The European Union´s Foreign, Security and Defence Policies and Austria´s Ambitions

32 Pages·0.382 MB·English

by  Wijk Rob de.

Rob de Wijk

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The European Union´s h
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Foreign, Security and
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Defence Policies and
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Austria´s Ambitions r
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Wien, im Büro für
März 2004 Sicherheitspolitik
Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk ist Direktor des Clingendael Institute for International Relations in
Den Haag, Professor für Internationale Beziehungen an der Königlich Niederländischen Mili-
tärakademie in Breda [1999] und Professor für Strategische Studien an der Universität Leiden
[2000]. Weiters ist er Mitglied im Nationalen Verteidigungs- und Forschungsrat in den Nie-
derlanden sowie am Institut für angewandte Wissenschaftsforschung tätig.
Diese Studie wurde am Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies verfasst.

Impressum
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Redaktion: Mag. Walter Matyas, Doris Washiedl
Korrektorat: Doris Washiedl, Melitta Strouhal
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Inhaltsverzeichnis
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction _______________________________________________________________________________ 3
The Development of CFSP and ESDP_________________________________________________________ 4
The Geopolitical Changes ____________________________________________________________________ 4
Hard-liners Prevail__________________________________________________________________________ 6
Balancing of Dominant American Power _______________________________________________________ 8
Revitalisation of the CFSP ____________________________________________________________________ 9
The Composition of the EURRF ______________________________________________________________ 12
An Expeditionary Force for the EU?___________________________________________________________ 14
The New Requirements: Towards Expeditionary Capabilities? ___________________________________ 17
Austria and the EURRF_____________________________________________________________________ 18
A Conceptual Approach ____________________________________________________________________ 18
The Security Environment___________________________________________________________________ 18
Political Ambitions_________________________________________________________________________ 20
The Operational Context ____________________________________________________________________ 24
Austria’s Present Capabilities________________________________________________________________ 24
The New Requirements: Homeland Security___________________________________________________ 25
The New Requirements: Expeditionary Operations _____________________________________________ 25
Conscription_______________________________________________________________________________ 26
Co-operability _____________________________________________________________________________ 26
Towards a Balanced Force Structure __________________________________________________________ 27
The Route to Transformation ________________________________________________________________ 28
Annex 1 __________________________________________________________________________________ 30
Current Capabilities________________________________________________________________________ 30
Annex 2 __________________________________________________________________________________ 31
Capability Commitment Conference (CCC)____________________________________________________ 31
Austrian Commitments_____________________________________________________________________ 31
European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)______________________________________________________ 32

Introduction declaration of the war on terror, and the Iraq crisis
of early 2003. This new strategic reality requires
As a result of the geopolitical changes of the 1990s,
the European Union not only to strike a new
the United States’ strategic focus is no longer
transatlantic bargain, but to renew its attempts to
Europe. This conclusion is reinforced by the
develop a credible Common Foreign and Security
events of 11 September 2001, the subsequent
Policy (CFSP) including a European Security and

