The Decline of the Ritsuryo System: Hypotheses on Economic and Institutional Change

36 Pages·1.276 MB·English

by  Yamamura Kozo.

The Society for Japanese Studies
The Decline of the Ritsuryo System: Hypotheses on Economic and Institutional Change
Author(s): Kozo Yamamura
Source: Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 3-37
Published by: The Society for Japanese Studies
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/133435
Accessed: 25/12/2009 07:51
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sjs.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
The Society for Japanese Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of Japanese Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
KOZO YAMAMURA
The Decline of the
Ritsury6 System:
on Economic and Institutional
Hypotheses Change
This essay is an economic historian's attempt to analyze the Ritsuryo
economy-the economy of the period between the Taika Reform of
the mid-seventh century and the beginning of the tenth century.' This
analysis differs in several crucial ways from those made by Japanese
scholars because of the difference in analytical framework; the Japa-
nese scholars have a basically Marxist and institutionalist framework
in contrast to the analytical framework of this essay which is essen-
tially modem economic theory.2
1. This follows the periodization usually adopted by Japanese economic
historians. Though it does not affect our analysis, there is an ongoing debate
among Japanese specialists concerning the specific dates when the ritsu (penal
codes) and ryo (administrative codes) were written. Several scholars even
argue that the Taika Reform was a later fabrication (the so-called Taika
Kaishin kyoko-ron). For an excellent analysis of this debate, see Nomura
Tadao, Kenkyishi: Taika Kaishin (Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1973) which also
contains an up-to-date bibliography on the Ritsury6 period. The beginning of
the tenth century is chosen to mark the end of the Ritsury6 period because the
number of shoen began to increase visibly during the tenth century.
2. The basic analytical framework adopted in this essay is the theory of
institutional change which is based on modern (as opposed to Marxist) eco-
nomic theory. For the analytical basis of the theory and its application to the
economic history of medieval Europe and the United States, see Davis, L. E.
and North, D. C., InstitutionalC hange and American Economic Growth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); North, D. C. and Thomas,
R. P., The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1973); Cheung, Steven N. S., "Private Property Rights and Share-
cropping," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 76, No. 6 (November/
December, 1968); Cheung, Steven N. S., "The Structure of Contract and
the Theory of Non-Exclusive Resources," The Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 1970); Demsetz, Harold, "The Exchange and Enforce-
ment of Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 9 (October
1966).
3
4 Journal of Japanese Studies
Because the available English books on Japanese history provide
only limited descriptions of economic aspects of the period,3 a sub-
stantial part of this essay is devoted to a description of the Ritsury6
economy and the political changes which are pertinent in under-
standing the changes in the economy and economic institutions. Both
these descriptions and the explicit theoretical analyses on several
aspects of the economy and economic institutions attempt to show
that: (i) The Ritsury6 economic system was an outcome of the desire
of the political-military leaders to maintain a political equilibrium
and to assure that their economic base would be either enlarged or at
least maintained. (ii) The Ritsury6 economic system was inherently
unstable and it was gradually eroded because it was advantageous to
those who dominated the system. (iii) Various economic changes
including the disappearance of slaves and semi-free skilled labor, the
contractual arrangements adopted between the landholders and the
cultivators, and the methods of taxation were all "rational," i.e., the
best among the economic alternatives as judged within the framework
of modern economic theory.4 (iii) will be presented in an Appendix.
3. English books containing useful descriptions of the economic aspects
of this period are: Duus, Peter, Feudalism in Japan (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf Publishing Co., 1969); Hall, John W., Government and Local Power
in Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Hall, J. W., Japan:
From Prehistory to Modern Times (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1971);
Hall, J. W. and Mass, J. P., eds., Medieval Japan: Essays in Institutional History
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Sansom, George, A History of
Japan to 1334 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); and Toyoda
Takeshi, A History of Pre-Meiji Commerce in Japan (Kokusai Bunka Shin-
kokai, 1969).
