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The Explanation of Amour-Propre NikoKolodny UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley Rousseau’sthoughtismarkedbyanoptimismandapessimismthateach evoke,atleastintherightmood,afeelingofrecognitiondifficulttosup- press. We have an innate capacity for virtue, and with it freedom and happiness.Yetourpresentsocialconditionsinstillinusarestlesscraving for superiority, which leads to vice, and with it bondage and misery. As Rousseaufamouslyencapsulatestheidea:“manisnaturallygoodand...it isfromtheseinstitutionsalonethatmenbecomewicked”(LM575/OC 1.1136).1 However this dictum is understood, it entails at least what we mightcallthe“thesisofpossiblegoodness”:thatwhilehumanpsychology issuchthatmenbecomewickedundertheconditionsinwhichwenow findthem,neverthelessmenwouldbe,orhavebeen,goodunderother conditions. Thedefenseofthethesisfacesanobviousproblem.Almostallthat weknowofhumannatureisasitisexpressedunderconditionsrelevantly similartothosethatcurrentlyprevail.Sowhatevidencedowehavethat itwouldexpressitselfdifferentlyunderdifferentconditions?Rousseau’s answeristoconstructhypotheticalhistoriesofthespecies,inthesecond Discourse,andoftheindividual,inEmile.Thesehistoriesaimtodescribe apossiblepsychologysuchthat(i)ifmenhadit,itwouldexplainwhy,in conditionslikethosethatcurrentlyprevail,menarebadand(ii)would implythatmen,underotherconditions,wouldbegood,and(iii)itcan IamverygratefultoVe´roniqueMunoz-Darde´,FredNeuhouser,DavidOwens,andan anonymousreaderforthePhilosophicalReviewforcomments. 1. WorksofRousseauthatarefrequentlycitedhavebeenidentifiedbyabbreviations thatarelistedattheendofthearticle. PhilosophicalReview,Vol.119,No.2,2010 DOI10.1215/00318108-2009-036 ©2010byCornellUniversity 165 NIKO KOLODNY plausiblybesaid,onthebasisofwhateverobservationandintrospectionis availabletous,tobethepsychologythatweactuallyhave. Evensettingasidethematterofplausibility,itissurprisinglydiffi- cult,oratleastsurprisinglycomplicated,toarticulateevenapossiblepsy- chologythatwouldexplainwhymenarebadinthewaysthatRousseausays theyare,whileallowingthattheymighteverbegoodinthewaysthathe saystheycanbe.Spelloutprinciplesthatwouldpermitmentobegood, anditbecomesamysterywhymenshouldeverhavebecomebad.Spell outprinciplesthatexplainwhymenarebad,anditseemsimpossiblethat theycouldeverbeotherwise.InterpretationsofRousseau,evenseveralto whichIamdeeplyindebted,havenotfullyengaged,Ithink,withthecom- plications.2ThisiswhatItrytodohere. Tothatend,Iattemptapositivereconstruction.Iformulatepsy- chologicalprinciplesthatwouldexplainwhy,inconditionslikethosethat Rousseaufindsmenin,theyarebadinthewayheobserves;thatwould imply that men, under other conditions, would be good in the way he imagines; and that I believe are at least consistent with what Rousseau otherwisesaysonthesubject.Whethertheseprinciplescanbesaidtobe Rousseau’sinanyfurthersenseishardertosay.Tobesure,heneverexplic- itlyarticulatedthem.Andwhateverpositivetextualsupportcanbefound forthemnodoubtrequiresemphasizingsomepartsofhisdiscussiontothe neglectofothersandtakinginonewayexpressionsthatmightreasonably betakeninanother.Butthismaynotmatterformymainaim,whichissim- plytobringoutthenecessarydifficultyandcomplexityofanydefenseof Rousseau’sthesisofpossiblegoodness.Isuspectthatthisiswheremuch of the interest of his work lies in any event: in the depth of the tension betweenhisoptimismandhispessimismthatisrevealedbyhisstruggles toreconcilethem. In section 1, I interpret the thesis of possible goodness as the claimthat,underpresentconditions,amour-propre—aconcernforhow