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Rob de Wijk n e s y l a n A e The European Union´s h c s Foreign, Security and i g e Defence Policies and t a Austria´s Ambitions r t S ________________________________________ Wien, im Büro für März 2004 Sicherheitspolitik Prof. Dr. Rob de Wijk ist Direktor des Clingendael Institute for International Relations in Den Haag, Professor für Internationale Beziehungen an der Königlich Niederländischen Mili- tärakademie in Breda [1999] und Professor für Strategische Studien an der Universität Leiden [2000]. Weiters ist er Mitglied im Nationalen Verteidigungs- und Forschungsrat in den Nie- derlanden sowie am Institut für angewandte Wissenschaftsforschung tätig. Diese Studie wurde am Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies verfasst. Impressum Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich: Sektionschef Hon.Prof. DDr. Erich Reiter Redaktion: Mag. Walter Matyas, Doris Washiedl Korrektorat: Doris Washiedl, Melitta Strouhal Eigentümer, Verleger und Hersteller: Büro für Sicherheitspolitik des Bundesministeriums für Landesverteidigung Amtsgebäude Stiftgasse 2a, 1070 Wien Tel. (+43-1) 5200/27000, Fax (+43-1) 5200/17068 Gestaltung: Doris Washiedl Vervielfältigung: Vzlt Johann Jakob Druck- und Reprostelle der Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien Aktuelle Informationen zu Publikationen des Büros für Sicherheitspolitik und der Landesverteidigungsakademie finden Sie im Internet: <http://www.bundesheer.at/wissen-forschung/bsp/publikat.shtml> Inhaltsverzeichnis ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction _______________________________________________________________________________ 3 The Development of CFSP and ESDP_________________________________________________________ 4 The Geopolitical Changes ____________________________________________________________________ 4 Hard-liners Prevail__________________________________________________________________________ 6 Balancing of Dominant American Power _______________________________________________________ 8 Revitalisation of the CFSP ____________________________________________________________________ 9 The Composition of the EURRF ______________________________________________________________ 12 An Expeditionary Force for the EU?___________________________________________________________ 14 The New Requirements: Towards Expeditionary Capabilities? ___________________________________ 17 Austria and the EURRF_____________________________________________________________________ 18 A Conceptual Approach ____________________________________________________________________ 18 The Security Environment___________________________________________________________________ 18 Political Ambitions_________________________________________________________________________ 20 The Operational Context ____________________________________________________________________ 24 Austria’s Present Capabilities________________________________________________________________ 24 The New Requirements: Homeland Security___________________________________________________ 25 The New Requirements: Expeditionary Operations _____________________________________________ 25 Conscription_______________________________________________________________________________ 26 Co-operability _____________________________________________________________________________ 26 Towards a Balanced Force Structure __________________________________________________________ 27 The Route to Transformation ________________________________________________________________ 28 Annex 1 __________________________________________________________________________________ 30 Current Capabilities________________________________________________________________________ 30 Annex 2 __________________________________________________________________________________ 31 Capability Commitment Conference (CCC)____________________________________________________ 31 Austrian Commitments_____________________________________________________________________ 31 European Capability Action Plan (ECAP)______________________________________________________ 32 Introduction declaration of the war on terror, and the Iraq crisis of early 2003. This new strategic reality requires As a result of the geopolitical changes of the 1990s, the European Union not only to strike a new the United States’ strategic focus is no longer transatlantic bargain, but to renew its attempts to Europe. This conclusion is reinforced by the develop a credible Common Foreign and Security events of 11 September 2001, the subsequent Policy (CFSP) including a European Security and 3 Defence Policy (ESDP). Consequently, it is ex- This report must be considered as an attempt to pected that the debate on how to develop the provide a broad, conceptual approach to Austria’s Union’s Rapid Reaction Force (EURFF) into a armed forces, as an input both for the internal and credible force for peace support and combat op- external debate of Austria’s future armed forces. erations will remain high on the agenda. More- If there is agreement on the conceptual basis over, after the ratification of the Union’s for force transformation, a more detailed discus- "Constitution" and the publication of its Defence sion is needed to answer the following questions: White Book and Strategic Concept this develop- ment could even get a new push. • The size and composition of Austria’s home- land defence forces; This project defines Austria’s role in this proc- • The size and composition of Austria’s forces