4. Among the Japanese sources examined, the following were the most
useful: Egashira Tsuneharu, Nihon shoen keizaishi-ron (Yfihikaku, 1932);
Fujiki Kunihiko, Kodai 2, Nihon zenshi 3 (Tokyo University Press, 1971);
Harashima Reiji, Nihon kodai shakai no kiso kozo (Mirai-sha, 1969); Horie
Yasuzo, Nihon keizaishi gaiyo (Hirano Shob6, 1956); Hosokawa Kameichi,
Nihon jiin keizaishi-ron (Keimei-sha, 1930); Imamiya Shin, Handen shauju-sei
no kenkyu (Ryfigin-sha, 1944); Inoue Mitsusada et al., Iwanami koza-Nihon
rekishi 3: Kodai 3 (Iwanami Shoten, 1962); Ishimoda Sho, Chusei-teki sekai
no keisei (Tokyo University Press, 1957); lyanaga Teiz6, Narajidai no gozoku
to n6min (Shibun-do, 1956); Iyanaga Teizo, ed., Nihon keizaishi taikei I-
Kodai (Tokyo University Press, 1965); Kawane Yoshiyasu, Chusei hoken-sei
seiritsu shiron (Tokyo University Press, 1971); Kikuchi Yasuaki, Nihon kodai
tochi shoyu no kenkyi (Tokyo University Press, 1970); Murai Yasuhiko,
Kodai kokka kaitai katei no kenkyu (Iwanami Shoten, 1965); Murao Jir6,
Ritsuryo zaisei-shi no kenkyt (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1962); Noaki K6jiro,
Narach6 jidaishi no shomondai (Hanawa Shob6, 1968); Osaka Rekishi Gakkai,
ed., Ritsuryo kokka no kiso kozo (Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1961); Sakamoto Taro,
Yamamura: Ritsury6S ystem 5
The Ritsuryo System as OriginallyA dopted
During the early decades of the seventh century the throne (or,
more accurately,t he leading Yamato uji)5 was under strong pressure
to act if it was to maintaint he hegemonyi n what in fact was a con-
federation of uji. Disequilibratingp ressures which threatened the
hegemony were mounting because of the rising economic-hence
military-power of contending uji. Forced retreat from Korea had
weakened the position of the throne, and implicit in the rising of
T'ang China on the continent was a possible threat to the emerging
nation state.6T he choice of a course of action for the throne, how-
ever, was severelyl imited by two major constraints:( 1) Any action
adoptedb y the throne must not be so detrimentalt o the interests of
the uji as to tempt them to challenge the hegemony of the throne.
The uji could be expectedt o pay the price for continuedp eace only
if the price did not exceed the cost of establishinga new equilibrium.
(2) Duringt his period Japan was activelyi mportingC hinesec ulture
and emulatingt he model of T'ang China, then at the height of its
political strength.I t was, therefore,t o be expected that the only ad-
vanced model availablet o the Japanesew ould be adopted, changed
only as was necessaryt o maintaint he political equilibrium.
The declared goals of the Taika Reform, which initiated the
Ritsuryo system, were ambitious,a nd the most far-reachinga mong
them was the policy to change the landholdings ystem. The imperial
Kodai I, Nihon zenshi 2 (Tokyo University Press, 1970); Shimabara Reiji,
Kodai Nihon shakai no kiso k6oz (Mirai-sha, 1968); Shimizu Mitsuo, Jodai
no tochi kankei (Ito Shoten, 1944); Shiozawa Kimio, Kodai sensei kokka no
kozo (Ochanomizu Shobo, 1962); Takeuchi Riz6, Jiryo shoen no kenkyi (Unebi
Shob6, 1942); Takeuchi Riz6, Nihon hoken-sei seiritsu no kenkyfi (Yoshikawa
Kobunkan, 1955); Takeuchi Riz6 and Mori Katsumi, Nihonshi gaisetsu
(Hanawa Shob6, 1970); Takigawa Seijir6, Nihon dorei keizaishi (Toko Shoin,
1957); Takigawa Seijiro, Ritsuryo jidai no nomin seikatsu (Tok6 Shoin, 1969);
Takigawa Seijir6, Ritsury6 jidai no nomin seikatsu (T6ko Shoin, 1969); Torao
Toshiya, Handen Shuijuho no kenkyu (Yoshikawa K6bunkan, 1962); Yagi
Atsuru, Ritsuryo kokka seiritsu katei no kenkyu (Hanawa Shob6, 1968); and
Yasuda Motohisa, Nihon shoen-shi gaisetsu (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1957).
