The Ethics of Abortion Appealing to reason rather than religious belief, this book is the most comprehensive case against the choice of abortion yet published. The Ethics of Abortion critically evaluates all the major grounds for denying fetal personhood, including the views of those who defend not only abortion but also infanticide. It also provides several (non-theological) justifi cations for the conclusion that all human beings, including those in utero, should be respected as persons. This book also critiques the view that abortion is not wrong even if the human fetus is a person. The Ethics of Abortion examines hard cases for those who are pro-life, such as abortion in cases of rape or in order to save the mother’s life, as well as hard cases for defenders of abortion, such as sex selection abortion and the rationale for being “personally opposed” but publically supportive of abortion. It concludes with a discussion of whether artifi cial wombs might end the abortion debate. Answering the arguments of defenders of abortion, this book provides reasoned justifi cation for the view that all intentional abortions are morally wrong and that doctors and nurses who object to abortion should not be forced to act against their consciences. Dr. Christopher Kaczor is Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. Routledge Annals of Bioethics Series Editors: Mark J. Cherry St. Edward’s University, USA Ana Smith Iltis Saint Louis University. USA Regional Perspectives in Bioethics (2003) Edited by Mark J. Cherry and John F. Peppin Religious Perspectives on Bioethics (2004) Edited by Mark J. Cherry, Ana Smith Iltis, and John F. Peppin Research Ethics (2005) Edited by Ana Smith Iltis Thomistic Principles and Bioethics (2006) Jason T. Eberl The Ethics of Genetic Engineering (2007) Roberta M. Berry Legal Perspectives in Bioethics (2007) Edited by Ana Smith Iltis, Sandra H. Johnson, and Barbara A. Hinze Biomedical Research and Beyond: Expanding the Ethics of Inquiry (2007) Christopher O. Tollefsen Practical Autonomy and Bioethics (2009) James Stacey Taylor The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice (2010) Christopher Kaczor The Ethics of Abortion Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Question of Justice Christopher Kaczor First published 2011 by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2011 Christopher Kaczor The right of Christopher Kaczor to be identifi ed as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now know nor here after invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifi cation and explanation without intent to in fringe. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kaczor, Christopher Robert, 1969– The ethics of abortion : women’s rights, human life, and the question of justice / Christopher Kaczor. — 1st ed. p. cm. 1. Abortion—Moral and ethical aspects. 2. Abortion—Law and legislation. 3. Women’s rights. I. Title. HQ767.15.K33 2010 179.7'6—dc22 2010018225 ISBN 0-203-84116-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN13: 978–0–415–88468–6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–88469–3 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–84116–7 (ebk) Dedicated to Chad Roper and Jeff Petruska Contents Acknowledgments x 1 Introduction 1 1.1 How Should We Talk About Abortion? 2 1.2 Loaded Language 6 1.3 Women and Abortion 8 1.4 Moral Goodness and Human Flourishing 11 2 Does Personhood Begin After Birth? 13 2.1 Persons vs. Human Beings 14 2.1.1 Not All Human Beings Are Persons 15 2.1.2 Potentiality Is Irrelevant 16 2.2 When Does Personhood Begin? 17 2.3 Critical Responses to Justifi cations of Infanticide 20 2.3.1 Is Species Morally Irrelevant? 20 2.3.2 Potentiality and the Symmetry Principle 23 2.3.3 Curious Exceptions to the Rule 27 2.4 Defi ning Personhood 27 2.5 Seriously Ill Newborns 33 2.6 Arbitrary Limits? 35 3 Does Personhood Begin at Birth? 38 3.1 Distinguishing Humans from Persons 38 3.2 Abortion Yes, Infanticide No 40 3.3 Critiquing the Conventional View 42 3.4 Is Personhood a Matter of Location? 48 3.5 What is Partial Birth Abortion? 51 3.6 Reconsidering Warren’s Account 52 4 Does Personhood Begin During Pregnancy? 56 4.1 What Characteristic Grants Personhood? 56 viii Contents 4.1.1 Conscious Desires/Interests 57 4.1.2 Viability 68 4.1.3 Quickening/Fetal Movement 71 4.1.4 Sentience 74 4.1.5 Human Appearance 78 4.1.6 Brain Development 79 4.1.7 Implantation 81 4.2 The Developmental View 83 4.3 A Critique of the Developmental View 85 5 Does Personhood Begin at Conception? 91 5.1 Are All Human Beings Persons? 91 5.1.1 Personhood as Endowment or Performance? 93 5.1.2 Humans are Rational Animals 97 5.1.3 The Lessons of History 102 5.2 When Do Humans Begin to Exist? 102 5.3 The Constitutive Property Argument 105 6 Does the Human Embryo Have Rights? 121 6.1 The Acorn Analogy 122 6.2 Size 125 6.3 Twinning 127 6.4 Embryo Fusion 129 6.5 High Embryo-Mortality Rate 131 6.6 Hylomorphism 133 6.7 Anti-Abortion, Anti-Contraception 136 6.8 Living Human Cells Are Not Persons 137 6.9 Embryo Rescue Case 139 6.10 The Bag of Marbles Analogy 139 6.11 Cost–Benefi t Analysis 142 6.12 The Uncertainty Argument 143 7 Is it Wrong to Abort a Person? 145 7.1 The Violinist Analogy 145 7.2 The Burglar Analogy 147 7.3 The “No Worse Off” Argument 150 7.4 Critical Analysis of the Violinist Analogy 150 7.4.1 The Misunderstood Samaritan 150 7.4.2 The Bodily Integrity Objection 151 7.4.3 The Consistency Objection 154 7.4.4 The Intention/Foresight Objection 157 7.5 Critical Analysis of the Burglar Analogy 162 7.6 Special Duties to Care for Children? 165 Contents ix 7.7 The Comparative Burdens Objection 168 7.8 Does Killing Make a Being “Worse Off”? 176 8 Is Abortion Permissible in Hard Cases? 177 8.1 Hard Cases for Critics of Abortion 178 8.1.1 Diffi cult Circumstances 178 8.1.2 Fetal Deformity 179 8.1.3 Abortion for the Child’s Good 181 8.1.4 Cases of Rape and Incest 183 8.1.5 Abortion to Save the Mother’s Life 185 8.2 Cases of Conscience 191 8.3 Hard Cases for Defenders of Abortion 193 8.3.1 Murder of Pregnant Women 193 8.3.2 Sex Selection Abortion 194 8.3.3 Abortion for Frivolous Reasons 200 8.3.4 Safe and Legal, but Why Rare? 200 8.3.5 Why Personal Opposition? 202 8.3.6 Prenatal Bonding with “Our Baby” 206 8.3.7 Morally Permissible vs. Morally Objectionable 209 8.3.8 Intermediate Moral Worth of the Human Fetus 210 9 Could Artifi cial Wombs End the Abortion Debate? 215 9.1 Artifi cial Wombs and Ardent Defenders of Abortion 215 9.2 Artifi cial Wombs and Ardent Critics of Abortion 219 9.2.1 The Artifi ciality Objection 219 9.2.2 The IVF Objection 220 9.2.3 The Deprivation of Maternal Shelter Objection 220 9.2.4 The Birth Within Marriage Objection 222 9.2.5 The Integrative Parenthood Objection 223 9.2.6 The Surrogate Motherhood Objection 225 9.2.7 The Wrongful Experimentation Objection 226 9.2.8 The Objection from the Right of a Child to Develop in the Womb of the Mother 227 9.3 An End to the Abortion Debate? 230 Bibliography 231 Index 243
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