ess and the consequences for the structure of its for deployment abroad; armed forces. The first part of this report deals • Interoperability requirements; with the development of the CFSP and its ESDP. It • Doctrinal requirements. will conclude with Austria’s role and place in it. Such discussion could be supported and "objec- Part two deals with the possible future contribu- tively validated" through qualitative and quantita- tion of Austria’s armed forces. In this part the tive analyses. following issues will be dealt with: • What kind of contribution to CFSP/ESDP The Development of CFSP and ESDP could be expected from a country with the standing of Austria, which is a highly devel- oped, industrialized democracy with interests The Geopolitical Changes beyond its own borders? How does one define The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet the level of political ambition? Union had important implications for transatlan- • Should Austria, given the size of its defence tic relations. During the Cold War European allies budget limit itself to specific contributions to had grown accustomed to American engagement. international coalitions? If so, should Austria However, this engagement was forced upon the focus on niche capabilities or should it con- Americans by the Cold War, which was an excep- tribute with general-purpose forces? tional period in history when America’s interests • European forces are being transformed into in Europe were being threatened. After the Cold expeditionary armed forces making use of War America’s interests were more likely to be at Network Centric Warfare. What are the conse- stake in the Far East (the Koreas and Taiwan), quences for the structure and the required ca- Central Asia (the oil-rich Caspian Sea region), the pabilities for Austria’s armed forces? What are oil-rich Persian Gulf Region (Iraq and Iran), the the basic building blocks of such a force? Middle East (Israel and Palestine) and Central and • Is there a balance between forces for conven- South America (the war on drugs in Colombia). It tional and unconventional military operations? is only logical that the United States refocused its Is it possible to use the same forces for both attention to these regions. Moreover, as Europe no types of operation? longer is America’s number one security preoccu- • How does the debate on homeland security pation, the transatlantic security relationship will affect the debate on force structuring and force change. Now that Europe is not threatened and capabilities? the EU is economically an equal partner, the • How do the conclusions of this report relate to United States expects Europe to take care of its present commitments to the European Union? own backyard. In addition, the Americans expect • What are the overall recommendations to be European support if their interests are threatened. drawn from our analyses? For the Europeans this requires a change from 4 security consumer to security provider, for which rorism and at present it is considered to be the they are mentally, organizationally and militarily only threat to European societies. Over the last not equipped. decades Europeans have endured many incidents of terrorism, from the IRA in Northern Ireland to Due to the geopolitical changes of the 1990s the Bader-Meinhof Group in Germany and from and response to the events of the early 21st century the Red Brigades in Italy to the ETA in Spain. some fundamental differences have become visi- Moreover, European governments are familiar ble between the United States and its traditional with rogue states, for example, in 1986 Libya fired European allies, with the exception of the United a missile at Lampedusa, an uninhabited Italian Kingdom. island. This was the only direct attack on NATO territory in the existence of the Alliance, but it did First, there are considerable transatlantic dif- not result in a European call for missile defences. ferences in threat perception. On the one hand, the In Europe the security risks of WMD and missiles measures taken in 1998 and 1999 expressed a are simply not perceived as substantial enough to growing American fear of the consequences of justify the spending of taxpayers’ money. Many missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) European policymakers consider the NMD- proliferation and the threat of catastrophic terror- project (now known as Ground Based Midcourse ism. This fear led to a feeling of vulnerability, as a Defence) as a disproportionate measure against a result of which the freedom to act in foreign policy distant threat. would be limited and its hegemonic position would be encroached upon. War against the Second, there are transatlantic differences of United States was unlikely in the past and will be opinion about how security could be provided. unlikely in the future, but United States territory European governments do not underestimate the is by no means safe. WMD, their means of deliv- threats of wars, terrorism, and rogue states, they ery and terrorism are the only instruments avail- are simply used to managing complex security able to the weak. Enemies will not confront the situations. The problem of terror is managed United States head-on, because they are no match through a combination of practical measures and to its army, navy, air force and marines. political means. For example, Irish separatism was dealt with by the British armed forces by fighting They will exploit the inherent weaknesses and militant IRA members and by political dialogue vulnerabilities of its