Also useful are Vols. 2, 3, and 4 of Nihon no rekishi published by Chiuo
Koronsha, i.e., Naoki K6jir6, Kodai kokka no seiritsu (1965); Aoki Kazuo,
Nara no miyako (1970); and Kitayama Shigeo, Heian-kyo (1970).
5. Uji could be translated into "lineage group" or "family," provided we
remain aware of the differences in uji and these possible translations. See Hall,
Government and Local Power, pp. 34-44.
6. A succinct discussion elaborating the observations made in this para-
graph is found in Nagahara Keiji, Nihon keizai-shi (Yuhikaku, 1970), pp.
24-26.
6 Journal of Japanese Studies
government declared that all rice land, both that already under culti-
vation and potentially arable land, now belonged to the central govern-
ment.7 The rights to cultivate the rice land were granted on the
following basis: A free male was granted two tan (about 0.3 acres)
at six years of age, an allotment which belonged to him as long as he
lived. Free females were allotted two-thirds of the amount given free
males (0.2 acres), and male and female slaves were granted two-
thirds of the amounts which free males and females received.8 The
conditions for receiving and returning the land were the same for
slaves and free women as for free males. The people in each house-
hold then pooled their land for the purpose of cultivation. Rice land
could not be bought or sold, although it was possible with special
permission of appropriate government officials to rent land out on
an annual basis or exchange it for the convenience of cultivation.9
The law governing these practices was called Handen-shiju-ho, i.e.,
the Land Allotment Law, and the plot given to each individual
under the law was called kubunden, literally, "mouth-share field."
To carry out the intent of the law, the government conducted
censuses of all households and surveyed all current and potential
paddy land. The surveys were carried out using the jori system
whereby the land was divided into squares of approximately half-a-
mile on each side, and then each side was further divided into six
equal widths to create 36 sub-blocks. A sub-block became one cho
and equaled ten tan.
Land used for residential and upland (non-rice) cultivation did
not fall within the province of the law. The only constraint imposed
on residential land was that it could not be bought or sold. The use
of upland was granted on a once-and-for-all basis with no regard to
7. This did not mean that the state claimed ownership of land, but that the
government declared its intention to have administrativec ontrol over and rights
to tax the revenues from the land. This view contrasts the view held by Imamiya
and Terao, both cited in footnote 4 above, who hold that the land belonged
to the government. Questions concerning theoretical ownership are not pursued
in this essay as they are not directly relevant to our economic analysis. See
Nakata Kaoru, "Ritsury6j idai no tochi shiyuiken,"K okka gakkai zasshi, Vol. 42,
(October 1928); Cornelius J. Kiley, "Property and Political Authority in Early
Medieval Japan," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1970; and
Akamatsu Toshihide, Chusei-kodai shakai keizaishi kenkya (Heirakuji Shoten,
1972), pp. 3-19 for a critical review of the views expressed by leading scholars
on this subject.
8. Slaves will be discussed in the Appendix. A good source on the origins
and legal definition of slaves is Yagi, pp. 274-302.
9. For further details concerning the legal conditions, see Imamiya, pp.
84-85.
Yamamura: Ritsuryo System 7
the composition or social status of a household. No mention of the
size of upland fields allotted to each household can be found in
the extant records other than that the size held by households tended to
differ from region to region. Upland could not be traded either, al-
though it could be rented out on an annual basis if permission was
obtained from appropriate government officials. In regions where the
climate permitted, the government either required or encouraged
the planting of mulberry and sumac trees on uplands. Given that
land could not be freely alienated, neither residential land nor upland
can be considered to have been bona fide private property.l0
Regulations pertaining to taxation were much more detailed.