onecomparestoothers—becomes“inflamed”—veryroughly,becomesa concernforsuperiorityoverothers—whereasinotherconditions,amour- proprewouldbe“healthy”—wouldbeaconcernforequalitywithothers. Insection2,IsuggestthatRousseau’sprojectistodescribecertainbasic desires (although the word ‘desire’ may connote something overly nar- row,aswewillsee)suchthatincombinationwithcertainbeliefs,liableto ariseunderpresentconditions,inflamedamour-propreresultsasakind 2. IhaveinmindforemosttheworkofNicholasDent,JoshuaCohen,JohnRawls, andFrederickNeuhousercitedinthereferencesbelow. 166 The Explanation of Amour-Propre ofderiveddesire,whereasincombinationwithotherbeliefs,whichwould arise under other conditions, healthy amour-propre would result. To a firstapproximation,thebasicdesiresarePreservativeAmourdeSoi—acon- cernforone’swell-being—andtheConcernforEvaluation—aconcern, whichwemustfurtherspecify,thatothersevaluateoneinaparticularway. Thequestionisthenwhatbeliefscombinewiththesedesirestoproduce inflamed, or alternately healthy, amour-propre. In section 3, I explain why some answers from the existing literature seem inadequate. In sec- tion4,Isuggestthat,forRousseau,thesourceofthetroubleseemstobe DependenceonOpinion—atendencytolooktoothers’evaluationsfor the source of one’s value—and, specifically, Social Self-Evaluation—the beliefthatthesourceofone’svalueisSocialAdvantage—superiorityin goods,suchaswealthandpoliticalpower,thatdependonconventionand consent.ThequestionisthenhowSocialSelf-Evaluationleadstoinflamed amour-propre.Insection5,Iexamineasuggestion,drawnfromtheliter- ature,thatinflamedamour-proprearisesfromthecombinationofSocial Self-EvaluationwiththeConcernforAccurateEvaluation—inpractice,a desirethatothersvalueoneattherateonevaluesoneself.Althoughthis providesanexplanationofcertainphenomenaassociatedwithinflamed amour-propre,itdoesnotexplainitscentralcharacteristics.Surprisingly, theresultingpsychologytendstoindividualcontentmentandsocialcon- cord. In section 6, I offer two compatible, but singly sufficient, alterna- tiveexplanationsofhowinflamedamour-propremightarisefromSocial Self-Evaluation.ThefirstreplacesPreservativeAmourdeSoiwithProgres- siveAmourdeSoi—aconcerntodevelop,toactualizewhatgivesonevalue. ThesecondsupplementstheConcernforAccurateEvaluationwiththe ConcernforHigherAccurateEvaluation—adesirethatonewillbeevalu- atedmorehighlyandthatthisevaluationwillbeaccurate.Insection7,I explainhowthesedesiresleadtohealthyamour-proprewhenSocialSelf- Evaluation is replaced by Evaluative Knowledge—knowledge that one’s truevalueisone’snaturalvalue,measuredbyone’shumanityandnatural virtues. 1.Amour-Propre Commentators generally agree that men become wicked principally through some relation between present conditions and amour-propre: aspecialkindofself-concern,specifically,forhowonecomparestooth- ers.Onacommonreading,presentconditionsproduceamour-propre, 167 NIKO KOLODNY andamour-propreitselfmakesmenwicked.Menwouldbegood,there- fore,onlyunderconditionsthatdidnotproduceamour-propreatall.3But thisseemsuntenable.Foronething,Rousseausuggeststhatsocietymakes amour-propre inevitable. So if amour-propre itself makes men wicked, thenitwouldseemthatmencouldbegoodonlybywithdrawingfrom,or neverhavingentered,society.ButRousseaudeniesthatwithdrawalfrom societyispossibleordesirable(2D150–51,203–4;SC53/OC3.152–53, 207–8,364).Thus,thisreadingthreatenstodeprivethethesisofpossible goodnessofanypracticalinterest.Atmost,thethesiswouldexonerateour nature(byshowingthatitisnotresponsibleforourwickedness)whileleav- ingusnoprospectofreform.4Moreover,Rousseauseemstosayprecisely