The discourse trap and the US military: from the War on Terror to the surge

276 Pages·2013·3.169 MB·English

by  Jeffrey Michaels

The Discourse Trap and the US Military
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The Discourse Trap and the US Military
From the War on Terror to the Surge
By Jeffrey H. Michaels
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the discourse trap and the us military
Copyright © Jeffrey H. Michaels, 2013.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the
world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers
Limited, registered in England, company number 785998,
of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above
companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.
ISBN-1 3: 978-0230-37204-7
Library of Congress Cataloging-i n-P ublication Data
Michaels, Jeffrey H.
The discourse trap and the US military: from the War on Terror to the
surge / by Jeffrey H. Michaels.
p. cm.
ISBN 978–0 – 230– 37204– 7 (alk. paper)
1. United States. Dept. of Defense—H istory—2 1st century. 2. United
States—A rmed Forces—P ublic relations—H istory—2 1st century.
3. Military planning—U nited States—H istory—2 1st century. 4. United
States—M ilitary policy—D ecision making. 5. Military doctrine—U nited
States—H istory—2 1st century. 6. Afghan War, 2001—U nited States.
7. Iraq War, 2003–2 011— United States. 8. War on Terrorism,
2001–2 009. 9. Discourse analysis, Narrative. I. Title.
UA23.6.M555 2013
355.601'4—d c23 2012039050
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Scribe Inc.
First edition: March 2013
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
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Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Global War on Terrorism 17
3 Shock and Awe 81
4 Characterizing the Irregular Adversary in Iraq 107
5 The Surge: From Iraq to Afghanistan 147
6 Conclusion 167
Notes 175
Bibliography 221
Index 257
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Acknowledgments
My original interest in the impact of discourse and terminology on the US
Defense Department stemmed from my own experience working in the sub-
basement of the Pentagon during the period 2004– 5. However, it was only in
the course of my doctoral research in the Department of War Studies at King’s
College London that I was able to move from the world of practice to the world
of theory and explore the wider implications of the discursive entrapment I had
witnessed firsthand. The completion of this book, based largely on my doctoral
thesis “The Discourse Trap: Constitutive Effects of Terminology Development,
Dissemination and Control in the US Defense Department 2001– 2006,”
would not have been possible without the support of many individuals. First
and foremost, I am greatly beholden to my supervisor, Professor Sir Lawrence
Freedman, for his brilliant guidance, encouragement, generosity, friendship,
and remarkable patience over the course of many years. I am also grateful for
the critiques provided by my thesis examiners Theo Farrell and Stuart Croft.
Numerous friends and colleagues were also kind enough to read and comment
on my PhD manuscript and subsequent revisions. Special thanks must go to
Marcus Faulkner, Matthew Ford, David Ucko, Joshua Geltzer, Samir Puri,
Lowell Schwartz, Tim Sweijs, and Rudra Chaudhuri. Numerous officials and
former colleagues in the Department of Defense who will remain nameless pro-
vided both source material and guidance and their assistance proved invaluable
for my research. In addition, the support of Peter B. Martin in initially opening
up many doors in Washington, DC, for me effectively started the chain reac-
tion that eventually led to this book. On a more personal note, thanks are due
to my parents, Alan and Kathy, as well as other members of my family, for their
unwavering love and enduring support.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
I
n Makers of Modern Strategy, John Shy and Thomas W. Collier make
a brief mention of the importance of language in “revolutionary war,”
claiming that words are weapons. They state, “Language is used to iso-
late and confuse enemies, rally and motivate friends, and enlist the support
of wavering bystanders.” Rather than being merely a tool of war, they also
argue that language can shape a war: “But the same language directs— or
misdirects— military effort; the rhetoric of political conflict becomes the real-
ity of strategic theory.”1 This observation is one of the primary ideas inform-
ing this study. It is my contention that the importance political and military
systems attach to the creation, dissemination, and control of language in war
extends beyond “revolutionary war” and instead is a key feature of conflict
more generally. Once introduced into the political- military discourse, words
can shape a battlefield and be battled over themselves. This terminological
phenomenon has so far received scant academic attention and represents a
gap in the existing war studies literature.
This book aims to bridge this gap by examining how the discourses devised
for political or military reasons can have a much greater, and in many ways,
different impact than was intended when the discourse was first introduced.
It will argue that discourse plays an integral role in conflict, direct as well as
indirect. Discourse can take on a life of its own, forcing political and military
leaders and their associated institutions to fall victim to a “discourse trap.” This
phenomenon is defined as the action that is motivated or constrained primar-
ily by the discursive constructs ostensibly created to serve the needs of policy
makers. In some instances, political and military leaders may feel compelled to
adopt policies and practices in order to justify or abide by their discourse. In
other instances, the discourse, perhaps out of sheer repetition, creates a “self-
fulfilling prophecy”— defined as “a false definition of the situation which makes
the originally false conception come true”— and can seriously impair strategic
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