia. Each site had two designated alert fighters on duty twenty-four hours a day, sevendaysaweek.Manyotherfighteraircraftwerebasedacrossthecountry, buttheywerenotNORADassets,anditwouldtaketimetoarmthemandor- ganizetheircrews.12 Earlier,farlargernumbersofU.S.AirForceaircrafthadprovidedairde- fensefortheentirenation.Thepost-WorldWarIIchillinrelationsbetweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, the expansion of the Soviet long-range bomberfleet,andthedetonationin1949ofaSovietatomicbombcontributed totheevolutionofthecontinentalairdefensemissionanditsdedicatedfighter forceintheUnitedStates.Establishedin1957,thejointU.S.-CanadianNorth AmericanAirDefenseCommand,asitwasthencalled,wasresponsibleforin- terceptinganySovietlong-rangebombersthatmightattacktheNorthernHemi- sphere.Thecommand’sforcesnumberedabouttwelvehundredinterceptorsby 1960.ThenumberofalertfightersandalertsiteschangedastheSovietmilitary threat evolved. In light of increased Soviet reliance on ballistic missiles over manned bombers beginning in the early 1960s, and because of budget con- straints,theDepartmentofDefensehadbythemid-1970sreducedthenumber ofNORADinterceptorstoaboutthreehundred.Thenumberofalertsitesand alertfighterscontinuedtodropasthebreakupoftheSovietUnionandthedis- solutionoftheWarsawPactin1991greatlydiminishedthethreatofnuclearat- tack,whichNORAD’scorestructurehadbeendevelopedtocounter.Thereafter, NORAD strategists began to consider shifting the mission from air defense againstnuclearattacktodefendingtheUnitedStatesandCanadabymaintain- ingpeacetimeairsovereignty.Thismeant“providingsurveillanceandcontrol of the territorial airspace.” To do so, NORAD air sovereignty fighters would carry out a number of missions. These included “intercepting and destroying uncontrollable air objects; tracking hijacked aircraft; assisting aircraft in dis- tress;...andinterceptingsuspectaircraft,includingcounterdrugoperationsand peacetime military intercepts.” In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union,NORAD’sleadersbelievedthatthecommand’smostpressingmission was intercepting drug smugglers. But, in fact, the largest percentage of alert sites’totalactivityinvolvedassistingaircraftindistressandinspectinguniden- tifiedaircraft.13 InFebruary1993,Gen.ColinL.Powell,U.S.Army,theChairmanofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), determined that because of the greatly lessened Sovietthreat“theUnitedStatesnolongerneededalarge,dedicatedairdefense 7 force.”14HethereforerecommendedthatthenumberofdedicatedAirNational Guardunitsassignedtothecontinentalairdefensemission“besharplyreduced oreliminated”andthatthemissionbecarriedout“bydualtaskingexistingac- tiveandreservegeneral-purposefighterandtrainingsquadronsintheAirForce, theNavy,andtheMarineCorps.”15InareportsentonMay3,1994,tothechair- men of the U.S. Senate and U.S. House armed services committees and sub- committeesondefenseappropriations,theGeneralAccountingOffice—asthe GeneralAccountability Office was then called—supported Powell’s recom- mendations,concluding,“Adedicatedcontinentalairdefenseforceisnolonger needed.”16 Overviewofthe9/11AttacksandSummaryoftheAirDefenseResponse The9/11terroristattacksengenderedtheclassicfogofwar,intheairand ontheground.Thegovernment’slongstandingantihijackingprotocol,whichset outtherolesandresponsibilitiesoftheFederalAviationAdministrationandthe NorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommandintheeventofairpiracy,wasei- ther bypassed or lost along its way to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Amidst the chaos and violence of that morning, the U.S.Air Force played a prominentroleinreactingtotheattacks,asservicepersonnellaboredintheface ofthenation’sdeadliestsurpriseattacksincePearlHarbortodefendthecoun- tryagainstmultiplecommandeeredaircraftandadditionalsuspectedhijackings. Ofcriticalimportancetoaneffectiveairdefenseresponsewastimelyno- tificationbyFAAairtrafficcontrollerstoNortheastAirDefenseSectorperson- nelofeachhijacking.Thatissueandotheraspectsoftheairdefenseresponse timeline were investigated by the National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States—more commonly known as the 9/11 Commis- sion—beginninginearly2003.Thecommission’sinvestigationscontinuedinto 