Issues in Business Ethics 44 David Rönnegard The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency Issues in Business Ethics Volume 44 Serieseditors WimDubbink,DepartmentofPhilosophy,SchoolofHumanities, TilburgUniversity,Tilburg,Netherlands MolliePainter-Morland,NottinghamBusinessSchool,CollegeofBusiness Law&SocialScience,Nottingham,UnitedKingdom Moreinformationaboutthisseriesathttp://www.springer.com/series/6077 David Rönnegard The Fallacy of Corporate Moral Agency 123 DavidRönnegard Stockholm Sweden ISSN0925-6733 ISSN2215-1680 (electronic) IssuesinBusinessEthics ISBN978-94-017-9755-9 ISBN978-94-017-9756-6 (eBook) DOI10.1007/978-94-017-9756-6 LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015936147 SpringerDordrechtHeidelbergNewYorkLondon ©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht2015 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof thematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbook arebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsor theeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforany errorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade. Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerScience+Business MediaB.V.DordrechtispartofSpringerScience+Business Media(www. springer.com) Abstract This book is a philosophical analysis of the corporation in society that spans the disciplines of Ethics, Law, Economics, and Political Philosophy. Part I poses a meta-ethicalchallenge to the position, generally accepted in Business Ethics, that acorporationqualifiesasamoralagent.Themostprominenttheoriesofcorporate moralagencyareanalysedbyevaluatingiftheycansatisfythethreenecessarymoral agencyabilities of intentionality,autonomy,andan ability to act. PartI concludes that, metaphysically speaking, the corporation itself does not qualify as a moral agent, in part because the morally relevant sense of the abilities of intentionality and autonomy require awareness on behalf of the agent. Therefore, corporations cannotbemorallyresponsibleasdistinctfromtheirmembers.Attributionsofmoral responsibilitytocorporationsareatbestanellipticalwayofreferringtoindividual corporatememberswhomaybemorallyresponsible. Part II proceeds from the premise that the corporation is not a moral agent. It seeks to descriptively evaluate what the corporation is and to prescriptively evaluatewhatrolethecorporationoughttohaveinsociety.Bytracingthehistorical developmentofthecorporatelegalforminEnglishandAmericanlaw,itisargued thatdescriptivelythecorporateformisprimarilyalegalagent.Itisalsomaintained thatthe corporationisa legalfictiongrantedto associationsof individuals,andas suchitisdescriptivelyaninstrumentofthestate. Part II then proceeds to prescriptively argue that the corporation also ought to be an instrument of the state. As such, the state may legitimately regulate corporate actions to be in accord with national goals of social welfare. It is highlighted that although the corporate legal form is an instrument of the state, actual corporations are the instruments of their incorporators. Part II then takes issue with the prescriptions of the Corporate Social Responsibility movement whichmaintainthatawiderconstituencyofstakeholdersthanmerelyshareholders ought to be considered in managerial decision-making. It is argued that many of the prescriptions of CSR are very difficult to uphold unless one also mistakenly advocates corporate moral agency. Furthermore, the issues that CSR wishes to v vi Abstract tackle are better addressed through public initiatives and legal enactments by the government. The normative force of the argument is that citizens of democratic states ought to primarily make calls for legal enactments in order to hold the corporatelegalinstrumentsaccountabletotheirpreferences. Contents PartI TheFallacyofCorporateMoralAgency 1 TheImportanceofCorporateMoralAgency ........................... 5 References.................................................................... 8 2 NecessaryConditionsforMoralAgency................................. 9 References.................................................................... 15 3 CorporateIntentions....................................................... 17 3.1 ExplicationofPeterFrench’sConceptionofCorporate MoralAgency ........................................................ 18 3.2 TheMetaphysicsofIntentionsandItsMoralRelevance........... 22 References.................................................................... 29 4 CorporateActions.......................................................... 31 4.1 AreCorporateAgentsAutonomous?................................ 34 4.2 Freevs.Non-freeAgents ............................................ 38 4.3 EmergentCorporateMoralAgency?................................ 41 References.................................................................... 48 5 CorporateAutonomy....................................................... 51 References.................................................................... 55 6 SummaryofWhyCorporateMoralAgencyIsaFallacy .............. 57 6.1 Autonomy ............................................................ 57 6.2 Intention .............................................................. 58 6.3 Action................................................................. 58 Reference..................................................................... 59 7 The Reference of Corporate Proper Names andResponsibilityAttributions........................................... 61 References.................................................................... 71 vii viii Contents 8 CorporateCollectiveMoralAgency...................................... 73 8.1 Joint/SharedIntentions............................................... 74 8.2 Group/CorporateIntentions.......................................... 78 8.3 CorporateCollectiveIntentions...................................... 81 References.................................................................... 90 9 Conclusion:LegitimateandIllegitimateCorporateMoral ResponsibilityAttributions................................................ 91 9.1 MoralResponsibilityAttributiontoaCollectiveWhole........... 91 9.2 MoralResponsibilityAttributiontoaCorporateStructure......... 93 9.3 MoralResponsibilityAttributiontoaUnanimously IntendingCollective.................................................. 94 9.4 Elliptical Moral Responsibility Attribution toaCollectiveWhole ................................................ 97 References.................................................................... 99 PartII TheRoleoftheCorporationinSociety 10 TheRoleoftheCorporationinSociety:TheDescriptiveView ....... 103 10.1 TheFirstCorporations............................................... 104 10.2 TheLegalDebateAbouttheNatureoftheCorporation ........... 105 10.3 TheShareholderPrimacyNorm..................................... 108 10.4 The Separation of the Corporation from theShareholdersandtheEmergenceoftheCorporate ShareasanAutonomousFormofProperty......................... 118 10.5 TheLimitedLiabilityofShareholders.............................. 122 10.6 TheReificationoftheCorporation(andthe Legal InfluenceoftheTheoriesAbouttheNatureoftheCorporation)... 128 10.7 TheCorporationasSocio-economicInstrument.................... 136 References.................................................................... 140 11 TheRoleoftheCorporationinSociety:ThePrescriptiveView....... 143 11.1 Oughtthe CorporateLegalForm to Be Used as anInstrumentoftheState?........................................... 144 11.1.1 TheProblemwiththeDescriptiveClaims oftheNexus-of-ContractsTheory......................... 145 11.1.2 TheProblemwiththeLibertarianPrescription forAbsolutePropertyRights............................... 149 11.2 TheWrongwiththeCorporateSocialResponsibility Movement ............................................................ 157 11.2.1 ThePhilosophicalFoundationsoftheCSRMovement... 157 11.2.2 ShareholderTheoryvs.CSR............................... 164 11.2.3 TheRationalityoftheShareholderPrimacyNorm....... 182 Contents ix 11.3 TheDivisionBetweenPublicandPrivateCorporate Responsibilities....................................................... 185 11.3.1 ThePublic/PrivateDistinction............................. 186 11.3.2 TheMarketasaZoneofMoralException................ 192 11.3.3 TheJustificationforStateRegulation ..................... 199 11.4 Summary:TheRoletheCorporationOughttoPlayinSociety.... 205 References.................................................................... 206 Conclusion ........................................................................ 209 Bibliography ................................................................. 213
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