3
Defence Policy (ESDP). Consequently, it is ex- This report must be considered as an attempt to
pected that the debate on how to develop the provide a broad, conceptual approach to Austria’s
Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (EURFF) into a armed forces, as an input both for the internal and
credible force for peace support and combat op- external debate of Austria’s future armed forces.
erations will remain high on the agenda. More-
If there is agreement on the conceptual basis
over, after the ratification of the Union’s
for force transformation, a more detailed discus-
"Constitution" and the publication of its Defence
sion is needed to answer the following questions:
White Book and Strategic Concept this develop-
ment could even get a new push. • The size and composition of Austria’s home-
land defence forces;
This project defines Austria’s role in this proc-
• The size and composition of Austria’s forces
ess and the consequences for the structure of its
for deployment abroad;
armed forces. The first part of this report deals
• Interoperability requirements;
with the development of the CFSP and its ESDP. It
• Doctrinal requirements.
will conclude with Austria’s role and place in it.
Such discussion could be supported and "objec-
Part two deals with the possible future contribu-
tively validated" through qualitative and quantita-
tion of Austria’s armed forces. In this part the
tive analyses.
following issues will be dealt with:
• What kind of contribution to CFSP/ESDP
The Development of CFSP and ESDP
could be expected from a country with the
standing of Austria, which is a highly devel-
oped, industrialized democracy with interests The Geopolitical Changes
beyond its own borders? How does one define The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet
the level of political ambition? Union had important implications for transatlan-
• Should Austria, given the size of its defence tic relations. During the Cold War European allies
budget limit itself to specific contributions to had grown accustomed to American engagement.
international coalitions? If so, should Austria However, this engagement was forced upon the
focus on niche capabilities or should it con- Americans by the Cold War, which was an excep-
tribute with general-purpose forces? tional period in history when America’s interests
• European forces are being transformed into in Europe were being threatened. After the Cold
expeditionary armed forces making use of War America’s interests were more likely to be at
Network Centric Warfare. What are the conse- stake in the Far East (the Koreas and Taiwan),
quences for the structure and the required ca- Central Asia (the oil-rich Caspian Sea region), the
pabilities for Austria’s armed forces? What are oil-rich Persian Gulf Region (Iraq and Iran), the
the basic building blocks of such a force? Middle East (Israel and Palestine) and Central and
• Is there a balance between forces for conven- South America (the war on drugs in Colombia). It
tional and unconventional military operations? is only logical that the United States refocused its
Is it possible to use the same forces for both attention to these regions. Moreover, as Europe no
types of operation? longer is America’s number one security preoccu-
• How does the debate on homeland security pation, the transatlantic security relationship will
affect the debate on force structuring and force change. Now that Europe is not threatened and
capabilities? the EU is economically an equal partner, the
• How do the conclusions of this report relate to United States expects Europe to take care of its
present commitments to the European Union? own backyard. In addition, the Americans expect
• What are the overall recommendations to be European support if their interests are threatened.
drawn from our analyses? For the Europeans this requires a change from

4
security consumer to security provider, for which rorism and at present it is considered to be the
they are mentally, organizationally and militarily only threat to European societies. Over the last
not equipped. decades Europeans have endured many incidents
of terrorism, from the IRA in Northern Ireland to
Due to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s
the Bader-Meinhof Group in Germany and from
and response to the events of the early 21st century
the Red Brigades in Italy to the ETA in Spain.
some fundamental differences have become visi-
Moreover, European governments are familiar
ble between the United States and its traditional
with rogue states, for example, in 1986 Libya fired
European allies, with the exception of the United
a missile at Lampedusa, an uninhabited Italian
Kingdom.
island. This was the only direct attack on NATO
territory in the existence of the Alliance, but it did
First, there are considerable transatlantic dif-
not result in a European call for missile defences.
ferences in threat perception. On the one hand, the
In Europe the security risks of WMD and missiles
measures taken in 1998 and 1999 expressed a
are simply not perceived as substantial enough to
growing American fear of the consequences of
justify the spending of taxpayers’ money. Many
missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
European policymakers consider the NMD-
proliferation and the threat of catastrophic terror-
project (now known as Ground Based Midcourse
ism. This fear led to a feeling of vulnerability, as a
Defence) as a disproportionate measure against a
result of which the freedom to act in foreign policy
distant threat.
would be limited and its hegemonic position
would be encroached upon. War against the
Second, there are transatlantic differences of
United States was unlikely in the past and will be
opinion about how security could be provided.
unlikely in the future, but United States territory
European governments do not underestimate the
is by no means safe. WMD, their means of deliv-
threats of wars, terrorism, and rogue states, they
ery and terrorism are the only instruments avail-
are simply used to managing complex security
able to the weak. Enemies will not confront the
situations. The problem of terror is managed
United States head-on, because they are no match
through a combination of practical measures and
to its army, navy, air force and marines.
political means. For example, Irish separatism was
dealt with by the British armed forces by fighting
They will exploit the inherent weaknesses and
militant IRA members and by political dialogue
vulnerabilities of its open, liberal, democratic and
with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA.
industrialised society through asymmetrical forms
European security management aimed at prevent-
of warfare, most notably terrorist attacks on
ing wars has traditionally been done through
American soil but also against its interests abroad.
engagement, i.e. regimes and treaties. The empha-
Thus, for the US, terrorism and missiles are very
sis on multilateralism and loss of sovereignty go
real threats, although over the last decades only a
hand in hand. As a result of European integration
small portion of the total terror-related casualties
Europeans have been steadily giving up powers
were Americans.1
to Brussels. Americans do not see any source of
On the other hand, Europeans have learned to democratic legitimacy higher than the constitu-
live with a complex security situation. Through- tional nation state.
out its history Europe experienced numerous and
This supports the view of Robert Kagan, who
disastrous wars as an essential element of a con-
argued that the Europeans believe that a peaceful
tinuous process of nation-building. Apart from all
world is one governed by law, norms, and inter-
this, Europeans are also not unfamiliar with ter-
national agreements. In this world, power politics