thatmancanbegoodinsociety(E255/OC4.550–51)and,accordingly, thatamour-proprecantakeagood,aswellasabad,form(E235,243/ OC4.523–24). SomesuggestthatRousseauholdsthatthisgoodformcanbereal- izedonlybysomehowidentifyingone’sindividual“self”withacollective “self,”sothatone’samour-propreistransformedintoaconcernforhow thecollectivecompareswithitsrivals.5ButmuchoftheworkonRousseau ofthelastfewdecades—ledbyNicholasDent’slandmark1989studyand elaborated in different ways by John Rawls, Joshua Cohen, and Freder- ickNeuhouser—suggestsadifferentview,whichseemstomebothmore faithfultothetextsandmoreinterestinginitsownright.6 Onthisview, amour-propre,understoodexclusivelyasakindofindividual,ratherthan collective, self-concern, can take not only a bad, or what Dent calls an “excessive”or“inflamed,”formbutalsoagood,or“natural”or“healthy,” form.Sounderstood,thethesisofpossiblegoodnessisthathumanpsy- chology is such that under present conditions, amour-propre becomes 3. See,forexample,AllanBloom’sintroductiontohistranslationofEmile,E10. 4. However,JudithShklar,MenandCitizens(London:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1969)readsRousseauashavingsuchlimitedambitions. 5. SeeRogersD.Masters,ThePoliticalPhilosophyofRousseau(Princeton,NJ:Princeton UniversityPress,1968),42;Shklar,MenandCitizens,19;andDavidGauthier,TheSentiment ofExistence(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),chap.3. 6. NicholasDent,Rousseau:AnIntroductiontoHisPsychological,Social,andPoliticalThe- ory(NewYork:Blackwell,1989);Dent,ARousseauDictionary(Cambridge:Blackwell,1992); Dent,Rousseau(London:Routledge,2005);JohnRawls,LecturesontheHistoryofPolitical Philosophy,ed.SamuelFreeman(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2007);Joshua Cohen,“TheNaturalGoodnessofHumanity,”inReclaimingtheHistoryofEthics:Essaysfor JohnRawls,ed.AndrewsReath,BarbaraHerman,andChristineKorsgaard(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),102–39;andFrederickNeuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy ofSelf-Love:Evil,Rationality,andtheDriveforRecognition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2008). 168 The Explanation of Amour-Propre inflamed,whereasunderotherpossiblesocialconditions,amour-propre wouldbehealthy. Generically,asIhavesaid,amour-propreisaconcernforhowone compares to others. Perhaps all forms of self-concern, such as concern forone’shealth,aredesiresthatone’sactualconditioncomparewellwith certainpossibleconditions,whichsomeone,oneselforanother,mightenjoy. Butamour-propreisa“comparative”desire,whereasthedesireforhealth is“absolute,”inthestrictersensethatitisadesirethatone’sactualcondi- tioncomparewellwiththeactualconditionsofothers. In commentary, amour-propre is often described, more specifi- cally,asadesiretobeevaluatedbyothersashavingacertainvalueincompari- sonwithothers.7SometimesRousseaudoesdescribeitthisway.But,atother times,hedescribesamour-propreonlyasadesiretohave acertainvalue incomparisonwithothers,ratherthanadesiretobeevaluatedinacertain way in comparison with others (E 235, 243, 296; RJJ 175/OC 4.523–24, 534–35,608;OC1.886).Ofcourse,itispossiblethatthesedescriptionsare elliptical;Rousseaujustomitsthe“intheeyesofothers”thatheintends tofollow“tohavevaluerelativetoothers.”Butitisalsopossiblethat,by ‘amour-propre’,Rousseaumeansbothformsofconcernforhowonecom- pares to others: concern for others’ appraisals of one’s value relative to othersandconcernforone’svalue relativetoothers(regardlessoftheir appraisals of it).8 I will work with this second understanding of amour- propre: Genericamour-propre:Adesiretohave,andtobeevaluatedbyothersashav- ing,acertainvalueincomparisonwithothers. Thereisatleastamethodologicalreasonforthis.Ifwecanexplainthethe- sisofpossiblegoodnessonthesecondunderstanding,thenwewillhave alsoexplainedthethesisofpossiblegoodnessontheformerone.Thecon- verse,bycontrast,isnotobviouslytrue. Despite other differences, Dent and those who follow his lead (myselfamongthem)agreethat,whateverelsemaybetrueofinflamed amour-propre,it entails aconcern to compare as morally superior tooth- ers, whereas, whatever else may be true of healthy amour-propre, it is incompatiblewithaconcerntocompareasmorallysuperiortoothersand 7. See,inparticular,Neuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy,chap.1,and“Rousseauonthe Relation between Reason and Self-Love (Amour propre),” Internationales Jahrbuch des DeutschenIdealismus1(2003):221–39. 8. LaurenceD.Cooper,Rousseau,Nature,andtheProblemoftheGoodLife(University Park:PennStateUniversityPress,1999),137–50,alsoquestionswhetheramour-propreis alwaysadesireforevaluation. 169 NIKO KOLODNY insteadentailsaconcerntocompareasamoralequal toothers.9By“moral equality/superiority,”Imean“equality/superiorityofbasicworthorstand- ing”or“equal/superiorentitlementtorespect.”Itmayhelptothinkofitin thisway:Mostmoderntheoriesofmoralityclaimthatthereisakindof worthorclaimtorespectthatallhuman,orrational,orsentientbeings possessequallyandunconditionally,whetherornotsomemeritmoredis- approvalfortheirvices,moreblamefortheirmisdeeds,orlessesteemfor their traits or achievements that have no direct connection to morality, suchastheirbeauty,skill,orintelligence.Forourpurposes,“basicworthor standing”and“entitlementtorespect”isthisbutviewedinabstractionfrom theclaimsofequality,unconditionality,andindependencefromvariable attributesofthesekinds.Ifonehastroubleeffectingthisabstraction,it mayhelptothinkofhowthingsareviewedbytheoriesofnaturalslavery, orcastesystems,whereslavesoroutcastes,invirtueofvariableattributes, areaccordedless,orno,basicstandingorrespect. So,onourunderstanding,wehave: Healthyamour-propre:Adesiretohave,andtobeevaluatedbyallothersas having,acertainvalueincomparisonwithallothers,includingatleast moralequality; and: Inflamedamour-propre:Adesiretohave,andtobeevaluatedbyallothersas having,acertainvalueincomparisonwithallothers,includingatleastever greatermoralsuperiority. 9. Neuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy,chap.2,argues,andIagree,thathealthyamour- propreiscompatiblewith,andevenentails,adesireforother kindsofsuperiority.See sec.7below.Evenso,ImaybetakingsomeriskofreadingKantianassumptionsbackinto Rousseau.WhatseemsclearisthatRousseauholdsthatreasonandfreedomaredistinc- tiveofhumanity(2D141/OC3.141–42;SC53/OC3.364),thathumanbeingsarenatu- rallyequalalongsomeimportantdimension(howevernaturallyunequaltheymaybein otherrespects)(E41/OC4.251),thatnaturalequalityshouldplayacentralroleinour moralresponsestooneanother(E222–23/OC4.504–5),andthatamour-propreinvolves adesireforrespect,whateverotherkindsofevaluationitcraves.2D166/OC3.170.How- ever,itisconsistentwiththesefixedpointsthat,forexample,themorallyrelevantnatural equalitymightbeequalitynotofreasonandfreedom(asIclaiminsec.7.1)butofneed, thatthismightbeabasisnotforrespectbutinsteadforcompassion,andthatthebasis forrespectmightinsteadbeunequalnaturalvirtue.Itmayalsobethatmanyoftheevils ofinflamedamour-proprecouldbeavoidedwithoutanypositiverecognitionofequality. Muchimprovementwouldcomesimplyfromrefocusinghumanstrivingonthedevelop- mentofnaturalvirtues,assec.7indicates.IamindebtedtoDavidOwensforpressingme onthesepoints. 