THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE ROYAL NAVY 1918-1939. Volume 1 of 2.

416 Pages·2013·14.9 MB·English

TO THE NADIR AND BACK: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
ROYAL NAVY 1918-1939.

Volume 1 of 2.

Submitted by Michael Atholl FARQUHARSON-ROBERTS MA(Lond) MB BS
FRCS (Eng) to the University of Exeter for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Maritime History October 2012.

This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright
material and that no quotation may be published without proper
acknowledgement.

I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for
the award of a degree by this or any other University

Signed:

1
This thesis is dedicated to Miss Macaulay, an inspirational
teacher and head of history at Dorking County Grammar
School. When I gave up the study of history to pursue a
medical career, she told me that she ‘could have made a
historian’ of me.

I could not have completed this thesis without the help, direction and guidance of my
supervisor, Dr Michael Duffy and my tutor Dr Maria Fusaro. Dr Duffy in particular has
always had a very gentle, but firm hand on the tiller; he has been a truly outstanding
pilot and helmsman. I am also extremely grateful for the assistance of Dr Trevor Preist,
Dr Alan Wall and Dr Shaun Kilminster for specialist advice on physics, navigation and
statistics respectively.

I also thank for their unstinting support and assistance the various and many librarians I
have consulted. In particular, Miss Jenny Wraight and the other staff of the Admiralty
Historical Branch and Library, but also all the staff at the National Archive; between
them they epitomise what public service should be. Other libraries I have consulted less,
but they have been equally helpful, including the Exeter University library, the Bodleian
library, the library of the House of Lords, those of the Royal College of Defence
Studies, of the Royal United Services Institute, of Britannia Royal Naval College, of the
Institute of Naval Medicine, of the National Army Museum and of the Naval and
Military Club. Lastly, without the then Second Sea Lord, Vice Admiral Sir Adrian
Johns granting access to personnel records and the support of his staff and that of the
records holders at the TNT depot at Swadlincote, this thesis could not have even started.

Finally, and by no means least, this thesis could not have been undertaken without the
long suffering support of my wife, Jeannie. She married me for better or for worse, and
during the writing of this thesis has had to put up with me for lunch rather more often
than she had bargained for when she married a naval orthopaedic surgeon.
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ABSTRACT

The Royal Navy, and especially its leadership, is perceived to have performed poorly in
the First World War and its officers have been described as being automatons who only
came alive when directed by superiors. By contrast in the Second World War the Royal
Navy and its officers are seen as having ‘done well,’ displaying both flair and initiative.
There does not appear to have been any attempts made to look in any detail at what, if
anything, changed in the twenty years between the wars to explain the perceived
improvement. This thesis critically examines the executive branch of the Royal Navy,
and contends that the navy continually adapted and modified the training of its officers
to meet whatever was required of them; when they were required to passively obey
orders as in the Grand Fleet of the First World War, they had been trained for that
eventuality, when to show initiative likewise.

During the 1920s the officer corps was mismanaged and morale and motivation
suffered badly. The influence of the Admiralty civil service, the repository of
institutional memory, which managed junior officers’ careers, was conservative and
resistant to change. Changes in training both before and after the mutiny at Invergordon
(September 1931) brought the officer corps up to date and set it on track for its
outstanding performance in the next war, in particular recognising that leadership was
not an innate class based ability, but had to be taught and developed. However, the navy
had since the latter part of the nineteenth century changed the emphasis of officer’s
career paths; specialist training was seen as the ‘route to the top’ and command was
downgraded as a necessary part of an officer’s career development. It was only during
the latter part of Second World War that having exercised command at sea was
recognised as being an important part of an officer’s experience.

The thesis also addresses the ‘RNVR myth’. that the Royal Navy was only able
to prosecute the Second World War successfully because of an influx of well educated
temporary officers and that they were the major driving force.

This thesis has been largely based on primary sources, including personnel
records which have not been studied before and have been examined in such a way as to
allow statistical analysis.
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LIST OF CONTENTS

