OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES NO 59 / APRIL 2007 THE ECB SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS (SPF) A REVIEW AFTER EIGHT YEARS’ EXPERIENCE ISSN 1607148-4 by Carlos Bowles, Roberta Friz, Veronique Genre, Geoff Kenny, 9 771607 148006 Aidan Meyler and Tuomas Rautanen OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES NO 59 / APRIL 2007 THE ECB SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL FORECASTERS (SPF) A REVIEW AFTER EIGHT YEARS’ EXPERIENCE * by Carlos Bowles, Roberta Friz, Veronique Genre, Geoff Kenny, Aidan Meyler and Tuomas Rautanen In 2007 all ECB This paper can be downloaded without charge from publications feature a motif http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network taken from the €20 banknote. electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=967604. * This work was carried out while all the authors were working in the Euro Area Macroeconomic Developments Division of the ECB. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank (ECB). We would like to thank Juan Angel Garcia, Hans-Joachim Klöckers, Gerard Korteweg, Bettina Landau, Klaus Masuch, participants at a Eurosystem Monetary Policy Committee seminar and an anonymous ECB referee for their useful comments. Any errors are of course the sole responsibility of the authors. Corresponding author: Aidan Meyler ([email protected]). Individual anonymised SPF data are available upon request, for further information please contact [email protected] © European Central Bank, 2007 Address Kaiserstrasse 29 60311 Frankfurt am Main Germany Postal address Postfach 16 03 19 60066 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone +49 69 1344 0 Website http://www.ecb.int Fax +49 69 1344 6000 Telex 411 144 ecb d All rights reserved. Any reproduction, publication or reprint in the form of a different publication, whether printed or produced electronically, in whole or in part, is permitted only with the explicit written authorisation of the ECB or the author(s). The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank. ISSN 1607-1484 (print) ISSN 1725-6534 (online) CONTENTS CONTENTS ABSTRACT 4 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE SPF RESEARCH 47 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 ANNEXES 1 INTRODUCTION 9 1 Is there bias in the SPF forecast results? Evidence from a panel 2 SHORT- TO MORE MEDIUM-TERM data analysis 49 FORECASTING PERFORMANCE 13 2 A closer look at individual 2.1 Forecast performance statistics forecaster quality 52 for the aggregate SPF 13 3 The probability forecasts from 2.2 Testing for bias in the SPF 18 the ECB SPF: A preliminary 2.3 Comparing SPF and Consensus assessment 56 Economics forecasts 20 2.4 Heterogeneity and individual REFERENCES 61 forecast performance 21 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 3 ASSESSING FORECAST UNCERTAINTY OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 65 USING THE SPF 28 3.1 Alternative dispersion-based uncertainty indicators from the SPF 29 3.2 Comparison of alternative uncertainty indicators from the SPF 32 3.3 Other characteristics of the forecast probability distribution 34 3.4 Overall assessment of uncertainty measures 36 4 SPF LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS 37 4.1 Long-term inflation expectations: an indicator of the ECB’s credibility 38 4.2 Long-term real GDP growth expectations: a view on trend potential output growth 42 4.3 Long-term unemployment expectations 45 ECB Occasional Paper No 59 3 April 2007 ABSTRACT Consistent with this, respondents have generally reported the balance of risks to their long-term Eight years have passed since the European unemployment expectations to be to the upside Central Bank (ECB) launched its Survey of citing concerns as to whether required structural Professional Forecasters (SPF). The SPF asks a reforms in the labour market will be undertaken panel of approximately 75 forecasters located as the main factor behind this risk assessment. in the European Union (EU) for their short- to longer-term expectations for macroeconomic variables such as euro area inflation, growth and unemployment. This paper provides an initial assessment of the information content of this survey. First, we consider shorter-term (i.e., one- and two-year ahead rolling horizon) forecasts. The analysis suggests that, over the sample period, in common with other private and institutional forecasters, the SPF systematically under-forecast inflation but that there is less evidence of such systematic errors for GDP and unemployment forecasts. However, these findings, which generally hold regardless of whether one considers the aggregate SPF panel or individual responses, should be interpreted with caution given the relatively short sample period available for the analysis. Second, we consider SPF respondents’ assessment of forecast uncertainty using information from their probability distributions. The results suggest that, particularly at the individual level, SPF respondents do not seem to fully capture the overall level of macroeconomic uncertainty. Moreover, even at the aggregate level, a more sophisticated evaluation of the SPF density forecasts using the probability integral transform largely confirms this assessment. Lastly, we consider longer-term macroeconomic expectations from the SPF, where, as expectations cannot yet be assessed against so few actual realisations, we provide a mainly qualitative assessment. With regard to inflation, the study suggests that the ECB has been successful at anchoring long- term expectations at rates consistent with its primary objective to ensure price stability over the medium term. Long-term GDP expectations – which should provide an indication of the private sector’s assessment of potential growth – have declined over the sample period and the balance of risks reported by respondents has generally been skewed to the downside. ECB 4 Occasional Paper No 59 April 2007 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY forecasters form their inflation expectations, the SPF also collects information on expectations According to economic theory, expectations for GDP growth