The Fading Role of Congress in Foreign-Policy Decision Making by Jim Webb

100 Pages·2013·2.73 MB·English

Number 124 • Mar / Apr 2013 • $8.95
Chester Crocker Handling Crises of Transition
Gary Hart The McChrystal Way of War
Marvin Kalb The Rise of Young John Kerry
Ted Galen Carpenter National Narcissism
www.nationalinterest.org Robert W. Merry Nixon’s Strategic Vision
LEGISLATIVE
IRRELEVANCE
The Fading Role of Congress in Foreign-Policy Decision Making
by Jim Webb

.
Number 124 March/April 2013
The Realist
5 A Sadly Simplistic Afghan Debate by Robert W. Merry
While America’s Afghan discourse focuses principally on the question of how many troops to pull out and
when, policy makers largely ignore the imperative of executing the withdrawal in a purposeful fashion,
within a broader strategic framework. President Obama could find pertinent lessons in Richard Nixon’s
complex and far-reaching Asia policy, which set the region on a new—and more stable—path.
Articles
8 Congressional Abdication by Jim Webb
Since World War II, and particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has been losing its historic
role in the articulation and functioning of national-security policy. This former senator, who served on the
Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees, decries the flow of power on such crucial matters to the
executive branch, at the expense of both the prerogative and responsibility of Congress.
16 Syria’s Crisis of Transition by Chester Crocker
History suggests that Syria’s best chance to emerge from its bloody civil war lies in an internationally led,
negotiated transition, subject to some measure of external monitoring. But if America is to play a role, it
must understand that timing is crucial, and trying to pick a winner will likely backfire. This is a time for
“pre-negotiation” and allowing the situation to ripen to a point when diplomatic action can bear fruit.
25 When Kerry Stormed D.C. by Marvin Kalb
John Kerry was just five years out of Yale and not yet three years past his Vietnam combat duty when he
went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 to oppose the U.S. war policy. He became an
instant celebrity and set himself upon a political trek that has included twenty-eight years in the U.S. Senate,
his party’s presidential nomination and—now—his new job as secretary of state.
37 Japan’s Daunting Challenge by Daniel Sneider
The new Japanese government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe encompasses contradictory impulses that could
thwart American hopes that this Asian island nation can get its economic house in order and serve as a
regional counterweight to a rising China. Instead, it could opt for a “fortress Japan” nationalism that isolates
it in Asia and bolsters efforts to protect an economy beset by public debt and an aging population.
47 Delusions of Indispensability by Ted Galen Carpenter
The idea of America as the world’s “indispensable nation” is so entrenched in the U.S. consciousness that
hardly anyone in academic, journalistic or governmental circles dares to challenge it. But this proposition
fosters counterproductive security goals and results in strategic overreach. Beware those who press the
necessity of “American leadership.”
56 The Mythical Liberal Order by Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber
It is conventional in the West to view international cooperation under a liberal order as the prevailing reality
of the global scene, with inevitable challenges along the way. This narrative is wrong. The liberal order
remains largely an aspiration, not a description of how states actually behave. Advancing a normative liberal
agenda in the twenty-first century will require a new way of looking at the world.
Reviews & Essays

69 Mo Yan’s Delicate Balancing Act by Sabina Knight
Since winning the 2012 Nobel Prize in Literature, China’s Mo Yan has become a scapegoat for the sins of
the regime in which he must survive. Such judgments neglect much that can be learned from his work. By
operating in a “gray zone,” Mo voices subtle political criticisms that would risk reprisal if presented overtly.
The key to understanding him is to seek out the underlying meaning in his probing stories of individual
resilience in the face of the relentless forces of instinct, sexuality and history.
81 The McChrystal Way of War by Gary Hart
The hallmarks of a soldier’s life are duty, discipline and ambition. Those also serve as important elements
of My Share of the Task, the detailed and revealing memoir of General Stanley McChrystal, who rose to
be commander of international forces in Afghanistan until he resigned amid controversy in 2010. His
departure represents a serious loss for his country because McChrystal was an innovative thinker at a time
when the U.S. military was facing dramatic changes.
89 Reassessing the Coolidge Legacy by John R. Coyne Jr.
Calvin Coolidge, the thirtieth president, doesn’t enjoy elevated ratings from academics in their periodic
surveys of presidential performance. But Amity Shlaes doesn’t buy the conventional view and sets out
to force a reappraisal of a man who presided over a robust economy, federal-budget surpluses, serious
reductions in the national debt and generally very good times. His presidency offers lessons for our own day.
Images AP Images: page 74; Corbis: pages 27, 32, 63, 71, 77; Getty: pages 10, 13, 29, 35, 38, 42, 45, 60, 66,
80, 82, 87, 91, 94; iStockPhoto: pages 18, 21, 49, 52; Veer: page 55
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The Realist
A Sadly Simplistic achievable if the president had sufficient
fortitude.