Volume 1
Submission 1
Index 2
Abstract 3
Dedication 4
List of illustrations 5
Introduction 7
PART ONE: The Royal Naval Executive Officer 12 November 1918 37
Chapter 1: The Executive Branch Officer 39
Chapter 2: Entry, Education and Training 57
Chapter 3: Personnel management 91
PART TWO: To the Nadir and Back 103
Chapter 1: Declining to the Nadir: Admirals Wemyss, Beatty and Madden and their 105
policies regarding the officer corps.
Chapter 2: Declining to the Nadir: Admirals Wemyss, Beatty and Madden and the 137
morale of the officer corps.
Chapter 3: The Nadir and the Inflection: Admiral Field 169
Chapter 4: The Ascension: Admiral Chatfield and the improvement of the officers’ lot. 217
Chapter 5: The Ascension: Admiral Chatfield and the coming war. 235
PART THREE: The Apogee 257
Chapter 1: Admirals Backhouse and Pound. 259
Chapter 2: Conclusion: The Naval Officer on 2nd September 1939 297
Volume 2
Submission 315
Appendix A: Royal Naval officer’s rank insignia etc 319
Appendix B: Cohort Study, Ethical Approvals etc and methodology 325
Appendix C: The Branches of the Executive Branch 335
Appendix D: Illustrative Officer’s training Record and Certificates 343
Appendix E: Admiralty Fleet Order 2315/32
365
Confidential Admiralty Fleet Order 2023/32
Glossary 373
Bibliography 381
Annexes (on CD in rear pocket)
List of abbreviations used in the Annexes
Annex A: Spreadsheet of Midshipmen of 1920 seniority
Annex B: Spreadsheet of Midshipmen of 1925 seniority
Annex C: Spreadsheet of Midshipmen of 1930 seniority
Annex D: Spreadsheet of Midshipmen of 1935 seniority

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig.1 An index page and an Admiralty Fleet Order from December 1930.
Fig.2 Herzberg’s factors affecting employee motivation.
Fig.3 The three sons of the Cambell family.
Fig.4 Numbers of Royal Naval personnel up to the First World War.
Fig. 5 Instruction on a Whitehead torpedo.
Fig. 6 Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth.
Fig. 7 Frontispiece of the ‘Blue Book’ for January 1920.
Fig. 8 A portion an officers Admiralty personal record.
Fig. 9 Officers record card.
Fig. 10 An Officer’s ledger.
Fig. 11 Two pages of an officer’s ledger.
Fig. 12 Extract from a 1925 Navy list
Fig. 13 BRNC ‘Blue Book’ showing cadets ‘Admiralty numbers’.
Fig. 14 Letter from ADM 116/1734.
Fig. 15 Instructions for completing form S206.
Fig. 16 First page of a completed S206.
Fig. 17 Second page of S206 showing the end of the first section.
Fig. 18 Last page of S206.
Fig. 19 Total numbers of executive branch lieutenant commanders each September.
Fig. 20 Cartoon from the ‘Evening Standard’ 20 March 1928.
Fig. 21 Herzberg matrix at the end of the 1920s.
Fig. 22 Admiral Field, according to Roskill, ‘the most colourless First Sea Lord’ of the inter war period.
Fig. 23 Extract from an S206 transcribed onto an officers record card.
Fig. 24 Example of a ‘flimsy’.
Fig. 25 Form S206 prior to introduction of numerical marking.
Fig. 26 Post 1931 S206.
Fig. 27 Post 1931 S206.
Fig. 28 HMS Frobisher as a training cruiser.
Fig. 29 Herzberg Matrix at the end of Field’s term of office.
Fig. 30 Portion of the record card of an officer discharged to the retired list in 1935.
Fig. 31 To illustrate the degree to which RNVR officers came to predominate.
Fig. 32 Herzberg matrix on the outbreak of war.
Fig. 33 Table of cadets showing ultimate rank reached by year of passing out as cadets/entry as
midshipmen.
Fig. 34 The probability of a Dartmouth or Special Entry cadet reaching the rank of commander, captain
or flag rank.
Fig. 35 The first course at the Imperial Defence College.
Fig. 39 Army officers in combat arms relied on specialists from other corps.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS THESIS

1SL First Sea Lord
2SL Second Sea Lord
2SLPersRec Second Sea Lord’s Personnel Records
ACNS Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff
ADM Admiralty files at the national archive
AFO Admiralty Fleet Order
AMO Admiralty Monthly Order
AWO Admiralty Weekly Order
BR Book of Reference
BRNC Britannia Royal Naval College (at Dartmouth)
CAFO Confidential Admiralty Fleet Order
CB Confidential Book (of reference)
CID Committee on Imperial Defence
CNS Chief of the Naval Staff
DCNS Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff
GS General Service (unofficial abbreviation)
HMSO His Majesty’s Stationery Office
KR & AI Kings Regulations and Admiralty Instructions
NA Naval Assistant
NDA Naval Discipline Act
RNR Royal Naval Reserve
RNVR Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve
S206 Confidential report on an Officer
TBD Torpedo Boat Destroyer (archaic)
TNA The National Archive (formerly PRO)
VCNS Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

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TO THE NADIR AND BACK: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
ROYAL NAVY 1918-1939

INTRODUCTION

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The Royal Navy was a major participant in the two major wars of the twentieth century.
The First and Second World Wars were, truly, wars like no other. The increasingly
rapid technological advances of the nineteenth1 and early twentieth centuries had meant
that the Royal Navy had undergone a near total revolution, not only in material and
tactical thinking but also in its organisation and training. Its ships were outstanding and
the industrial organisations (private and public) to build and support it were world
leaders.2 For centuries naval warfare had evolved incrementally as had the demands
placed on naval officers. Now the new technologies made very different demands of
them, on how they were educated and trained, how they led and in turn, how they were
led. The developments meant that a single executive officer could no longer aspire to
know everything he needed to know about his profession, and seamanship was no
longer the only or even the major professional ability.3

There is a widespread perception in the literature that the officer corps of the
Royal Navy born of these changes did not perform ‘well’ in the First World War. This
has been ascribed in large part to the rigidity of their education and training, but,
paradoxically, it is believed that in the Second World War many of the same officers
performed exceptionally ‘well’.

