The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942–49

205 Pages·1993·28.922 MB·English

by  John Baylis (auth.)

THE DIPLOMACY OF PRAGMATISM
Also byJohn Baylis
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY (editor)
ANGLO-AMERICAN DEFENCE RELATIONS
BRITISH DEFENCEPOLICY:Striking the Right Balance
BRITISH DEFENCEPOLICY IN ACHANGING WORLD (editor)
BRITAIN, NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (with Ken Booth)
CONTEMPORARYSTRATEGY,VolumesIandII(withKenBooth,John Garnett
and Phil Williams)
DILEMMAS OF WORLD POLITICS (editor withN.Rengger)
MAKERS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY (editor withJohn Garnett)
NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE(withGeraldSegal.Edwina Moreton
and LawrenceFreedman)
SOVIETSTRATEGY (editor with Gerald Segal)
The Diplomacy of
Pragmatism
Britain and the Formation of NATO,
1942-49
John Baylis
Reader inInternational Politicsand Deanofthe
Faculty ofEconomicsand SocialStudies
University of Wales,Aberystwyth
©John Baylis 1993
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1993 978-0-333-57835-3
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of
this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or
transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with
the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court
Road, London WlP 9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages.
First published 1993 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 978-1-349-39096-0 ISBN 978-0-230-37237-5 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230372375
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
ll'ansferred to digital printing 1998
02!780
To Brian
Contents
Acknowledgements viii
Preface IX
Introduction
Wartime Planning for a PostwarEuropean
Security Group, 1941---44 8
2 Emerging Differences between the Chiefs of Staff
and the Foreign Office, 1944-45 19
3 Postwar Attitudes towards the Soviet Union 37
4 Towards a Treaty with France 49
5 The Western Union and the Brussels Pact 63
6 The Chiefs of Staffand the Continental Commitment 76
7 The Pentagon Talks, 22 March - 1April 1948 92
8 The Washington Talks on Security,6July -
9 September 1948 98
9 Last-Minute Problems, 9 September 1948-
28 March 1949 107
10 Conclusions and Achievements 116
Appendix 1 The Dunkirk Treaty, 4 March 1947 131
Appendix 2 'The Overall Strategic Plan', May 1947 134
Appendix 3 The Brussels Treaty, 17March 1948 152
Appendix 4 'The Pentagon Paper', 1April 1948 157
Appendix 5 The North Atlantic Treaty 160
Sources 164
Notes 166
Select Bibliography 184
Index 186
vii
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my thanks to the British Academy for a grant in
1983 which enabled me to do research at the National Archives in the
United States. I am particularly grateful to Professor Inis Claude and the
Departmentof Governmentand Foreign Affairs for giving me a 'home' at
the University of Virginia, Charlottesville during this research trip to the
United States. My thanks also go to the University of Wales, Aberystwyth
for granting me sabbatical leave to complete the research on the book and
for providing financial support to visit the Canadian Public Archives in
September 1990.Iamalso grateful toProfessorJohn Garnett for providing
me withadditionalfinancial support from theWilson Fund tovisit Canada.
Ialso wish torecord my gratitude to Lord Gladwynfor allowing me an
interview andtoSirNicholas Hendersonfortheconsiderabletrouble hehas
gone to in corresponding with the author on various occasions. Dr Cees
Wiebes, Dr Bert Zeeman, Dr Peter Foot, Dr John Young and Dr Alex
Danchev havealsoprovidedveryuseful advice onvarious topicscoveredin
the book.
I am grateful to the library staffs of numerous institutions and archives
for their assistance. InparticularIwish toexpress my thanks tothe staffof
the George C. Marshall Library, at Virginia Military Institute; the Library
of Congress; the National Archives in Washington; the Harry S. Truman
LibraryinIndependence;thePublicArchivesofCanadainOttawa;Churchill
College, Cambridge; and the British Library of Political and Economic
Science. I am especially grateful to the staff at the Hugh Owen Library in
Aberystwythfor theircheerful assistanceand thestaffatthePublic Record
Office inLondon.Copyrightmaterial from thePRO hasbeen used withthe
permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
Some of the material in this book originally appeared in International
Affairs and The Journal ofStrategic Studies.I am grateful to the editorial
boards of both journals for allowing me to use the material in this study.
My thanks also go to Carol Parry who has borne the arduous task of
typing the manuscript for this book with great cheerfulness and skill.Iam
also grateful toAlan Macmillan who, for the third time inrecent years, has
undertaken the tedious task of indexing a book for me.
Finally, and most importantly, I am indebted to my wife, Marion, and
daughters,Emma andKatiefortheirmoralsupport andencouragement,and
tomybrother, Brian, forhisconsiderablehospitalityandgoodcounsel over
the years.
viii
Preface
In the years 1989 and 1990 the whole face of European security was
transformed. Initially, people's revolutions took place all over Eastern