2004,anditsfinalreportwaspublishedinJulyofthatyear.17 The commission had access to extensive audio and written records, in- cluding various logs, tape recordings, and radar transmissions from NEADS, NORAD,CONR,andtheFAA.Thesesourcesenabledthecommissiontode- termine,forthefirsttime,anaccuratetimelineofthehijackingsandthemilitary responsetothem.18Thereconstructionoftheeventsof9/11hadbeenfaultyin thedaysimmediatelyaftertheattacksandslowforsometimethereafter.This wasdue,inpart,tothecomplex,cascadingnatureoftheattacks;theircoordi- nation;theirspeed;conflictingandincompleteaccountsregardingpossiblefol- low-onhijackings;anoverwhelmingfocusonpreventingfutureattacksrather thanimmediatelydissectingthereactiontothelastone;andinadequateforen- siccapabilitiesacrossthegovernment,particularlywithinkeyentitiesoftheair defense response. The original faulty timelines, drafted by government agen- ciesinthehoursanddaysaftertheattacks,werethebasisofwidespreadmedia coverageandcongressionaltestimony.Theirproblematicnaturebecameappar- ent even before the 9/11 Commission published its final report, and in March 8 2004,NORAD’scommander,GeneralEberhart,wrotetothe9/11Commission acknowledgingthatitstimelinewasaccurate.19 InafindingofparticularrelevancetotheU.S.AirForceandtheconduct offutureU.S.airdefenseoperations,thecommissionconcludedthattheFederal AviationAdministrationdidnotnotifytheNortheastAirDefenseSectorofthe hijackings expeditiously enough forAir Force fighters to intercept any of the doomedaircraft.Thisresultedfromvariouscircumstances,manyhavingtodo with the surprise nature of the attacks and the violent tactics of the hijackers. Withrespecttothefourhijackings,thecommissiondeterminedthefollowing: 1.TheFAAnotifiedNEADSofthefirsthijacking—shortlythereafterde- terminedtobeAmericanAirlinesFlight11—justundernineminutesbeforethe plane slammed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. This was the longestnotificationNEADSairdefendersreceivedthatday.20 2.TheFAAnotifiedNEADSofa“secondpossiblehijack”almostsimul- taneouslywiththecrashofUnitedAirlinesFlight175intotheSouthTower.21 3.FifteenminutesafterthissecondstrikeattheWorldTradeCenter,the FAApassedtotheNEADSairdefendersareportthatAmericanAirlinesFlight 11hadinfactnotcrashed;instead,thehijackedaircraftwassaidtobeflyingover NewJersey,orevenfurthersouth,andheadingtowardWashington,D.C.22The confusionoverthestatusofAmericanFlight11hadbegun,however,almostim- mediatelyaftertheNorthTowerwashit.Duringtheperiodbetweenthetwoat- tacksinNewYorkCity,theFAAtoldtheNEADSairdefendersthatitcouldnot confirmthatAmericanFlight11hadcrashed.23 4.LessthanfourminutesbeforeAmericanAirlinesFlight77crashedinto thePentagon,theFAAtoldtheNEADSairdefendersthattheflightwasmiss- ing.TheFAAstaffer,whodidnotdescribetheflightasahijack,passedthein- formationtotheairdefendersduringatelephonecallinitiatedbyNEADSabout anotherproblematicaircraft.24 5. NEADS personnel were not aware that UnitedAirlines Flight 93 had been hijacked until just over four minutes after it had slammed into an aban- donedstripmineinPennsylvania.WordofUnitedFlight93’slastknownlati- tudeandlongitudecameduringatelephonecallfromanFAAmilitaryliaison who was himself unaware that the aircraft had crashed. Twelve minutes after thecrash,inthecourseofatelephonecallinitiatedbyNEADSstaff,theFAA informedtheairdefendersthatUnitedFlight93hadgonedownatanunknown locationnortheastofCampDavid.25 Evenacursoryexaminationofthe9/11Commission’sreportandtimeline suggeststhatimprovingU.S.airdefenseagainstanyfutureterroristattackde- pends on a quicker FAAdetermination that a plane has indeed been hijacked and more effective coordination and timely communication between the FAA and the various sectors of NORAD. These enhancements, in fact, have been amongthegovernment’scriticalaccomplishmentssince9/11,andthesuccessof OperationNobleEaglehasbeendueinparttoimprovementsintheseareas(see 9 Table1,TimingofFAANotificationtoNORAD’sNortheastAirDefenseSec- tor,p54). Throughouttheattacks,andinthehoursthatfollowed,militaryandcivil- ian agencies and leaders endeavored to obtain accurate information, establish interagency communications, and respond in a coordinated way. Their efforts