Taxes were paid in rice, in kind (mostly in cloth), and in labor
(corvee for military service and a variety of other purposes). The
tax paid in rice (the tax on kubunden) was two sheaves (tsuka) and
two hands (tawari) per tan, that is, 2.2 sheaves. Since the median
yield per tan was estimated to have been about 40 sheaves, the tax
rate was approximately five per cent of the total yield. For more
productive land, some of which yielded as much as 50 sheaves, the
tax rate was closer to two to three per cent. Lower taxes were allowed
for persons with fields located in hills and valleys or with exceptionally
unproductive land. Because tax reductions were allowed for poor
land and because the land initially allotted was of better quality than
that allotted later, most Japanese scholars assess the average tax
burden at the beginning of the Ritsury6 period as about three per
cent.'1
The tax in kind was usually paid in cloth, a principal medium of
exchange during this period. The annual rate was one j] of course
silk per tan and 1.2 j] of coarse cloth per household. Although Japa-
nese scholars do not agree on the precise nature of the cloth or the
measurements, one can assume that "coarse silk" referred to higher-
quality cloth woven from the fiber of paper mulberry trees, and
"coarse cloth" referred to lower-quality cloth woven from inferior
plant fibers. We also know that one jo equaled ten shaku and one
shaku was roughly 30 square centimeters or about 12 square inches.12
Weaving this cloth became the task of women.13
10. The best source on the observations contained in this and the preceding
paragraph is lyanaga Teiz6, "Ritsury6-sei-teki tochi-shoyu" in Inoue et al.,
cited in footnote 4, pp. 33-78.
11. Takigawa, Ritsuryo jidai, pp. 267-269.
12. An excellent source for further discussion of taxes in kind and corvee
is Aoki Kazuo, "Ritsuryo zaisei" in Inoue et al., pp. 115-146.
13. Women were not free of corvee. They too were conscripted on an ad
8 Journal of Japanese Studies
Corvee,t he heaviest of the tax burdens,w as levied at the rate of
60 days per year on all able-bodiedm ales between 20 and 59 years
of age. Corvee labor was assigned to any task the prefectural
governors deemed necessary. Ten additional days of corvee were
levied, but this could be paid off at the rate of 2.6 shaku of coarse
silk per day. No such substitutionw as allowed for the 30 days of
corveer equiredf or publicw orks and transportationo f taxes (rice and
cloth) to the capital.T he usual corveeb urdeno n males thus addedu p
to 100 days annually.
Another type of corvee was military service. One out of every
three or four able-bodied males was selected for military training
which took one month a year for two to three years. Then, upon
completion of training, these men were assigneda s eji (soldiers
defendingt he capital), sekimori (defenderso f northernK yushu), or
soldierst o serve in the campaignso n the northernf ront. In addition,
two males per 50 householdsw ere draftedf or an indefinitep eriod of
time to work in governmentb ureaus or in some militaryc apacity.14
Elaboratec entrala nd local administrativae pparatusesw ere estab-
lished to administert he detailed provisionsc oncerningl andholdings
and taxation. Among the numerouso ffices created, the most impor-
tant in terms of an economic analysis of the Ritsuryo system were
those of kokuji (prefecturalg overnors) and gunji (district magis-
trates). The prefecturalg overnors,w ho numbered6 6 by the end of
the seventh century,w ere appointedb y the central governmentf or a
tenure of six years. The district magistrates,w ho numbered5 92 at
the end of the seventh century, were selected by the prefectural
governorsa nd served, at least in theory, at the pleasureo f the pre-
fectural governors.A lthough a few qualificationse xisted for district
magistratest, he prefecturalg overnorsw ere allowed a wide latitudei n
selectingt heir subordinates.
The Backgroundf or the Erosion of the System
From the beginning,t he Ritsuryos ystem as it functionedi n Japan
differedf rom what it was supposedt o have been in theory. In order
to carry out the Ritsury6 codes to the letter, the powerful uji and
potentiallyt roublesomeb ranchf amilies of the imperiall ineage would
have had to place all of theirl andholdings( tadokoro) and cultivators
hoc basis to serve as ladies-in-waitingo r to perform manual labor required by
the government. Hall, Japan, p. 58.
