Table Of Content

Mladen Dolar, Alenka Zupanõiõ, and Slavoj Zi2ek, edito.t The Puppet ond the Dwarf:The Perverse Core of Christionity, by SÌavoj ZiZek The Shortest Shadow: Nietzschei PhiÌosophy of the Two, by AÌenta Zupanèiõ k Oedipus OnÌine? Siting Freud ofter Freud, by Jerry Aline Flieger Interrogation Mochine: Loibcch ond NSK, by AÌexei Monroe The PoroÌÌaxView, by Slavol Ziãek AVoice and Nothing More, by Mladen DoÌar Subjectivity ond Otherness:Á PhiÌosophicoÌ Reading of Loccn, by Lorenzo Chiesa The Odd One In: On Comedy, by AÌenka Zupanõiõ The Monstrosity ol Chiist: Pcrodox or Dio.lectic? by SÌavoj 2iZek and John MiÌbank, edited Ìry Creston Davis Interface Fantosy: A Locanicn Cyborg Ontology, by André Nusselder Laccn ot the Scene, by Henry Bond Loughter: Notes on c Pcssion, by Anca ParmÌescu AlÌ for Nothing: Hcmlet! Negotivity, by Andrew CutrofeÌÌo The TroubÌe with Pleasure: DeÌeuze cnd PsychoonoÌysis, by Aaron Schuster Whtrt k Sex? by Aìenka Zupanõiõ Liquidction World: On the Árt of living AbsentÌy, by Alexi Kukuljevic Incontinence of theVoid: EconomiccÌ-PhilosophiccÌ Spondrels, by Slavol Züek The Dosh-The Other Side of Absolute Knowing, by Rebecca Comal,and Frank Ruda THE DASH-THE OTHER SIDI OF ABSOLUTE KNOWING Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda THE MIT PRES;S CAMBRIDGE, MASS,ACHUSETTS LONDON, ENGLAND @ zor8 Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology AÌÌ rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any eÌectronic or mechanical means (incÌuding photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrievaÌ) without permission in \ niting from the pubÌisher. This book was set in Joanna MT Pro by Toppan Best,ser Premedia Limited. Printed and bound in the United States ofAmerìca. Library of Congress CataÌoging-in-PubÌication Data is available. ISBN: 978-o-262-S3S3S 9 ro98765432r CONTE NTS Series Foreword INTRODUqTION: HEGEL To THE LETTER PART I: FIRST TIME AS PHENOMENOLOGY, SECOND TIME AS ... LOGTC? 9 ÍóKANT BROUGHT TO HIS SENSES'' í1 2 A TALE OF TWO BOOKS 29 THE DASH, OR HOW TO DO THINGS WITH SIGNS 53 PART II: PUNqTUATIoNS oF ABSOLUTE KNOWING 63 4 HEGEL'S LAST WORDS 65 Rebecca Comay HEGEL'S FIRST \,vORDS a7 Frank Ruda EPILOGUE: THE POINT Is To LosE IT l07 Abbreviations ofWorks by Hegel IÌ3 Notes I15 BibÌiography r57 Index 173 SIRIES FOREWORD A short circuit occurs when there is a faulty connection in the network- faulty, of course, from the standpoint of the network's smooth íunctioning. Is not the shock of short-circuiting, therefore, one of the best metaphors for a criticaÌ reading? Is not one of the most effective critical procedures to cross wires that do not usuaÌly touch: to take a major classic (text, author, notion) and read it in a short-clrcuiting way, through the lens of a "minor" author, text, or conceptual apparatus ("minor" should be understood here in Deleuze's sense: not "of Ìesser quality," but marginalized, disavowed by the hegemonic ideoÌogy, or dealing with a "lower," less dignified topic) ? If the minor reference is welÌ chosen, such a procedure can lead to insights which compÌetely shatter and undermine our common perceptions. This is what Marx, among others, did with philosophy and religion (short-circuiting phllosophicaÌ speculation through the lens of political economy, that is to say, economic speculation); this is what Freud and Nietzsche did with morality (short-circuiting the highest ethical notions through the lens of the unconscious libidinal economy) . What such a reading achieves is not a simple "desublimation," a reduction of the higher intellectuaÌ content to its Ìower economic or Ìibidinal cause; the aim of such an approach is, rather, the inher ent decentering of the interpreted text, which brings to light its "unthought," its disavowed presuppositions and consequences. And this is what "Short Circuits" \ /ants to do, again and again. The under- Ìying premise of the series is that Lacanian psychoanalysis is a prìviÌeged instrument of such an approach, whose purpose is to illuminate a standard text or Ìdeoìogical formation, making it readable in a totalÌy new way- the long history of Lacanian interventions in philosophy, religion, the arts (from the visual arts to the cìnema, music, and literature), ideoÌogy, and pol itics justifies this premise. This, then, is not a new series of books on psychoanalysis, but a series of "connections in the Freudian field"-of short o É, oì Lacanian interventions in art, phiÌosophy, theology, and