boreincreasinglysubstantialresultsasthedayworeon.Butduringthecritical 109minutesoftheactualattackperiod,themilitaryresponsebytheU.S.gov- ernmentconsistedofthelaunchbyNEADSoffourfullyarmedairdefensefight- ers and a spare jet armed with a 20-mm Gatling gun.26 None of these aircraft wereabletointerceptanyofthefourhijackedplanes.27 All five fighters launched during the attack period had a single, and the same, potential target: the first aircraft hijacked,AmericanAirlines Flight 11. ThefirsttwofighterslaunchedfromOtisAirNationalGuardBaseinresponse toanFAArequestforassistancewithFlight11,butithadalreadycrashedbythe timethefighterstookoff.28Morethanthirty-fiveminuteslater,thesecondthree fighterslaunchedfromLangleyAirForceBaseinresponsetoafaultyFAAre- portthatFlight11wasstillaloftandwasheadedtowardWashington,D.C.29 Thefivefighterscouldnotinterceptthesecond,third,orfourthhijacked planes at least in part because NEADS did not ask their pilots to do so. The NEADSairdefendersdidnotaskbecausetheydidnotknow,orknewtoolate, that UnitedAirlines Flight 175,AmericanAirlines Flight 77, and UnitedAir- linesFlight93hadbeenhijacked.Fortheirpart,FAAairtrafficcontrollerswere inmostcasesunabletoexpeditiouslyandaccuratelydetermineifandwhichair- craftwerehijacked.Theiruncertaintiesandtheresultingdelaysinnotifyingthe militaryandrequestingassistanceweretheconsequencesprimarilyofthetac- ticsofthehijackers.Bymurderingthecockpitcrewsofthefourflights,thehi- jackersrenderedthegovernment’santihijackingprotocolobsolete;byturningoff or altering the flights’transponders, they made locating, tracking, and inter- ceptingthecommandeeredplanesexceedinglydifficult. Inalmostallpre-9/11hijackings,theinformationflowfromcommercial pilots—underthreatbutstillatthecontrols—toairtrafficcontrollers,andthen, eventually,toNORADandrespondingU.S.AirForcepilots,remainedintact. Withinminutes,thenatureofthe9/11attacksrenderedthetraditional“hijacking paradigm” invalid.30The paradigm assumed that negotiations between hijackers and law enforcement would take place, usually after a commandeered planelandedsafely,andthatpassengersandcrewwouldemergeunscathed.The tactics of the 9/11 hijacker-pilots and their teams took full advantage of these long-held assumptions to keep the victimized passengers and remaining crew undercontrolandtheairtrafficcontrolsystem—and,hence,theairdefensesys- tem—largelyinthedark.Inastroke,FAAantihijackingprotocolsthathadbeen the standard for decades and NORAD air defense response procedures built thereonwereoutdatedandirrelevant.Inhindsightandtotheircredit,manyFAA and NEADS employees, with little situational awareness, and often in the ab- 10 sence of senior staff, took the initiative and improvised a response to a cata- strophicsituationforwhichtheyhadnottrainedandwerenotprepared.31 The last hijacking involving coordination between FAAair traffic con- trollersandmanagementandtheU.S.militarytookplaceonFebruary11,1993, whenatwenty-year-oldEthiopianmanhijackedLufthansaAirlinesFlight592 overAustrian airspace shortly after it left Frankfurt InternationalAirport for CairoandAddisAbaba.Wieldingwhatlookedlikeasemiautomaticpistolbut waslaterfoundtobeastarter’spistol,NebiuDemekecommandeeredtheAir- bus310-300andforceditspilottodivertittoNewYorkafterarefuelingstop inHanover,Germany.AftertheplanelandedatJohnF.KennedyInternational Airport,thehijackersurrenderedpeacefullytotheFederalBureauofInvestiga- tion(FBI),endinganearlytwelve-hourordealforninety-fourpassengersandten crewmembers.32Notably,fourU.S.militaryservicemeninvolvedintheresponse tothathijackingplayedkeyrolesintheairdefenseresponseon9/11. The commander of the glass-enclosed battle cab overlooking the opera- tionsfloorattheNortheastAirDefenseSectoron9/11,Col.RobertMarr,was assignedtotheNEADSoperationsectionwhenhiscommanderlearnedfroma news broadcast of the Lufthansa hijacking. Seeking sufficient advance notice foramilitaryresponseastheaircraftheadedtowardtheUnitedStates,Marrtold representativesoftheFederalAviationAdministrationthattheyneededtopass arequestformilitaryassistanceuptheirchainofcommand.Healsoalertedhis ownchainofcommandtobepreparedforsucharequest.Ashourspassed,co- ordinationcontinuedathigherlevelsofauthorityonthemilitaryandFAAsides, andMarrexplainedtheneedforanairdefenseresponsetotheLufthansaflight