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The Fall of Che Guevara This page intentionally left blank The Fall of Che Guevara A Story of Soldiers, Spies, and Diplomats HENRY BUTTERFIELD RYAN New York Oxford Oxford University Press 1998 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1998 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ryan, Henry Butterfield. The fall of Che Guevara : a story of soldiers, spies, and diplomats / Henry Butterfield Ryan. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-511879-0 1. Guevara, Ernesto, 1928-1967. 2. Guerrillas—Bolivia— History—20th century. 3. Insurgency—Bolivia—History—20th century. 4. United States—Foreign relations—Bolivia. 5. Bolivia— Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. F3326.G84R93 1997 327.73084—<Jc21 97-11627 9 8 7 6 5 4 32 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper For my brother, Webster, and my granddaughter, Katie This page intentionally left blank Preface T he purpose of this book is to tell the story of the U.S. government's response to Che Guevara during his insurgency in Bolivia in 1966-67. This story serves as a case history of U.S. counterinsurgency practices as they developed following World War II and were honed to a fine point during the tense Cold War years of the 1960s. Many people who remember how disastrously wrong the attempt at counterinsurgency went in Southeast Asia tend to forget that it succeeded in Latin America. Guevara hoped not just to start a guerrilla war in Bolivia but to ignite a rebellion against the established order in all of South America, while at the same time delivering a major blow to U.S. influence there—to "Yankee imperialism," he would say. Readers must determine for them- selves whether the defeat of Cuban aspirations should be regretted or applauded, but unquestionably it had an important effect on politics in the Western Hemisphere. Guevara's failure not only diminished Cuban revolutionary hopes but also reduced the value of Cuba's hand in its bit- ter struggle within international communist circles over the proper way to create revolution. Consequently, the case had greater significance for both sides than indicated by the limited dimensions of the actual fight- ing, and therefore it merits close attention. In studying the U.S. response to the insurgency, I will closely exam- ine the controversial involvement of U.S. officials in Guevara's death. I will also present biographic sketches of the main actors in the drama and occasionally focus on disputes among officials and on personal tensions viii Preface between allies, in the belief that individual histories and interpersonal struggles, sometimes even petty ones, have more to do with diplomacy than students of the subject are often given to believe. According to an old adage, history is written by victors, but if so, the story of Guevara's insurgency in Bolivia is a notable exception. His defeat there has been told again and again by writers professing and demonstrating their admiration for both him and his cause, and he was indeed an admirable man. But only a few—Leo Sauvage and Daniel James, for example—write critically, and even they criticize his perfor- mance more than his purpose. A different version, as told by Bolivian military leaders, remains mostly untranslated and consequently enjoys comparatively limited circulation, an important exception being the ac- count of Captain Gary Prado Salmon, whose company captured Gue- vara. Even today, nearly thirty years after Guevara's death, it is difficult to write dispassionately about the events in his life. Feelings still run strong among people who recall his career, and a historian trying for im- partiality continually fears the danger of belittling or caricaturing one side or the other. Nevertheless, I have tried in this book to tell without bias the story of two groups of human beings, each with powerful and conflicting convictions, resolving their differences in the unfortunately primitive way that is still humanity's habit. In much of the literature, the Americans involved in countering Gue- vara in Bolivia are depicted as murky figures, hovering ominously in the wings and manipulating Bolivian puppets—a portrayal resulting par- tially from an automatic aversion many writers of this story have to names such as Green Berets, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or U.S. Military Advisory Group (MILGP). Furthermore, the necessarily secret nature of those groups has kept them far out of focus, even though everyone who has written about these events knows they played promi- nent roles. By far the greater reason for the continuing obscurity of the Ameri- cans, however, lies in the fact that the U.S. government did not release any documents concerning its role until I, perhaps rashly, decided to spend what became the equivalent of three years (actually spread out over five) in the tedious process of prying these documents out of their secret files through various procedures established for that purpose. Should any young scholar or writer be tempted to try this route to gain quick publication, let me cite two letters. One is from the State Depart- Preface ix ment saying my appeal of June 3, 1992, for release of certain documents had been granted; this letter is dated November 18, 1996. Another was a letter from the National Archives that brought me part of the material I requested on September 5, 1991—dated June 21, 1994. Two requests, one to the House of Representatives and one to the Kennedy Library, though many years old and after frequent reminders, have still been nei- ther granted nor denied. Nevertheless, despite the ponderousness of the process, a huge number of secret documents have come to light; and as they have, the U.S. officials involved in the capture of Che Guevara have stepped out of the shadows. Within our story of the struggle with Guevara in Bolivia lies a sub- theme about the role of diplomatic establishments, notably embassies and consulates. It has particular relevance at the end of the century, when their functions, all but unknown in much of the United States, have nevertheless become the subject of intense scrutiny in the smaller world of foreign affairs. Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, the foreign-affairs community—Congress, the executive branch, the press, universities, and think tanks, among others—has also begun to question seriously the role of intelligence in U.S. foreign relations, especially the part played by the CIA. The U.S. government's interaction with revolutionary Cuba, including its response to Guevara in Bolivia, provides some useful, if far from conclusive, data for this debate also. I will return to that subject at the end of the narrative. Many people and a number of institutions have given me invaluable help in writing this book, although none bear responsibility for its content. I am especially thankful to Clare Hall, Cambridge, where, as a Life Member, I can return at will. Consequently, I spent two summers there writing much of the text. I also am grateful to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, where I spent approximately 18 months working on several projects, including this book. The Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, a service of the Associa- tion for Diplomatic Studies and Training, also aided me greatly. That program provides an ever-growing and invaluable collection of inter- views based on the careers of U.S. officials who have served abroad. I am very much indebted to Senator David L. Boren and Congress- man Dave McCurdy, then chairmen of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence, respectively, and to Senator Sam Nunn and