have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast,
1 A. K. Cronin, "Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy believe power-politics is needed to deal with Iraq,
in the Age of Terrorism”, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer
2002, p. 124.

5
Al Qaeda and other malign forces. Kagan argues is a specific threat. Watershed events in American
however that the Europeans do not understand history such as the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour,
that their safety is ultimately guaranteed by the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea,
American military power.2 the blockade of Berlin, the 1962 Cuba crisis and
most recently, the September 11 attacks have had
To oversimplify, Europeans prefer interna-
a catalysing effect on American society which
tional law and norms because they are weaker
mobilised political will to act decisively. European
than the United States; the Americans turn to
policymakers, probably with the exception of the
unilateralism because the US is the only remain-
British, underestimate the effects of these events
ing superpower. Consequently, European govern-
since they tend to interpret American action as
ments seek relative security whereas Americans
"unilateralist".
seek absolute security. Generally speaking, Euro-
peans try to manage the risks and minimise the
problems whereas Americans seek military vic- Hard-liners Prevail
tory. With the inauguration of George W. Bush as
President of the United States in 2001 the differ-
Europeans put more emphasis on intent; the
ence between Europe and the US became even
United States stresses capability. Europe overem-
more visible. Already in its first six months in
phasizes economics whilst the United States over-
office the Bush Administration moved towards a
emphasizes political and military issues.
hard-line unilateralist position. It decided to de-
As a result, Europeans and Americans differ ploy NMD; abrogated the 1972 ABM Treaty;
fundamentally in the methods of dealing with rejected the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; refused to ratify
contemporary security threats. Europeans put the Rio Pact on biodiversity, opposed the ban on
emphasis on "soft security", i.e. diplomacy, sanc- landmines, withdrew from the Biological Weap-
tions and incentives such as economic aid and ons Convention ratified by the United States in
peace support operations. Americans emphasize 1975; and withdrew from the treaty on the Inter-
"hard security", i.e. limited wars of intervention to national Criminal Court (ICC) which had been
defend interests and promote regional security. Of signed by the previous President shortly before
course, the Americans got involved in diplomatic leaving office. These decisions conflicted with
efforts and peace support operations, like those in European views on the value of regimes and
the Balkans, but in most cases European allies treaties.
asked them to. America’s security situation is less
On September 20, 2001, Bush declared war on
complex because, with the exception of the Civil
terrorism during a speech to Congress. This
War, no war has taken place on its soil. By defini-
speech is considered to be the most important
tion US armed forces are expeditionary forces for
statement on grand strategy since President Tru-
deployment outside the Continental US to defend
man’s speech of March 12, 1947 when the United
its interests.
States declared to fight communism world-wide.
Third, in contrast to most European powers, After September 11 the Administration refused an
the United States needs an enemy to focus its offer from NATO to help, which had invoked
foreign and security policy. The United States has Article 5 (its collective defence clause), for the first
a problem-solving, materialistic culture and with- time in history. Bush reluctantly accepted British
out an enemy there is no problem to solve. Ameri- military aid during the war against the Taliban
can history is full of examples of its unwillingness and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Next, the American
and inability to organise its policy well until there President wanted immunity from the ICC, which