open, liberal, democratic and with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the IRA. industrialised society through asymmetrical forms European security management aimed at prevent- of warfare, most notably terrorist attacks on ing wars has traditionally been done through American soil but also against its interests abroad. engagement, i.e. regimes and treaties. The empha- Thus, for the US, terrorism and missiles are very sis on multilateralism and loss of sovereignty go real threats, although over the last decades only a hand in hand. As a result of European integration small portion of the total terror-related casualties Europeans have been steadily giving up powers were Americans.1 to Brussels. Americans do not see any source of On the other hand, Europeans have learned to democratic legitimacy higher than the constitu- live with a complex security situation. Through- tional nation state. out its history Europe experienced numerous and This supports the view of Robert Kagan, who disastrous wars as an essential element of a con- argued that the Europeans believe that a peaceful tinuous process of nation-building. Apart from all world is one governed by law, norms, and inter- this, Europeans are also not unfamiliar with ter- national agreements. In this world, power politics have become obsolete. Americans, by contrast, 1 A. K. Cronin, "Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy believe power-politics is needed to deal with Iraq, in the Age of Terrorism”, Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, p. 124. 5 Al Qaeda and other malign forces. Kagan argues is a specific threat. Watershed events in American however that the Europeans do not understand history such as the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbour, that their safety is ultimately guaranteed by the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea, American military power.2 the blockade of Berlin, the 1962 Cuba crisis and most recently, the September 11 attacks have had To oversimplify, Europeans prefer interna- a catalysing effect on American society which tional law and norms because they are weaker mobilised political will to act decisively. European than the United States; the Americans turn to policymakers, probably with the exception of the unilateralism because the US is the only remain- British, underestimate the effects of these events ing superpower. Consequently, European govern- since they tend to interpret American action as ments seek relative security whereas Americans "unilateralist". seek absolute security. Generally speaking, Euro- peans try to manage the risks and minimise the problems whereas Americans seek military vic- Hard-liners Prevail tory. With the inauguration of George W. Bush as President of the United States in 2001 the differ- Europeans put more emphasis on intent; the ence between Europe and the US became even United States stresses capability. Europe overem- more visible. Already in its first six months in phasizes economics whilst the United States over- office the Bush Administration moved towards a emphasizes political and military issues. hard-line unilateralist position. It decided to de- As a result, Europeans and Americans differ ploy NMD; abrogated the 1972 ABM Treaty; fundamentally in the methods of dealing with rejected the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; refused to ratify contemporary security threats. Europeans put the Rio Pact on biodiversity, opposed the ban on emphasis on "soft security", i.e. diplomacy, sanc- landmines, withdrew from the Biological Weap- tions and incentives such as economic aid and ons Convention ratified by the United States in peace support operations. Americans emphasize 1975; and withdrew from the treaty on the Inter- "hard security", i.e. limited wars of intervention to national Criminal Court (ICC) which had been defend interests and promote regional security. Of signed by the previous President shortly before course, the Americans got involved in diplomatic leaving office. These decisions conflicted with efforts and peace support operations, like those in European views on the value of regimes and the Balkans, but in most cases European allies treaties. asked them to. America’s security situation is less On September 20, 2001, Bush declared war on complex because, with the exception of the Civil terrorism during a speech to Congress. This War, no war has taken place on its soil. By defini- speech is considered to be the most important tion US armed forces are expeditionary forces for statement on grand strategy since President Tru- deployment outside the Continental US to defend man’s speech of March 12, 1947 when the United its interests. States declared to fight communism world-wide. Third, in contrast to most European powers, After September 11 the Administration refused an the United States needs an enemy to focus its offer from NATO to help, which had invoked foreign and security policy. The United States has Article 5 (its collective defence clause), for the first a problem-solving, materialistic culture and with- time in history. Bush reluctantly accepted British out an enemy there is no problem to solve. Ameri- military aid during the war against the Taliban can history is full of examples of its unwillingness and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Next, the American and inability to organise its policy well until there President wanted immunity from the ICC, which 2 R. Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, no. 116, June–July 2002. 