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NationalitiesPapers(2019),47:5,715–718 doi:10.1017/nps.2019.42 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Introduction to the Special Issue: The Donbas Conflict MarleneLaruelle* TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,Washington,DC,USA *Correspondingauthor.Email:[email protected] Introduction Many scholarly studies of the Ukrainian conflict look at its origins, focusing either on the international level (external interference) or the domestic one (including ethnic, linguistic, eco- nomic,andregionaltensions)(Pikulicka-WilczewskaandSakwa2015).Theinternationallevelof analysis draws attention to external factors, namely Russia’s conscious decision to fragment Ukraine and make it a “failed state” in order to avoid its moving closer to the European Union andtheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO).EventhoughMoscowdeniesplayinganyrole in the conflict, several international and independent Russian sources have confirmed the direct involvementofRussianregulartroops(Urban2015;Sutyagin2015;YashinandShorina2015).For scholarswhoemphasizetheprimacyoftheinternationalaspectoftheconflict,thecurrentwarin DonetskandLuhanskisnotacivilwarbutawarorchestratedanddirectedfromMoscowagainst UkraineviaRussianproxies(Motyl2014;Kuzio2015). AsecondcategoryofscholarsemphasizestensionswithintheUkrainianstateandseeseastern Ukraine,particularlytheDonbasregion(aswellasCrimea),asthemosttroublesomeandvolatile part of the country. A first group of domestic-focused scholars insists on the role of ethnicity, language, and fragmented identities (Arel 2014; Kulyk 2012; Sotiriou 2016). A second group advances an analysis of Ukraine’s structural weaknesses, in terms of historical legacies, state functioning,relationsbetweenthepoliticalauthoritiesandtheoligarchs,anddeepregionaldivides (Kudelia 2012;Katchanovski 2014;Darden 2014;Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2015;Sakwa2015; Shevel2015).Athirdgroupfavorsaneconomicinterpretationoftheconflict(Zhukov2014),aswell astheautonomyofindigenousactorssuchaslocalpoliticalandeconomicelites(Matveeva2016; Matsuzato2017). Thesetworesearchdirectionsconfrontedeachotherintwopublicdebates.SergiyKudelia(2014) proposed a research agenda that would focus on the literature of group-based strategies and emotionalresponses(Gurr1970;Horowitz2001;Petersen2002)inordertointerprettheconsid- erablegrievancesoftheDonbaspopulationtowardtheUkrainianstate.AndreasUmlandcountered thisbystatingthatnoneoftheinsurgentgroupshadtheorganizationalorfinancialresourcesto fundaprotestmovement—asign,accordingtohim,thattheyshouldbeunderstoodasMoscow’s proxies(Umland2014).AseconddebatehasemergedasareactiontoDriscoll’s(2019)useofthe notionof“civilwar”todescribetheconflict. YetitisnotcontradictorytoconsiderboththattheDonbasconflictreliesonwidespreadgrassroots discontent that drove it from peaceful protests to violence1 and that Moscow was able to instru- mentalize and feed this discontentto its ownends—warfare againstthe Euromaidangovernment. Petersen’s(2011)workontheWesterninterventionintheBalkansandMylonas’(2013)studyofthe rationalebehindastate’sdecisiontomobilizeco-ethnicsabroadaregoodexamplesofthistrendthat emphasizestheinterplaybetweendomesticissuesandforeignagendas.Localleaders,eveniffunded abroad,arenotpurepuppetsorpawnsoftheirpatrons.Theyarerootedinlocal,everydaypoliticsthat allowsthemtosecurelocalsupportandactaspowerbrokerswithdecision-makingautonomyandthe ©AssociationfortheStudyofNationalities2019. 716 MarleneLaruelle abilitytocombinelocalgrievanceswitha“higher”geopoliticalagenda(Diani2003;PollettaandJasper 2001;McAdam,Tarrow,andTilly2001;Tilly2008). FiveyearsafterthebeginningoftheconflictineasternUkraine,wearestilllackingacompre- hensive, scholarship-based, multilayered analysis able to integrate the conflict’s different dimen- sions.WearealsomissingacomparativestudyofboththeRussianandtheUkrainiansidesthat wouldinterpretthemasamirrorgame,intimatelyinterrelatedandrespondingtoeachother.This specialissuehopestoaddonemodestlayertoourknowledgeoftheconflictbylookingatbothsides simultaneously, combining research on Ukraine and on Russia, with a specific focus on actors’ agency. Openingthisspecialissue,SergiyKudelia’sarticleexplorestheimpactofregionalidentityonthe population’sperceptionoftheconflict.BasedonasurveyconductedineighttownsofDonetskand Luhanskoblastsinspring2015,itshowsthatrespondentswhoidentifiedthemselveswith“Donbas” advancedmorepositiveviewsofthesecessionistauthorities,interpretingtheinsurgenciesasbeing basedongenuineideationalmotivesandnotseeingthemasfeedinginsecurity.Onthecontrary, thosewhoidentifiedwith“Ukraine”asawholeweremorecritical,seeingthesecessionistauthorities ascriminalgroupsresponsibleforviolence.Hisstudyconfirmsthedeepdivideoverinterpretingthe