and the unemployment rate play a crucial role in how the economy functions, over both long and short horizons, as well as as well as in how, and the extent to which, probability distributions surrounding the policy agents, including central banks, can forecast point estimates for all three influence macroeconomic outcomes.1 At the macroeconomic variables. most fundamental level, this reflects the idea that economic agents, both firms and households, This paper constitutes an initial assessment of have strong incentives to make their key the information content of the SPF by providing economic decisions (e.g. consumption, a detailed analysis of the survey data collected investment or price-setting) in a way that over the period between 1999 and 2006. Given optimally takes into account the likely future that the available sample period is still relatively developments of the economic variables short, the results of this first comprehensive relevant to such decisions. In line with the assessment of SPF data must be treated with importance of expectations in understanding some caution. Nonetheless, a number of the functioning of the economy, the European important insights can be obtained based on the Central Bank (ECB), in particular, has a clear experience over the last eight years. interest in being able to assess the private sector’s short to medium-term inflation SHORT TO MORE MEDIUM-TERM FORECASTING expectations when conducting its regular broad- PERFORMANCE based analysis and assessment of the risks to price stability. Information about such A key result of the analysis presented in this expectations can, for example, provide evidence paper is that SPF panel members, like most on the extent to which shocks affecting the other forecasters, have tended to underpredict inflation process are perceived by agents as euro area inflation for most of the period since likely to persist or be more short-lived. In 1999. However, this result warrants careful addition, it is clearly useful to collect interpretation. On the one hand, the clear information on private sector forecasts for tendency for SPF participants to underestimate inflation, as this can serve as a point of the inflation outcome over one and two-year comparison with – though no replacement for horizons points to the need to exercise a high – the Eurosystem’s own assessment of the degree of caution when using such expectations inflation outlook. Finally, a key ECB concern is as a predictor of future inflation. On the other also to obtain information that can help assess hand, our analysis shows that a large part of this the extent to which private agents hold “systematic” error can be explained by the expectations that are in line with the ECB’s sequence of asymmetric and largely quantitative definition of its price stability unpredictable shocks that hit euro area inflation objective. Such expectations can help in over the period; oil prices, weather-related food assessing the credibility of the single currency’s shocks, unforeseen changes in administered monetary policy, as perceived by economic prices and indirect taxes. Adjusting for the experts located throughout the European Union effects of such shocks, there is far less evidence (EU). To this end, the Survey of Professional of a systematic underprediction or bias in the Forecasters (SPF) also seeks to gather SPF inflation expectations. information about longer-term expectations for the euro area Harmonised Index of Consumer We found much less of a one-sided pattern in Prices (HICP), the price index on which the GDP growth forecast errors. In the early stages ECB announced its performance would be 1 Carroll (2001) cites Keynes (1936) as among the first to assessed. In order to provide the broader recognise the importance of expectations within the economic macroeconomic context in which professional system. ECB Occasional Paper No 59 5 April 2007 of the survey, respondents underestimated the reflect a high degree of commonality in the strength of GDP growth. However, following information available (and not available) to the slowdown in 2001, GDP growth was then panel members, thus leading them to “get it consistently overpredicted by respondents; an wrong” not only in the aggregate, but also error common to many other forecasters. The individually. A similar pattern is observed for tendency towards overprediction is most clearly both GDP growth and the unemployment rate, evident for the two-year ahead horizon. Finally, in the sense that the overall pattern of forecast the pattern of errors in the unemployment rate errors is broadly and consistently shared among forecasts is somewhat at odds with the errors the vast majority of panel members. related to GDP. Respondents have tended to expect a higher unemployment rate than the Another cross-sectional feature of the SPF actual outcome, but if they were to have forecast panel that we examined was whether there was the real side of the economy according to any perceptible difference between the Okun’s Law, one would have expected an error performance of panel members from the in the opposite direction. However, once financial sector and the performance of those account is taken of statistical and methodological from the non-financial sector. In general, for all revisions in the unemployment rate, the three macroeconomic variables and all horizons, inconsistency between the unemployment rate the evidence does not point to any significant and GDP growth expectations is substantially differences between these two sectors. reduced. Additionally, the effects of labour Additionally, there is no evidence that economic market reforms should be taken into account. conditions in the country of the individual panel members have had any significant explanatory More formal regression tests also provide power for their euro area expectations. As a additional evidence of bias in the aggregate final component to our analysis of short to more SPF results. This evidence is strongest for medium-term forecasting performance, we inflation expectations and weaker for investigated whether there are forecasters who unemployment and GDP growth expectations. are