The English Civil War and after, 1642–1658 PDF
Preview The English Civil War and after, 1642–1658
The English Civil War and after, 1642-1658 The English Civil War and after, 1642-1658 EDITED BY R. H. PARRY Contributors Robert Ashton, Brian Manning, D. H. Pennington, Ivan Roots, C. V. Wedgwood, Austin Woolrych PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Selection and editorial matter© R. H. Parry 1970 Text© Brian Manning, D. H. Pennington, C. V. Wedgwood, Austin Woolrych, Ivan Roots, Robert Ashton 1970 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1970 First published I970 by MACMILLAN AND CO LTD Little Essex Street London WC2 and also at Bombay Calcutta and Madras Macmillan South Africa (Publishers) Pty Ltd Johannesburg The Macmillan Company of Australia Pty Ltd Melbourne The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd Toronto Gill and Macmillan Ltd Dublin ISBN 978-0-333-10023-3 ISBN 978-1-349-15368-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-15368-8 Contents Preface vii List of Abbreviations viii I The Outbreak of the English Civil War I BRIAN MANNING 2 The Rebels of 1642 22 D. H. PENNINGTON 3 The Trial of Charles I 41 C. V. WEDGWOOD 4 Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Saints 59 AUSTIN WOOLRYCH 5 Swordsmen and Decimators - Cromwell's Major-Generals 78 IVAN ROOTS 6 The Civil War and the Class Struggle 93 ROBERT ASHTON 7 Interest - Public, Private and Communal III IVAN ROOTS Notes on Contributors I22 Index 125 v Preface FoR several years past it has been the custom at Eton College to give a course of revision lectures to history specialists about to take their 'A' levels. These have normally concerned the Special Subject paper and have been delivered by members of the History department. Partly as a change, but mainly in the belief that the study of history in Sixth Forms now more closely approximates to the work of university undergraduates in the subject, it was decided to invite some of the most prominent scholars of the Great Rebellion of the seventeenth century to come to Eton to deliver lectures on topics of their own selection. All but one of the essays had their origin in this decision and the exception is the second essay by Professor Roots, which was written specially for this book. No one who has taught history for any length of time to Sixth Forms can fail to realise that his main problem is to keep up to date with current research and current publications. This degree of specialisation may have some disadvantages but it is nevertheless a fact. It is hoped therefore, that this volume will elucidate some aspects of the seven teenth century which now interest all students of the period. Practically no alteration has been made to the manuscripts submitted by the authors and the function of the editor has been administrative rather than scholarly. In most cases full references have been included for those who care to use them, but this is not so with Dame Veronica W edgwood's 'The Trial of Charles I' because her lecture was a speci ally condensed version of her excellent and popular book on the subject. R. H. PARRY Eton Mayi969 vii List of Abbreviations BM British Museum (;a~~. l'.I>or.n. (;alendar of ~tate l'apers I>or.nestic (;J [House of] (;or.nr.nons' Journals Econ. Hist. Rev. Econor.nic History Review EHR English Historical Review HJ Historical Journal HMC Historical Manuscripts Commission JB~ Journal of British ~tudies JMH Journal of Modern History LJ [House of] Lords' Journals 1'1' l'ast and l'resent PRO Public Record Office, London SP State Papers, Public Record Office TRH~ Transactions of the Royal Historical ~ociety T~l' The ~tate l'apers ofJ ohn Thurloe (ed. T. Birch, 1742) viii The Outbreak of the English 1. Civil War BRIAN MANNING THE members of the Long Parliament were for the most part well-to-do landowners, nobility and gentry, who shared similar social and educa tional backgrounds, similar economic interests, and similar ideas on religion and politics. They disliked 'popery' and what they regarded as the 'popish' tendencies of Archbishop Laud and his party, who had dominated the church during the 1630s. But they were not inclined towards presbyterianism and they feared the more radical puritans and 'sectaries'. Although they had no love for bishops, most of them wished to keep episcopal government of the church, provided that it could be reformed so as to be under the supervision of the common law and parliament and the squirearchy; and provided that the bishops were men of the same middle-of-the-road views in religion as most of the nobility and gentry. They disliked the policies and methods of government of Charles I in the 163os; but once unpopular taxes such as Ship-money had been made illegal, unpopular courts like Star Chamber and High Commission abolished, and the summoning of a parliament at least once in every three years assured by the Triennial Act, there remained only one obstacle to agreement between the king and the two Houses of Parliament-distrust. Could Charles I be trusted to act moderately and keep within the limits imposed on him by the legislation of the Long Parliament? A majority of the House of Commons and a minority of the House of Lords answered in the negative: the king was still surrounded by evil advisers and he could not be trusted until the Privy Council and govern ment offices were filled by men in whom 'parliament may have cause to confide'. A majority of the House of Lords and a minority of the House of Commons answered in the affirmative: the time had come to give the king the benefit of the doubt and not antagonise him further by restric ting his right to choose his own counsellors and officers. Charles asked whether there would be any end to the demands of the majority in the House of Commons: so far he had agreed to all they asked but without being able to win their confidence, and still they made more demands. 