motivesoftheconflict;differentstorylinesmayremainabarriertoreconciliation andthefuture reintegrationofthetwoinsurgentregions. OntheRussianside,ifpublicsupportfortheannexationofCrimeawashighlyconsensualand easy to secure, the Donbas conflict necessitates more public relations work to make it both controllable by the Kremlin and logical to domestic public opinion while securing Moscow’s “plausibledeniability”ofsupportinglocalinsurgents.Onthelatterpoint,SanshiroHosaka,inspired byWilson’s“virtualpolitics”frame,investigatestheso-calledSurkovleaks—thousandsofemails, released by Ukrainian hackers, that allegedly belong to Vladislav Surkov. His article offers an insightful window into how the Kremlin managed—or orchestrated, depending on the reader’s interpretation—the different plots and storylines created around the Donbas conflict by myriad actors.Iftheleaksdisappointthosehopingtofindawell-craftedKremlin-ledsecretplantodrive Ukraine apart, they nevertheless reveal the everyday chaotic, reactive management of the Novorossiyamyth. Aspreviouslysaid,Hosaka’sfindingsdonotcontradictKudelia’s,asthetwostudiesaresituated at different levels. The fact that part of the Donbas population feels genuine solidarity with the insurgents’discourseontheregion’sspecificidentitydoesnotprecludetheKremlinfromhaving regulatedandorientedthenarrativesandtheactionsofallthepowerbrokersmediatingbetweenthe insurgentsandtheRussianauthorities. The following three articles delve into the question of “volunteer fighters”—an understudied angle,forobviousreasonsrelatedtodifficultfieldworkconditionsandchallengestodatacollection. WiththeexceptionoftheworkofAndrásRácz,whoattemptedtocalculatethenumberofforeign fightersontheRussiansidefollowingdifferentmethodsandarrivedataconservativeestimateof between 8,000 and 15,000 (Rácz 2017), we do not have at our disposal in-depth research on the topic. In this issue, Ivan Gomza and Johann Zajaczkowski investigate the case of the Azov movement, which became the mostactive and influential far-right actor on the Ukrainian scene duetoitslegitimacyasaparamilitarybattalionthatprovedefficientonthebattlefrontandhelped the Ukrainian army to secure territory and regain some of the towns lost to insurgents. The movement has now succeeded in entering more institutionalized politics, deploying its veterans’ espritdecorpstolobbyintenselyanddevelopvigilanteactivitiesagainstthosedeemedunpatriotic. ThelasttwolastarticlesexplorethedestinyofRussianvolunteerfightersinDonbas,whichhas beenmorechallenging thanthatoftheirUkrainian counterparts. Whereasthe Azovfighters are celebratedasnationalheroesinUkraine,theRussianfightersfindthemselvesinagrayzone,since theRussianauthoritiesdonotrecognizetheirinvolvementintheconflictandcanthereforehonor neitherfallensoldiersnorvolunteerfighters.NataliaYudinaandAlexanderVerkhovskyfirstlook attheRussiannationalistgroups’engagementtoDonbasandtheirpathtoit,eitherbyindividual NationalitiesPapers 717 choice or by following more organized strategies advanced by institutionalized groups such as Cossacksorthemainradicalmovements.Atthesametimeasvolunteerswerefightingalongsidethe insurgents,theRussianultra-right movemententeredintoadeepcrisisithasyettoexit,leaving fighters with fewoptions onceback home.Marlene Laruelle seconds thatanalysis bytracing the transformations of the Novorossiya utopia from the point at which volunteer fighters began to return to Russia and found themselves compelled to reinvent themselves in a new context. She delvesintothemainDonbascelebrities’struggletoreconvertfromwarintopolitics—thedestinies ofIgorStrelkov,Aleksandr Borodai,andZakharPrilepin exemplify thistrend—andthe replace- mentofactiononthegroundwithinvestmentintheNovorossievedenieliteratureorpublitsistika. HerarticleconcludesbystatingthatNovorossiyaasautopiahasdied,survivingonlyintheliterary realm,withlimitedconnectionstothefrozenconflictgoingoninDonbas. Disclosure. Authorhasnothingtodisclose. Note 1 Lowstatecapacityandlegitimacyisprominentintoday’sliteratureonthecausesofcivilwar.See Fearon 2007; Laitin 2007; Laitin and Shapiro 2007; Hoeffler 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug2013;Sambanis2005;etc. References Arel, Dominique. 2014. “Double-Talk: Why Ukrainians Fight Over Language.” Foreign Affairs, March 18. http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/141042/dominique-arel/double-talk. Cederman,Lars-Erik,KristianSkredeGleditsch,andHalvardBuhaug.2013.Inequality,Grievances,andCivilWar.Cambridge, UK:CambridgeUniversityPress. Darden,Keith.2014.“Ukraine’sCrisisofLegitimacy.”ForeignAffairs,March3.https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia- fsu/2014-03-03/ukraines-crisis-legitimacy. Diani,Mario.2003.