6 had been formed on July 1, 2002, for American when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorists (…) our For that reason, he threatened to block a UN security will require all Americans to be forward- mandate for the continued deployment of the looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive International Police Task Force in the Balkans. action, when necessary to defend our liberty and This not only put the entire NATO mission in the to defend our lives”.5 Thus, a new unilateralist, Balkans at risk, but also led to severe criticism first strike policy of "defensive intervention" was from America’s closest allies. In the United States announced. Vice president Dick Cheney under- this policy was widely supported, because the scored the need for such a strategy during a ICC was believed to undermine American sover- hawkish speech delivered to war veterans on eignty. President Bush also put the nuclear issue August 26, 2002. He argued that pre-emption on the agenda. He showed renewed interest in against Iraq was necessary because "there is no nuclear-armed missile interceptors in an NMD doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of and low-yield nuclear ground penetrators to mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amass- destroy hardened underground bunkers and ing them to use against our friends, against our tunnel complexes because conventional means allies, and against us. And there is no doubt that would be less efficient. In this context the Nuclear his aggressive regional ambitions will lead him Posture Review of January 8, 2002 caused much into future confrontations with his neighbours”. unease among allies because it explicitly called for Quoting former foreign secretary Henry Kiss- a capability to destroy "hard and deeply buried inger, Cheney argued that this produces "an targets”.3 imperative for preventive action.” In addition, "our job would be more difficult in the face of a The real policy change came with the State of nuclear armed Saddan Hussein”.6 This policy the Union address on January 29, 2002. Referring change was confirmed with the 2002 National to North Korea, Iran and Iraq, Bush stated that Security Strategy, published in September of that "States like these constitute an axis of evil, arming year. to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose Key officials, including Vice President Dick a grave and growing danger. They could provide Cheney, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to and Richard Perle and his colleagues of the now match their hatred. They could attack our allies or influential Defence Policy Board at the Pentagon attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of support this grand strategy. Their thinking is these cases, the price of indifference would be clearly expressed in the Statement of Principles of catastrophic”.4 Elaborating on the "axis of evil” the neoconservative Project for the New American speech, he announced a major policy shift during Century. They gained victory over moderate the Graduation Speech at West Point on June 1, officials who favoured an approach based on 2002: "For much of the last century, America’s multilateralism, such as the then Secretary of defence relied on the Cold War doctrines of deter- Defence Colin Powell. rence and containment (…) Deterrence –the prom- ise of massive retaliation against nations- means Bush’ grand strategy is based on the principles nothing against shadowy terrorists with no nation mentioned above. It is based on the firm belief or citizen to defend. Containment is not possible 5 G.W. Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy West Point, 3 US Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, New York, Washington DC, 1 June 2002. submitted to congress on 31 December 2000, pp. 46–47. 6 D. Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans 4 G.W. Bush, The President’s State of the Union Address, of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention, Washington Washington DC, 29 January 2002. DC, 26 August 2002. 7 that the United States is powerful enough to go at kindly disposed towards the West.9 Primakov it alone if this is in its best interest. According to believed that co-operating too closely with NATO the aforementioned Statement the United States would impede the formation of a new, multipolar must "shape a new century favourable to Ameri- world. By means of an active dialogue with can principles”, whilst national leadership must NATO, Russia would have to prevent, however, accept "the United States global responsibilities”.7 that the alliance could harm its interests. The According to the neoconservatists the strategy is decision to agree to the establishment of the Per- aimed at maintaining America’s pre-eminence, manent Joint Council should therefore be seen in precluding the rise of a great power, and shaping this context. the international order in line with American Furthermore, the special relationship between principles and interests. Institutions, treaties and Germany and Russia, the "strategic triangle" of rules are merely obstacles to this grand strategy. Russia, China and India, the "strategic partner- The events of September 11 reinforced the argu- ship" of Russia and China can all be explained as ments of those favouring this grand strategy. attempts to counterbalance the United States. The September 11 was seen as an attack on America CFSP and the ESDP can also be explained as and everything it stands for and, consequently, attempts to counterbalance American power and America’s vital