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The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War This page intentionally left blank The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War An Analysis D A ANI SHER Translated by Moshe Tlamim Foreword by Shlomo Gazit McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London This book was originally published in Hebrew in 2003 by Ma’arachot, the IDF publishing house, which is affiliated with the Israel Ministry of Defence Publishing House. This book is a work of independent scholarship and was not sponsored by a government entity. It was translated by Moshe Tlamin. All photographs courtesy IDF and Ma’arachot Archives. LIBRARYOFCONGRESSCATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATIONDATA Asher, Daniel, Dr. [Li-shebor et ha-konseptsyah. English] The Egyptian strategy for the Yom Kippur war : an analysis / Dani Asher ; translated by Moshe Tlamim ; foreword by Shlomo Gazit. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7864-4253-9 softcover: 50# alkaline paper 1. Israel-Arab War, 1973—Campaigns—Egypt. 2. Israel-Arab War, 1973—Decision making. 3. Israel-Arab War, 1973—Egypt. 4. Israel-Arab War, 1973—Participation, Soviet. 5. Egypt— Military policy. 6. Egypt—Military relations—Soviet Union. 7. Soviet Union—Military relations—Egypt. 8. Civil-military relations—Egypt—History—20th century. 9. Strategy. I. Title. DS128.1.A8413 2009 956.04'8—dc22 2009016895 British Library cataloguing data are available ©2009 Dani Asher. All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. On the cover: Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (center) flanked by his military staff at his Army headquarters in Cairo on October 15, 1973 (Associated Press) Manufactured in the United States of America McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 611, Je›erson, North Carolina 28640 www.mcfarlandpub.com To my family, who encouraged and supported me with all their love in the lengthy production of this work: my late mother, Ruth, who gave me boundless support; my late father, Avraham, who instilled in me the foun- dations of historical research; my son, Itai, and his family, my daughters Noa and Nurit; and most of all my wife and constant companion— Menucha. This page intentionally left blank Acknowledgments During my years of service in the IDF (Israel Defense Forces), I had the opportunity to study various facets of the enemy and keep close tabs on “the other side.” Between 1970 and 1971, I was the Southern Command’s intelligence officer, and in this capacity was responsi- ble for carrying out research on the Egyptian army and carefully tracking its lengthy war preparations. The Egyptians had analyzed the course of events in the War of Attrition and learned the lessons from this conflict. The army’s training routine included specialized com- bat activities—such as bridging and water crossings—that were geared to the expected fighting conditions. On a few occasions I was able to observe the Egyptian forces, right under their noses, undergoing canal fording exercises. During the “Year of Decision”—the year after the cease-fire went into effect in August 1970—we waited for hostilities to break out every three months, and followed the Egyptians’ ground preparations for a major water-crossing operation. We discerned intensive activity along the canal: preparations at the banks for a breakthrough, getting fording barges ready, and prac- ticing descents into the water. We also noted the assembly and staging areas that they built close to the front, and observed how they were paving roads and constructing bridges to enable their forces to move from the assembly areas to the crossing points. In response we deployed artillery and antiaircraft missile batteries and cannons, set up headquarters and obser- vation posts, and drew up as complete a picture as possible of the Egyptian plan for travers- ing the canal. During this period I took part in operations and exercises designed to test the Egyp- tians’ capabilities. One of these involved moving an amphibious force in the Gulf of Suez and the Bitter Lakes—a skill that the Egyptians put to great use in the war. On February 28, 1971, I participated in another drill to test the “Or Yikarot” system. This system was based on oil- storage facilities located at the canal, that could spread an oil slick on the surface of the water and then be ignited electrically, turning the canal into a flaming inferno. The Egyptians viewed this system as a major obstacle that had to be overcome before a successful canal crossing could be made. My responsibility in Israeli operational planning and presenting the enemy’s probable courses of action provided me with tools I have been able to apply to this study for understanding the Egyptians’ preparatory stages of the war. In 1973 I was sent to the Jerusalem Brigade as its MI officer. In September of that year, on Rosh Hashana (the Jewish New Year), I inspected one of the brigade’s reserve battalions