systematically better or worse than others. Importantly, some of these findings may be The analysis suggests that a small number of subject to a small sample bias. Using a longer forecasters consistently perform above average sample period, in which the shocks driving for some variables and horizons (although not inflation might be less asymmetric and one- systematically for all variables and all sided, could reverse this result. Whilst these horizons). results confirm the need to exercise caution when considering the information content of FORECAST UNCERTAINTY the SPF for future macroeconomic outcomes, SPF forecasts generally appear to be slightly The SPF provides several dimensions for superior to naïve and purely backward-looking measuring forecast uncertainty. One may rely benchmarks. Lastly, in terms of bias and overall on information provided by individual point predictive accuracy, the SPF performance over estimates only and consider disagreement the period analysed is broadly similar to the among the forecasters’ views as an indication results of other similar surveys, such as of uncertainty, or one may also make use of the Consensus Economics. probability distributions that each panel member assigns to his/her forecast, which is one of the Our analysis of the individual SPF replies SPF’s most original features. Disagreement suggests that the broad pattern of the individual among panel members, simply measured by the forecasts is essentially the same as that of the standard deviation of individual point estimates, aggregate SPF results. For example, at least does not appear to be a good proxy for overall 90% of the panel consistently forecast inflation macroeconomic uncertainty. Across all to be below the actual outcome. This may macroeconomic variables and horizons, the ECB 6 Occasional Paper No 59 April 2007 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY spread of the cross-sectional distribution is failed to accurately assess the risks of lower rarely sufficiently wide to encompass the actual growth and higher unemployment associated outcome. This suggests some limitations to the with the economic downturn. These conclusions usefulness of measures of macroeconomic suggest a need for caution when using the SPF uncertainty that are based on the cross-sectional distributions as an indicator of the overall distribution of point estimates alone, i.e. a high uncertainty about the macroeconomic outlook. degree of consensus is not necessarily an However, it would seem that more definitive indication of a low level of forecast uncertainty. and robust conclusions must await the For example, over the period 2001-04, the accumulation of further data. short-term uncertainty about GDP growth, measured as the sum of the average variance of LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY individual distributions and the variance of point estimates, tended to rise and remain high, Our analysis of the longer-term expectations in while the level of disagreement among panel the SPF dataset is more descriptive, since such members actually declined. expectations cannot be assessed against actual realisations. There are, nonetheless, a number More generally, since the start of the SPF, the of findings worth noting. First, a key feature pattern of short-term forecast uncertainty, as that emerges is the clear anchoring of long-term perceived by SPF respondents, has been broadly inflation expectations at a level in line with stable for both inflation and the unemployment the definition of price stability adopted by the rate. For GDP growth, however, the SPF has ECB Governing Council. Throughout each of indicated a higher degree of variability, as the eight years analysed, average long-term reflected in a considerable increase in perceived expectations have remained “below, but close short-term uncertainty over the period 2002-03. to, 2%”, and therefore fully in line with the For both inflation and the unemployment rate, ECB’s quantitative definition of its price risks over the one-year horizon have generally stability objective. In particular, average long- been assessed by SPF respondents to be skewed, term expectations have exhibited considerable on average, to the upside over the period resilience notwithstanding the persistently 1999-2006. This contrasts with GDP growth higher-than-expected inflation outcomes over for which downside risks have tended to shorter horizons. Rather than revising upward predominate. their long-term inflation expectations in response to the numerous short-run inflation There are also some indications that panel shocks, respondents have instead reflected such members may not fully internalise the overall developments in the balance of risks. In line level of macroeconomic uncertainty. For with these findings, while there has been a example, compared with the level of uncertainty significant decline in disagreement about long- indicated by the historical volatility of the term inflation forecasts among SPF participants, actual inflation rate, the perceptions of uncertainty surrounding each individual individual panel members indicate a lower level forecast has tended to increase slightly over of uncertainty. In particular, individual panel time. members tend to give a relatively low weight to outcomes further away from the average. While At the level of individual panel members, a this possible underestimation of overall number of other important features also emerge inflation uncertainty is much less severe at the from our analysis. First, those individual panel aggregate level, our evaluation of the aggregate members with expectations towards the lower SPF density forecasts suggests some evidence end of the cross-sectional distribution (around that respondents failed to accurately assess the 1.5%) have gradually revised upward their risk of higher inflation outcomes over this long-term inflation expectations but nevertheless period. In addition, SPF respondents may have they are still in line with price stability (e.g. ECB Occasional Paper No 59 7 April 2007 around 1.8/1.9%). This process has resulted in a gradual “narrowing” of the cross-sectional distribution