2 R. Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, no. 116,
June–July 2002.

6
had been formed on July 1, 2002, for American when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles
or secretly provide them to terrorists (…) our
For that reason, he threatened to block a UN
security will require all Americans to be forward-
mandate for the continued deployment of the
looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive
International Police Task Force in the Balkans.
action, when necessary to defend our liberty and
This not only put the entire NATO mission in the
to defend our lives”.5 Thus, a new unilateralist,
Balkans at risk, but also led to severe criticism
first strike policy of "defensive intervention" was
from America’s closest allies. In the United States
announced. Vice president Dick Cheney under-
this policy was widely supported, because the
scored the need for such a strategy during a
ICC was believed to undermine American sover-
hawkish speech delivered to war veterans on
eignty. President Bush also put the nuclear issue
August 26, 2002. He argued that pre-emption
on the agenda. He showed renewed interest in
against Iraq was necessary because "there is no
nuclear-armed missile interceptors in an NMD
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of
and low-yield nuclear ground penetrators to
mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amass-
destroy hardened underground bunkers and
ing them to use against our friends, against our
tunnel complexes because conventional means
allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that
would be less efficient. In this context the Nuclear
his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him
Posture Review of January 8, 2002 caused much
into future confrontations with his neighbours”.
unease among allies because it explicitly called for
Quoting former foreign secretary Henry Kiss-
a capability to destroy "hard and deeply buried
inger, Cheney argued that this produces "an
targets”.3
imperative for preventive action.” In addition,
"our job would be more difficult in the face of a
The real policy change came with the State of
nuclear armed Saddan Hussein”.6 This policy
the Union address on January 29, 2002. Referring
change was confirmed with the 2002 National
to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Bush stated that
Security Strategy, published in September of that
"States like these constitute an axis of evil, arming
year.
to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose
Key officials, including Vice President Dick
a grave and growing danger. They could provide
Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld,
these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to
and Richard Perle and his colleagues of the now
match their hatred. They could attack our allies or
influential Defence Policy Board at the Pentagon
attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of
support this grand strategy. Their thinking is
these cases, the price of indifference would be
clearly expressed in the Statement of Principles of
catastrophic”.4 Elaborating on the "axis of evil”
the neoconservative Project for the New American
speech, he announced a major policy shift during
Century. They gained victory over moderate
the Graduation Speech at West Point on June 1,
officials who favoured an approach based on
2002: "For much of the last century, America’s
multilateralism, such as the then Secretary of
defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deter-
Defence Colin Powell.
rence and containment (…) Deterrence –the prom-
ise of massive retaliation against nations- means Bush’ grand strategy is based on the principles
nothing against shadowy terrorists with no nation mentioned above. It is based on the firm belief
or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible

5 G.W. Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation
Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point,
3 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, New York, Washington DC, 1 June 2002.
submitted to congress on 31 December 2000, pp. 46–47. 6 D. Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans
4 G.W. Bush, The President’s State of the Union Address, of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Washington
Washington DC, 29 January 2002. DC, 26 August 2002.

7
that the United States is powerful enough to go at kindly disposed towards the West.9 Primakov
it alone if this is in its best interest. According to believed that co-operating too closely with NATO
the aforementioned Statement the United States would impede the formation of a new, multipolar
must "shape a new century favourable to Ameri- world. By means of an active dialogue with
can principles”, whilst national leadership must NATO, Russia would have to prevent, however,
accept "the United States global responsibilities”.7 that the alliance could harm its interests. The
According to the neoconservatists the strategy is decision to agree to the establishment of the Per-
aimed at maintaining America’s pre-eminence, manent Joint Council should therefore be seen in
precluding the rise of a great power, and shaping this context.
the international order in line with American
Furthermore, the special relationship between
principles and interests. Institutions, treaties and
Germany and Russia, the "strategic triangle" of
rules are merely obstacles to this grand strategy.
Russia, China and India, the "strategic partner-
The events of September 11 reinforced the argu-
ship" of Russia and China can all be explained as
ments of those favouring this grand strategy.
attempts to counterbalance the United States. The
September 11 was seen as an attack on America
CFSP and the ESDP can also be explained as
and everything it stands for and, consequently,
attempts to counterbalance American power and
America’s vital interests are at stake. Indeed, this
to come to terms with the new strategic reality.
is a very powerful motivation to go alone and to
adopt a new doctrine of "pre-emption" and "de-
So far, all attempts to counterbalance have
fensive intervention". For that reason the current
failed. Moreover, the rise of an international order
administration is reforming its defence apparatus
dominated by American power has not yet trig-
to allow the United States to project force from the
gered a global backlash and the strategic rivalry
continental US, rather than from overseas bases in
and competitive balancing among the great pow-
Europe, Asia and the Middle East and to be able
ers is actually quite limited. There are two possi-
to deal with contemporary challenges, including
ble explanations. First, balancing involves
asymmetrical warfare.8
economic, military and political costs, which
neither Russia, China or the European Union are
willing to bear. Both Russia and China lack re-
Balancing of Dominant American Power
sources, whilst the European Union is not willing
According to the Realist school of thought in
to spend more on defence to give its ESDP more
international relations coalitions, or great powers
substance. In addition, the blossoming of the
would try to counterbalance American hegemonic
relationship between Russia and the United States
power in order to achieve freedom of action.
was one of the unexpected changes resulting from
There have been some attempts to counterbalance
9/11. The Americans need the Russians for intel-
American power indeed. In the mid-1990’s, the
ligence-gathering and cooperation in other areas;
Russian minister of foreign Affairs, Yevgeny
the Russians consider the war on terrorism a
Primakov, put forward his theory of "multipolar-
unique opportunity to turn Russia into the indis-
ity". He asserted that a counterbalance to the
pensable partner for the United States and to gain
United States was necessary and he emphasised
economically.
the importance of co-operation with China, India,
Iran, Iraq, Syria and other states that were not
Second, unlike Russia or the United Kingdom,
the United States is not a traditional imperial
power trying to enlarge its territory. America’s
"imperialism" is of an ideological nature seeing as

