THE FAILURE OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACTS FOR FLOOD CONTROL ON THE CONNECTICUT AND MERRIMACK RIVERS, 1926--1950 (NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHUSETTS)

135 Pages·7.37 MB·English

by  HUBBARD, ELISABETH V

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
THE FAILURE OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACTS FOR
FLOOD CONTROL ON THE CONNECTICUT AND
MERRIMACK RIVERS, 1936 TO 1950
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF 'THE DIVISION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BY
E. VICKERY HUBBARD
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
AUGUST, 1951
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am indebted to Dr. Whitney R. Cross, formerly of the
Department of History of Smith College, for suggesting the topic
of this paper and advising me in the initial research; and to Mr.
William E. Leuchtenburg, of the Department of Political Science of
Smith College, for supplying information on the political back­
ground and criticizing the finished manuscript. For any errors
of fact or interpretation I claim sole responsibility.
I am also indebted to the Amherst College Library, the
Libraries of Harvard University, the Smith College Library, the
Massachusetts State House Library, and the Vermont State Library
for generously making available to me their resources.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION! THE PROBLEM . . . . . . ................... 1
Chapter
I. THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF THE PROBLEM. . . . ........
5
II. ATTEMPTS AT STATE ACTION ......................... 11
III. FEDERAL POLICY AND PROGRAM IN RIVER DEVELOPMENT. .
19
IV. THE NEW ENGLAND COMPACTS— POWER OR STATES RIGHTS?.
35
V. THE DEATH OF THE COMPACTS......................... 52
VI. FEDERAL OWNERSHIP: CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE . . . . 76
VII. THE STATES* RIGHTS POLICY. . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
VIII. THE STATES' RIGHTS POLICY IN ACTION. . . . . . . . 10^-
IX. CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . s . . . . . . . » » « « « . « « . .. 12^4*
iii
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM
New England first faced an acute need for flood control
after the floods of 1927? 1936, and 1938, which were the most dis­
astrous in her history. Local measures were entirely inadequate;
it became apparent that the engineering problem involved entire
river systems. At the same time other problems, although far less
clearly realized or strongly felt, also demanded a control of the
whole river for their solution. Pollution, soil erosion, wasteful
lumbering, and diminished river flow were cutting down the value
of economic resources. The integrated river development made pos­
sible by modern technology could not only prevent floods and re­
store depleted resources; it might also develop navigation and
hydro-electric power on a scale dwarfing previous attempts. But
it also threatened to sacrifice particular benefits in favor of
other benefits and to interfere with prevailing rights of private
exploitation.
Since there is conflict both among the uses and the users
of a river, its unified development requires some form of organi­
zation with power to accomplish the purpose. The Natural Resources
Task Force of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Execu­
tive Branch of the Government points out that multi-purpose de­
velopment cannot be obtained simply by adding up the various bene-
1
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2
fits but rather ’’lies in the harmonizing or balancing of poten-
tial uses. . . . Whatever type of organization is adopted, it must
be designed to weigh the often conflicting claims of irrigation,
flood protection, power development, water supply, navigation,
pollution control, recreation and commercial and game fishing."'1'
It indicates the conflicts among users by stating: "The problem
of water“resource development is further complicated by its sig­
nificant relationship with the management of the public domain,
mineral resource development, agricultural policy, transportation
policy, and general industrial development. . . . Power develop-
2
ment affects virtually all phases of river basin economy."
In New England the problem was concerned with an economy
that showed signs of weakness. It had suffered blows even before
the full impact of the depression. Long ago it had lost any
claims to agricultural or lumbering pre-eminence. More recently
New England had lost textile and paper mills to the South and had
become aware of mounting industrial competition from other sec­
tions of the country. An increasing deficiency of raw materials
was accompanied by a loss of favored position in regard to markets,
to the detriment of both her industry and her transportation. Her
early Industrial development had been based in large part on the
water power and pure water supply available in her streams. Pol­
lution had progressively deteriorated her industrial water supply.
With the advent of electricity, she lost her competitive power ad­
1
Leslie A. Miller, et al., Organization and Policy in the
Field of Natural Resources. Report prepared for the Commission on
the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Wash­
ington: Government Printing Office, 19*+9) ? p. 16.
2Ibid., p. 17.
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3
vantage and had since become increasingly dependent on imported
fuels for her electricity. Her production of hydroelectricity
did not materially increase in the period from 1936 to 19*+8? de­
spite new installations.'1' Many of her old generators had been
2
abandoned because of flood damage and inadequate flow. Mean­
while the rest of the country had far surpassed her in the de­
velopment of hydroelectricity under a spectacular program of Fed­
eral projects.
When the flood crisis forced New England to study her
water resources, the concept of multi-purpose development was
flourishing under a new impetus. President Roosevelt had made
it his policy and put it to the test in the Tennessee Valley Au­
thority. Identified in the public mind with government exploita­
tion of hydroelectricity, since that was the most apparent and
contested value involved, it became a symbol of centralized Fed­
eral control over the national economy, generally unwelcome in
New England.
Various forces barred the way to integrated development
of water resources in New England under either Federal or region­
al auspices. The private utilities were strong: they were well
consolidated with other business interests and had penetrated in­
to the State governments. The political tradition of protecting
and favoring private enterprise had promoted prosperity in the
i
Leland Olds, 18Comprehensive Development of the Connecti­
cut River,81 speech delivered in Northampton, Mass., March 18, 19^9.
O
Power Survey Committee of the New England Council, Power
in New England. A Report Prepared by William F. Uhl with the As­
sistance of Harold K. Barrows and Howard M. Turner (Boston: The
New England Council, 19^8), pp. 1+2, 1+5.
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past. The State governments were weak in their financial position