“LeadersorBrokers?PositionsandInfluenceinSocialMovementNetworks.”InSocialMovementsand Networks:RelationalApproachestoCollectiveAction,editedbyMarioDianiandDougMcAdam,105–122.NewYork: OxfordUniversityPress. Fearon,James,KimuliKasara,andDavidLaitin.2007.“EthnicMinorityRuleandCivilWarOnset.”AmericanPoliticalScience Review101(1):187–193. Gurr,Ted.1970.WhyMenRebel.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress. Hoeffler,Anke.2001.“‘Greed’versus‘Grievance’:AUsefulConceptualDistinctionintheStudyofCivilWar?”Studiesin EthnicityandNationalism11(2):274–285. Horowitz,Donald.2001.TheDeadlyEthnicRiot.Oakland,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress. Katchanovski, Ivan. 2014. “Role of Far-Right Nationalists in Ukraine Protests.” The Moscow Times, February 12. http:// www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/role-of-far-right-nationalists-in-ukraine-protests/494349.html. Kudelia,Sergiy.2012.“TheSourcesofContinuityandChangeofUkraine’sIncompleteState.”CommunistandPost-Communist Studies45(3–4):417–428. Kudelia,Sergiy.2014.“DomesticSourcesoftheDonbasInsurgency.”PONARSEurasiaPolicyMemo351(September2014). http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/domestic-sources-donbas-insurgency. Kulyk,Volodymyr.2011.“LanguageIdentity,LinguisticDiversityandPoliticalCleavages:EvidencefromUkraine.”Nations andNationalism17(3):627–648. Kuzio,Taras.2015.“Ukraine’sCitizensHaveDefeatedPutin’s“NewRussia.””FinancialTimes,July7.http://blogs.ft.com/ beyond-brics/2015/07/07/ukraines-citizens-have-defeated-putins-new-russia-now-poroshenko-must-defeat-ukraines-oli garchs/. Laitin,David.2007.Nations,StatesandViolence.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Laitin,David,andJacobShapiro.2007.“ThePolitical,EconomicandOrganizationalSourcesofTerrorism.”InTerrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness, edited by Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress. Matsuzato,Kimitaka.2017.“TheDonbassWar:OutbreakandDeadlock.”Demokratizatsiya25(2):175–201. Matveeva,Anna.2016.“NoMoscowStooges:IdentityPolarizationandGuerrillaMovementsinDonbass.”SoutheastEuropean andBlackSeaStudies16(1):25–50. McAdam,Doug,SidneyTarrow,andCharlesTilly.2001.DynamicsofContention.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. 718 MarleneLaruelle Motyl,Alexander.2014.“TheSourcesofRussianConduct.TheNewCaseforContainment.”ForeignAffairs,November16. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-11-16/sources-russian-conduct. Mylonas, Harris. 2013. The Politics of Nation-Building. Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. Petersen, Roger. 2002. Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, Resentment in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress. Petersen, Roger. 2011. Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversityPress. Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka, and Richard Sakwa, eds. 2015. Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, Propaganda and Perspectives.E-IRInfo. Polletta, Francesca, and James Jasper. 2001. “Collective Identity and Social Movements.” Annual Review of Sociology 27: 283–305. Pop-Eleches,Grigore,andGraemeB.Robertson.2015.“PoliticalMachinesandRegionalIdentities:EvidencefromPost-Soviet Ukraine.” http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/PopEleches01222015/Pop-Eleches-Robertson-Ukraine-patronage-and- region-CSDP-2015.pdf. Rácz,András.2017.“TheElephantintheRoom:RussianForeignFightersinUkraine.”InNotOnlySyria?ThePhenomenonof ForeignFightersinaComparativePerspective,editedbyK.Rekawek,60–73.Amsterdam:ISOPress. Sakwa,Richard.2015.FrontlineUkraine:CrisisintheBorderlands.London:I.B.Tauris. Sambanis.Nicholas.2005.UnderstandingCivilWar:EvidenceandAnalysis,Vol.2—Europe,CentralAsia,andOtherRegions. Washington,DC:WorldBankPublications. Shevel,Oxana.2015.“TheMicro-DynamicsoftheOnsetofViolenceintheDonbas.”PONARSworkshop“AnalyzingViolence inUkraine,”GeorgeWashingtonUniversity,May18–19. Sotiriou,Stylianos.2016.“TheIrreversibilityofHistory:TheCaseoftheUkrainianCrisis(2013–2015).”SoutheastEuropean andBlackSeaStudies16(1):51–70. Sutyagin,Igor.2015.“RussianForcesinUkraine.”RUSIBriefingPaper,March. Tilly,Charles.2008.ContentiousPerformances.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Umland,Andreas.2014.“InDefenseofConspirology:ARejoindertoSerhiyKudelia’sAnti-PoliticalAnalysisoftheHybrid WarinEasternUkraine.”PONARSblog,September30.http://www.ponarseurasia.org/node/7274. Urban,Mark.2015.“HowManyRussiansareFightinginUkraine?”BBC,March10.http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 31794523. 