7 Project for the New American Century, Statement of
Principles, see <newamericancentury.com>.
8 D.H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military", Foreign 9 O. Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security after
Affairs, May/June 2002, pp. 20–32. Kosovo", Survival, winter 1999–2000, p. 128.

8
the United States considers itself as the champion Many feared that European security would
of democracy and the free market economy, decouple as a result of probable American unilat-
whose values are universal and should be ex- eralism and the consequences of the increased
ported all over the world. Nevertheless, for other technological gap. EU Commissioner Chris Patten
cultures, most notably the Islamic world, this expressed this concern about American unilateral-
behaviour could be threatening. It is one of the ism explicitly in an internal paper for the Euro-
explanations that keeps the struggle between the pean Commission. He asserted that the Union has
United States and the militant representatives of the obligation to contribute to the increase of
political Islam alive. Interestingly, in the United stability, because the world is one in which the
States a debate is emerging on American imperial- United States increasingly acts without giving any
ism. Conservative Realists, like Andrew J. Bace- thought to the concerns of others.11
vich argue that the United States should go its
However, the Iraq crisis of early 2003 also
own way.10 It should not have its foreign and
demonstrated that disunity among the Europeans
security policy restricted by international law and
could undermine the integration process as well.
institutions. Rather, an "empire of freedom"
Spain, Italy and most East Europeans supported
should be established, one that is ruled by the
the United States and the United Kingdom, whilst
United States and founded on specific values and
Germany and France tried to prevent them from a
norms, such as democracy, free market economy
quick decision to go to war. Thus the Union and
and human rights. Thus a new unipolar order or
the further development of the CFSP and the
Pax Americana will be created.
ESDP are a prerequisite for political stability.
Unfortunately, the historical record of the
Revitalisation of the CFSP
CFSP, established with the Maastricht Treaty on
Nevertheless, because of the geopolitical changes
the EU (TEU) of 1992, and the incorporation of the
mentioned and the new realities of U.S. foreign
ESDP in the Amsterdam TEU of 1997 are not very
policy, the European Union has no other choice
impressive. The only significant Europe-led op-
but to strike a new transatlantic bargain, one that
eration was the WEU mine countermeasure force
is based on a strategic vision of equal partnership.
deployed in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988
If Europeans fail to do so, Europe and America
during the Iran-Iraq war. During the early 1990s
will drift apart, Europe will be marginalized and
the WEU carried out a naval operation to enforce
run the risk of becoming entangled in a security
the UN embargo against Iraq. Since 1992, the
competition among Germany, France, the United
WEU has been involved in the enforcement of the
Kingdom and possibly Italy. The first signs of this
UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia, first in the
were visible during the Iraq crisis of late 2002 and
Adriatic Sea, then along the river Danube. In 1994
early 2003.
the WEU was requested to organise a police force
In the present debate on European integration in the EU-administered city of Mostar. During the
the consequences of American unilateralism is late 1990s the Union asked WEU-support in plan-
usually overlooked or ignored. The initiatives for ning the Multinational Advisory Police Element
the ESDP have not only been the result of (MAPE) in Albania, organising a de-mining op-
Europe’s ongoing process of integration, but were eration in Croatia, and monitoring the situation in
prompted by the worry about America’s security Kosovo through imagery provided by the WEU
commitment to Europe as well. Satellite Centre.