ideology. "Short Cir- IÉrl cuits" intends to revive a plactice of reading which confronts a classic text, oL author, or notion with its own hidden presuppositions, and thus reveals its tg, disavowed truth. The basic criterion for the texts that wilÌ be published is that E they eÍfectuate such a theoretical short cilcuit. After reading a book in this !,t tì series, the reader should not simply have learned something new: the point is, rather, to make him or her aware of another---disturbing-side of something he or she knew all the time. Sìavo1 ZiZek INTRODUCTION: HEGEL TO THT LETTER This book works with a set of basic propositions that are arÌ interreÌated. First: If you want to modernìze Hegei-to retrieve Heger as a postcriticaÌ, profane thinker (that is, someone not onÌy aÌert to the contingencies of sociaÌ and historicaÌ exisrence but equipped and motlvated to intervene in these).- you sooner or Ìarer have to face the monster.you've got to take seriousÌy the most embarrassingÌy grandiose moment in the system, the point at which it,s alÌ too tempting ro srart skimming, srarr apologizing, or simpÌy put the book down: absoÌute knowing. HegeÌ's critics, from Kierkegaard onward, have stopped revÌling yHoeug ewÌi'ss ha)b: siot Ìuswtea ÌiÌdoewasÌ icsomn tainsg ae npchieilso,s oitp shmy oothfe irdse snintigt'yeu rv(aeorirrti eosf, "it" *c.arnrcre,l,s, ,o u,tf mtimaex , oitf cthoen ssigynstse mhi sisto trhicuasr tshuef femrionmg eton t thoef lstÌsa umgohstetr teb"rerinbcÌhe orfe hgirsetsosrifo.ntn: ea bcsno_- ÌÌrte knowing is an updated form of Stoicism-an urtimate indifference to the concrere worÌd. such indirference is expressed by phil0sophy,s principred disengagement from poÌiticaÌ Ìife in the wake of the French Revorution and its subsequent sequestration as a "priesthood apart,,,-the reslgnation crys_ talÌized in the infamous image of the owÌ of Minerva. HegeÌ teÌÌingÌy ends the Phenomenology with the religious gesture of sacrifice:we rearn in the end that we _hav1 to let things go. HegeÌ might have been the one phiÌosopher who explicitÌy did not reÌl us how to .h.ng. the worÌd. H" p.o-.,ig",.a rro he refused to "give instruction as to what the world ought to be.','The "agv"orw.aeud, aim of his phiÌosophy was ro grasp its own rime in thought. Jean HyppoÌite remarked on the shift that occurs with the move into the tshpeÌr epreh eonfo rmeÌeignioolno giny tthuern psÀ einnormo eano nloogyu:m ween oreÌaovgey ,a lra p rheevneoÌamtieonna obf ewhhinadt aÌiensd behind and beyond appearances.3 The science oitogic is expÌicitÌy a.Àrr.a ., the "exposition of God os he is ìn his eternoÌ essence before the creotion of noture ancl of z 9 Fo o finite spirit"l-an exposition of a moment belore time, a timeless pastness of lo alÌ the categories constitutive of the worÌd and thought. Hegel thus performs a oÈ megaÌomaniac transgression of Kant's prohibition: he presents us with every- F thÌng needed to think everythìng that is, was, and will ever be. We are invìted = to think what God thought before he created the world-we become prÌ\T to a world without us-a privilege that, however, onÌy forces us to give up any idea of changing the worÌd we do have (for we couÌd not but rely on the categories that are permanently constitutive of this world and that establlsh its necessity). But thÌs form of absoÌute knowing, as ScheÌÌing obiected, gives a monstrous precedence to logic, not onÌy over the workings of human history, but also over nature, even over the nature that unconsciously works inside aÌl of us (a point Kierkegaard wìiÌ also emphasize) . This is an abbreviated balance sheet of the conceit that stands at tÌle center of Hegel's thought-a claim so exaggeratedly absolute it seems írredeemabÌe Íbr any form of contemporary thÌnking. Given this historical consensus, the contemporary state of Hegel's recep- tion is peculiar. For the generalized disparagement of absolute knowing no Ìonger entaiÌs a dismissal of Hegel's thought altogether, as it did for most of the Ìast two centuries.s The current situation rather bears curious similar- ities with the situatíon described by Friedrich EngeÌs, who wrote apropos of Feuerbach's interventÌon in the immediate post-HegeÌian aftermath that "everyone became instantly a Feuerbachian."6 HegeÌ surprì.singly seems to have become the Feuerbach of the twenty-first century. Today, ignoring the absoÌute bone in the throat of knowledge, everyone has become a Hegelian. Having been cured of his