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Citethisarticle:Laruelle,M.2019.IntroductiontotheSpecialIssue:TheDonbasConflict.NationalitiesPapers47:715–718, doi:10.1017/nps.2019.42 NationalitiesPapers(2019),47:5,719–733 doi:10.1017/nps.2019.18 SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE Back From Utopia: How Donbas Fighters Reinvent Themselves in a Post-Novorossiya Russia MarleneLaruelle* TheGeorgeWashingtonUniversity,Washington,DC,USA *Correspondingauthor.Email:[email protected] Abstract Howtocopewiththeendofutopia?Howtomovefrommakinghistoryonaday-to-daybasistocapitalizing onalegend?ThatisthedilemmaRussianveteransoftheDonbasinsurgencyhavefacedsincetheexalting atmosphereofNovorossiyafadedaway.Inthisarticle,ItracethetransformationsoftheNovorossiyautopia from the point at which Russian volunteer fighters began to return to Russia and found themselves compelledtoreinventthemselvesinanewcontext.Ifirstlookatthedifficultreconversionfromwarto politicsofDonbasheroessuchasIgorStrelkovandAleksandrBorodaiandhowtheireffortstolaunchnew structuresbasedontheirwarlegitimacyhavesucceededorfailed.Ithenturntoinvestigatethebirthofnew heroes, such as the writer Zakhar Prilepin, who wave the metaphorical flag of Donbas at a time when exaltationofthewarhasdeclined.Afterthat,IexplorehowNovorossiyahasbecomealiteraturegenrethat occupiestheshelvesofRussianbookstores,spanningfromNovorossievedenie—the“scienceofNovoros- siya”—totherichsubgenreofwarmemoirsandveterandiaries. Keywords:Novorossiya;Donbas;Russiannationalism;veterans Introduction Howtocopewiththeendofutopia?Howtomovefrommakinghistoryonaday-to-daybasisto capitalizingonalegend?ThatisthedilemmaRussianveteransoftheDonbasinsurgencyhavefaced since the exalting atmosphere of Novorossiya faded away. While the self-proclaimed People’s RepublicsofDonetskandLugansk(DNR andLNR)1bothstillexist andfunctionassecessionist territories,Novorossiyaasautopianprojectnolongerdoes;itisdeadinallitsdifferentconceptions. As a territorial notion, there is no longer an expectation that eastern Ukrainian territories will secedeandattempttojoinRussia;eventheephemerousNovorossiyaconfederationofthetwode facto republics was terminated in May 2015 by its founder, Oleg Tsarev, a businessman from Dnipropetrovsk then the head of the “Novorossiya Parliament.” As a revolutionary ideology of “Russian Spring” transforming the Putin regime, Novorossiya has likewise disappeared. The Kremlin retook control of the insurgency in the summer of 2014 and progressively pushed out thevolunteerfighters,whohadlargelylefttheconflictzonebytheendof2016.Theregimehasdone agoodjobofmanagingthePandora’sboxopenedwiththewarwithUkraine,notallowingitselfto beco-optedbythenationalists:since2016,theideologicalexaltationhasgraduallydeclinedandis currentlystagnantatalowlevel. One of the most revealing signs of the death of Novorossiya—the most powerful nationalist utopia to take shape in post-Soviet Russia—was the June 2017 proclamation by Aleksandr Zakharchenko, the then-leader of the de facto Donetsk Republic, of the “federal state of ©AssociationfortheStudyofNationalities2019. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 720 MarleneLaruelle Malorossiya”—ahistoricaltermusedtodefinetheUkrainianterritoriesduringthetsaristera.This eccentricdeclarationdidnotwinthesupportoftheLuganskauthoritiesandwasmockedevenby the Kremlin. But beyond the anecdote, the shift from the notion of Novorossiya to that of Malorossiya reveals the death of the “new Russia” myth: the Donbas insurgency no longer calls forautopianalternativetoRussia,instead—andmoremodestly—presentingitselfasanalternative totoday’sUkraine(Korrespondent,July19,2017). In this article, I trace the transformations of the Novorossiya utopia from the point at which RussianvolunteerfightersbegantoreturntoRussiaandfoundthemselvescompelledtoreinvent themselvesinanewcontext.IfirstlookatthedifficultreconversionfromwartopoliticsofDonbas heroessuchasIgorStrelkovandAleksandrBorodaiandhowtheireffortstolaunchnewstructures basedontheirwarlegitimacyhavesucceededorfailed.Ithenturntoinvestigatethebirthofnew heroes,suchasthewriterZakharPrilepin,whowavethesymbolicflagofDonbasatatimewhen exaltationofthewarhasdeclined.Afterthat,IexplorehowNovorossiyahasbecomealiterature genre that occupies the shelves of Russian bookstores, spanning from Novorossievedenie—the “scienceofNovorossiya”—totherichsubgenreofwarmemoirsandveterandiaries. SituatingResearchonDonbasVeterans This article issituated atthe intersection of three fields ofresearch: the evolution of the Donbas conflict five years after its eruption; the transformation of the landscape of mercenaries, war veterans, and paramilitary associations in Russia; and the relationship between state structures andfiguresIcall“ideologicalentrepreneurs.” Most academic discussions of the Donbas conflict identify three main actors: the Russian state, the Ukrainian state, and the leadership of the secessionist republics of Donetsk and Lugansk.Butthereisafourthactorthatisoftenoverlooked:thefightersthemselves,especially the volunteers, whose motivations for war remain murkier than those of the other actors and