and disinclined to experiment in social controls. Although there
was a regional division of economic interest between the northern
and the southern New England States, they were united in their
distrust of increasing Federal authority. Once the insecurely-
seated Democratic regimes of Massachusetts and Connecticut had
worked out a compromise for flood control with their Republican
sister States, they stood with the antagonists of the New Deal
for regional solidarity and States' Rights. Public opinion,
clamoring for flood control, was poorly informed on the engineer­
ing possibilities of river basins. No obvious large source of
undeveloped power kindled the general imagination. The policy
of the Federal government was divided, reflecting opposition in
Congress between the followers of the Roosevelt philosophy and
its opponents, regional conflicts of interest, and the claims of
government agencies for jurisdiction and survival.
"'’his paper deals with the political history of the at­
tempt of Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut
to achieve flood control of the two major New England rivers
through interstate compacts. Its concern with the problem of
the Connecticut and the Merrimack River basins often involves
both the entire New England region and the rest of the United
States. It attempts to show how the balancing of the forces en­
gaged in the problem have thus far defeated the unified develop­
ment of these rivers and hindered their effective flood control.
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CHAPTER I
THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF THE PROBLEM
Neither the recurrent spring overflows nor the major
floods New England had experienced throughout her history had
prepared her for the catastrophes which began in 1927. Late in
the fall of that year the comparatively small Winooski River in
the northwestern section of Vermont overran the cities of Barre,
Montpelier, and Burlington, taking fifty-five lives; washing out
bridges, dams, and highways; stopping telephones, electric lights,
automobiles, and trains.1 With the losses on other rivers, the
2
total damage in Vermont was almost twenty-five million dollars.
The entire Connecticut River suffered fifteen and a half million
dollars of direct loss; the Merrimack, well over two million.^
But it was not until 1936 that these two great river basins felt
the full lash of the flood, when Manchester, Lawrence, Lowell,
and Haverhill; Holyoke, Springfield, and Hartford took the water
in their streets; and the total direct damage to New England was
^Luther B. Johnson, Vermont in Flood Time (Randolph, Ver­
mont: Roy L. Johnson Co., 1927)7 PP• 1-20.
p
Report of Advisory Committee of Engineers on Flod Con­
trol, Public Service Commission, State of Vermont, to Hon. John
E. Weeks, Governor, (December 19, 1928), p. 3*
-'New England Regional Planning Commission, Water Resources
of New England. Publication No, 51 (Boston: National Resources
Committee, Region One, 1938), pp. 16?, 332.
5
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6
x
over a hundred million dollars. This stands as New England’s
worst flood of record. Yet in 1938, while a hurricane was blow~
ing up across the southern New England coast, floods overreached
the previous high water marks in Adams and North Adams on the
Hoosie River, on the southern tributaries of the Connecticut, and
in the highly industrialized Thames River Valley.^
Three unprecedented floods had occurred within nine
years. Their greater destruction was caused partly by an increase
in the rate and amount of run-off from hills stripped of their
original forest cover and plowed too far up their slopes. In
some instances soils, eroded in sheets or leaving gullies, were
deposited farther down to block channels and cover fields. As
the floods dug deeper, they carried greater deposits of worthless
subsoil, which began to smother, rather than enrich, the produc-
if
tive earth of the downstream farms. Unchecked, the loss of farm­
land might be irreplaceable. However, in the immediate monetary
^Ibid.. p. 3«
p
U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Comprehensive
Flood Control Plans. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Con­
trol, House of Representatives, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., on H. R.
96^0, March 19, April 9? 19^ (Washingtons Government Printing
Office, 19^0), pp. 32, M), i+l, 81+9-50.
%ew England Regional Planning Commission, Water Resources
of New England, pp. LK36-39.
^State of Vermont, Commission for the Study of Water Re­
sources and Electrical Energy, Water Resources and Electrical
Energy. (191+1). p. 15. Cf. statement of W. H. Feiker that floods
were not detrimental to the lower Connecticut farms (U. S. Con­
gress, House of RepresentativeSj Comprehensive Flood Control
Plans. Hearings before the Committee on Flood Control, House of
Representatives, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., on Reports of the Chief
of Engineers and Amendments to Flood Control Acts, April !+, 1938
[Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938], pp. 289-90).
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7
reckoning, the losses of bridges, railroads, highways, utilities,
and industries loomed much larger. There had been a tremendous
increase in physical structures susceptible to damage. They had
pressed close to the rivers to gain the advantages of power, water
supply, and transportation. Not only were they intruders in the
flood bed of the river, but in the form of protective walls, di­
version channels, industrial dams, and low bridges, they dammed
high waters and blocked them off from their natural floodways,
so that they often took new and destructive courses.^
Apparently, the problem was as broad as the river basin.
Walls built to protect one locality might actually menace another.
Judging by experience with the Mississippi River, the very build­
ing of dikes, by narrowing the river's channel, made higher and
2
higher dikes necessary. The suggested alternative of moving
back and giving the river room received scant attention, not only
because of the loss in transportation and resources entailed, but
also because in the narrow valleys of the tributaries it was physi­
cally impossible. The logical answer seemed to be to control the
rivers at their source. Although reforestation measures might
alleviate flood damage, they could not furnish complete protec-
•j
New England Regional Planning Commission, Water Resources
of New England, pp. 26k, *+38; Massachusetts General Court, Report
of the Special Commission Directed to Make an Investigation and
Study Relative to Certain Problems in the Merrimack Valley. So-
called. Massachusetts Legislative Document, Senate— No. 100, Janu­
ary, 1938 (Bostons Wright and Potter Printing Co., Legislative
Printers, 1938), pp. 27-28.
O
Report of the President's Committee on Water Flow, De­
velopment of the Rivers of the United States. U. S. 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., House Doc. No. 395" (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 193*0, p. 2k7.
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