14. The source cited in footnote 12 and the same author's Nara no miyako,
pp. 212-229.
Yamamura: Ritsuryo System 9
(be) at the disposal of the central government. Few uji leaders would
have accepted such a demand and, being fully aware of this fact, the
imperial government did not attempt to enforce the Ritsuryo laws
strictly.
To ensure the support of potential rivals, the throne established
an elaborate official ranking system within which uji leaders were
accorded high ranks, and the politically stronger among them were
also appointed to high positions within the newly created bureaucracy.
As both the ranking system and administrative positions carried with
them large stipends, given in the form of rice land and of labor to
cultivate the land, it was unlikely that any of the major uji leaders or
members of the branch families of the imperial lineage suffered any
economic loss due to the adoption of the new system. Although there
is little historical evidence, it is unlikely that the land and the culti-
vators belonging to the major uji leaders were claimed by the throne
for purposes of redistribution. Also, for those uji leaders located in
regions distant from the capital, i.e., in the regions over which the
power of the throne did not reach or to which it extended only weakly,
the effect of the Ritsuryo system was only nominal at best and perhaps
nil. At this time the imperial forces yet had many campaigns to wage
before they could claim even two-thirds of what is present-day
Japan.15
For insight into the magnitude of the economic concessions which
the throne made to the uji leaders and the members of the branch
families of the imperial lineage, let us examine the stipends officially
granted for rank and office as codified in 701. The leaders (princes)
of the imperial branch families were ranked from first to fourth class
according to the theoretical order of the succession to the throne. The
15. While there is historical evidence indicating that much of the land
formerly held by the imperial lineage came under the administration of the
provincial governors, there is no historical record stating that the land belonging
to other leading uji was relinquished to the Ritsuryo government. Surviving
evidence shows that the tadokoro of the pre-Taika Reform continued to exist
after the Reform. For the historical evidence, see Takeuchi Rizo, ed., Tochi
seido-shi, 1 (Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1973), pp. 39-42. Takeuchi, despite the
evidence which he presents, argues that the tadokoro were handed over to
the Ritsury6 government during the fifty years following the Reform. Not to
believe that this was the case, Takeuchi argues, is "to agree with those who
believe that no Taika Reform took place," p. 42. There, however, is no reason
to equate the relinquishing of the tadokoro with the Taika Reform itself.
Furthermore, given what we know of the ascending power of the leading uji
within the Ritsury6 system, it is highly unlikely that they gave up their land
during the latter half of the seventh century.
10 Journal of Japanese Studies
princes of the first class received,b y virtue of their rank, 80 cho of
the best quality rice paddy, 800 householdst o cultivatet he paddies,
a total of 100 servantsa nd guards,a nd annuals tipendsi n cloth and
iron plows. Thought he stipendsd eclineda s rank fell, even a fourth-
rankedp rincer eceived4 0 cho of rice paddy, 300 households,a nd 40
servantsa nd guards.I f we remembert hat each free male receivedt wo
tan of kubunden,8 0 cho of rice land would have been sufficientt o
distributet o 400 males. In addition,a s most householdsw ere extended
rather than nuclear, 800 households would have contained at least
5,000 individualsa nd thus severalt housande ffectivec ultivators.N ot
only was the land granted tax-exempt, but each of the household
membersg iven to the princesr eceivedh is share of kubundena ccord-
ing to the establisheds chedule.
