The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration: Radical Change and the Limits of Conditionality PDF
Preview The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration: Radical Change and the Limits of Conditionality
Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos Argyris Passas The Depoliticisation of Greece’s Public Revenue Administration Radical Change and the Limits of Conditionality ’ The Depoliticisation of Greece s Public Revenue Administration (cid:129) Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos Argyris Passas The Depoliticisation ’ of Greece s Public Revenue Administration Radical Change and the Limits of Conditionality DionyssisDimitrakopoulos ArgyrisPassas DepartmentofPolitics DepartmentofInternational Birkbeck,UniversityofLondon EuropeanandAreaStudies London,UK PanteionUniversityofSocialandPolitical Sciences Athens,Greece ISBN978-3-030-23212-2 ISBN978-3-030-23213-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23213-9 ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2020 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthe materialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation, broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformation storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodology nowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Despite being classified as an advanced economy by virtue of its euro area membership, by all accounts Greece’s institutional capacity in the judicial process, tax administration, expenditure control, and statistical services was below that in practically any other European economy (Kopits 2016, 24) ‘Wespendalotoftimeontherevenueadministration,tryingtodragit out of the 1930s’ (statement made at a meeting held in London in January 2018 under the Chatham House rule) ‘We certainly cannot say that these people (i.e. the EU and IMF staff) came here to destroy paradise’ (interview, Athens, 9 November 2016) ‘I must say that, were it not for the Troika’s major pressure, it might have never materialised’ (interview, Athens, 2 June 2017) We dedicate this book to Katerina Papakonstantinou, Maria Zampara and, in particular, Alkis A. and Yiorgos A. Passas hoping that at least the latter two will experience Greece as a country where paying and collecting tax fairly will be the norm. If thathappens,itwillbeinnosmallpartdueto the reform that we examine in this book. Preface Whenwestartedworkingonthisproject,wehadnoideawewouldendupmakinga bookoutofit.Ourmuchmoretimidobjectivewastowriteanarticleforanacademic journalandeventhatfeltlikeabitofastretchfortwopoliticalscientistswhodonot normally write about public revenue administrations. What sparked our interest in thereformofGreece’spublicrevenueadministrationwasthefactthat,asPresident Obama’schiefofstaffrightlynoted,‘youneverwantaseriouscrisistogotowaste’, i.e.acrisis‘isanopportunitytodothethingsthatyouthinkyoucouldnotdobefore’ (Emanuel2008).AsanyonewhohasencounteredthemodernGreekstate’sappara- tuswouldtestify,attheonsetofthecrisisitwasindesperateneedforreform,butthe country’s public revenue administration in particular stood out in that respect. Having grown accustomed to reading, hearing or even experiencing stories about its legendary ineffectiveness, heavy-handedness, opacity and corruption (all of whicharesociopoliticalconstructs),coupledwithourdeeplyheldbeliefthatpaying and collecting tax fairly is first and foremost a basic civic duty, a matter of social justice—since none of the public goods that need protecting and none of the resources and opportunities that need to be redistributed in unequal societies can beprotected,fundedorredistributedwithouttaxjustice—wedecidedtotrytolook intoitbyparticipatingintheannualcompetitionforsmallresearchgrantsconducted by the Hellenic Observatory at the European Institute of the London School of EconomicsandPoliticalScience. We did so after reading the surprising (to us at least) news in the press that the Greek government was going to establish an independent public revenue authority thatwasmeanttooperateatarm’slengthfromthegovernmentoftheday.Tous,this soundedlikenothingshortofarevolutionsincewewereawareoftheGreekpolitical establishment’s aversion to genuinely independent authorities, the problems that extant authorities were facing, the academic literature on Greece’s limited reform capacityaswellasthepervasiveviewamongstGreeksthatacknowledgestheneed for deep reforms ‘because the country could not go on as it was’ as long as these reformsstartfromothersocialgroupsfirst. ix x Preface When we decided to participate in the Hellenic Observatory’s competition, we didsowith adegree oftrepidation that was duenotonly tothehighlycompetitive nature of the process. The reasons for our trepidation were threefold. First, we believe that independent authorities pose particular challenges to democracy. Detachment from the exigencies of the electoral cycle implies that voters are necessarilyasunwillingtohearunpopulartruthsbeingsaidasunwillingpoliticians vying for office are to tell them. Although it is true that far too many citizens in advancedliberaldemocracieseithertakedemocracyforgranted—astherampantrise of populism shows—or construe democracy only in terms of rights, we do not believethat theuseofindependentauthorities