The aim of this thesis is to examine how the Royal Navy managed its officers
between the two wars - barely twenty years apart - to ascertain what contributed to this
perceived change in their performance. Because the relevant literature is sparse and in
part erroneous, it cannot do so without looking back to how the officers had been
inducted, moulded, educated and trained. It has to address significant misperceptions in
the literature concerning the professional character of the executive branch officer,
which in turn questions the perceptions of naval officers performance in the First World
War, the genesis of their generally outstanding performance in the Second World War
and the conclusions drawn by some as to which part of the navy was actually
responsible for the perceived improvement.

The lack of understanding of how naval officers were produced and, more
importantly, the breadth of their abilities and capabilities has blinkered historians in

1 Jan S. Breemer, The Great Race: Innovation and Counter-Innovation at Sea, 1840-1890, Corbett Paper
No2 (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, 2011).
2 Ian Johnston, Brian Newman & Ian Buxton ‘Building the Grand Fleet: 1906-1916’, in John Jordan (ed.)
Warship 2012 (London: Conway, 2012) pp. 8-21.
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their understanding of the officer corps and their assessment of its performance. These
include significant and differing misperceptions as to their professional character.
Gordon in his seminal work on naval command in the First World War paints a
compelling picture of a rigid unthinking officer corps up to and including admirals, 4 in
thrall to the concept of ‘all laws are as naught beside this one,/ thou shalt not question
but obey’.5 Barnett reflected a common opinion when he wrote that:
in 1900 the officer corps of the Royal Navy displayed the characteristics of
professional inbreeding to the extent of Goyaesque fantasy. Arrogance,
punctilious ritual, ignorance of technical progress … were added to the
unchanged organisation of the eighteenth-century navy to produce a decadence
hardly matched in any force of modern time. 6

Churchill was another to make much of the supposed lack of initiative shown by
naval officers. In the context described by Gordon (the Battle of Jutland), Churchill said
that ‘[e]verything was centralized in the Flagship, and all initiative except in avoiding
torpedo attack was denied to the leaders of squadrons and divisions.’7 Churchill went
further, attributing their poor performance to poor education, ‘mere sea service’. Like
much of Churchill’s dealing with naval affairs, this conceals an amazing degree of
ignorance of naval matters, but is, typically, beautifully written.

Navies are by their very nature extremely hierarchical and discipline is rigid,
because it has to be, ‘things happen too quickly at sea to allow time for long and
detailed instructions. Orders must be short and snappy, and they must be instantly and
exactly obeyed’.8 Discipline at sea rests on that very basis and often there can be no
room for individuality or initiative.9 Barnett described the resulting officer as ‘an

3 Michael Howard, War in European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) p. 127.
4 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London: John Murray,
1996).
5 Which is actually a telling misquotation, perpetuated to this day in engravings of the poem found on
many Royal Naval officers’ office walls. In the original it is ‘Thou shalt not criticize but obey!’,
somewhat less of an injunction to unthinking obedience, see Ronald A. Hopwood, The Old Way and
Other Poems (London: John Murray, 1916) p. 20.
6 Corelli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War, (London:
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963) p. 185.
7 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918, (London: Penguin Classics, 2007) p. 620.
8 BR 827 A Seaman’s Pocket-Book, (London: HMSO, June 1943) p. 4.
9 By way of illustration, a twin fifteen inch BL Mark 1 magazine/shell room/barbette/turret in service
(latterly as the Mark 1* and Mark 1 N) in both wars was manned by 64 men. Each man had particular
duties and actions to be carried out in a particular and specific sequence, thirty seven to load and fire,
seven further after firing. If these were not carried out in the correct sequence, each gun could not and did
not fire continuously. This required discipline, obedience and teamwork of the highest order. See Ian
Buxton Big Gun Monitors: The History of the Design, Construction and Operation of the Royal Navy’s
Monitors (Tynemouth: World Ship Society and Trident Books, 1978) p.173; Peter Hodges The Big Gun:
Battleship Main Armament 1860-1945 (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1981) pp. 133-4; John
Campbell Naval Weapons of World War Two (London: Conway Maritime, 1985) pp.25-8.
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