Afghan Debate In such narrow terms, Obama has an
edge in political and policy logic. But the
problem is that he hasn’t spelled out how
By Robert W. Merry he plans to execute the withdrawal in a
purposeful fashion or how the exit would fit
into a broader strategic framework.
As the debate over America’s Afghan True, the country is war-weary. Its
.troop withdrawal grinds on, it’s volunteer troops are stretched beyond their
...time to consider the lesson of psychological limit. The public fisc is a
Richard Nixon, whose Watergate abase- mess, in part because of war costs. Strains in
ment obscures the reality that he has more the U.S.-Pakistani relationship have reached
to teach us on such matters than is generally dangerous proportions. The civilizational
recognized. The country could use some of tensions between Islam and the West have
Nixon’s strategic acumen these days. been heightened by America’s continued
This is reflected in the foreign-policy presence on Islamic soil. And there’s no
discourse unfolding in response to the reason to believe that Al Qaeda, which
Obama administration’s plans to speed up precipitated the war with its 9/11 attacks
its exit from Afghanistan. It’s essentially on America, now figures appreciably in the
a binary debate, simplistic in its terms. outcome of this war one way or the other.
Neither President Obama nor his critics Thus, Obama is wise to deflect
look good in this face-off. opponents who can’t accept that these
The discussion is focused on the simple realities negate prospects of the victory
question of how many troops should be they foresee if the U.S. military effort
brought home from that troubled land— were sufficiently robust and long lasting.
and when. Obama, seeing little hope of As neoconservative commentator Gary
a traditional military victory, wants them Schmitt wrote in the Weekly Standard, “In
out as quickly as he can get them home short, the insurgent cancer was going into
smoothly and without serious harm to remission but the White House, irrationally,
them in the process. His critics argue that wants to stop treatment.” But for Schmitt
this represents a military capitulation, and his allies, there never seems to be any
foregoing a victory that would be discernible turn of events that could end
the treatment. Since the aim is to defeat and
Robert W. Merry is editor of The National Interest subdue Afghanistan’s Taliban—and since
and an author of books on American history and the Taliban is an indigenous element of
foreign policy. His latest book is Where They Stand: Afghan society that is never going away—
The American Presidents in the Eyes of Voters and the neocon approach leads inexorably to
Historians (Simon & Schuster, 2012). endless war.
The Realist March/April 2013 5
By pulling together Asia’s rising non-Communist states
and bringing China into the world as a responsible player,
Nixon began a process of bolstering regional stability.
That’s why Obama’s exit strategy, along assassinations of commanding political
the lines of his carefully calibrated military figures. Campus buildings were being
exit from Iraq, is necessary. burned and bombed. Urban race riots
But where’s the strategic context for following the killing of Martin Luther King
such a policy? How can America reduce Jr. raised questions about the country’s
its Afghan footprint while continuing to essential stability. Hundreds of thousands
exercise influence in the area through deft of antiwar demonstrators were flocking to
diplomacy backed up by offshore military Washington.
capability? What nations could help us do Accordingly, Nixon fashioned a militarily
that? What new developments are brewing risky and politically dangerous strategy: He
in the region that could be exploited in the ordered a retreat from Vietnam, a slow,
effort to maintain stability? methodical withdrawal under enemy fire.
Perhaps such questions are weighing He would use the military breathing room
heavily on Obama as he proceeds with his from the Communist devastation to bolster
exit strategy, but there’s little evidence of the South Vietnamese army so it could pick
it. Here’s where we should consider the up the slack. Further, Nixon brought his
story of Richard Nixon and the Vietnam combat troops home first, ahead of support
nightmare he inherited in 1969. His personnel, in order to reduce casualties and
subsequent actions not only got his country calm the home front. In doing so, he left
out of a poisonous quagmire (and without the remaining support troops vulnerable to
defeat; that came later) but also transformed the kind of Tet-like Communist offensive
the geopolitical landscape of Asia in ways that had destroyed the presidency of his
that stabilized the region for decades. predecessor, Lyndon Johnson.
Upon entering the White House, Nixon Thus, Nixon placed himself in a
made a stark calculation: the Vietnam War predicament of epic proportions. Militarily,
was not winnable at an acceptable cost. he had to calibrate a risky maneuver in
In military terms, this may have been Vietnam, which could lead to disaster in
debatable, given the devastation visited the field and also result in political crisis
upon the Communist opposition during at home. Politically, he had to manage
the 1968 Tet Offensive, which cost the an unstable domestic scene, which could
Communists thirty-seven thousand men, engulf him at home and upset his military
compared to 2,500 Americans. Even calibrations in Vietnam. Wending his way
a year later, at Nixon’s inauguration, the through this thicket, he got all U.S. troops
Communist main force was still reeling home by the end of his first term.
from its 1968 decimation. And yet as this harrowing drama unfolded,
But the situation at home precluded any Nixon viewed it as merely a sideshow, the
attempt to exploit this temporary enemy necessary cleanup effort that enabled him
weakness militarily. The war was tearing to pursue simultaneously his broad Asian
apart a country already raw from recent vision, as reflected in a Foreign Affairs article
6 The National Interest The Realist
he wrote in October 1967. Entitled “Asia wouldn’t have been emboldened to resist
After Viet Nam,” it foreshadowed a new the Chinese giant, and China wouldn’t have
Cold War strategy based on significant been emboldened to break decisively with
developments in the geopolitics of Asia. the Soviet Union.