Europe, dramatically sweeping away the reactionary Communist regimes
which had been in power since the 1940s. This was followed by free
elections and an uneven process of democratic reform. Unlike previous
challenges to Communist rule, there was no intervention by the Soviet
Union, which was under the reformist leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.
Indeed the Soviet leader indirectly encouraged the process of reform and
continued to pursue a wide range of remarkable foreign policy initiatives
designed to transform East-West relations. Unilateral cuts in defence ex
penditure, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and Eastern
European countries, unprecedented concessions in arms control negotia
tions, all signalled a fresh approach to diplomacy and security. With the
signing of the Treaty on the FinalSettlement with Respect toGermany by
the four allied states (Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and
France) and the two Germanies on 12 September 1990 and German
reunification on 3Octoberof thesame year,theforty-five yeardivision of
Germany wasended. 1991alsosawthedisintegration of theSoviet Union.
To most contemporary observers of the postwar era the Cold War finally
had been brought to a close.
However, these breathtaking events brought uncertainties over future
European security arrangements. As a result, one of the key tasks for
statesmen in the 1990s is the creation of a new European security order.
Despite its flaws the old postwar security system based on confrontation
and nuclear deterrence had helped to keep the peace foran unprecedented
period in European history. Now that the Cold War has ended and the
foundations of the old order have been irretrievably undermined, the key
question iswhatisgoing to take itsplace. Anew Europeanorder hasto be
built,different fromtheold, takingaccount ofthenewsuperpowerrelation
shipandtherapidityofthechanges takingplace intheWesternand Eastern
halves of Europe.
In this context, in which uncertainty prevails and new turbulent forces
are beginning to stir, the history of the formation of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation in the late 1940s is of some interest.
Insome important respects the world of the 1990s and the world of the
late 1940s are very different. Inparticular, Britain's status in the interna
tional community is very different. Inthe late forties a major hot war had
IX
x Preface
justended and the victorious allies had tostruggle with the reemergenceof
strong ideological suspicions and conflicting interests. In the 1990s, al
though the Cold War hasjustended and some residual suspicions remain,
amuchgreaterconsensus isevidentamong the leading powers ontheneed
tobuildasystem ofsecurity which islessdependentonthekind ofmilitary
confrontationanddivision ofEurope which hascharacterisedthe lastforty
five years. Inparticular, ideological confrontation between the major pow
ers is less pronounced and the former Soviet Republics are much more
concerned with the process of domestic reform than with achieving a
cordonsanitaireinEastern Europe. Atthe same time democracy is break
ingout allover Eastern Europe.Some ofthestructuresoftheold system of
security also remain in place to help provide confidence as the process of
transformation is taking place. Unlike the late I940s Germany isalso now
reunited under a democratic government. In some respects, therefore, the
internationalenvironmentoftheearly 1990sappears much moreauspicious
forthecontinuationofglobal harmony comparedwith thegatheringclouds
ofthe immediatepostwaryears.Inother respects, the withdrawalofSoviet
forces from the Eastern European states, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, and thecivil warinYugoslaviahaveraised newproblemswhich are
very different from those of the late 1940s.
Despitethese importantdifferences,however, therearesomesimilarities
between the two periods which makes the story of the formation of NATO
instructive. In the late 1940s the old classical system of security had been
totally undermined by the events of the Second World War. By 1990 the
foundations ofthepostwarorderhadalso been significantlyeroded.States
men inthe late 1940swerefaced with great uncertaintiesas they attempted
todevelop new concepts and structuresdesigned toestablish a more stable
and peaceful international order. Much the same is true intheearly 1990s.
In the late I940s the first priority was tobuild asystem based on coopera
tion with the Soviet Union. The need to establish cooperative relations
between theWest and theformer SovietRepublics remains essential inthe
present era.
In the late 1940sanew order only emerged asa result ofacombination
ofpragmatism,patienceand vision. Inthisrespectthehistory oftheforma
tion of NATO is particularly illuminating. Immediate problems had to be
resolved.Flexible andpainstakingdiplomacy wasnecessary. Newconcepts
had to be forged. A creative process of developing a new security system
had to be undertaken. Keeping different options open, trying continuously
to blend different economic, political and security dimensions of policy
togetherand keeping sightofthegeneral directionitwashoped tomove in,