that was manning most of the strongholds on the Suez Canal. (Months later, with a team from the IDF’s History Branch, I investigated what had happened to the battalion during the first days of the fighting.) Prior to the outbreak of hostilities I also monitored changes in the vii viii Acknowledgments sector, although I was not involved in assessment analysis. Only in the last phases of the war did I return to the sector, this time with a brigade that had been transferred to Maj. Gen. Arik Sharon’s division and ordered to hold the sector west of the Suez Canal in the “agricul- tural barrier” south of Ismalia, facing the Egyptians’ Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Again I was deeply involved in the canal sector and even met with Egyptian paratroop officers (170th Brigade) holding the line opposite us. This encounter took place during the initial low-level “peace talks” between Israel and Egypt prior to Israeli disengagement. We discussed local issues, area problems, and border questions. During the talks I was also invited to visit Cairo. After serving in other sectors, including the Northern Command opposite the Syrians, I returned to the study of military doctrine. Between 1979 and 1984 I was in charge of ana- lyzing the enemy’s military doctrine. In this role, I examined the roots and principles of war, the Soviet army’s development of its war doctrine, and the way the Arab armies—especially the Egyptian armed forces—adopted it and put it into practice. In this capacity I wrote dozens of papers and lectured to soldiers and officers, expanding their knowledge of this subject. In the following years I collected material, visited libraries and archives, and met with scholars working on related topics. I kept abreast of the accounts and memoirs written by the commanders who fought in the war, and read the published material summarizing and for- mulating the lessons of the war. When I joined the faculty at the IDF’s Command and General Staff College, I realized the need to convey to officers—on their way to senior command and staff positions—information and critical explanations of the military situations and moves in past wars in general and Israel’s wars in particular. I would like to dedicate this book to all my students, in the belief that its material will prove vital to them for the roles they will be called on to fulfill. I began the task of gathering material for the research many years ago. The time and effort that I invested naturally came at the price of other obligations, and required the con- sent and understanding of many individuals—commanders, subordinates, military associates, and work colleagues—who recognized the subject’s importance and encouraged me to pur- sue it. For this, I am deeply grateful to them. I would especially like to thank my advisors at Tel Aviv University: Professors Shimon Shamir and Yehuda Wallach, whose encouragement and assistance enabled me to undertake this project; Prof. Eyal Ziser, who replaced Prof. Shamir when the latter became incapaci- tated; Dr. Mati Mayzel, for his help; and Prof. Yoav Gelber of Haifa University, who recom- mended a new version of this study, and facilitated its acceptance as a doctoral thesis. Thanks are also due to the Jaffee Center of Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University for the support it extended during my research; to the commander of IDF military colleges, Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, and the director of the Command and General Staff College, Brig. Gen. Yaakov Zigdon, for helping me obtain permission to have the work published as a book; and to Lt. Col. Hagai Golan, commander of the “Ma’arachot” publishing house, and my editor, Zvi Ofer, both of whom labored tirelessly in transforming the research into book form and getting it published. Table of Contents Acknowledgments vii Foreword by Major General Shlomo Gazit (Ret.) 1 Preface 3 Introduction: The Egyptian Military Concept on the Eve of the Yom Kippur War 9 1—The Egyptian Army: From the Six-Day War to the End of the War of Attrition 13 2—Israel’s Defense System on the Sinai Front 35 3—Egypt Prior to the Yom Kippur War: Acceptance of the Soviet Warfare Doctrine 56 4—Potential Problems in the Campaign: Planning the Military Solutions 72 5—The Soviet Warfare Doctrine and Its Application by the Egyptians 97 Conclusion 178 Appendix A: The Soviet Warfare Doctrine—The Attack at the Divisional and Field Army Levels 187 Appendix B: The Development of Deception in the Soviet Warfare Doctrine 202 Appendix C: The Infantry Division Crossing a Water Obstacle, Order No. 41 from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 205 Appendix D: The Second Infantry Division’s Attack Order in the Yom Kippur War 226 Appendix E: Battle Order No. 1 for Operation “Granite 2 Improved,” Issued by the Commander of the Seventh Division 228 Appendix F: The IDF’s Defense System on the Suez Canal and Its Capture by the Attacking Forces 233 Chapter Notes 241 Bibliography 267 Index 272 ix