acrosstheboard isalwaysasneces- sary as their proponents purport it to be while they remain rather silent (often deafeninglyso)withregardtothematerialluresofthemarketaswellastheproblem of‘revolvingdoors’.Asforthemeaningofindependence,ifonetakesasociological perspective,onewillnoticethatinmanycasestheseniorofficialsoftheseauthorities haverathersimilarbackgroundsintermsofclass,education,gender,etc.tothoseof many leading politicians. The strength of isomorphism is significant, as are its pitfalls. One of the most significant pitfalls is the potential for blame avoidance. Independent authorities offer this potential especially in a country such as Greece where politicians (and senior officials) often show excessive aversion to the very ideaofresigningfromoffice. Second,shiftingthefocusofpoliticalaccountabilityfromintra-departmentalhier- archies to accountability to parliament poses particular challenges in the case of Greece since the Greek parliament is characteristically docile. Its key weakness, which isalso one that permeates the country’s entire political system, isaversion to evidence-baseddebates.Thisisunsurprisingsincegatheringandinterpretingevidence isacumbersomeandchallengingactivityandGreekparliamentariansarenotaccus- tomed to it. This is not due to the lack of means (itself a political construct). Their offices remain handsomely funded by the state budget. Rather, they are culturally keenerontheuseofslogans,asaremuchoftheGreekpressandbodypolitic.Thefinal reasonforourtrepidationwasourfear—basedonpastexperience—thattheinterview- intensivenatureofthisresearchprojectwouldbeunderminedbytherelativeabsence of the culture of research interview from large segments of both the political and administrative élite. On that front, and with only a handful of (anyway telling) exceptions,weendedupbeingpleasantlysurprised. Carryingoutthisresearchprojectwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithoutthefinan- cialsupportprovidedbytheHellenicObservatory.Wearegratefulforit.Wearealso gratefultoMsEvaKatakalou,doctoralcandidateatPanteionUniversityofSocialand Political Sciences, for the excellent research assistance that she has provided; the 34individualswhohaveagreedtobeinterviewedforthepurposeofthisprojectand for help with tracking down obscure documents; as well as Georgette Lalis, Nikos ErinakisandMichalisPsalidopoulosforthehelptheyhaveprovidedintrackingdown key officials. Our work has benefitted from the comments offered by Tryfon Alexiadis, Nikos Karavitis, Fragiskos Koutentakis, Georgette Lalis, Antonis Papayannidis,PhilipposSachinidis,CalliopeSpanou,HarryTheoharisandTheodore Tsekos during the presentation of an earlier paper at the Jean Monnet Chair’s Preface xi workshop on administrative reform in Greece at Panteion University, Athens, on 5 April 2017. We have also benefitted from the comments made by Dr Ali Burak Güven,ProfessorDeborahMabbett,ProfessorE.C.PageFBA,DrDavidStyanand ProfessorTheodoreTsekosinthecontextofthe‘bookclub’ofBirkbeck’sPolitics Department.Theusualdisclaimerapplies.DionyssisG.Dimitrakopoulosgratefully acknowledges the research funding and time off from routine duties granted by Birkbeck’s Politics Department while working on this project. We would also like to thank the team at Springer, especially Johannes Glaeser, for the professional handlingoftheproductionprocess. London,UK DionyssisDimitrakopoulos Athens,Greece ArgyrisPassas April2019 Contents 1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TaxCollectioninGreece:TheMagnitudeoftheProblem. . . . . . . . . . . 2 Greece’sPublicRevenueAdministrationattheOnsetoftheCrisis. . . . . 4 Greece’sLimitedReformCapacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ModelsofPublicRevenueAdministrations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 ThePuzzle,CoreArgumentandStructureoftheBook. . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2 Non-majoritarianInstitutions,ConditionalityandDomestic Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 TheConceptofDepoliticisation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 ThePurposeofNon-majoritarianInstitutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 NMIs,ExecutiveAgenciesandtheIssueofAccountability. . . . . . . . . . 39 Conditionality. . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . 42 TheLogicofConditionality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 ConditionalityandtheEuropeanUnion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3 TheFirstMoU:PiecemealChangeandExternalAssistance inConditionsofCrisis.. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . .. 59 TheOnsetoftheCrisis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 TheFirstMoUandtheReformoftheGreekPublicRevenue Administration:TimidAdHoceryinConditionsofCrisis. . . . . . . . . . . 61 TheProvisionofTechnicalAssistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 4 TheSecondMoU:ExternallyImposedChangeDespiteDomestic Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 TheIntroductionofSemi-Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 TheImplementationandLimitsofSemi-Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 ConcludingRemarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 xiii
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