10 Forthcoming: A.J. Bacevich, American Empire (Harvard 11 International Herald Tribune, "The EU Counterweight To
University Press). American Influence", 16 June 2000.

9
A chance to carry out more demanding opera- for autonomous action and should develop a force
tions came in 1997. Albania was on the brink of projection capability for operations in an out-of-
civil war due to the collapse of its pyramid in- area environment. The war on Kosovo showed
vestment schemes. As the WEU refrained from that the countries of the European Union are
organising a force it seemed that the organisation largely dependent on the Americans for carrying
had no real role to play in the new Europe. There out large-scale military operations.13 In practice
was evidently no political will to carry out a large- the Americans led the air campaign. They carried
scale European-led military operation in what was out 65% of all the flights and, within that figure,
considered a high-risk environment. For Dutch 80 percent of all combat missions. In addition, the
policy makers, this reinforced the belief that Americans dominated the command lines so that
NATO should take the lead in the most demand- the air campaign was chiefly carried out accord-
ing operations. ing to an American recipe. This military-
technological gap between Europe and the US has
In March the Security Council authorised Italy
promoted the decoupling of European and
to lead a 7,000-strong multinational peace force in
American security, as coalition wars with the
Albania. This clearly undermined the develop-
United States turn out to be a myth. The major
ment of the CFSP, as the "S" of security within the
reason for this gap is inefficiency in defence
CFSP remained in fact a dead letter. Not surpris-
spending. While Union member states have a
ingly, the Union was criticised by the Americans
collective gross national product similar to the US,
for being unable to deal with security risks in their
they spend only 65 % of what Washington spends
own backyard.
on its armed forces. Due to poor co-ordination
and basically Cold War force structures, Europe-
In the late 1990s Britain and France took the
ans get a disproportional low return from their
lead in the Union by deciding to revitalize the
budgets in key areas such as procurement and
defence component within the CFSP. Being un-
research and development. In some areas the
able to join the European Monetary Union, the
European allies have collectively only 10 to 15% of
new Blair government chooses to show its dedica-
the assets of the Americans.
tion to European integration through an initiative
in the field of the ESDP. In addition Blair strongly
Of importance to the development of the ESDP
believed that the Union should be a "force for
has been the fact that during operation Allied Force,
good", i.e. should contribute to a better world.12
NATO’s much-praised political consultation
mechanism turned out to function unsatisfactorily.
At their meeting in December 1998 in St. Malo
Compared to its role as a military organisation,
French president Jacques Chirac and British Prime
NATO played no role of importance as a political
Minister Tony Blair agreed that the member states
organisation. This led to considerable uneasiness
of the European Union should have a "capacity for
among a number of smaller allies. Harmonisation
autonomous European action". The importance of
of policies took place in the Contact Group for the
the St. Malo declaration is that it has comple-
Former Yugoslavia, the Quint (the five NATO
mented the debate on institutional matters with a
members of the Contact Group) and the G-8 (the
discussion on capabilities.
seven largest industrial nations and Russia). Ap-
The lack of such a European autonomous ca- parently these were discussion clubs with honeyed
pacity was clearly demonstrated during the War decision-making processes, which were not crisis-
on Kosovo in 1999. Operation Allied Force under- resistant. The result was that institutions, which
lined the conclusion that Europe had no capability

13 For this see D.C. Gompert, R.L. Kugler and M.C. Libricki,
12 This view was expressed by Roger Liddle (Cabinet office Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in
London) during Paris Transatlantic Coference of the WEU Military Affairs (Washington, National Defense University
Instuitute for Security Studies, 21–22 June 2001. Press, 1999).

10