duringacallhereceivedfromtheWhiteHouse.AfterinitiallyopposingNEADS involvement,theWhiteHousecalledbackseveralhourslaterthatdayandau- thorizedtheNortheastAirDefenseSectortoproceed.Thesectorscrambledtwo F–15s from OtisAir National Guard Base, and then two F–16s fromAtlantic CityAirNationalGuardBase,tointerceptandtrailthehijackedaircraft.33Marr laterrecalled,“Ittookoversixhourstogainaninitialtailonthisoccasion.”34 Theleadpilotofthefirsttwofighterssentalofton9/11,Lt.Col.Timothy Duffy,hadbeenthesecondofthetwoOtisF–15pilotsscrambledinresponse to the Lufthansa hijacking.After intercepting the errant flight off the coast of eastern Canada, the fighters remained out of sight, about ten miles behind it. Theymovedwithinfivemiles,butaboveandbehindthejetasitnearedKennedy Airport.Asitlanded,theOtisfightersflewbyatlowaltitude,circledoverhead whilenegotiationsproceeded,andthenreturnedtotheirbasesafterthehijacker surrendered.35 The senior director of the weapons section at the NortheastAir Defense Sectoron9/11,Maj.JamesFox,wasaNEADSweaponscontrollerduringthe Lufthansahijacking.Thathijacking,unlikethoseon9/11,unfoldedduringape- riodofmanyhoursandoveradistanceof5,600miles,anditspilotremainedin chargeofthecockpit.ThusNEADSpersonnelwereabletoreceiveintelligence 11 farinadvanceoftheaircraft’sarrivalinU.S.airspaceandtoprepareforanef- fective,timelyresponsebyreviewinghijackregulationsandexercises.36 Themissioncrewcommandertechnicianon9/11,MSgt.JoeMcCain,was aNEADSidentificationtechnicianduringtheLufthansahijacking.HisNEADS colleaguesgavetheflighta“Special15”classification,astheywouldDeltaAir- lines Flight 1989, suspected of being hijacked on September 11, 2001. The Lufthansahijackingwastreatedasalawenforcementissue,andtheFBIwasthe leadagencyontheground.37BecauseNEADSpersonnelexercisedforthistype ofairpiracyeveryweek,theLufthansahijackingpresentedintermsofresponse, accordingtoMcCain,a“veryeasyscenario.”38 Thanks in part to Marr’s initiative, coordination between the FAAand NEADS in response to the Lufthansa hijacking went smoothly. Intercept au- thorizationfromhighernationalauthoritiescamedowntoNEADSinrelativeac- cordance with established interagency procedures, if slowly, and the actual interceptfollowedknownprotocols.39 U.S.governmentantihijackingprocedurescurrentin1993underwentonly minorrevisionsintheyearsleadinguptothe9/11attacks.Certainhigh-levelin- structionsandordersineffectonSeptember11,2001,setoutprotocolsforFAA- NORAD cooperation and addressed issues surrounding requests for and authorizationofmilitaryescortaircraft.Twooftheseofficialpronouncements laid out procedures to be implemented after the FAAdetermined that a plane hadbeenhijackedandrequiredmilitaryassistance,buttheygavenoguidance astohowtheFAAwoulddecideifahijackinghad,indeed,occurred.Thatgap wasfilled,atleastinpart,byathirdorderdirectedtoFAAairtrafficcontrollers. AChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction and attached enclo- suresdatedJune1,2001,providedguidanceanddirectiontothedeputydirec- torforoperations,NationalMilitaryCommandCenter(NMCC)atthePentagon; theNORADcommander;andoperationalcommandersfordealingwithhijack- ingsofcivilormilitaryaircraft.UndertheCJCSprotocol,whichwasineffect on September 11, 2001, the head of the FederalAviationAdministration was solelyresponsiblefordirectingtheresponseoflawenforcementagenciestoa hijacking. If the FAAadministrator decided that law enforcement needed the assistanceoftheDepartmentofDefense,thenheorshewouldnotify,assoon aspossible,theNMCC,the“focalpoint”foranyFAArequestsforDODassis- tance.Inthiscapacitythecenterwouldcoordinate,onbehalfoftheDOD,be- tweentheFAAandoperationalcommanders.Intheeventofahijackingjudged torequiretheassistanceofmilitaryescortaircraft,theFAAhijackcoordinator was to notify the NMCC deputy director of operations, who would contact NEADSoranappropriateunifiedcommandtodeterminetheavailabilityofsuit- ableassetsandwouldalsoforwardtheFAArequesttothesecretaryofdefense forapproval.ApprovalswouldreturntoNMCCfordisseminationtoNORAD ortotheunifiedcommand.Thecenterwouldthenauthorizedirectcoordination between the FAAand the designated squadron providing escort aircraft. Nor- 12