2 BRIAN MANNING He distrusted the leaders of the House of Commons and their friends in the House of Lords, and suspected them of ambition for power and of a secret design to convert the monarchy into a virtual republic. He refused to surrender his right to choose his own advisers. He could count on the support of a majority of the House of Lords, and he might have been able to gain the support of a majority in the House of Commons if at this moment he had not embarked upon a course of action which intensified distrust of his intentions. Charles was persuaded that the discontent of the majority of the Commons was due to the machinations of a small faction. He believed that if the trouble-makers were removed or discredited the loyalty to the crown and instinctive conservatism of the majority would reassert itself. So he accused six of the leaders, one peer and five members of the House of Commons, of treason, and on 4 January I642 went in person to the House of Commons with armed guards in an unsuccessful attempt to arrest the five members. 'The attempt on the Five Members' con firmed the majority's distrust of the king and their confidence in their leaders. It also disquieted those members of the two Houses who were coming to prefer the risks of trusting the king to the dangers of continu ing disagreement between the king and the House of Commons and between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. But although such men had their confidence in the king shaken and were reluctant to take his side, they shared his distrust of the leaders of the House of Commons. In the early part of 1642 only two small minorities saw a resort to force as either necessary or inevitable. There were a few wholehearted royalists who for some time had been telling the king that if he did not show a willingness to defend his rights by force he would never be able to stop the steady erosion of his power; and there were a few radical puritans who were ready to resort to force to bring about sweeping changes in the government and doctrine of the church. But the vast majority of the two Houses of Parliament, of the nobility and gentry in general, of the government officers, of the lawyers, of the mayors and aldermen of towns, of the leading merchants, in other words, the great bulk of the governing classes, still deplored the thought of resol ving the disagreement by force, and still hoped for and expected agree ment between king, Lords and Commons. Yet they were steadily being divided into two parties during 1642; parliamentarians, who distrusted the king and demanded more restrictions on his power, at least for a time until they could trust him with greater power again; and THE OUTBREAK OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 3 royalists, who were unhappy about reducing the power of the crown too much, and longed to be able to trust the king. This was not a division over religious or political ends. Thus men from the same social background and with the same economic interests, with similar political and religious ideas, found themselves in opposite parties, for the decision they had to take in 1642 was not a decision about the best form of government for the church or for the state, nor about changes in the social or the economic order, but simply whether or not to trust Charles I. Men of the same class and the same political and religious views gave different answers to this question and found themselves on opposite sides; men of different classes and different political and religious views gave the same answer to this question and found them selves on the same side. Many of those who distrusted the king and regarded his obstinacy as the only obstacle to agreement consented to the raising of an army under the command of the Earl of Essex because they thought that a show of force would make the king more reasonable. They believed that no more than a show of force would be necessary because the king appeared to have few supporters and small means to raise an army: he would not be able to fight and would be obliged to negotiate. But the king proved to have more supporters and greater resources than at first appeared. For many were willing to trust him now that he seemed almost powerless. They did not wish to see him forced into an abject surrender which would permanently weaken the crown. They supported him because they thought that when parliament saw that he had the means to fight it would moderate its demands and reach an agreement without bloodshed. So by the end of the summer of 1642 there were two armies on foot in England, and the country found that it had drifted into a civil war that few wanted to fight. Distrust was the main obstacle to agreement between king and parlia ment, but it might not have been an insurmountable obstacle without the conjuncture of other factors, which involved the lower classes in the crisis and drove a deeper wedge into the ruling class. These other factors were the fear of papists, the sharp decline of trade and industry, and an upsurge of class-feeling and class-hostility. On 5 May 1641 the crisis over the Earl of Strafford was approaching a climax. The Bill of Attainder had passed the Commons and was now before the Lords. The king was making desperate efforts to save the earl from execution: it was still doubtful whether the bill would pass the Lords, and, if it did, even more doubtful whether the king could be brought to give his consent. Parliament and London were beset with
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