The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase PDF
Preview The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO RONALD H. COASE The Elgar Companion to Ronald H. Coase Edited by Claude Menard University of Paris, Pantheon-Sorbonne, France Elodie Bertrand National Center for Scientific Research, France ~Edward Elgar ~ PUBLISHING Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA ©Claude Menard and Elodie Bertrand 2016 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2015950276 This book is available electronically in the Elgaronline Economics subject collection · DOl 10.4337/9781782547990 ISBN 978 1 78254 798 3 (cased) ISBN 978 1 78254 799 0 (eBook) Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire Contents List off igures and tables V111 List of contributors IX List of reviewers XI Introduction 1 Claude Menard and Elodie Bertrand PART I COASE IN CONTEXT 1 Ronald Coase: the makings of an iconoclast 7 Mary M. Shirley 2 Coase and the London School of Economics in the 1920s-1940s 18 Jim Thomas 3 The transaction cost economics project: origins, evolution, utilization 34 Oliver E. Williamson PART II FOUNDATIONS: KEY CONCEPTS 4 Coase's theory of the firm: the next steps 45 Kenneth J. Arrow 5 Revisiting Coase on anticipations and the cobweb model 51 George W Evans and Roger Guesnerie 6 Coase's contribution to contract theory 68 Douglas WAllen and Yoram Barzel 7 Coase on property rights 83 John N. Drobak 8 Coasean bargaining to address environmental externalities 97 Gary D. Libecap 9 Coase on the nature and assessment of social institutions 110 Stephen Pratten v VI The Elgar companion to Ronald H. Coase PART III FIRM AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 10 The holdup game 131 Richard R. W Brooks 11 The employment relation and Coase's theory of the firm 148 Robert F Freeland 12 Managerial authority in the Coasean firm: an entrepreneurial perspective 160 Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Peter G. Klein 13 The realistic method of Ronald Coase: lessons for research on mergers and acquisitions 172 J. Harold Mulherin 14 Ronald H. Coase and the economics of network infrastructures 187 Claude Menard PART IV MARKET: STRUCTURE AND REGULATION 15 The Coase conjecture 205 Faruk Gul 16 What do we really know about durable goods monopolies? The Coase conjecture in economics and its relevance for the safety razor industry 222 John V.C. Nye 17 Coase and Demsetz on property rights: the case of radio spectrum 235 Thomas W Hazlett 18 Coase and the regulation of public utilities 249 John Groenewegen and Piet de Vries 19 Coase and the transaction cost approach to regulation 262 Marian W Moszoro and Pablo T Spiller 20 Emerging markets: what can we learn from Ronald Coase? 276 Ning Wang Contents vu PARTY LAW AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 21 Ronald Coase and the legal-economic nexus 291 Steven G. Medema 22 Coase and the departure from property 305 Benito Arrufiada 23 Coase's empirical studies: the case of the lighthouse 320 Elodie Bertrand 24 Some failures of the popular Coase Theorem 333 Joseph Farrell 25 The empirical accuracy and judicial use of the Coase Theorem (vel non) 346 Ward Farnsworth Index 359 Figures and tables FIGURES 6.1 Coase and the contract theory literature 78 14.1 Interactions defining the institutional structure of production 189 17.1 Wireless license 'interleaving'-regulatory vandalism 242 TABLES 13.1 Schematic of the takeover process 17 4 13.2 Example of a target firm that publicly announces it is for sale 178 13.3 For sale announcements and takeover competition 179 13.4 Regression analysis of merger premiums 181 19.1 A taxonomy of state types and regulatory hazards 270 viii Contributors Douglas W. Allen, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Canada Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University, USA Benito Arruiiada, Pompeu Fabra University and Barcelona GSE, Spain Yoram Barzel, University of Washington, Seattle, USA Elodie Bertrand, National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS), France Richard R.W. Brooks, Columbia Law School, USA John N. Drobak, Washington University School of Law, USA George W. Evans, University of Oregon, USA and University of St Andrews, UK Ward Farnsworth, The University of Texas School of Law, USA Joseph Farrell, University of California, Berkeley, USA Kirsten Foss, Norwegian School of Economics, Norway Nicolai J. Foss, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark Robert F. Freeland, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA John Groenewegen, Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands Roger Guesnerie, College de France and Paris School of Economics, France Faruk Gul, Princeton University, USA Thomas W. Hazlett, Clemson University, USA Peter G. Klein, Baylor University, USA and Norwegian School of Economics, Norway Gary D. Libecap, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA Steven G. Medema, University of Colorado Denver, USA Claude Menard, University of Paris, Pantheon-Sorbonne, France Marian W. Moszoro, University of California, Berkeley, USA and Kozminski University, Poland ix
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