interests are at stake. Indeed, this to come to terms with the new strategic reality. is a very powerful motivation to go alone and to adopt a new doctrine of "pre-emption" and "de- So far, all attempts to counterbalance have fensive intervention". For that reason the current failed. Moreover, the rise of an international order administration is reforming its defence apparatus dominated by American power has not yet trig- to allow the United States to project force from the gered a global backlash and the strategic rivalry continental US, rather than from overseas bases in and competitive balancing among the great pow- Europe, Asia and the Middle East and to be able ers is actually quite limited. There are two possi- to deal with contemporary challenges, including ble explanations. First, balancing involves asymmetrical warfare.8 economic, military and political costs, which neither Russia, China or the European Union are willing to bear. Both Russia and China lack re- Balancing of Dominant American Power sources, whilst the European Union is not willing According to the Realist school of thought in to spend more on defence to give its ESDP more international relations coalitions, or great powers substance. In addition, the blossoming of the would try to counterbalance American hegemonic relationship between Russia and the United States power in order to achieve freedom of action. was one of the unexpected changes resulting from There have been some attempts to counterbalance 9/11. The Americans need the Russians for intel- American power indeed. In the mid-1990’s, the ligence-gathering and cooperation in other areas; Russian minister of foreign Affairs, Yevgeny the Russians consider the war on terrorism a Primakov, put forward his theory of "multipolar- unique opportunity to turn Russia into the indis- ity". He asserted that a counterbalance to the pensable partner for the United States and to gain United States was necessary and he emphasised economically. the importance of co-operation with China, India, Iran, Iraq, Syria and other states that were not Second, unlike Russia or the United Kingdom, the United States is not a traditional imperial power trying to enlarge its territory. America’s "imperialism" is of an ideological nature seeing as 7 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles, see <newamericancentury.com>. 8 D.H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military", Foreign 9 O. Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security after Affairs, May/June 2002, pp. 20–32. Kosovo", Survival, winter 1999–2000, p. 128. 8 the United States considers itself as the champion Many feared that European security would of democracy and the free market economy, decouple as a result of probable American unilat- whose values are universal and should be ex- eralism and the consequences of the increased ported all over the world. Nevertheless, for other technological gap. EU Commissioner Chris Patten cultures, most notably the Islamic world, this expressed this concern about American unilateral- behaviour could be threatening. It is one of the ism explicitly in an internal paper for the Euro- explanations that keeps the struggle between the pean Commission. He asserted that the Union has United States and the militant representatives of the obligation to contribute to the increase of political Islam alive. Interestingly, in the United stability, because the world is one in which the States a debate is emerging on American imperial- United States increasingly acts without giving any ism. Conservative Realists, like Andrew J. Bace- thought to the concerns of others.11 vich argue that the United States should go its However, the Iraq crisis of early 2003 also own way.10 It should not have its foreign and demonstrated that disunity among the Europeans security policy restricted by international law and could undermine the integration process as well. institutions. Rather, an "empire of freedom" Spain, Italy and most East Europeans supported should be established, one that is ruled by the the United States and the United Kingdom, whilst United States and founded on specific values and Germany and France tried to prevent them from a norms, such as democracy, free market economy quick decision to go to war. Thus the Union and and human rights. Thus a new unipolar order or the further development of the CFSP and the Pax Americana will be created. ESDP are a prerequisite for political stability. Unfortunately, the historical record of the Revitalisation of the CFSP CFSP, established with the Maastricht Treaty on Nevertheless, because of the geopolitical changes the EU (TEU) of 1992, and the incorporation of the mentioned and the new realities of U.S. foreign ESDP in the Amsterdam TEU of 1997 are not very policy, the European Union has no other choice impressive. The only significant Europe-led op- but to strike a new transatlantic bargain, one that eration was the WEU mine countermeasure force is based on a strategic vision of equal partnership. deployed in the Persian Gulf in 1987 and 1988 If Europeans fail to do so, Europe and America during the Iran-Iraq war. During the early 1990s will drift apart, Europe will be marginalized and the WEU carried out a naval operation to enforce run the risk of becoming entangled in a security the UN embargo against Iraq. Since 1992, the competition among Germany, France, the United WEU has been involved in the enforcement of the Kingdom and possibly Italy. The first signs of this UN embargo on the former Yugoslavia, first in the were visible during the Iraq crisis of late 2002 and Adriatic Sea, then along the river Danube. In 1994 early 2003. the WEU was requested to organise a police force In the present debate on European integration in the EU-administered city of Mostar. During the the consequences of American unilateralism is late 1990s the Union asked WEU-support in plan- usually overlooked or ignored. The initiatives for ning the Multinational Advisory Police Element the ESDP have not only been the result of (MAPE) in Albania, organising a de-mining op- Europe’s ongoing process of integration, but were eration in Croatia, and monitoring the situation in prompted by the worry about America’s security Kosovo through imagery provided by the WEU commitment to Europe as well. Satellite Centre. 