The head and the leadingm emberso f uji receivedr anks ranging
from those carryings tipendso f 80 cho of rice paddy, 300 households
(increasedt o 600 in 706), and 100 servantsa nd guards,t o the lower
ranks coming with less of each type of stipend.W hile it was possible
to obtain the lucrativeh igh rankingsb y passing prescribede xamina-
tions, these were in fact held by personsb oastingl ineagesf rom one of
the major uji. To assure that the highest ranks were monopolizedb y
the major uji, a system known as the on'i (literally, a system of
"shadowr anks") was put into effect.H oweveri ncompetenta son or a
grandsono f a high-rankingp erson was, he was assuredo f beginning
his climb up the bureaucraticla dderf rom a relativelyh igh rank, one
which he would have found difficultt o attaini f here were to compete
by examinationo r achievementT. ypically,t he son of a man possessing
first-ranks tatusw ould begin his climb at the fifth rank and the grand-
son of such a man would begin at the sixth rank.S imilarlyt he starting
rank of sons and grandsonsw as correspondinglylo wer if their fathers
or grandfatherps ossessedr anksb elow the first.16
There also were handsome stipends accompanyingo ffices, al-
thougho nly a small minorityo f personsi n the higherr anks and some
princes benefited from them. The position of the First Minister
(Dajo-Daijin) carrieda stipendo f 40 cho of rice land, 3,000 house-
holds, and 300 guardsa nd servants;a nd the positionso f the Ministers
of the Right and the Left each carried 30 cho of rice land, 2,000
households,a nd 200 servantsa nd guards.T he stipendsf or the Privy
Councillors (Dainagon) were lower, but were still substantialw ith
20 cho of rice land, 800 households,a nd 100 servantsa nd guards.A ll
16. For a table specifying the relationships between the rank held by
grandfather,f ather, and son within the on'i system, see Aoki, Nara no miyako,
p. 142.
Yamamura: RitsuryoS ystem 11
income of princesa nd nobles in the first three ranksw as tax-exempt;
in addition, lesser nobles received exemptions from corv6e and a
partialr eductioni n other taxes.
In brief, the throne'sc oncessionst o the nobles consisted of eco-
nomic rewardsi n the forms of various stipends,t ax exemptions,a nd
other privilegess uch as the "shadowr ank" system, preferentialc on-
siderationi n the grantingo f promotions,a nd even a speciall egal status
wherebyn obles received little or no penalty in the event they com-
mitteda minorc rime.A nd while it was not mentionedi n the Ritsury6
codes, the rice land grantedt o the princesa nd the nobles was the best
the throneh ad to offer. The memberso f the imperiall ineage and the
leaders of the major uji undoubtedlyw ere de facto nobles in the pre-
Taika period, but they now became de jure nobles whose economic
rewardsw ere sanctionedb y the system which they helped to create
and maintain.
At the other end of the economic and social spectrum,t he life
of the kubundenc ultivatorsw as extremelyd ifficult.T his can be shown
easily by the following calculation. On the basis of extant census
records and other official tax registers, we know that the modal
household size was around ten persons. A typical household con-
sisted of three adult males, five adult females (adult in this case
meaning over six years of age, i.e., entitled to kubunden), and two
infants.T he total kubundenr eceivedb y such a householdw ould have
been 122/3 tan. The total expected rice yield from this amount of
paddy would be 398 sheaves if we assume that superior, medium,
inferior,a nd poor rice paddies, respectivelyy ielding 50, 40, 30, and
15 sheaves, were distributedi n the ratio of 1:2:2:2, as stipulatedi n
the Ritsuryoc odes.
Of the total yield of 398 sheaves, 25.33 sheavesm ust be deducted
from the disposablei ncome of the cultivatorsb ecause, accordingt o
several extant records,a bout two sheaves were requiredt o seed each
tan for the next planting. This left the household with an amount
equivalentt o about 18.6 koku of semi-polishedr ice. Since one koku
in Ritsuryom easurementw as equivalentt o .404 koku in Tokugawa
measurementt, his was roughlye quivalentt o 7.528 Tokugawak oku,
or 37.36 bushels. Even if we ignore the three to five per cent tax,
this amount was, as Takigawa has shown by using records of the
minimumr equiremento n a per diem basis for convicts, conscripted
soldiers, and governmento fficials, sufficientt o "keep hunger away
from the household for only three-fifths of the year."17
17. For the observationsc ontainedi n this and precedingp aragraphss, ee
TakigawaR, itsuryoj idai, pp. 77-80. The quotationi s from p. 79.