havenotbeenexploredthusfar.OneoftheonlystudiesatourdisposalisashorttextbyAndrás RáczdiscussingthedifferentwaystocalculatethenumberofforeignfightersontheRussianside oftheinsurgency—hearrivedataconservativeestimateofbetween8,000and15,000—andthe limitationsoftheexercise(Rácz,2017). Volunteers are often accused—even by secessionist authorities—of being responsible for a disproportionatenumberofcasualtiesandactsofirregularviolence.Arichliteratureonpathsto individual radicalization may help us capture which factors prompt individuals to engage in violence. Such studies typically look at cases of either right-wing extremist and skinhead gangs orviolentjihadistgroupsandindividuals.Scholarsofsocialpsychologyhavearguedthatthequest forpersonalsignificanceleadstoactiveengagementinradicalactivity(Sageman2004;McCauley andMoskalenko2008;DeciandRyan2000).Thequestforsignificanceisnotalinearprocess,but may ebb and flow depending on external factors, such as an individual’s exposure to collective violentideologies,abilitytojoinradicalcommunities,andvirtualorrealcontactsonadailybasis. Socialmediachat-rooms,“how-to”magazines,andwebsitesprovidebroadknowledgeaboutthe ideologyandmethodsofviolence,aswellasconnectinglonewolveswithsimilarly-mindedpeople acrosstheworld(Weimann2014;Spaaij2012;Pantucci2011). The literature on civil war and insurgencies (Della Porta and LaFree 2011; Ganor 2002; McCauleyandMoskalenko2011),aswellasonmercenariesmorespecifically,likewiseofferssome theoreticalinsightsintocertainaspectsofthisresearch.Thephenomenonofmercenarieshasbeen widely studied, with the focus primarily on its “normalization” as embodied by private security contractors, especially in the context of the Iraq war (Stoker 2008; Krahmann 2012; Petersohn 2014).Recentresearchanalyzesmodernmercenariesasrenewingaformofmedievalarrangement whereby insurgent leaders guaranteed local social order by recruiting “payroll” fighters (McFate 2015), a tactic resembling some gang patterns (Manwaring 2010). Fitzsimmons (2013) takes an innovativeapproachthatlooksathownewmercenarygroupsplaceheavyemphasisonbehavioral Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. NationalitiesPapers 721 norms, encouraging their personnel to think creatively, take personal initiative, enhance their technicalproficiency,anddevelopasenseofloyaltytotheirfellowfighters.Marten(2012)broadens thescopeofanalysisbylinkingthequestionofmercenariestowarlords,which,asDriscollnotesin referencetoGeorgiaandChechnya,someweakstatesregardasexpedientsolutionstotheproblems ofstabilityandgovernance(Driscoll2015).Anotherfruitfuldiscussionlinksconflictprocessesto theemergenceofneworganizationalformsbystudyingtheoverlapbetweenformalorganizational hierarchies (militia, regime, etc.) and relational networks (Padgett and Powell2012;Padgett and McLean2006). Russian fighters in the Donbas conflict include both professional mercenaries—fighting for money—and radicalized individuals looking for personal significance through their combat experience.Asawhole,theybenefittedfromrelativelyfavorablepublicopinionathome:inMay 2014,61percentofrespondentstoaLevadaCentersurveysupportedtheinvolvementofRussian volunteersinDonbas,afigurethatdecreasedslightlyto53percentinmid-2015(themostrecent pointforwhichdataisavailable)(LevadaCenter2015a).Yetonly29percentwerefavorabletoward theirinvolvementinRussiandomesticpolitics,while43percentwereopposedtoit.Theconstit- uencythatwasmostsupportiveoftheirpoliticalinvolvementathomewashighlyeducatedyetlow- incomeindividualsaged40andabove(LevadaCenter2015b).Thegapbetweenpublicsupportfor thevolunteers’roleintheconflictandalackofdesireforthemtobecomepoliticallyactiveathome is significant for these fighters as they cease violent activity and attempt to deradicalize through politics.Thepresentarticlehonesinonpreciselythisissue. Thisbringsustoasecondbodyofliterature,theonerelatingtowarveterans.Oncevolunteer fightersleavetheconflictzone,theyundergoanidentitytransformation,becomingwarveterans— with the ambiguity that the war in Donbas is not recognized as such by the Russian authorities. Research on Russian veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars usually focuses on their war experience and traumas, as well as on the way they negotiate social benefits with the state. Yet their role as powerbrokers in the field of military and patriotic education has largely remained understudied, addressed mostly in the works of Kulmala and Tarasenko (2016) and Sieca- Kozlowski (2010).Veterans fromthe warinAfghanistan werethe first tobecomesociallyactive and engage in bringing up the youth in a patriotic manner, gradually joined by veterans of the Chechenwars,formerspetsnaz,membersoftheAlfaelitetroops,andallkindsofcontractorsfrom theRussianarmy.Alltheseformermenofwarneedtobuildanewprofessionalnicheforthemselves