170 The Explanation of Amour-Propre Severalfeaturesareworthyofnote.First,amour-propre,inbothofthese formsatleast,isgeneral:thedesireistobeequalorsuperiortoallothers andtobeevaluatedassuchbyallothers.Second,undercurrentcondi- tions,inflamedamour-propreispervasive.Inparticular,itdoesn’tsimply afflictthehighbornortherich.10Third,inflamedamour-proprecannot besatisfied.Onereasonforthisisthatothers,whethertheiramour-propre ishealthyorinflamed,willnotbecontenttoevaluateone,ortoallowone tobeevaluatedbyothers,assuperiortothemselves(E213–14;RJJ113/OC 4.493,OC1.806).However,thetenorofRousseau’sdiscussionseemsto suggestthatinflamedamour-propreis,moreover,adesireforevergreater superiority.Beingsimplysomewhatbetterthanotherswillscarcelysatisfy it.Inflamedamour-propreinstillsinusanaversionfor“everythingthatby beingsomethingpreventsusfrombeingeverything”(RJJ112/OC1.806). Sounderstood,inflamedamour-propreisnotonlyunsatisfiableinpractice butalsoinsatiableinprinciple.11 Fourth, inflamed amour-propre expresses itself in Competition for SocialAdvantage:unremitting,zero-sumcompetitionforgreatersocialvalue thanothers,where socialvalueismeasuredby socialgoods.Socialgoods existonlyby“convention”and“consent”:onlybecauseoftheattitudesof others.Socialgoodsincludeproperty,politicalpower(powertogetothers todoone’sbidding),socialclass,fame,andsoon.Some(butperhapsnot all)ofthesegoods,suchassocialclass,are“positional,”inthesensethat theirvalueisdeterminedbytheirrankingrelativetoalternatives.12With respecttothesegoods,theresimplyisnodistinctionbetweensocialvalue andsocialadvantage. Fifth,inflamedamour-propreisatleastassociatedwith(although it may not consist in) a disposition to vices of pride—petulance, imperi- ous rage—and vices of shame—obsequiousness, servility. These are best 10. See,forexample,Rousseau’sdescriptionof“theCitizen,”theUriahHeepofmod- estrankandmeans,who“courtsthegreatwhomhehates,andtherichwhomhedespises.” 2D187/OC3.192.SeealsoDent,Rousseau:AnIntroduction,60;andDent,Rousseau,55. 11. Thismayseemtobecontradictedontheverynextpagebytheexampleofthe deluded“foolsconsumedbyamour-propre”who“sincetheythinkthemselvessecurelyin firstplace,theyarealwaysverycontentwiththeirlot.”RJJ113/OC1.807.Inthecontext, however,“contentwiththeirlot”seemstomean“notjealousofothers.”Theabsenceofjeal- ousyiscompatiblewiththeinsatiabilityofamour-propre.Onecandesireevergreatersupe- riorityoverothers,whilenotpreferringtheconditionofanyothertoone’sown,because onebelievesthateverysuchconditionisinferior. 12. Thenotionofa“positionalgood”comesfromFredHirsch,SocialLimitstoGrowth (London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul,1976). 171 NIKO KOLODNY understoodasdistortionsofthehealthytendencytoobject,ortostandup foroneself,whenonehasnotbeenevaluatedasamoralequal.Thevicesof prideconsistinbelievingoneselfsuperiorandobjecting,evenwhenoth- ershaveevaluatedoneasanequal,becausetheyhavenotevaluatedone assuperior.Thevicesofshameconsistinbelievingoneselfinferiorandso failingtoobjectwhenothershavenotevaluatedoneasanequal.Itmight atfirstseemthatvicesofshamenotonlyarenotassociatedwithbutalso areincompatiblewithinflamedamour-propre.Butthisisnotso.Evenif oneseesitasone’sduetobeevaluatedasinferior,onemaystillcraveto beevaluatedassuperior.13Thevicesofprideandshame,unlikeinflamed amour-propre,arenotpervasive(somewillhavevicesofpride,othersvices ofshame),orgeneral(thedemandisnotthatonebeevaluatedassuperior toeveryoneelsebutthatonebeevaluatedassuperiortothosetowhomone believesoneissuperior),or,ingeneral,insatiable(evaluatingsomeoneat thepricethathebelieveshehassuffices). Sixth, inflamed amour-propre leaves us vicious, by any common- sense measure. We refuse to accept moral