of point estimates, implying higher consensus that outcomes will be below, but close to, 2%. However, another feature of the cross-sectional distribution of long-term inflation expectations was its “bi-modal” nature, giving rise to a relatively high proportion of respondents reporting long-term expectations of 1.8% and 2.0%. Only a small proportion quoted longer-term inflation at 1.9%, although this has changed in 2006. The relatively high proportion of respondents reporting exactly 2.0% or slightly above cautions against any complacency on the part of the ECB in taking its credibility for granted. Finally, over the longer horizons, our analysis of real variables also reveals some interesting findings. In particular, long-term GDP expectations – which should provide an indication of the private sector’s assessment of potential growth – have declined over the sample period. Moreover, the overall level of uncertainty surrounding long-term expectations for GDP growth has been assessed by SPF respondents to have been quite stable over the period 1999-2006, although the balance of risk has generally been skewed to the downside. The uncertainty surrounding the longer-term outlook for the unemployment rate is generally assessed to be considerably higher than for either inflation or GDP growth. In addition, the risks to the longer-term unemployment rate expectations have been persistently assessed by SPF participants to be on the upside. Respondents have linked this to concerns as to whether required structural reforms in the labour market will be undertaken. ECB 8 Occasional Paper No 59 April 2007 1 INTRODUCTION 1 INTRODUCTION of the risks to price stability.3 Information about such expectations could, for example, provide Around the time of its inception in June 1998, evidence on the extent to which shocks affecting the ECB began preparations – in collaboration the inflation process are perceived by agents as with the national central banks (NCBs) in the likely to persist or to remain more short-lived. EU – to establish a survey of the private sector’s Indeed, at the start of Stage III of European expectations of future euro area macroeconomic Monetary Union (EMU), the whole topic of developments, in particular inflation. And thus, building forecasts for the euro area the first SPF took place in the first quarter of macroeconomy represented new ground, with 1999, immediately following the establishment much uncertainty existing about which of the single currency. Since then, up to the underlying economic models to adopt and their fourth quarter of 2006, 32 surveys have been associated parameters. In this context, it was carried out on a quarterly basis, thereby deemed useful to collect information on private contributing to the growth of a rich source of sector forecasts for inflation, as it could serve information on euro area macroeconomic as a point of comparison with – though no forecasts and expectations.2 For a more detailed replacement for – the Eurosystem’s own overview of the ECB SPF and its main features, assessment of the inflation outlook. see Garcia (2003), which provided a preliminary assessment of the SPF. In this paper, based on a In addition, at the start of Stage III of EMU, a longer time span of data, we attempt to provide key concern for the new central bank was to a more comprehensive review of the performance obtain information that could help in the of the SPF to date. assessment of the extent to which private agents held expectations that were in line with the HISTORY AND MOTIVATION FOR THE SPF ECB’s quantitative definition of its price stability objective. Information on such A number of factors underpinned the ECB’s expectations would help in the assessment of wish to initiate the SPF and collect information the credibility of the new single currency’s on the macroeconomic expectations and monetary policy, as perceived by economic forecasts of the private sector. In particular, experts located throughout the EU. In this according to mainstream economic theory, respect, the SPF sought to gather information expectations play a crucial role in influencing about medium to long-term expectations for the how the economy functions, as well as how and euro area HICP, the price index on which the to what extent policy agents, including central ECB announced that its performance would be banks, can influence macroeconomic outcomes. assessed. At that time, no other survey measures At the most fundamental level, this reflects the of long-term inflation expectations for the euro idea that economic agents, both firms and area HICP were available.4 Lastly, in order to households, have strong incentives to make their key economic decisions (e.g. consumption, 2 In this paper, we use the terms “expectations” and “forecasts” investment or price-setting decisions) in a way interchangeably. that optimally takes into account the likely 3 Issing (2003) provides an overview of the two-pillar approach used by the ECB, in the context of the ECB’s 2003 review of its future developments of the economic variables monetary policy strategy. See also ECB (2004a). relevant to such decisions. 4 Since then a number of surveys, such as those conducted by Consensus Economics and the Eurozone Barometer, have published information on long-term inflation expectations in In line with the importance of expectations in the euro area, defined in terms of the HICP. In the United States, understanding the functioning of the economy, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has conducted a Survey of Professional Forecasters since 1990 – although this the ECB, in particular, had a clear interest in survey actually dates back to 1968 when it was originally known being able to assess the private sector’s short to as the ASA/NBER Economic Outlook Survey and was conducted by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National medium-term inflation outlook when conducting Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). See Croushore (1993) its regular broad-based analysis and assessment for further details. ECB Occasional Paper No 59 9 April 2007
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