These included the growing tensions By pulling together Asia’s rising non-
between China and the Soviet Union; the Communist states and bringing China into
rise of economically progressive nations in the world as a responsible player, Nixon
“non-communist Asia,” notably Japan, Hong began a process of bolstering regional
Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea; stability. He also diminished the prospect
these nations’ lingering concerns about the that America would be pulled into endless
threat from China; and America’s exhaustion wars in the region. Further, in applying
from playing the role of global policeman. pressure on the Soviets he induced them to
All this posed an opportunity for America show more flexibility in their dealings with
to work with these rising Asian nations to the United States. This was brilliant foreign
fashion a collective regional defense posture policy with far-reaching, positive and long-
against a menacing China while also trying lasting consequences.
to lure China out of its “angry isolation.” This kind of strategic thinking is missing
The rising tensions in Sino-Soviet relations from today’s foreign-policy discourse.
provided a promising opening to this Obama isn’t pursuing it, and his critics
new policy. “Taking the long view,” wrote aren’t asking for it. So we get the binary
Nixon, “we simply cannot afford to leave debate focused on how many troops should
China forever outside the family of nations, be left in Afghanistan, and for how long.
there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its Obama says not many and not for long; his
hates and threaten its neighbors.” The aim, critics say it should be more, over a longer
he said, should be to persuade China that time span. This is essentially a meaningless
it “cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, debate when considered alongside the
and that its own national interest requires a big strategic questions regarding the
turning away from foreign adventuring and threat of Islamic fundamentalism and
a turning inward toward the solution of its how the country can meet it effectively
own domestic problems.” without kindling more anti-Western fervor
Nixon’s article presaged his later overture throughout the world of Islam.
to China and also helped prepare China We need the kind of grand strategic
intellectually for that overture when it came. vision that Nixon applied to a chaotic Asia
Meanwhile, he believed, it was crucial that four decades ago. It isn’t enough to leave
he prevent a Communist victory in Vietnam. Afghanistan, just as it wasn’t enough for
Otherwise, America’s Asian presence would Nixon to execute his harrowing Vietnam
have been severely attenuated. And without retreat. A chaotic world needs U.S.
a clear American commitment to the region, leadership that can take the country beyond
the rising non-Communist nations likely simplistic binary debates. n
The Realist March/April 2013 7
Congressional Abdication
By Jim Webb
In matters of foreign policy, Congress, appropriations for such armies to no
and especially the Senate, was designed more than two years. This was a clear
as a hedge against the abuses exhibited signal that in our new country there
by overeager European monarchs who for would be no standing army to be sent off
centuries had whimsically entangled their on foreign adventures at the whim of a
countries in misguided adventures. America pseudomonarch. The United States would
would not be such a place. The Constitu- not engage in unchecked, perpetual military
tion would protect our governmental pro- campaigns.
cess from the overreach of a single executive Congress would also “provide and
who might otherwise succumb to the im- maintain a Navy,” with no time limit
pulsive temptation to unilaterally risk our on such appropriations. This distinction
country’s blood, treasure and international between “raising” an army and
prestige. Congress was given the power to “maintaining” a navy marked a recognition
declare war and appropriate funds, thus of the reality that our country would need
eliminating any resemblance to European- to protect vital sea-lanes as a matter of
style monarchies when it came to the presi- commercial and national security, confront
dential war power. acts of piracy—the eighteenth-century
Importantly and often forgotten equivalent of international terrorism—and
these days, Article I, Section 8 of the act as a deterrent to large-scale war.
Constitution was also carefully drawn to Practical circumstances have changed,
give Congress, not the president, certain but basic philosophical principles should
powers over the structure and use of the not. We reluctantly became a global
military. True, the president would act military power in the aftermath of World
as commander in chief, but only in the War II, despite our initial effort to follow
sense that he would be executing policies historical patterns and demobilize. nato
shepherded within the boundaries of was not established until 1949, and the
legislative powers. In some cases his power 1950 invasion of South Korea surprised
is narrowed further by the requirement us. In the ensuing decades, the changing
that he obtain the “Advice and Consent” nature of modern warfare, the growth
of two-thirds of the Senate. Congress, not of the military-industrial complex and
the president, would “raise and support national-security policies in the wake of
Armies,” with the Constitution limiting the Cold War all have contributed to a
mammoth defense structure and an
Jim Webb is a former U.S. senator from Virginia atrophied role for Congress that would
and served as secretary of the navy in the Reagan not have been recognizable when the
administration. Constitution was written. And there is little
8 The National Interest Congressional Abdication