afterre-enteringcivilianlife.Theymakethemostoftheirprivilegedrelationshipwiththepower ministries,oftenenjoyingdiscountedaccesstomilitaryandparamilitaryfacilitiesandinstallations, suchasshootingranges.Professionalizingtheirpatrioticcommitmentandmilitaryskillscanthus besimultaneouslyasurvivaltacticforthosefacingreintegrationdifficulties,awayoflegitimizing theirnewsocialidentitybytrainingyouth,andaprofitablebusinessventure(manyopenprivate securityservicesforbusinessmen[Laruelle2015]).TheDonbasveteranshopetofollowthesame path:theylobbyforthesamestatusandassociatedbenefits,andlooktoenterthesameprofessional nicheandsecureaprivilegedrelationshipwithpowerministries. Lastbutnotleast,manyleadersoftheNovorossiyawaralsobelongtothecategoryof“ideological entrepreneurs.” I define them as individuals who have genuine room to maneuver in terms of developinganideologicalagendaandtakingadvantageofthemanygreyzonestheregimeoffersfor cultivating patronage networks. Just as oligarchies are not secure but remain dependent on individual loyalty to some members of the ruling elite, ideological entrepreneurships are also unstable; they can be challenged and their ideational empire dismembered. These entrepreneurs mayworkformaterialbenefitsandrecognition,yettheystillbelieveinwhattheyfightfor.Inthe case of Novorossiya, both Igor Strelkov and Aleksandr Borodai worked under the protective umbrella of the Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who has never hidden his monarchist convictions and involvement in the Ukrainian crisis. Once back home, however, they had to navigateamuchmoreconstrainedenvironmentwheregettingstatesupportrequiresrenegotiating previouscommitments. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 722 MarleneLaruelle FallenHeroes:ADifficultPoliticalReconversion TheDonbasinsurgents,bothlocalsandRussiancitizens,didnothidetheirdisappointmentatwhat they interpreted as the Kremlin’s lack of support. All had been hoping for a quick and easy annexation/reintegrationintotheRussianFederationonthemodelpioneeredbyCrimea,butthis never materialized. A second disappointment has been the post-Novorossiya context: even the legendaryleadersofDonetskandLuganskhavestruggledtocapitalizeontheirwartimelegitimacy. Although discouraged, many former warlords have nevertheless remained loyal to the Russian regime and have hesitated to move into open opposition to the Kremlin, even if the authorities’ approvaloforganizedgrassrootssupportfortheconflictceasedasearlyas2015.Here,Idelveinto thetrajectoriesoftwoofthemainpersonificationsofNovorossiya—thewarlordIgorStrelkovand the “polit-administrator” Aleksandr Borodai—to analyze two divergent strategies of civilian reintegrationintoRussia. Strelkov,theSolitaryMonarchist ThetrajectoryofIgorStrelkov—hisrealsurnameisGirkin—(1970),theiconicwarlordofDonetsk, revealsthechallengesofbuildinganautonomouspoliticalcareerbasedonlegitimacyderivedfrom theDonbaswar.StrelkovhasatrackrecordoffightingfortheRussiannationalistcause,firstasa defenderoftheWhiteHousein1993,theninTransnistria,Yugoslavia,Chechnya,and,eventually, CrimeaandDonbas,wherehebecamethefaceoftheSlavyanskbattle.Ahistorianbytraininganda specialist on the Russian civil war, openly monarchist, he has participated over the years in numerous historical reenactments, playing the role of a White officer (The Insider 2014). This influencedhisleadershipduringtheconflict:amonginsurgents,theflamboyantmilitaryleaderwas knownforhiseffortstorestoreorderanddemandsforamorehierarchicalchainofcommand,as wellasforhisattemptstosubstantiatemilitaryorderwithreligiousarguments.Forexample,atthe end of July 2014, a few days before his resignation, he prohibited the use of obscene language amonghistroops,allegingthatRussia’senemiesusedobscenitiestoinsultholyiconsandthatthis practiceshouldthereforebeconsideredasin(Ikorpus2014).Strelkov,whoservedasministerof defenseforthedefactoDNR,wassubsequentlydismissedfromthispostforunclearreasons,likely because he was too much of a liability after the shooting-down of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17(MH17)andwasknownfornotfollowingMoscow’sorderscloselyenough(Belkovskii,quoted inMongait2015). UponhisreturntoRussia,Strelkovkeptalowprofileforseveralmonthsbeforeattemptingto capitalizeonhisprestige.InNovember2014,hewasknownbyonly21percentofrespondentstoa Levadasurvey,butofthese,41percenthadasomewhatpositiveperceptionofhim(Levada2014). ByMarch2015,hewasknownby27percentofpeople,55percentofwhomwerefavorabletoward him,26percentneutral,andonlyeightpercentnegative(Levada2015b).AsnotedbytheLevada Center,StrelkovwasthuslesswidelyknownthanAlexeiNavalny,butmorepopularamongthose whodidknowofhim.InNovember2014,hedecidedtolaunchtheNovorossiyamovement,with thedualaimofpromotinghiscauseinRussiaandofferinghumanitarian—andpotentiallyfinancial —supporttotheinsurgents.TheNovorossiyamovementhingesonStrelkov’sownprestige,which, attheendof2014,wasatitszenithamongnationalist-mindedRussians.Onthenationalistsegment of the Russian Internet, posters portrayed him as various Russian heroes throughout the ages— Alexander Nevsky against German and Baltic invaders, Suvorov against the Ottomans and the Poles,KutuzovagainstNapoleon,theofficersofboththeWhiteandRedArmies,andtheSoviet heroesatStalingrad—andhewasevenfeaturedinsomeonlinecartoons.2Amushroomingcultof personalitytookshape,asevidencedbythe(nowdefunct)websitesuperstrelkov.ru. Yetthissuccessamongnationalist-mindedRussiansandhisnetworksinsomepowerministries, likelyincludingtheForeignSecurityServices(FSB),werefarfromsufficienttosecureStrelkovany political niche. In need of a new, more inclusive strategy, he co-founded K25, the January 25Committee,inJanuary2016.Hispartnersincluded,amongothers,EduardLimonov,theleader Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. NationalitiesPapers 723 oftheforbiddenNationalBolshevikPartyandoftheoppositionalmovementOtherRussia;Egor Prosvirnin, the founder of the website Sputnik i Pogrom; the radical nationalist essayist Maksim Kalashnikov; and Konstantin Krylov, the leader of the National Democrats. The Committee’s founding resolution advanced a Russian imperial agenda, with a specific focus on Ukraine, and supportedLimonov’sproposaltoinstitutionalizeApril5astheDayoftheRussianNation(Den’ russkoi natsii, commemorating Alexander Nevsky’s victory over Western crusaders); it also proposed the abolition of Article 282 of the Penal Code, which targets incitement to hatred (Dvizhenie Novorossiia Igoria Strelkova 2016). On paper, the Committee could have become a newlandmarkontheRussiannationalistlandscape,abletounifyfiguresfromdifferentdoctrinal traditions—ethnonationalistssuchasProsvirninandKrylov,EurasianistandStalinistfigureslike Kalashnikov, and representatives of pro-tsarist nostalgia such as Strelkov himself. Yet K25 was ineffectiveandrapidlytransformedintoamoreStrelkov-centricorganizationwiththedepartureof LimonovandProsvirinasearlyasMarch2016. Sincethen,StrelkovhascontinuedtoappearindividuallyandtofeedtheNovorossiyamovement websiteaswellashisownbuthasnotengagedinanyotherformofoutreach.Hetriedtojointhe RussianMarch,buthewasnotwelcomethereduetothetensionsbetweenhismovementandthe Russian National Front organizing the March (Istrelkov.ru 2017). His status in post-Novorossiya Russiaisanuncomfortableone,locatedinakindofgrayzonebetweenoppositionandofficialization: unlikeotherfamousnationalistfigures,suchasLimonov,hehasnotbeenarrestedandcondemned, butnordoesheenjoyofficialstatusinthewaythat,forinstance,theconservativethinkerMikhail Remizov,PresidentoftheInstituteofNationalStrategy,does.Strelkovwastemporarilybarredfrom appearinginmainstreammedia,buthasprogressivelybeenreintegratedaspartofthe“constructive opposition,”puttinghiminasimilarpositiontoAleksandrProkhanovorAleksandrDugin. Thisambivalentstatuswasparticularlyvisibleduringthe2017onlinedebateheagreedtoenter intowithAlexeiNavalny,inwhichStrelkovpositionedhimselfasareserveofficer,loyaltoRussia andthereforetoitslegitimateauthoritiesevenwhenhedisagreeswiththemideologically.During the debate, he advanced a boldmonarchist discourse, contending that contemporaryRussia had inherited false borders drawn by the Bolsheviks and should fight for the return of its imperial borders and the expulsion of every imported Western element (Naval’nyi LIVE 2017). He denounced Russia’s position on the Minsk Agreements as a betrayal of the Donbas cause and accusedtheleadersoftheDNRandLNRofbeingcorruptmercenariescontrolledbyRussianand Ukrainianoligarchs.Thisopenlymonarchistandimperialistdiscursivelinecannothopetoreach largeconstituencies,minimizingStrelkov’sabilitytocapitalizeonhispositionasthemostfamous Russianwarlord. Borodai:Veterans’ActivitiesasaToolforReintegration AmoresuccessfulcaseisthatofAleksandrBorodai(1972),formerprimeministeranddeputyprime ministerofthedefactoDonetskRepublic.LikeStrelkov,Borodaiprideshimselfonhisnationalist biography,whichincludesthe1993WhiteHousefight,Transnistria,andChechnya(thelastasawar journalist) (RBK Daily, May 26, 2014). But Borodai has been more responsive than Strelkov to Moscow’svisionoftheconflict,workingasapara-governmentalfigurechannelingcommunication fromtheKremlintotheDonetskauthorities.BorodaiseemstohavebeencuratedbyVladislavSurkov, Putin’sformereminencegriseandnowassistanttothepresidentfortheDonbasconflict,andcanthus countonmoredirectaccesstopowerinstitutionsthanStrelkov(Kofman2017).ThishasledPavel Gubarev (2016, 209), the first people’s governor and minister of foreign affairs of the Donetsk Republic and an ideologist of the “Russian Spring,” to denounce Borodai as a traitor to the