metaphyslcaÌ sickness, Hegel has suddenly become compatible with an unexpected variety of contemporary phiÌosophical proi- ects. From radical theoÌogy to Anglo-American pragmatism, from liberaÌ democratic theory to radical anarchism, from speculative realism to psycho- anaÌysis, a plethora of diverging positions have set out to prove that Hegel was actuaÌÌy not so bad. He was Ìess teleological, Ìess totaÌity-obsessed, Ìess reac- tionary, less nationalist, less patriarchal, less warmongering, Iess monarchical, less contradiction-fetishizing, less subÌation-crazy-and not even aÌways off the wall ln his Ìogical deduction of the number of existing planets (seven!) in the solar system./ Even Hegel's un-owl-of-Minerva-ish geopolitical prophe- cies have proved to be not so outÌandish (for example, his description of the impending gÌobal hegemony of the United States) ... Is this book another such rescue attempt?Yes and no. Here's our gambÌe: the onÌy way to provide a rìgorously nonmetaphysical renderlng of Hegel is by affirming rn'hat is normalÌy taken to be HegeÌ's most moribund metaphysi- caÌ baggage. What is usuaÌly regarded as the "mystical sheÌÌ" of the HegeÌian system turns out to be its most rational kerneÌ. Instead of reining in the Hege- lian enterprise-whether by retreating to a critical transcendental (broadÌy epistemoÌogicaÌ) standpoint or by embracing his aÌÌ-round friendÌiness as a theorist of recognition, his compatibiiity with ÌiberaÌ democracy, his contri- butions to human rights, or his attunement to singuÌarity and arterity--our intention is rather to push Hegel's project to its rimirs. one must unapoÌo_ geticaÌÌy exaggerate what seems most irredeemable: it is at the extremities of Hegel's system that the points of resistance are found. we take Hegel,s radlcalism to be located at the point where his thought is usuaÌÌy taken to regress most' Far from serving up a sopÌristicated recycÌing of some ver- sion of precritÌcaÌ rationaÌist metaphysics, it's preciseÌy the cã.rcept of abso_ lute knowing that estabÌishes HegeÌ's contemporary credentiaÌs. To rocate this kerneÌ is to retrieve a countercurrent that wirl redeem the specuÌatlve promise of pragmatism agalnst its most vocal proponents-that is, praxis itseÌf, second (and this directly folÌows): you can'r sever rhe phenomenoìogy oÍ spirit from the scìence of rogic. TÌre infamous Abgeschrokenheir of the phenomeïology, its cÌosure or compÌetion, is not onry sustained and eÌucidated by the passage ro the logic but aÌso opens it up in startÌing directions. unÌike standard artempts to Ìink rhe Phenomenology ro the rogic (or ro uncoupÌe them), our srarring poinr is tÌre folÌowing: the rogic does nor so much stabiÌize, authorize, or ground the Phenomenoiogy, aìthough it elucidares or ilÌuminates it. rts funcrion is not to provide the PhenomenoÌogy witÌr some klnd of rationar scaffording or ro sup_ pÌy the hermeneutic key to its interpretatlon. And for this reason, Lo'g oth_ ers' it cannot be harnessed either to a neo-Kantìan agenda (for exampre, as an expÌication of the transcendentaÌ rures governing our historicaÌÌy evoÌv_ ing epistemic practices) or to a neopragmatist one (a crarification or,,mak_ ing expÌicit" of the impÌicit commitments sustaining our ongoing ranguage games) These Ìast rwo agendas, rhe neo-Kanrian and th. ,r.Ç.ugLatÌsr, are surprisingÌy compatibÌe and have even come to coalesce in recent HegeÌ schoÌarship. Nor does the rogic represent an unfortunate regression from the "thoroughgoing skepticism"u of ihe phenomenorogy ro a prelriticaÌ, dogmatic metaphysics. it does not speak of or from the perspective of an ontotheoÌogi- cal plenum where thought coaguÌates o. .op.,Ì.,", with being. It cannot be peeled away from rhe phenomenoÌogy Ìike -yr,i."Ì flotsam o. riegated to the basement of a iong-discarded tradition. And so too conversely: the phenomenoÌ_ ogy cannot be jettisoned from the rogic as some kind of positivist or historicaÌ excrescence or set aside as a propaedeutic protocol that can be discontinued once one has arrived at a pÌace caÌled absolute knowing. A traditionaÌ view of HegeÌ's rogìc (usuarÌy presenred as a criticism) is that Hegel is not only expounding rhe erernar raws of reaÌity but thereby tíyirrg to prove the omnipresence and omnipotence of reason. contemporary critics of this grandiose vlsion sometimes attempt to rehabiÌitate hrs iogic-to rescue the logic from its own "meraphysicai" carapace-by arguing instead that the