equality or to moderate our claimsaccordingly.Wearegiventothehostileordebasingvicesofpride andshame.Andwearelockedinzero-sumCompetitionforSocialAdvan- tage, where our gain must be another’s loss and another’s gain must be our loss. We are thus inclined to be uncharitable, deceitful, and so on.Seventh,itleavesusmiserablebecauseitsaddlesuswithbothdesires forevaluationthatwecanneversatisfyanddesiresforsocialgoodsthat have no real worth and are divorced from the true sources of pleasure. Eighth, inflamed amour-propre leaves one unfree, no matter how high one’s station. Even if one ostensibly commands others, one still craves something—evaluation—thatonlyotherscanprovide.Onemustseekto beanddowhateverelicitsfavorableevaluationsfromothers(E244/OC 4.536).Finally,insofarasweareafflictedwithinflamedamour-propre,we 13. Althoughlessoftendiscussed—itseems,forexample,toescapetheotherwisethor- oughcataloginNeuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy,chap.3—thisaspectofthepsychologyof inflamedamour-propreisarecurringideainRousseau.Forsomeexceptions,seeDent, Rousseau:AnIntroduction,18,26,57;andRawls,Lectures,204.Thedisfavoredinthesecond Discoursefeelnotonly“envy”towardthefavored—adesiretoenjoywhattheyenjoy—but also“shame”beforethem—asensethattheyaresomehowappropriatelydisfavored.2D 166/OC3.170.“Somuchcontemptdebasesthem.Theybecomecowardly,fearful,and fawningandfallasfarbelowthemselvesastheyhadpreviouslybeenraisedabovethem- selves.”E88/OC4.315.“Whatisvilerthananimpoverishedrichmanwho,remembering thecontemptowedtopoverty,feelshimselftohavebecomethelowestofmen?”E194/OC 4.468. 172 The Explanation of Amour-Propre arealienated.Inawaythatwillbetouchedonagainbelow,weareestranged fromourtruenatureandsourceofvalue. 2.BasicDesires Rousseau tells us that which form someone’s amour-propre will take dependson:“whatpositionhewillfeelhehasamongmen,andwhatkinds ofobstacleshemaybelievehehastoovercometoreachthepositionhe wants to occupy” (E 235, see also 243/OC 4.523–24, 534–35). This sug- geststhefollowingexplanatoryschema.Currentconditionsleadtocer- tain beliefs about “position” and “obstacles.” Those beliefs, interacting withcertainmorebasicdesires,produceinflamedamour-propreasakind ofderiveddesire.Otherconditionswouldleadtodifferentbeliefs.These differentbeliefs,interactingwiththesamedesires,wouldproducehealthy amour-propreasakindofderiveddesire. Thequestionisthenwhatthesemorebasicdesiresandbeliefsare. Let’sstartwithaprovisionalviewoftherelevantdesires.Theymustbe,or ariseoutof,amourdesoi,thedesirefromwhichRousseausaysthatamour- proprearises(E92,212–13/OC4.322,491).Amourdesoiisagenericcon- cernforoneself,whichneednotinvolveexclusively,orindeedatall,acon- cerneitherforhowonecompareswithothersorforhowothersevaluate one.Itisatleastadesiretosurvive,althoughsomesuggestthatitisadesire tofarewellmorebroadly.14 Preservative Amour de Soi: The desire, not necessarily self-conscious, for one’sownwell-being. In its prereflective form, Preservative Amour de Soi is simply an instinctive desireforcertainthingsthatinfacttendtopromoteone’swell-being.With reflection,however,comesaconceptionofone’swell-beingandwhatpro- motesit.Initsreflectiveform,PreservativeAmourdeSoiisadesireforwhat onebelievesservesone’swell-being. Even in its reflective form, Preservative Amour de Soi need not involveanyconcernfor,orevenawarenessof,others’evaluationsofone. Withafurtherstageofreflection,however,oneacquiresthisawareness. Onelearnsthatthereisafurther“dimension,”sotospeak,inwhichthings can fare better or worse: not only in nature but also in the eyes of others. 