10 Forthcoming: A.J. Bacevich, American Empire (Harvard 11 International Herald Tribune, "The EU Counterweight To University Press). American Influence", 16 June 2000. 9 A chance to carry out more demanding opera- for autonomous action and should develop a force tions came in 1997. Albania was on the brink of projection capability for operations in an out-of- civil war due to the collapse of its pyramid in- area environment. The war on Kosovo showed vestment schemes. As the WEU refrained from that the countries of the European Union are organising a force it seemed that the organisation largely dependent on the Americans for carrying had no real role to play in the new Europe. There out large-scale military operations.13 In practice was evidently no political will to carry out a large- the Americans led the air campaign. They carried scale European-led military operation in what was out 65% of all the flights and, within that figure, considered a high-risk environment. For Dutch 80 percent of all combat missions. In addition, the policy makers, this reinforced the belief that Americans dominated the command lines so that NATO should take the lead in the most demand- the air campaign was chiefly carried out accord- ing operations. ing to an American recipe. This military- technological gap between Europe and the US has In March the Security Council authorised Italy promoted the decoupling of European and to lead a 7,000-strong multinational peace force in American security, as coalition wars with the Albania. This clearly undermined the develop- United States turn out to be a myth. The major ment of the CFSP, as the "S" of security within the reason for this gap is inefficiency in defence CFSP remained in fact a dead letter. Not surpris- spending. While Union member states have a ingly, the Union was criticised by the Americans collective gross national product similar to the US, for being unable to deal with security risks in their they spend only 65 % of what Washington spends own backyard. on its armed forces. Due to poor co-ordination and basically Cold War force structures, Europe- In the late 1990s Britain and France took the ans get a disproportional low return from their lead in the Union by deciding to revitalize the budgets in key areas such as procurement and defence component within the CFSP. Being un- research and development. In some areas the able to join the European Monetary Union, the European allies have collectively only 10 to 15% of new Blair government chooses to show its dedica- the assets of the Americans. tion to European integration through an initiative in the field of the ESDP. In addition Blair strongly Of importance to the development of the ESDP believed that the Union should be a "force for has been the fact that during operation Allied Force, good", i.e. should contribute to a better world.12 NATO’s much-praised political consultation mechanism turned out to function unsatisfactorily. At their meeting in December 1998 in St. Malo Compared to its role as a military organisation, French president Jacques Chirac and British Prime NATO played no role of importance as a political Minister Tony Blair agreed that the member states organisation. This led to considerable uneasiness of the European Union should have a "capacity for among a number of smaller allies. Harmonisation autonomous European action". The importance of of policies took place in the Contact Group for the the St. Malo declaration is that it has comple- Former Yugoslavia, the Quint (the five NATO mented the debate on institutional matters with a members of the Contact Group) and the G-8 (the discussion on capabilities. seven largest industrial nations and Russia). Ap- The lack of such a European autonomous ca- parently these were discussion clubs with honeyed pacity was clearly demonstrated during the War decision-making processes, which were not crisis- on Kosovo in 1999. Operation Allied Force under- resistant. The result was that institutions, which lined the conclusion that Europe had no capability 13 For this see D.C. Gompert, R.L. Kugler and M.C. Libricki, 12 This view was expressed by Roger Liddle (Cabinet office Mind the Gap: Promoting a Transatlantic Revolution in London) during Paris Transatlantic Coference of the WEU Military Affairs (Washington, National Defense University Instuitute for Security Studies, 21–22 June 2001. Press, 1999). 10

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The Development of CFSP and ESDPThe Geopolitical Changes Hard-liners Prevail Balancing of Dominant American Power Revitalisation of the CFSP The Composition of the EURRF An Expeditionary Force for the EU?The New Requirements: Towards Expeditionary Capabilities? Austria and the EURRFA Conceptual Appr
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