Novorossiyacause,describinghimasa“newcomer”(priezzhii)withoutthelegitimacyofthe“locals” (tutoshnie)anddecryinghispurportedrefusaltofightagainstcorruptionandracket. InanotherdistinctionfromStrelkov,Borodaihaslongcultivatedfriendshipswithsomefigures on the nationalist landscape who are better-integrated into the military, such as Aleksandr Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use. 724 MarleneLaruelle Prokhanov.BorodaiandProkhanov,whohavecollaboratedonseveralmediaprojects,haveknown each other since the former’s childhood, as Borodai is the son of a respected philosopher, Yuri Borodai, who was a friend of Eurasianist historian and Soviet-era semi-dissident Lev Gumilev (1912–1992)(Navigator,May19,2014;Russkaiasluzhbanovostei,May20,2014). OnceBorodailefttheDonbaswartheaterinAugust2014,hisreintegrationinRussiawaseasier than Strelkov’s due to his launch of the Union of Donbas Volunteers (Soiuz Dobrovol’tsev Donbassa),registeredbytheMinistryofJusticeinthesummerof2015.3Yettheassociationfailed initsprincipalaimofbeingrecognizedasaveterans’association:officially,Russiaisnotatwarwith Ukraineandvolunteerfightersneversecuredanyofficialstatusasprivatecontractors;assuch,they cannot be given the same benefits and recognition as veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya.Somedeputies,suchastheLDPR’sSergeiZhigarevandFairRussia’sMikhailEmelianov, proposedgivingDonbasveteransaccesstothesocialprotectionsofferedtootherveterans,butthe Dumadidnotpassthebill(NovyeIzvestiia2018).Privatedonationshaveneverthelessenabledthe Union to provide some humanitarian and legal aid, help volunteer fighters find jobs upon their returntoRussia,offerassistancetothefamiliesoffallensoldiers,andraisefundstobuildgravesor installcommemorativeplaquesforthosewhowerekilledincombat.4 Theassociationhasopenedseveraldozenregionaloffices,albeitthateachoftheseprobablyhas just a few people. On May 6, 2018 (St. George’s Day in the Julian calendar), the association celebratedtheDayofVolunteerswithameetingofDonbasveteransaroundeachcity’sMonument to Fallen Soldiers of the Great Patriotic War, with different flags for the Donetsk, Lugansk, and Novorossiyarepublics.Basedonthevideoclipcommemoratingtheevent,Icalculatedthataround 300peopleattendedtheseevents,withapproximately50inMoscow(includingBorodaihimself),a similarnumberinRostov-on-Don,oneofthemaincentersoftraininganddepartureforDonbas, 30inNovosibirsk,andsmallergroupsofbetweenfiveand20peopleinabout25othercities(Soiuz Dobrovol’tsev Donbassa 2018).5 This is a far cry from the 600 delegates said to have met at the Poklonskaia Gora Museum in Moscow in October 2015, who were purported to represent “the 50,000-strongDonbasvolunteerarmy”(Boiko2015). TheAssociationhasengagedinlobbying,althoughthishasnotbeensuccessfulthusfar.Itsmain objective is to secure the support of Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Avia- tion,andNavy(DOSAAF),theassociationinchargeofmilitaryeducationundertheMinistryof Defense, in order to be integrated into its military-patriotic training networks (Novye Izvestiia 2018).TheAssociationhopedthatthepresidentialdecreemaking2018theYearoftheVolunteer wasasignofgoodwillfromtheauthorities,butitwasunderstoodbytheKremlinasacelebrationof allkindsofcharityactivism,notmilitaryengagementspecifically.Somemunicipalities,suchasthe Kalugaregion,organizedofficialeventswiththeUnionofDonbasVolunteerstodiscusscoordi- nation of volunteer activities, but this is a rare case of official co-optation at the regional level (Novorossiia2018).Membersoftheassociationthusfindthemselvesconfinedtoreproducingthe activityof many other military-patriotic associations led by former special forces or contractors: settingupsmallprivatesecurityfirmsandpatrioticclubsforyouththatallowthemtoreintegrate intocivilianlifeandusetheircombatskillsandlegitimacy. Theassociationseesitselfasa“mobilizationalreserve,”accordingtoBorodai(Boiko2015),but withouthismenbeinglegallyrecognizedasveterans,theirpotentialtointegrateintoregularunits willbeconstrained.Somesources,chieflywithintheUkrainianmedia,6haveclaimedthatBorodai’s associationisprimarilyatraininghubfornewvolunteers.Thereisnoevidenceofthis,however. GiventheRussianauthorities’reluctancetosendnonregulararmyorprivatecontractorstoDonbas andtheassociation’sobediencetotheKremlin(onwhichitsstatusdepends),itseemsdoubtfulthat itperformssuchafunction. AtthesametimeasthemainrepresentativesofthedefactoDonetskRepublicarestrugglingto findtheirnicheinRussia,theyhavetocompetewiththemanyothermovementsthatsentvolunteer fighters to Donbas. One of those to have gained in visibility due to the conflict is the Russian ImperialMovement(Russkoeimperskoedvizhenie,RID).TheRIDhasexistedsincethemid-2000s Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 10 Feb 2022 at 15:19:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
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