14. See,forexample,Neuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy,30n.3. 173 NIKO KOLODNY One’sconcerntofarewellinnature“extends,”insomesense,15tothisnew interpersonaldimension.Theresultisthe: ConcernforEvaluation:Thedesirethatothersevaluateoneinaparticular way(whichwillneedtobefurtherspecified). 15. Inwhatsense?ItisnotasthoughPreservativeAmourdeSoi,togetherwithsomesuit- ableinstrumentalorconstitutivebelief,producestheConcernforEvaluationasaderived instrumentalorconstitutivedesire.Faringwellintheeyesofothersisnotconstitutiveoffar- ingwellinnature.Andeveniffaringwellintheeyesofothersissometimesinstrumental tofaringwellinnature(because,forexample,ifothersholdoneinhighesteem,theymay bemorereadytogiveonematerialaid),ourconcerntofarewellintheeyesofothersis notpurelyinstrumental.Whatthenistheexplanatoryconnectionbetweenourconcern tofarewellinnatureandourconcerntofarewellintheeyesofothers?Itisaninstanceofa neglectedphenomenon,Ithink,inwhichthefittingresponsetosomethingissimilarto— or“resonates”with—thefittingresponsetoitscounterpartinanotherdimensionofimpor- tance,whilereflectingthedistinctiveandirreducibleimportanceoftheparticulardimen- siontowhichitbelongs.Forexample,ourconcernforourpersonalprojects—forexam- ple,ourparticulareffortstocontributetoknowledge—resonateswithourappreciationof thebroadervalues—suchas,knowledgeitself—thattheypromoteorhonor.Wecareabout ourowneffortstocontributetoknowledgeonlyinsofaraswethinkthatknowledgeitselfissome- thingtobecaredaboutbyanyone.Nevertheless,wedonotcareaboutourcontributions toknowledgemerelyasmeansto,orconstituentsof,knowledgeitself.Instead,ourcon- cernforourowncontributionsreflectsthedistinctiveimportanceoftheirbeingours,an importancethatresonateswith,butcannotbereducedto,theimportanceofknowledge foranyone.Wedonotseeourselves,forexample,ashavingpreciselythesamereasonsto further,orcareaboutthesuccessof,others’effortstocontributetoknowledgeaswehave tofurther,orcareaboutthesuccessof,ourownefforts.Similarly,wedonotcareaboutfar- ingwellintheeyesofothersmerelyasameansto,orconstituentof,faringwellinnature. Instead,ourconcerntofarewellintheeyesofothersreflectsthedistinctiveimportanceto usofhowothermindsregardus,animportancethatresonateswith,althoughitcannotbe reducedto,theimportanceofwhatmerelyhappenstous.Forfurtherdiscussion,seemy “WhichRelationshipsJustifyPartiality?TheCaseofParentsandChildren,”Philosophyand PublicAffairs(forthcoming),and“WhichRelationshipsJustifyPartiality?GeneralConsid- erationsandProblemCases,”inPartialityandImpartiality:Morality,SpecialRelationshipsand theWiderWorld,ed.BrianFelthamandJohnCottingham(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, forthcoming). Itisafurtherquestionwhattriggersthis“extension”:whatcausesittooccur,when itdoes,intheindividualorthespecies?Theanswer,Ithink,issimplytheacquisition,bythe individualorthespecies,ofthecognitiveresourcestobeawareofbeingevaluated.Once thisawarenessisinplace,one’sconcerntofarewellinnaturenaturallyextendstothisnew dimension,howonefaresintheeyesofothers.Or,inmyterms:assoonasoneiscapable ofattitudestowardhowonefaresintheeyesofothers,onewillhaveattitudesthatresonate withone’sattitudestowardhowonefaresinnature.This“extension”maynomorecallfor furtherexplanationthandoesthe“extension”ofdesiretoanewobjectintheinstrumental case:forexample,thefactthat,onceonebecomesawarethatbearsaredangerous,one’s concerntofarewellinnaturenaturallyproducesaderiveddesiretoavoidbears. Neuhouser,Rousseau’sTheodicy,140–49,offersamoreelaborateexplanation,inter- estinginitsownright,whichhingesontheinfant’sneedfortheloveofacaregiver.This 174

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