The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

478 Pages·1983·42.066 MB·English

by  Lawrence Freedman (auth.)

THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Published inassociation with the InternationalInstitutefor Strategic
Studies
Studies inInternationalSecurity
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Adam Roberts:NATIONS IN ARMS:The Theory and Practiceof
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Robert Thompson: DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY:
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InternationalInstitutefor Strategic Studies conferencepapers
Christoph Bertram: NEW CONVENTIONALWEAPONS AND
(editor) EAST-WEST SECURITY
PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE
1980s
THE FUTUREOF STRATEGIC
DETERRENCE
THIRD-WORLD CONFLICTAND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s
THE EVOLUTION OF
NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Lawrence Freedman
M
MACMILLAN
©The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981, 1983
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
First edition 1981
Reprinted 1982 (twice), 1983
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 978-0-333-34564-1 ISBN 978-1-349-06608-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-06608-7
Contents
Page
Acknowledgments Xl
Introduction Xlll
SECTION 1 FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS 1
1 The Arrival of the Bomb 3
The transformation ofwar 3
Strategic bombardment 4
The political scienceof airpower 6
The experienceofWorld War II 10
Retaliation and the 'V' weapons 12
The atom bomb 14
The strategy of Hiroshima 16
2 Offenceand Defence 22
The persistence ofthe doctrine ofstrategic bombardment 22
The new strategic environment 24
The possibility ofdefence 30
3 Aggressionand Retaliation 34
The vital first blow 34
The atom bomb and aggressors 36
Early thoughts on deterrence 40
v
vi CONTENTS
SECTION 2 TOWARDS A POLICY OF
DETERRENCE 45
4 Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly 47
Atom bombs and the American wayofwar 47
The limits of the bomb 48
First or last resort 51
The bomb enters war plans 53
Atom bombs and the Soviet way ofwar 56
The Permanently Operating Factors 58
5 Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate 63
The Soviet bomb 63
The 'super' bomb 65
Tactical nuclear weapons 68
NSC-68 69
Korea 71
The conventional strategy 72
6 Massive Retaliation 76
The British conversion 78
The New Look 81
Dulles and massive retaliation 84
The spirit of the offence 89
SECTION 3 LIMITED WAR 91
7 Limited Objectives 93
Consensus on a nuclear strategy 93
The concept of limited war 97
Limited objectives 102
8 Limited Means 106
Limited nuclear war 106
The Soviet view 110
Graduated deterrence 112
On strategy and tactics 117
SECTION 4 THE FEAR OF SURPRISE
ATTACK 121
9 The Importance of BeingFirst 123
On winning nuclear wars 123
CONTENTS vii
Prevention or pre-emption 125
The virtues ofcounter-force 127
The blunting mission 130
Preparing for war 132
A sense of vulnerability 134
The delicacy of the balance 137
10 Sputniks and the Soviet Threat 139
The impact of Sputnik 139
First strikes for whom? 140
Soviet strategy after Stalin 145
The logicof pre-emption 147
Conclusion 152
11 The Technological Arms Race 155
The Killian Report 158
The Gaither Report 160
Mutual fears of surprise attack 163
Technology and stability 165
SECTION 5 THE STRATEGY OF STABLE
CONFLICT 173
12 The Formal Strategists 175
Military problems and the scientificmethod 177
Game theory 182
Prisoner's dilemma and chicken 185
13 Arms Control 190
The strategy of stable conflict 191
Disarmament to arms control 195
The disarmers disarmed 199
14 Bargaining and Escalation 208
Bargaining 208
Escalation 210
Tactics in escalation 211
Escalation dominance 215
The threat that leavessomething to chance 219
viii CONTENTS
SECfION 6 FROM COUNTER-FORCE TO
ASSURED DESTRUCfION 225
15 City-avoidance 227
McNamara's band 228
A strategy of multiple options 232
City-avoidance 234
Retreat from city-avoidance 239
16 Assured Destruction 245
Assured destruction 246
Mutual assured destruction 247
Dissillusion with defence 249
The action-reaction phenomenon 254
17 The Soviet Approach to Deterrence 257
The strategic learning curve 257
Guidelines for stability 259
A 'second-best deterrent' 261
The American challenge 264
The Brezhnev years 269
18 The Chinese Connection 273
The-People'sWar 274
.Atorn bombs as paper tigers 276
SECfION 7 THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION 283
19 A Conventional Defence for Europe 285
Theories ofconventional war 287
European attitudes 293
Towards a conventional balance 296
Conclusion 301
20 The European Nuclear Option:
(i)Anglo-Saxon Views 303
NATO and the Nth problem 304
The British nuclear force 307
21 The European Nuclear Option:
(ii) French and German Views 313
Gallois 314
CONTENTS IX
Beaufre 318
De Gaulle 320
German strategy 324
The multilateral force (MLF) 327
Conclusion 329
SECTION 8 RETREAT FROM ASSURED
DESTRUCTION 331
22 Military-Industrial Complexities 333
The McNamara legacy 335
The military-industrial complex 337
Force planning under Nixon 340
23 The Consensus Undermined 344
The Soviet build-up 345
The action-inaction phenomenon 347
The shame of assured destruction 348
New technologies 351
Arms control 354
24 Parity 359
Calm over Parity 360
Concern over superiority 364
Perceptions 367
Measuring the balance 369
25 Selective Options 372
Ifdeterrence should 'fail' 372
The search for options 375
'The Schlesinger doctrine' 377
Options for a European war 383
ICBM vulnerability 387
The political science of nuclear strategy 392
26 Conclusion 396
Notes 401
Bibliography 441
Subject Index 461
Name Index 468